Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

After St. Thomas showed that to mortal sin is owed the punishment that is the deprivation of beatitude, he shows consequently that those acting against God are to be punished also through the experience of something harmful¹.

Concerning this, however, he does two things: first, he shows the proposition; second, he infers one corollary, in the following chapter.

I. As to the first, he argues first thus. In guilt, the mind is not only turned away from the ultimate end, but is also unduly turned toward other things as toward ends. Therefore, one who sins in this way is not only to be punished by being excluded from the end, but also by feeling harm from other things. — The consequence is evident. Because punishment ought to answer proportionally to guilt.

It should be noted that aversion and conversion, according as they are found in sin, are understood according to affect and will: aversion, indeed, according as the will, which ought to have God as its ultimate end, is not inclined toward him as toward an end, by ordering its own things ultimately to him and loving him above all things; but conversion, according as the will loves some created thing as an ultimate end and above all things, and orders all its own things to it. To that aversion, therefore, the lack of divine fruition most fittingly corresponds as punishment: so that namely, just as someone by sinning abandoned God, so he is abandoned by God, and is not a sharer in divine fruition and beatitude. But to conversion it is fitting that there correspond as punishment some harm from creatures: so that just as someone voluntarily took delight in creatures more than was due, so from those very creatures he may receive harm and sorrow.

II. Secondly. Those who have a will turned away from the ultimate end do not fear being excluded from it. Therefore, by exclusion alone from the ultimate end they would not be recalled from sinning. Therefore, it is necessary to apply to sinners another punishment which they may fear. — The antecedent is proved. Because no one fears to lose what he does not desire to obtain. — But the ultimate consequence is proved: because punishments are inflicted for faults so that by the fear of punishments men may be restrained from sins.

Note that this is not said as though punishments are inflicted for no other purpose than that men may be restrained from sin: for it was said in the preceding chapter that they are inflicted by God on account of the order to be preserved in creatures. But it is understood that, beyond that order to be preserved in creatures, they are also inflicted so that men may be restrained from sin.

Thirdly. He who sets his end in creatures does not use them as he ought, namely by referring them to the ultimate end. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. Because if someone uses what is for the end inordinately, he is not only deprived of the end, but also incurs another harm: as is evident in food taken inordinately by a sick person.

It should be noted that, although one sinning mortally is inclined toward some creature as toward an end; and thus such a creature is not received by him as something ordered to the end, but as an end: nonetheless every creature, considered in itself, is ordered to God as to the ultimate end. Therefore it was well said that he who sets his end in creatures inordinately uses that which is for the end.

Fourthly. Those who act rightly perceive perfection and joy in the end intended by them. Therefore, conversely, sinners ought to receive affliction and harm from those things in which they set their end. — The consequence is proved. Because just as goods are owed to those who act rightly, so evils are owed to those who act perversely.

It is confirmed by the authority of Matthew 25, and of the Psalm.

By this, moreover, is excluded the opinion of Algazel, who posits that sinners are to be afflicted only by the loss of the ultimate end.

Note that St. Thomas attributes this opinion also to Avicenna in IV Sent., d. 44², with respect to the fact that sinners are not punished through the experience of any bodily harm, but through separation from the end. Avicenna added, however, that besides the punishment of separation from the end, the souls of the wicked after death will also be punished through the likenesses of bodies: just as in dreams, through likenesses of this kind existing in the phantasia, it seems to a man that he is tormented. Which St. Thomas shows in the same place to be impossible.

How, however, a soul separated from the body can suffer harm from something corporeal will be shown below in the fourth book³.