Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

After St. Thomas has shown what grace is, he consequently intends to show what effects accompany it¹. Concerning this, however, he does two things: first, he determines the effects of sanctifying grace; second, the effects of the divine gratuitous will which are called graces freely given, ch. 154.

As to the first, he sets down three conclusions: the first in this chapter; the second, in the following chapter; the third, in ch. 153.

I. The first is: Through the help of sanctifying grace, man attains this, namely that he loves God: understand, with the love of charity, by which God is loved as the object of supernatural beatitude.

And he argues first thus. The proper effect of divine love in man seems to be that he love God. Therefore, from sanctifying grace this results in man², that he loves God. — The antecedent is proved. Because this is chief in the intention of one who loves, that he be loved in return by the beloved: since the effort of the lover tends especially to this, that he draw the beloved to love him. — But the consequence is proved: because sanctifying grace is the effect of divine love in man.

It must be noted that, although both grace and the love of God are here said to be the effect of divine love, love is nevertheless called its proper effect: because it is the first and principal thing that God intends through his love. For grace is, as it were, the intrinsic effect of divine love, and immediate to it: because by the name of divine love, by which God specially loves man, there is imported both the act of loving itself and grace, which formally makes man pleasing and beloved to God. But the love of man, by which we love God, is that on account of which God imparts grace to us: because he gives us grace to the end that we may be elevated to the love of him. And therefore love is the principal thing intended in this life through the collation of grace.

Secondly. The ultimate end, to which man is brought through the help of divine grace, is the vision of God through his essence, which is proper to him, and is communicated to man by God. Therefore man cannot be brought to this end unless he be united to God through conformity of will, which is the proper effect of love. Therefore through sanctifying grace man is constituted a lover of God. — The first consequence is proved. Because for those who have one end, there must be some union insofar as they are ordained to the end: as is evident in citizens, and in soldiers. — But the second: because through grace man is directed to the end communicated to him by God.

It must be observed, from the teaching of St. Thomas, I-II, q. 28, a. 2, that in the love of friendship, the lover considers the goods or evils of the friend as his own, and the will of the friend as his own: so that he seems to suffer goods or evils, as it were, in his friend. And on this account it is said in IX Ethic. and II Rhet. that it belongs to friends to will the same things, and to grieve and rejoice over the same thing. For this reason it is well said here that conformity of will is the proper effect of love, namely of that which pertains to friendship.

Thirdly. The principal perfection of the affect is love. Therefore the principal effect of sanctifying grace is that man love God. — The antecedent is proved by this sign, that every movement of the affect is derived from love: as is evident by running through them all. — But the consequence is proved: because, since the end and the good is the proper object of the affect, it is necessary that through sanctifying grace, which directs man to the ultimate end, man's affect be principally perfected.

It must be noted that it should not be understood that the affect must be perfected by grace as though grace were a form and perfection existing in the will: but because there must originate from it love, which is the first perfection of the affect, as from that through which man is originally and fundamentally directed to the ultimate end.

Fourthly. Sanctifying grace is a certain form in man through which he is ordained to the ultimate end, which is God. Therefore through it man attains the likeness of God. Therefore through it he is made a lover of God. — The first consequence is proved. Because the form through which a thing is ordained to some end assimilates that thing in a certain way to the end: as is evident in gravity.

It must be noted that St. Thomas does not say that the form assimilates the thing simpliciter to the end, but in a certain way: because between them there is not properly a likeness, which implies an agreement in form; but there is a certain likeness of proportion, insofar as the form is proportioned to inducing the end, and thus the end is in some way virtually contained in it.

Fifthly. As is clear from what has been said, man's operations must become more perfect from grace. Therefore it is necessary that through it the love of God be established in us. — The consequence is proved. Because for the perfection of an operation it is required that one act constantly and promptly. But this is done especially by love, through which even difficult and heavy things seem light.

It is confirmed by the authority of the Apostle, Rom. 5, The charity of God etc.; and Jn. 14, He that loveth me etc.

II. For the understanding of the above-mentioned conclusion, it must be considered that, when man is said through grace to be made a lover of God, this is not to be understood as though grace were a form formally causative of the love of God, in the way in which the act of justice is elicited through the habit of justice; nor even because it is properly productive, effectively, of the charity by which God is loved by us: but because it naturally precedes the habit of charity and is presupposed by it; and because, according to the divine ordination, charity inseparably accompanies it, and results from it by a kind of natural concomitance, just as a proper passion accompanies its subject. Hence grace can be said to be the cause of charity in the way in which, among essentially ordered effects, the second of which, namely, presupposes the first, the first effect is called the cause of the second ones, by way of a kind of natural resultance proceeding from it: — this, however, is not properly to be an efficient cause, but improperly. Or even to be an instrument of the principal agent, producing all those effects together according to duration, but with a certain order according to nature. On this account St. Thomas did not propose that sanctifying grace is the cause of the love by which we love God: but that through the help of divine grace man attains this, namely that he loves God ³. Which is the same as to say that charity follows upon grace by a natural and necessary concomitance, according to the order of divine providence. — The same must be said of faith and hope, of which there is discussion below ⁴.