Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

After St. Thomas showed that man needs divine help to attain beatitude, he now wishes to show that man cannot merit such help ¹. And first, he proves the proposition; second, he removes a certain doubt ².

I. Therefore, he first argues thus. Man does not move himself to attain divine help, but is rather moved to this by God. Therefore, it is not given to us on this account, that we are advanced toward it through good works ³, but rather we make progress through good works because we are anticipated by divine help. — The antecedent is proved. Because every thing is related materially to that which is above itself. But matter does not move itself to its perfection, but must be moved by another. — The consequence is proved: because the motion of the mover precedes the movement of the mobile in reason and cause.

2. Concerning this last statement, it should be noted that the motion of the mover can be understood to precede the movement of the mobile in reason in two ways. In one way, just as that which falls into the definition of another is said to be prior to it in reason. And thus, according to the definition of motion set down in III Phys. ⁴, it is clear that to move is not prior in reason to being moved. But it could in this way be said to be prior in reason if a definition of motion were taken encompassing all its causes. For it would be said that motion is the act of that which exists in potency insofar as it is such, caused by the mover in the mobile. — In another way, just as what first falls in the intellect proceeding from one thing to another is called prior in reason. And in this way the motion of the mover is prior to the movement of the mobile: for we understand motion to proceed from the agent and mover before it is received in the mobile.

It is also said to precede in cause, that is, in causality: not because it is the true effective cause of the movement of the mobile, since, because the motion of the mover and the movement of the mobile are the same thing with respect to what they signify in recto, one cannot really be the effective cause of the other; but in that way in which that which is presupposed to another according to the mode of considering, as such, is said to be prior in causality. — It can also be said that this is understood of motion and movement with respect to the relations by which they are formally distinguished from one another: not indeed in such a way that one is the cause of the other, but because one is a condition of the agent, while the other is a condition of the patient; but the agent cause is prior to the patient and material cause.

3. But a doubt occurs concerning this reason. For through it, it seems to be proved that man cannot even merit beatitude either. Which, however, is clearly false. For beatitude is just as much above the nature of man as grace is. And consequently the soul will be related to it materially just as to grace.

He answers that one must speak in one way of man considered according to natural principles alone, and in another way of him as already possessing the aforesaid divine help. If he is considered in the first way, thus both grace and beatitude are above his nature, and he is compared to them materially alone: that is, by way of a receptive subject, but not by way of an agent sufficiently for the acquisition of them, since natural principles do not suffice to acquire those perfections which are above nature. And if the objection proceeds according to this sense, what is inferred is conceded: namely, that man cannot even merit beatitude.

If, however, he is considered in the second way, thus beatitude is not above the nature of man, insofar, namely, as it is perfected by such help: just as, although to heat is above the nature of water considered according to natural principles alone, it is nevertheless not above the nature of heated water insofar as it has heat. And therefore man, as perfected by grace, is not only materially related to beatitude, but also actively: insofar as through such divine help he can act sufficiently to acquire beatitude, on account of the virtues which arise from it, concerning which we will treat below ⁵.

Therefore, because when in this place man is compared to the aforesaid help, a comparison is made of human nature taken precisely to it, St. Thomas intends that man cannot merit it from acts proceeding from the faculty of nature. Therefore the argument proceeds exceedingly well concerning grace: and it would proceed in the same way concerning beatitude if the comparison were made to natural principles alone.

II. Secondly. Our soul operates under God as an instrumental agent under a principal agent. Therefore it cannot prepare itself to receive the effect of divine help except according as it acts from divine power. Therefore it is more anticipated by divine help to work well than it anticipates divine help, as it were by meriting or by preparing itself for it. — The first consequence is proved. Because an instrumental agent does not dispose toward the perfection to be induced by the principal agent except according as it acts in the power of the principal agent: as is shown concerning the heat of fire.

2. But it seems that this reason does not conclude. For by the effect of divine help is understood either beatitude, to which man can arrive by operating according to the aforesaid help; or the meritorious work itself proceeding from grace; or the divine help itself, so that it is an intransitive construction, and it is the same to say the effect of divine help as the effect which is divine help. If the first, thus it is indeed conceded that the soul cannot prepare itself through meritorious works for the reception of such an effect of divine help except according as it acts by divine power. But this is not to the purpose. Because St. Thomas does not intend here to prove that man cannot merit eternal life without divine help and power: for this was shown in the preceding chapter ⁶. — If the second, thus also it is not to the purpose. Because it is not asked whether man can merit without divine help the merit which proceeds from grace. For it is sufficiently clear that it is not without divine help if it is an effect of grace. — If the third, thus it is indeed concluded that man cannot prepare himself for the reception of grace except according as he acts by divine power; and that man is anticipated by a certain divine help for a preparation of this kind, and for working well. But it does not conclude that he is anticipated by the very divine help of which we are speaking, namely grace itself: and that man cannot merit grace. For it is not incompatible with a good work, and one meritorious of some perfection, that it be performed by divine power.

3. For the evidence of this, it must be considered that, since the arguments of this chapter are introduced against the error of Pelagius, they are to be taken according as the error of the Pelagians can be refuted through them. For the Pelagians posited that the beginning of a good work is from ourselves; and similarly the preparation for grace; and that for this man needs no divine help. From which it followed that grace is given to us by God on account of our merits preceding all divine help. This error is therefore rejected when it is shown that no good work of ours, and one meritorious of anything, can come to be except by divine help anticipating us: and that such a work cannot come to be by us through the power of nature alone, as is shown in the following arguments. And therefore it is said that by the effect of divine help, as is clear in the following chapter, there is understood here the divine effect itself, namely grace, by which we are helped toward good works. And the meaning is that we do not anticipate and merit grace and divine help simpliciter and absolutely by our natural works, because, since we can perform no good work except in divine power, as is shown also in Iª IIae, q. CIX, a. 6, and Quodl. I, a. 7, it is necessary that some divine help anticipate our whole nature, good operation, and all our merit. But if it is necessary that some divine help, namely the interior motion from God toward good, precede all our good and right operation by which we are ordered toward supernatural things, it is manifest that from the faculty of nature alone we cannot merit the second help, namely habitual grace. Which is the principal intent.

When, however, it is argued against this sense that, although some divine help anticipates every good work in us, it does not nevertheless follow from this that we cannot merit habitual grace: — it is answered that it follows exceedingly well, according to the mind of St. Thomas, namely, that by natural power alone we cannot merit grace itself. For if no good work can be done by us, especially one disposing toward supernatural things, except in divine power, it follows that by our own power alone we can do nothing of this kind of good, and consequently nothing that is meritorious of grace. Hence, although it is not incompatible with a good and meritorious work that it be done by divine power, but rather this is necessary, it is nevertheless incompatible that it be done from the power of nature alone.

III. Thirdly. The human soul is ordered under God as a particular agent under a universal agent. Therefore it is impossible that there be any right motion in it which divine action does not anticipate. — The consequence is proved. Because no particular agent can universally anticipate the action of the first universal agent: since its action has its origin from the universal agent, as is clear in motions. — It is confirmed by the authority of John 15.

Fourthly. The effect of divine help, which exceeds the faculty of nature, is not proportionate to the acts that man produces from his natural faculty. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is proved. Because reward is proportioned to merit: since in the retribution for merits the equality of justice is observed.

2. For the evidence of this reason, it must be considered, from the doctrine of St. Thomas, Iª IIae, q. CXIV, a. 1, that, since to recompense the reward of a work or labor is an act of justice, while justice is a certain equality: where there is not equality simpliciter, there the ratio of merit and reward is not present simpliciter; but there can be a ratio of merit secundum quid, insofar as equality is preserved secundum quid. And because between God and man there is the greatest inequality, and all that is good in man is from God: therefore between man and God there cannot be a ratio of merit simpliciter, but only secundum quid, and insofar as man performs a work to which reward and retribution are due from God according to divine preordination, but not absolutely. What is said, therefore, that reward must be proportioned to merit, is understood either simpliciter, as between those between whom there can be absolute equality; or secundum quid and according to the ordination of the one who rewards, as between man and God, between whom there cannot be absolute equality. Similarly, when it is said that in the retribution of reward the equality of justice is observed, it is understood either simpliciter or secundum quid. And because divine help, since it exceeds the faculty of nature, is not proportionate, even according to the divine ordination, to works produced from the natural faculty — for the natural act of any thing whatsoever is not ordained by God to something exceeding the proportion of the power that is the principle of the act: since by the institution of divine providence nothing acts beyond its species — therefore our works produced from the natural faculty alone cannot have the ratio of merit with respect to the aforesaid divine help. And according to this, that argument proceeds.

IV. Fifthly. Knowledge of the supernatural end is in man from God: since it exceeds the faculty of nature, and consequently natural reason. Therefore the movements of our will toward the ultimate end proceed from divine help. — The consequence is proved. Because knowledge precedes the movement of the will.

It should be noted, from the doctrine of St. Thomas, Iª IIae, q. cxiii ⁷, and De Veritate, q. xxviii ⁸, that man cannot prepare himself for habitual grace except through a right movement of the will toward the ultimate end: namely through faith and desire, by which he believes Him to be the justifier and the object of beatitude, and by which he desires Him under that aspect, and longs for His grace. Which movement indeed, if it is perfect, precedes the very infusion of grace in nature alone, according to the order of material cause. If, however, it is imperfect, it precedes also in time. On account of this, wishing to conclude that man cannot through natural principles alone merit grace, or prepare himself for it, St. Thomas concludes that the movements of the will toward the ultimate end are anticipated by God. For this is the same as if it were said that divine help precedes the preparation for grace: and thus it is not from the power of nature alone.

It is confirmed by the authority of the Apostle, Titus 3, Not from works, etc.; and Romans 9, It is not of him that willeth, etc. By which words of the Apostle, says St. Thomas, free will is not excluded, but is shown to be subject to God. It is also confirmed by the authority of Jeremiah, Lam. 5, Convert us, etc.

V. Secondly. He excludes a certain objection ⁹. For the opposite of this seems to be said in Zech. 1, where it is said from the person of God, Turn to me, and I will turn to you: from which it seems that our conversion anticipates God's operation.

But St. Thomas answers that this is said not because God's operation does not anticipate our conversion, but because He helps subsequently our conversion, by which we are turned to Him, by strengthening it so that it may attain its effect, and establishing it so that it may achieve the due end.

It should be noted that through that response St. Thomas understands that God is related to our conversion in two ways. In one way, by moving and prompting the soul of man interiorly to this, that it be turned to God. And thus God's turning to man anticipates our turning to Him. — In another way, by strengthening our very conversion to this, that it attain remission of sin and grace, which is its effect; and also by establishing and firming it up toward achieving the due end, namely beatitude. For if man perseveres in his conversion, he will achieve the end of beatitude. And thus God's turning to us does not anticipate our conversion, but accompanies it, or even follows in some way, namely according as one effect of grace follows upon another, as is shown in Iª IIae, q. cxi, a. 3.

Through this the error of the Pelagians is excluded, who say that help of this kind is given to us on account of merits: and also that the beginning of our justification is from ourselves, that is from the power of nature alone, but the consummation, namely the infusion of grace and remission of sin, is from God.

VI. But a doubt remains from what has been said. For since it has been shown that man cannot merit grace by the power of nature, since he is anticipated by divine help for any good works whatsoever, the doubt remains whether man, through works done by himself as prompted by divine help and divine motion, merits grace itself, at least de congruo.

Capreolus, in IV, d. xiv, q. II, to the arguments of Henry ¹⁰, finally holds, in accordance with the mind of St. Thomas, that, properly speaking, no disposition preceding the habit of grace can be called merit, neither de congruo nor de condigno. — But this does not seem to me to be the mind of St. Thomas. For although merit de condigno is not present there, on account of the inequality of our works to grace, I do not see, nevertheless, how merit of congruity is not present there: since according to the mind of St. Thomas, Iª IIae, q. cxiv, a. 3, merit of congruity is taken according to an equality of proportion, namely so that to a man acting according to his own power, God recompenses according to the excellence of His power. For according to this it seems congruous that to a man preparing himself for grace according as he is moved by God, God should infuse grace. But the things which Capreolus brings forward from Iª IIae, q. cxii, and q. cxiv, and from II Sent., d. xxvii, do not compel. For to one inspecting diligently it is apparent that in those places St. Thomas intends merit of condignity alone, but not merit of congruity: rather, in II Sent. ¹¹, he expressly concedes that merit of congruity is present there.