Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

From the foregoing St. Thomas draws this corollary, that judges do not sin by punishing the wicked ¹.

Concerning this, however, he does two things: first, he proves the proposition; second, he excludes certain objections ².

I. As to the first, he premises that, because some people make light of punishments inflicted by God, for the reason that, being devoted to sensible things, they care only for those things that they see; it has been ordained by divine providence that there should be men on earth who, through sensible and present punishments, compel others ³ to the observance of justice.

Then he argues first thus. It is just for the wicked to be punished: because through punishment fault is ordered. Therefore judges do not sin while they punish the wicked. — The consequence is proved. Because no one sins by the fact that he does justice.

Secondly. Men who are placed over others on earth are as it were the executors of divine providence. Therefore they do not sin by rewarding the good and punishing the wicked. — The consequence is proved. Because no one sins from the fact that he executes the order of divine providence. But that order has it that the good are rewarded, whereas the wicked are punished.

Thirdly. For the preservation of harmony among men it is necessary that punishments be inflicted on the wicked. Therefore that is not evil in itself. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. Because that which is necessary for the preservation of the good cannot be evil in itself.

Fourthly. The life of certain men impedes the common good, namely, the harmony of human society. Therefore they are to be removed from human society through death. — The consequence is proved. Because a particular good is to be removed in order that the common good may be preserved.

Fifthly. A physician cuts off a decayed limb well and usefully, if through it the corruption of the body is threatened. Therefore the ruler of a city also kills pestilential men justly and without sin, lest the peace of the city be disturbed. — The consequence is proved. Because just as a physician intends the ordered harmony of the humors, so the ruler of a city intends the ordered harmony of the citizens.

It must be noted that every individual person is compared to the whole community as a part to the whole. But every part is for the sake of the whole. Therefore, if the cutting off of a part is expedient for the safety of the whole, it is praiseworthily cut off. And this argument proceeds according to this foundation.

It is confirmed by the authority of 1 Cor. 5; Rom. 13; and 1 Pet. 2.

2. It must be noted, from the doctrine of St. Thomas, II-II, q. 108, a. 1, that in the infliction of punishments the mind of the one punishing must be considered. For if his intention is principally borne toward the evil of him who is punished and rests there, it is altogether unlawful: because to take pleasure in the evil of another belongs to hatred. But if the intention is borne toward the good that is attained through the punishment of the sinner, the punishment can be just, provided other circumstances are observed: namely, that the one punishing has the authority to punish, and that the punishment is carried out discreetly, and the like. Therefore St. Thomas, in all the arguments mentioned above, touched on something that pertains to the right intention of the judge.

II. As to the second point ⁴, he says that through this is excluded the error of certain people saying that it is not lawful to inflict bodily punishments. Now they adduced first, the authority of Exodus 20, which says: You shall not kill. — Secondly, the authority of Matt. 13, where the Lord said concerning the tares and the wheat: Let both grow until the harvest. — Thirdly, because as long as a man is in the world, he can be changed for the better.

2. To the first, however, he says that by those words only the unjust killing of a man is prohibited: as is clear from the words below; and from the words of the Lord in Matt. 5.

To the second he says that the killing of the wicked is prohibited there where this cannot be done without danger to the good. Which generally happens when the wicked are not yet distinguished from the good by manifest sins. — Or when the danger is feared lest the wicked draw many good people after them. Understand: because, if they have many followers, the good could rise up in their defense, and thus be exposed to the danger of death.

To the third he says first, that the danger that threatens from the life of the wicked is both greater and more certain than the good that is expected from their amendment. — He says secondly, that at the very moment of death they have the power of turning themselves to God through penance. And if they do not do this, it is probable that they would never recover from their malice.

It must be noted that, as was said above, it is lawful to kill a man when he is ruinous to the commonwealth. Now he is ruinous to the commonwealth when his life impedes the common good, namely, the harmony and peace of society. And because the common good outweighs a particular good, therefore also the evil that deprives of the common good is greater than the evil that deprives of a particular good; and it has more of the character of evil than the good of one particular person has of the character of good. On account of this St. Thomas says that the danger that threatens from the life of such a ruinous man is greater than the good that is expected from their amendment.