Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

After St. Thomas has shown that divine providence disposes rational creatures differently than other things according as they differ from others in the condition of their proper nature, he wishes further to show that, also according as they are distinguished from others by the dignity of their end, a higher ¹ mode of governance is applied to them by divine providence ².

I. And indeed, with respect to the natural end, he says it is manifest that they attain to a higher participation in the end, since they alone are able through their own operation to attain intelligible truth. He also says it is manifest, with respect to this natural end, that provision is made for them by God differently than for other things: inasmuch as to man is given intellect, and sensitive powers by which he may be aided in investigating the truth, and the use of speech by which men may help one another in the knowledge of the truth; which things, of course, are not given to others. But with respect to man's ultimate end, which is constituted in a certain knowledge of truth that exceeds his natural capacity, wherein man exceeds lower creatures, he wishes to show that also from this a diverse mode of governance is considered regarding men and regarding other, lower creatures. And he shows that man is directed to this end by a certain supernatural help, which does not belong to other things in relation to their proper end.

Concerning this, however, he does three things: first, he shows that man needs divine help to attain this kind of supernatural end; second, that he needs it to persevere in the good, ch. CLV; third, that he needs it to rise again from sin, ch. CLVI.

Concerning the first, he does three things: first, he shows the proposition; second, he shows what such help is, ch. CL; third, he determines concerning its effects, ch. CLI. — Concerning the first, he does two things: first, he shows the necessity of the aforesaid help; second, he shows that man cannot merit it, ch. CXLIX. Concerning the first, he does two things: first, he shows the proposition; second, he excludes a certain false opinion, in the following chapter.

II. As to the first, he shows that man needs divine help to attain beatitude.

And he argues first thus. Those things that are for the end must be proportionate to the end. Therefore, if man is ordered to an end that exceeds his natural capacity, some supernatural help must be divinely afforded him through which he may tend toward the end.

For the evidence of this reason, it must be considered that in every thing ordered to attaining some end by its own operation, there must be present something by which it can operate toward that end; otherwise it would never operate on account of the end. But that by which a thing operates toward the end must be proportionate to the end, for not everything is suited to every end, just as any instruments whatever do not serve every art, but each art has its own determinate instruments. And therefore, just as for attaining the end connatural to him natural principles were given to man, which are the intellect, the will, and sensitive powers, as was said above ³; so for attaining the supernatural end, which namely exceeds the capacity of human nature, it is necessary that some supernatural principle be given to man, since through natural principles he cannot reach it. And this is called divine help, because it is something divinely granted to man by which man is aided in attaining the supernatural end.

III. Secondly. To see the first Truth in itself so transcends the capacity of human nature that it is proper to God alone. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is proved. Because a thing of an inferior nature cannot be brought into that which is proper to a superior nature except by the power of that superior nature. This is made clear in the moon, which does not become luminous except by the power of the sun; and in water, which is not hot except by the power of fire.

Observe that to see the first Truth in itself is said to be proper to God alone, not because it could in no way belong to another, but because it belongs to God by nature, but not to any other.

Thirdly. Every single thing (namely, whose property it is to operate or act) attains its ultimate end through its own operation. But an operation derives its power from the operating principle, as is clear in the operation of seed. Therefore, man cannot attain to the supernatural end through his operation unless his operation receives efficacy from divine power.

It must be noted that the foundation of this reason is that through his own natural principles man cannot elicit an operation by which he may be brought to an end transcending the capacity of natural principles; for if he could elicit such an operation through natural principles, the end would no longer transcend the capacity of natural principles. Therefore it is necessary that the operation by which he is brought to the end have efficacy from some other principle, superadded to natural principles; otherwise, since operation has efficacy from the operating principle, man could never reach that end through his operation.

Fourthly. Under God, who is the first understanding and willing being, all intellects and wills are ordered as instruments under a principal agent. Therefore their operations do not have efficacy in respect of the ultimate perfection, which is the attainment of final beatitude, except through divine power. Therefore, etc. — The first consequence is proved. Because no instrument according to the power of its own form can lead to the ultimate perfection, but only according to the power of the principal agent, although according to its own power it can make some disposition toward it. This is made clear in a saw, and in the heat of an animal.

Fifthly. Man has very many impediments to attaining the end: namely, the weakness of reason, the passions and affections of the sensitive part, and the infirmity of the body. Therefore he needs divine help lest through such impediments he fail totally from the ultimate end.

It is confirmed by the authority of Jn. 6 and 15.

By this, moreover, the error of the Pelagians is excluded, who say that man can merit the glory of God through free will alone.

IV. Concerning this conclusion, however, it must be noted that we do not therefore posit that man needs divine help to attain beatitude as though God could not, by absolute power, give beatitude to one not having such help, which below ⁴ he will name grace, or could not without such grace order and accept man unto beatitude, for this is not repugnant to divine power; but because without such help, which is grace, man cannot attain beatitude as formally and intrinsically worthy of beatitude, and as if his works without such help were formally meritorious of eternal life. For if such works are accepted by God as those for which God wills to give beatitude, grace not existing in man, they will be worthy of eternal life extrinsically, that is, through divine acceptation alone, but not intrinsically, namely as if having in themselves something by which they are formally worthy of such a reward.

From which it is clear that the arguments of Scotus in distinction 17 of the First Book ⁵ do not proceed against the mind of St. Thomas, since they proceed against the first sense, but not against the second. See in Capreolus, in the same distinction of the First Book ⁶.