Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

After St. Thomas has shown that a certain divine help is necessary for us to attain beatitude, which we cannot merit by our own works, he wishes to explain what that help is ¹. Regarding this, however, he does two things: first, he shows by what name it is called; second, what it is ².

I. As to the first, he says that the said help is named grace, on account of two things. First, because it is given freely (gratis), and without preceding merits of one's own. Which reason is touched upon in Rom. 11.

Secondly, because by this help man is made pleasing (gratus) to God by a certain special prerogative: inasmuch as, besides the love by which God loves every creature by willing and working the being and perfection of every creature, a special character of divine love is considered toward those to whom He extends help for the attainment of the supernatural good, namely the fruition of Himself, as is shown in Eph. 1; for someone is said to be pleasing (gratus) to another because he is beloved by him. Hence also he who is loved by someone is said to have his favor (gratia).

2. For the evident understanding of this, it must be considered, from the teaching of St. Thomas, II Sent., d. XXVI, a. 1, ad 2, that although all natural goodnesses conferred on creatures can be called graces, because they are given freely by God, nevertheless the effect of divine love by which He loves man unto divine fruition is antonomastically called grace: just as that love itself is antonomastically called love, because man is not only loved by God as a work is loved by its artisan, but with a certain perfect love, which is as it were similar to friendship, inasmuch as He draws him into the fellowship of His own fruition, so that his glory and beatitude may be in that whereby God is blessed. On account of this it is well said here that, because man is rendered pleasing to God through that divine help by a certain special prerogative, therefore that help itself is named grace.

II. As to the second ³, he lays down this conclusion: This grace is something existing in the gratified man, as a certain form and perfection of his.

It is proved by a manifold reason ⁴. The first reason is this. By the help of divine grace man is directed to the ultimate end. Therefore it is necessary that he continually enjoy this help until he arrives at the end. Therefore such sanctifying grace is a certain form and perfection remaining in man, even when he is not operating.

The first consequence is proved. Because that which is directed to some end must have a continuous order to it: since the mover moves continuously until the movable thing attains the end through motion.

The second, truly: because the opposite of the consequent entails the opposite of the antecedent. For if it were participated by man according to some motion and passion, and not according to some form remaining and as it were resting in him, it would not be in man except as long as he was actually turned toward the end. And thus, since this is not continuously done by man, it follows that man does not continually enjoy this help until he arrives at the end. Which is the opposite of the antecedent.

2. For the evident understanding of this reason, it must be considered that a thing happens to be directed to an end in two ways. In one way, through some second act, by which it is actually moved to the acquisition of the end: just as a stone is directed downward when it is actually moved downward. In another way, through a first act, by which it has a habitual inclination and order, or fittingness, to the end: just as, when a stone is not actually moved downward, yet on account of the heaviness existing in it, it is said to be directed and inclined to the place below. In both ways God can move a creature to an end: but the difference is that the motion of a thing by which it is directed by God to an end through an actual tendency toward the end is not in the thing except when the thing is actually moved to the end through its own operation caused in it by God; but the form by which a thing is habitually inclined to the end, and becomes suitable and proportioned to the end, is in the creature even when the creature is not actually moved to the end; just as in a heavy body there is heaviness even when it is not actually moved downward. Because therefore man can be directed to supernatural beatitude by God both through an actual motion by which He moves the appetite to the love and desire of the end, and through some form caused by Him whereby man is as it were habitually ordered to beatitude: if he were directed to beatitude by the motion of the appetite alone from God toward actual operation, since such a motion is not continuous in man, as is clear in a sleeping man, it follows that neither would a direction of this kind to the end be continuous. On account of this it is well inferred here that, if man participated the divine help according to some motion or passion, namely according to a motion of the will caused in it by God, man would not continually enjoy the divine help until he arrived at the end: because such a motion or passion would not be in man except when he was actually turned toward the end, namely through an actual appetite for the end; which is evident is not done by man continuously.

3. Regarding the proof of the first consequence, however, it should be noted that, just as a motion is called continuous which is interrupted by no rest, so a continuous order to the end is called an order not interrupted until the end is attained. For if there is an order to the end in something, and afterwards that order ceases, and then is recovered, it is not called a continuous order to the end. But when something is ordered to the end, and the order is not interrupted, but the end is attained with no interruption of the order having occurred, that order is called continuous. In this sense, therefore, what St. Thomas says is understood, that that which is directed to some end must have a continuous order to it: because, namely, it is necessary that it have an order in no way interrupted toward the end, until it arrives at it.

III. But then a twofold doubt arises. One is against the proposition itself. For it seems to follow from this that once someone is directed by God to beatitude through the infusion of grace, he could never lose grace itself until he has arrived at beatitude: although it is Catholic teaching that grace is lost through mortal sin, and can be recovered through penance.

The other is against the proof of this proposition. For from the fact that the mover moves continuously until the movable thing arrives at the end through motion, one only has that man, having been directed by divine motion to beatitude, is moved by such motion until he arrives at it. And thus one has that man continually enjoys the divine help, which is the divine motion: but not that he enjoys some permanent and resting form, as was intended.

IV. For the solution of the first doubt, it must be considered that, since in the direction by which something is directed by another to an end through something caused in it that is proportioned to the end, three things concur, namely the action of the agent, by which it directs and moves the thing to the end; the form of the moved and directed thing, by which it is formally said to be directed; and the consequent relation, which is the relation of the ordered and directed thing to the end: while the active direction itself of the agent and director remains, it is necessary that the form itself of the directed thing, and the consequent relation, remain and not be interrupted; because the action of the mover is not without the act of the movable thing, and without the relation of the moved thing to that toward which it is moved. The sense of the proposition of St. Thomas is therefore that, if something is directed to an end, not through the mere preordination of the director alone, just as the predestined person is said to be directed and ordered to eternal life in the divine mind from eternity, but through some act received from the director in the one who is directed, whereby he is made worthy of eternal life; it is necessary that, while the active direction by which he is directed to the end remains, the relation to the end, and the act received in the one who is directed upon which such a relation is founded, remain continually. For in this way, since the man pleasing to God, as long as he is pleasing, is directed and ordered to beatitude by the divine action, even when he is not turned toward beatitude itself through an act of free choice; it very well follows that that form by which he is directed to such an end remains continually in him, even when he does not actually operate by turning himself to the end; and consequently that such an act is not in man after the manner of a motion or passion, but rather after the manner of a permanent form.

To the doubt, therefore, it is said that what is inferred does not follow. For St. Thomas does not intend that what is ordered to an end, speaking absolutely, has a continuous order to the end until it attains the end: but, as was said, that while the direction of the agent remains, there is a continuous order to the end until it attains it. It happens, however, that the direction itself of man to beatitude is interrupted through sin, inasmuch as God ceases from the causation of that form and act by which man was directed to the end. And thus it also happens that the order itself is interrupted.

2. It could also be said more briefly that it is understood as far as belongs to the very character of direction considered in itself. For the director directing some thing to an end by his motion, as far as is in him, does not cease until he has brought the thing to the end: and consequently such a relation and order of the directed thing, in itself, does not have the capacity to be interrupted. Yet with this stands the fact that through some supervening impediment the direction itself and the order itself can be impeded: just as, with wind supervening, an arrow can be impeded from arriving at the target intended by the archer. In the same way it is said that the direction itself of the man pleasing to God toward beatitude, in itself, is continuous; and the order of this kind of man directed to it, as far as is in itself, has it to endure continually until the man attains beatitude; yet such an order and such a direction can be interrupted through an impeding sin.

3. To the second ⁵, it is said that from that reason it is not concluded that man continually enjoys the divine motion alone, without the impression of a permanent form: but only that there must be some act in the man so directed, and that the order consequent upon that act is continuous, while the active direction itself remains, or even, as far as is in itself. From this, however, it follows that, since man is not always actually turned to the end through an act according to exercise, yet is always directed to it by God, even when he does not actually operate, until such direction ceases through sin: such an act in a man directed to beatitude cannot be the divine motion alone by which He actually moves free choice toward God, because that does not remain continually; but some form remaining in man even when he does not actually operate.

V. The second reason is this ⁶. A man is provoked to love someone specially on account of a good preexisting in him. Therefore, where a special love of God toward man is posited, there must be posited some special good conferred on man by God. Therefore, etc. — The first consequence is proved. Because the love of God is causative of the good that is in us, just as the love of man is provoked and caused by some good that is in the beloved. — The second, truly: because sanctifying grace designates the special love of God.

2. But this reason seems to conclude this alone, that sanctifying grace is something in man: not, however, that it is a permanent form, which is what is intended.

It is answered that, although at first glance that seems to be concluded, yet if it is diligently inspected, the proposition is concluded. For just as a man is provoked to a special love of another man from some perfection of his remaining in him, either real or thought to be so, and not from something existing in him after the manner of a passing thing: so God, by loving the rational creature specially, causes in it some permanent form, by which it can be said to be formally pleasing to God.

VI. The third reason is this. The end toward which man is directed through the help of grace is above human nature. Therefore it is necessary that there be superadded to man a supernatural form, by which he may be suitably ordered to it. — The consequence is proved. Because each thing is ordered to the end suitable to it according to the nature of its form. A sign of which is that of diverse species there are diverse ends.

The fourth reason is this. It is necessary that man arrive at the ultimate end through his own operations. Therefore it is necessary that there be superadded to him some form from which his operations may have the efficacy of meriting the ultimate end. — The consequence is proved. Because each thing operates according to its own form.

The fifth reason is this. The proper mode of man is that for the perfection of his operations there must, above natural potencies, be present in him some perfections and habits, by which he may as it were connaturally, easily, and delightfully work the good and work well. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is proved. Because divine providence provides for all things according to the mode of their nature.

It is confirmed. Because in Eph. 5, grace is called light, because through it man is advanced to the vision of God: for light is the principle of seeing.

VII. Through this, moreover, is excluded the opinion of those who say that grace posits nothing in man: just as neither in him who is said to have the favor of the king. Who have been deceived, not paying attention to the difference between divine and human love. For the former is causative of the good that it loves in someone: human love, however, is not.

It should be noted that, although human love is not universally causative of the good that it loves in someone, nevertheless there must be in the beloved some perfection by which another is provoked to love him. And thus in him who is said to have the favor of the king, one must posit some perfection from which the love of the king has its origin: although it is not necessary to posit in him anything caused by the love of the king.

From these things it is clearly evident that the opinion of those is false who said that grace is nothing other than the divine love and acceptance by which God accepts man unto eternal life. See in Capreolus, in XVII dist. of the First ⁷.

VIII. It should also be noted that from the things said above it is clearly left plain what sanctifying grace (gratia gratum faciens) is: that is, that which makes man pleasing to God for the attaining of beatitude. For it is: A certain form and perfection existing in the rational creature, through which man is formally rendered pleasing and beloved to God, and through which man is worthy of eternal life, and is ordered to lay hold of it: just as a heavy body is formally heavy by heaviness, and is ordered to the place below through it. And since it is not a substantial form, because it arrives after the complete being of the thing, it is clearly left plain that it is an accident; and a certain quality; and in the first species of quality, as is said in Iª IIae, q. cx, a. 3 ⁸; and Verit., q. XXVII, a. 2 ⁹; and II Sent., d. XXVI, a. 4 ¹⁰: not indeed that it can properly be called a habit of which the Philosopher spoke in the Categories ¹¹, since it is not immediately ordered to operation, nor is it in a potency of the soul, but in its essence; but it is as it were a certain disposition and aptitude with respect to glory, which is consummated grace. Hence it can be called a habit toward being: inasmuch as it constitutes man in a certain supernatural being, making him formally worthy of eternal life.

How, moreover, it is distinguished from virtue, see in Capreolus, in the Second, d. XXVI ¹²; and the arguments of Scotus, with their solutions ¹³; likewise I Sent., d. XVII, q. 1 ¹⁴.