Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

The third conclusion is ¹: It is necessary that the hope of future beatitude be caused in us through grace.

I. It is proved first from the fact that charity and faith are caused in us through grace. And this proceeds under a twofold head: namely, from the fact that hope precedes charity, and from the fact that the confirmation of hope follows charity. For in both ways it follows that grace, which is the cause of charity and of faith, is also the cause of hope: because, as was said above ², that which is the cause of something by way of a natural sequence originating from it, is also the cause of that which precedes it; and likewise, that which is the cause of something is also the cause of that which naturally follows upon it.

Therefore, from the first head it is argued as follows. It is caused in man through sanctifying grace that he loves God on account of Himself. Therefore it follows that through it man attains hope concerning God. — The consequence is proved. Because by the fact that someone hopes for good from another, a way is opened for man to love him according to himself: namely, by willing good to him even if nothing should come to him therefrom. — But this is proved: because, since the love that is toward others arises in man from the love that is toward himself, it is necessary that man, by the fact that he is affected toward his own good, be brought to the point of being affected toward the good of another.

From the second head, however, it is argued as follows. Through grace man is so constituted a lover of God according to the affect of charity that he is also instructed through faith that he is pre-loved by God, as is had in 1 John 4. Therefore it follows from the gift of grace that man has hope concerning God. — The consequence is proved. Because, since friendship has many consequent utilities, although it does not exist on account of one's own utility, it is necessary, when someone loves another and knows himself to be loved by him, that he have hope concerning him.

2. For the evidence of this reasoning, it must be considered, from the doctrine of St. Thomas, IIa IIae, q. 17, a. 8, and De Virtut., qu. de Spe ³, a. 3, that since love is twofold—namely, imperfect love, by which one loves something not on account of itself, but so that its good may come to oneself; and perfect love, by which someone is loved according to himself—hope belongs to the first love, since he hopes who intends to obtain something; but to charity, which adheres to God according to Himself, belongs the second love. And because in the way of generation the imperfect precedes the perfect, but in the way of perfection and form the perfect is naturally prior to the imperfect: therefore it was fittingly said that, by the fact that someone hopes for good from another, the way is prepared for loving him according to himself; and that from charity man is confirmed in hope, namely, as from what is prior naturally and according to perfection.

II. Secondly. From grace man is constituted a lover of God. Therefore there is caused in him a desire for union with God, according to what is possible. But faith, which is caused by grace, declares that the union of man with God according to perfect fruition is possible. Therefore the desire for divine fruition is also caused by grace and by love. Therefore so is the hope of obtaining future beatitude. — The first consequence is proved. Because in every one who loves there is caused a desire to be united to his beloved as much as is possible. — The last, however: because the desire for any thing troubles the mind of the one desiring unless there be present hope of attaining it.

Note that the foundation of this reasoning is that love and faith are caused by grace. From these two, moreover, is caused the hope of obtaining divine fruition: from love, indeed, insofar as the desire for possible union with God is caused by it; but from faith, insofar as through it such a union, which is according to perfect fruition, is shown to be possible.

Thirdly. In the progression by which we tend toward the desired beatitude as toward an ultimate end, many difficult things threaten to be endured, since virtue, through which we tend toward it, is concerned with difficult things. Therefore, so that man might tend more lightly and promptly toward beatitude, it was necessary to apply to him the hope of obtaining it. — The consequence is proved. Because in those things that are ordered to a desired end, if any difficulty should arise, hope of attaining the end brings solace, as is evident in one desiring health.

Fourthly. Through grace man is directed toward the ultimate end. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is proved. Because, since no one is moved toward an end to which he judges it to be impossible to attain, in order that someone may proceed toward an end, it is necessary that he be affected toward it as possible to be had. And this is the affect of hope.

For the evidence of this last statement, it must be considered, from the doctrine of St. Thomas in the questions cited above, that hope belongs to the appetite, because it tends toward the good as toward an object, and the good is the object of the will. For to hope is a certain movement of the appetitive power tending toward an arduous, possible good, but one to be attained with difficulty ⁴. On this account it was well said here that to be affected toward an end as possible to be had is the affect of hope.

The conclusion is confirmed by the authority of 1 Peter 1, He has regenerated, etc.; and Romans 8, By hope, etc.

III. Concerning the aforesaid, a doubt arises. For it seems that grace does not precede faith, charity, and hope as being in some way their cause, as was shown in the preceding ⁵: but rather that grace follows upon these. For, as St. Thomas shows in Ia IIae, q. 113 ⁶, and De Verit., q. 28 ⁷, for the justification of the ungodly there is required a movement of free choice toward God according to faith and charity and hope, as a disposition for the reception of grace. But a disposition precedes the form. Therefore the aforesaid precede grace.

2. For the evidence of this, it must be considered that in this place St. Thomas intends to posit the order of grace to the aforesaid virtues which belongs to them per se, but not the order which belongs to them per accidens, by reason of the condition of the subject. But that grace is infused into an adult man existing in sin, and consequently one to whom it belongs to prepare himself for grace through an act of free choice, is per accidens; since also in a non-adult grace is infused through baptism without the preparation and disposition of free choice. Therefore it is accidental to grace that the acts of those virtues be compared to it by way of a kind of disposition and preparation. But it belongs per se to grace that it be the root and foundation of those virtues, and in some way their form: and consequently that it precede them in the order of nature, just as the essence of the soul precedes its powers. And therefore grace is here posited as preceding those virtues in the order of nature: and it is false that a movement of free choice is per se a disposition for grace.

3. Yet nevertheless, because even in an adult sinner, while he is justified, grace and the aforesaid virtues, which are called theological, are infused in the same instant, it is necessary also to investigate the order of nature among them. Where it must be noted, from the doctrine of St. Thomas in De Verit., q. 28, a. 8, that the order of nature can be considered in a twofold way among them: namely, according to the ratio of material cause, in which order the imperfect is prior to the perfect, as being closer to matter; and according to the order of formal cause, in which order that which is more formal and more perfect is prior. In the first way, the movement of free choice naturally precedes the infusion of grace, just as a material disposition precedes the form; but in the second way, grace precedes the movement of free choice. Just as the disposition which necessitates to the form, accompanying it, in natural things in some way precedes the substantial form in the genus of material cause, insofar as it holds itself on the part of matter; but on the part of the formal cause, it is conversely, because the substantial form perfects both the matter and the material accidents.

IV. But a doubt arises. For St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 113, a. 8, ad 2, speaking of the movement of free choice insofar as it is a disposition for grace, says that in the order of nature it precedes the obtaining of grace, but follows the infusion of grace. Here, however, it has been said, according to his mind, that it precedes the infusion of grace.

It is answered that there is no contradiction in the words of St. Thomas, if they be diligently considered. For we can speak of the infusion of grace in a twofold way. In one way, as it holds itself on the part of the agent only, and is distinguished from the motion of the patient, which is called the reception of grace, in that way in which action is formally distinguished from passion; in another way, as it holds itself on the part of the patient: just as heating can be taken for the action of the one heating alone, and it can be taken for the passion of the thing heated, or for the reception of heat. If it is taken in the second way, thus the infusion of grace follows the movement of free choice in the order of nature: and in this sense we have spoken above. But if it is taken in the first way, thus it precedes: and in this sense he speaks in the Prima Secundae. — In other words, it can be said that these can be considered in a twofold way. In one way, on the part of the agent: and thus the infusion of grace precedes, because it is prior for an action to proceed from the agent than for any disposition, especially one existing simultaneously with the form, to be received in the mobile subject. In another way, on the part of the mobile subject: and thus the infusion of grace follows, because by nature it is prior for the subject to be disposed to the form than to receive the form.

2. That this, moreover, is according to the mind of St. Thomas is clear from his words, in which he says that the disposition of the subject precedes the reception of the form in the order of nature, yet follows the action of the agent, through which also the subject itself is disposed. And therefore the movement of free choice precedes the obtaining of grace, but follows the infusion of grace. For it is clear that in these words St. Thomas assumes that by one action grace and the disposition for it are infused; and that he takes the infusion of grace for the action alone by which God infuses grace, which naturally precedes both the disposition of the subject and the reception of the form, just as action naturally precedes passion. And thus he considers their order on the part of the agent when he says that the infusion of grace precedes the disposition of the subject and the movement of free choice. But when he says that the disposition of the subject and the movement of free choice precede the reception of grace, it is certain that he speaks of the infusion of grace on the part of the recipient; and that he considers the order of disposition and form on the part of the mobile or receptive subject, in which the disposition for the form is naturally received prior to the form itself. Whence it is clear that the intention of St. Thomas in the Prima Secundae does not disagree with those things which he says in Qq. de Veritate, and which we have noted above: namely, that according to the order of material cause, the movement of free choice precedes the infusion of grace, which in the Prima Secundae he calls the reception of grace; but according to the order of formal cause, the infusion of grace, namely that which designates the action, precedes the movement of free choice.