Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

In the second place, St. Thomas shows that the punishment by which someone is deprived of the ultimate end is unending ¹. Concerning this, moreover, he does two things: first, he shows what is proposed; second, he refutes certain objections ².

I. He argues first, therefore, as follows. The privation of the ultimate end is not a punishment except after this life. But after this life there does not remain to man the capacity to attain it. Therefore etc.

The major premise is proved. Because man is not born to attain the ultimate end in this life, as was shown above. Now the privation of something does not occur except when it is born to be had. — But the minor is proved: because the soul needs the body for the attainment of its end, inasmuch as through it it acquires perfection in knowledge and virtue. After it has been separated, however, it does not return again to this state, namely that it should acquire perfection through the body.

2. For the evidence of this argument, it must be considered that in it St. Thomas attends to the common condition of man, which is that through acts of virtues—such as virtues can be in us without grace and charity—man, deprived of grace and charity and having the use of free choice, may prepare himself for the reception of these from God, with God nonetheless moving the soul to this, and thus through works informed by charity arrive at the attainment of the ultimate end. It is evident, however, that this cannot take place without the body: since the soul does not acquire virtues of this kind, of which it has the natural seeds in itself, except by multiplied bodily acts; and a sufficient movement of the will for the reception of grace and justification cannot exist unless the powers of the soul have been duly disposed and regulated through exercises of this sort. And on that account, since after this life there is no state of acquiring virtues through bodily acts, even though the soul is at some time to be reunited to the body—since that is not the state of the way and of acquiring perfection, but of the term—it is most evident that man after this life cannot obtain grace and charity; and consequently that he will remain deprived of the ultimate end forever. And this is the foundation of this argument.

II. Secondly ³. In the nature of the soul and the angel there is an order to the ultimate end, which is God. Therefore, if it falls away from this order through some punishment, such punishment will remain forever.

The consequence is proved. Because, if someone is deprived of that which is in his nature to be had, it is impossible for that to be repaired unless there first occurs a resolution into preexisting matter, so that the same in species may be generated anew. This is clear in an animal losing its sight. But a spiritual thing, such as a soul or an angel, cannot be resolved into preexisting matter through any corruption.

III. Concerning this argument there is a doubt. For when it is said in the antecedent that in the nature of the soul and the angel there is an order to the ultimate end, which is God, it is understood either of the order that is from grace and charity, according to which man is ordered to beatitude; or of the order of nature alone, in which way we say that a spiritual nature is of itself capable of beatitude. If it is taken in the first way, then the antecedent is false: for charity and grace are not the natural perfections of man, such that the order to God founded in them could be said to belong by nature to a spiritual substance. — But if it is taken in the second way, that which the argument assumes is false: namely, that the soul which departed with mortal sin is deprived of that order after this life. For, since that order is founded and rooted in the nature of the soul, while the nature remains, that order itself also remains. But in the damned it is evident that the nature of the soul remains.

2. It is answered that it is understood of the order of nature alone, and not of the order following a perfection superadded to nature. But in what way an order of this kind can be called natural was shown above ⁴.

Yet it must be noted that concerning such an order, which is nothing other than a certain aptness of the soul for receiving grace, and divine fruition through the mediation of grace, we can speak in two ways: in one way, with respect to the relation itself according to itself and according to its root; in another way, with respect to its issue into act. In the first way, it cannot be removed: as St. Thomas shows in the First Part, q. xlviii, a. 4; and Iª IIae, q. lxxxv, a. 1 and 2; De Malo, q. ii, a. 12; and II Sent., d. xxxiv ⁵. In the second way, however, it can be removed.

It must be noted secondly, that we can understand this issue of that order into act to be removed in two ways: in one way, on account of a defect in the order itself; in another way, on account of some extrinsic hindering factor; just as, that air cannot be illuminated, we could understand either on account of a defect in the air's potency or aptness for light, or on account of some obstacle hindering it, or on account of the absence of the sun. Therefore the order of the soul to the ultimate end, which is God, cannot be removed with respect to its issue into act on account of a defect in the soul's aptness itself for grace and beatitude, because that aptness always remains in the soul with respect to its root: and thus one who departs with mortal sin is not deprived of such an order. But it can indeed be removed on account of some impediment: namely, on account of mortal sin, interposed between man and God by way of an obstacle; and on account of the withdrawal of the divine influx. And because the obstacle of sin in the damned is perpetual; and the withdrawal of the divine influx is also perpetual: therefore the order of the soul to beatitude will never issue into act in the damned; and thus the privation of such an order, in the aforesaid manner, will be perpetual in them.

3. That this is in accord with the mind of St. Thomas, however, is clear, because in the disputed question De Malo, in the place cited, ad 6, he says that the impossibility of grace which is in the damned is not from the total withdrawal of the aptness of nature for the good, but from the obstinacy of the will in evil, and from the immobility of the divine sentence that grace should not be applied to them forever. And in the First Part of the Second Part, in the place cited above ⁶, ad 3, he says that in the damned the natural inclination to virtue remains. But that it is not reduced to act happens because grace is lacking, according to divine justice. And he gives the example of a blind man, in whom the aptitude for seeing remains in the very root of nature, inasmuch as he is an animal naturally having sight; but it is not reduced to act, because the cause is lacking which could reduce it to act by forming the organ.

4. The sense of the argument is therefore that, because he who departs with mortal sin is deprived through punishment, or through divine retribution, of the natural order to beatitude with respect to its issue into act—divine justice so demanding—it is necessary (that is, it is fitting and just) that he be deprived of such an order forever: namely, on account of the defect of the agent cause, not indeed because it cannot, absolutely speaking, reduce that order to act, but because by an immobile will it has decreed not to give beatitude to one departing in mortal sin; just as the aptness of the nature of a blind man cannot be reduced to act on account of the defect of a cause unable to do this.

And it must be noted that this argument proceeds from a certain likeness and proportion to those things which are entirely natural. For just as, when someone is deprived of that which ought to belong to him naturally and through the action of a natural agent, he cannot be restored to it through a natural agent, as is shown regarding him who loses his sight; so, when the soul is deprived by a just sentence of an order natural to it on the part of the subject, but supernatural on the part of the object and the agent—such as is the order to supernatural beatitude—it is fitting that such an order should never be restored through the voluntary agent whose role it was to reduce such an order to act.

IV. But then a doubt arises. For just as it is in the nature of the soul to have an order to beatitude, so it is in its nature to have an order to grace: because just as it is receptive and capable of beatitude from God, so it is also capable of grace. But it is evident that the order of the soul to grace is restored in this life, of which man is nonetheless justly deprived on account of mortal sin. Therefore the order to beatitude can also be restored. And thus the argument is not conclusive.

To this it is said first, that one who sins mortally, as far as is on his part, is also deprived of grace irreparably: and consequently of the order to it with respect to its issue into act. For by sinning mortally he renders himself unworthy both of divine grace and of beatitude, to which he was able to arrive through it, by placing the obstacle of mortal sin between himself and God, which he cannot of himself remove.

It is said secondly, that although, as far as is on the part of the sinner, the privation of grace ought to be perpetual; yet because God, as long as the state of mortal life lasts, has willed out of mercy that man should be a wayfarer and be able to return to grace; therefore the grace of which someone is deprived through sin is repairable as far as is on the part of God, who wills to give it to one preparing himself, and who moves man to a preparation of this kind. But in the state of the soul after this life, because it is the state of the term and not of the way, not only can the order to beatitude not be restored, but neither can the order to grace. Because St. Thomas therefore speaks of the privation of the ultimate end after this life, when, that is, it is unto punishment for man; and in that state, by reason of the state itself, the restoration of the lost order is not fitting: on that account he concluded that such an order, which as far as is on the part of the sinner is irreparable, absolutely cannot be repaired.

V. Thirdly ⁷. Natural equity holds that each one should be deprived of the good against which he acts.

It is proved. Both because he renders himself unworthy of such a good. — And by the example of one acting against the commonwealth. Therefore he who sins against the ultimate end, and against charity, through which exists the fellowship of the Blessed and of those tending toward beatitude, ought to be punished eternally, even though he may have sinned for some short duration of time.

It must be noted that by the final words, and by those that were interposed in the argument, St. Thomas wishes to exclude an objection. For someone could argue that, although someone deserves through mortal sin to be deprived of beatitude, against which he acts, he ought not nonetheless to be deprived of it perpetually, but for a time: because punishment ought to correspond to sin; but sin is not perpetual, but is sometimes completed in a short duration of time.

St. Thomas answers that it is not necessary for the punishment to correspond to the sin with respect to duration. Which is clear also in human laws. For he who sins against the commonwealth is entirely deprived of the fellowship of the commonwealth through civil justice, either through death or through perpetual exile: because how great the duration of time was in sinning is not considered, but what that is against which he sinned. There is, however, as is said here, the same proportion of the whole of the present life to the earthly commonwealth, and of the whole of eternity to the fellowship of the Blessed. And on that account, just as he who acts against the commonwealth is deprived of it for the whole of the present life, so he who sins against the fellowship of the Blessed ought to be deprived of it eternally. — But that which is said, that the punishment ought to correspond to the sin, is understood according to severity: as is said in Iª IIae, q. lxxxvii, a. 3, ad 1.

VI. Fourthly. One sinning mortally ought to be punished just as if he had sinned eternally. Therefore etc. — The consequence is clear. Because it is doubtful to no one that for an eternal sin an eternal punishment is due. — But the antecedent is proved: because before the divine judgment the will is counted for the deed. But he who on account of a temporal good has turned away from the ultimate end, which is possessed forever, preferred its fruition to the fruition of the ultimate end. And thus it is clear that he would have willed much more to enjoy that temporal good forever.

Concerning that proposition, Before the divine judgment the will is counted for the deed, it must be considered, from the doctrine of St. Thomas in Iª IIae, q. xx, a. 4, that it is understood when the will is perfect and complete, and there is no cessation from the exterior act except on account of the impossibility of doing it. For because, when the will is perfect, man ceases from the exterior act on account of the inability to do it, nothing is diminished of the merit or of the fault. And on that account, because God looks upon the hearts of men, and is not only the rewarder of exterior acts, but also of interior ones: therefore, with respect to the infliction of punishment or the giving of a reward, before Him such a will without the work is rewarded as much as it would be rewarded even if the work were present, other things being equal on the part of the will. But before human judgment it is not so. For because men look only upon those things which are done externally, therefore they have to judge only concerning exterior actions: and consequently they have to reward or punish those alone.

VII. Fifthly. The reward of virtue, namely beatitude, is eternal. Therefore the punishment by which someone is excluded from beatitude also ought to be eternal. — The consequence is proved. Because by the same reason of justice punishment is rendered to sins, and reward to good acts.

Notice that it belongs to distributive justice to give evils and goods to each one equally according to proportion: that is, so that by as much as someone acts more virtuously, by so much more of good is bestowed upon him; and by as much as someone sins more, by so much more is he afflicted with punishment. On account of this St. Thomas says that by the same reason of justice punishment is rendered to sins, and reward to good acts.

The conclusion is confirmed by the authority of Matthew xxv.

Through this is excluded the opinion of those who say that the punishments of the wicked are at some time to be ended. Which opinion seems to have proceeded from certain philosophers saying that all punishments are purgatorial, and consequently to be ended.

VIII. As for the second part ⁸, St. Thomas adduces certain arguments for the aforesaid position, and resolves them.

The first is, because punishments are inflicted by human laws for the amendment of vices.

The second is, because it is necessary that punishment be inflicted on account of something else: otherwise God would take pleasure in punishments for their own sake; which detracts from the divine goodness. But no other more fitting end is seen than the amendment of vices.

2. To the second of these he answers that punishments are indeed inflicted on account of something else: not, however, on account of the amendment of vices, but on account of the order to be imposed on creatures, which requires that all things be dispensed to them proportionally, as is clear from Wis. xi; namely, so that, just as rewards correspond proportionally to good acts, so punishment may correspond to evil acts; and to certain evil acts an everlasting punishment, as was shown.

To the first, however, he says that if someone should grant that all punishments are introduced for nothing other than the amendment of vices, he is not nonetheless compelled to posit that all punishments are purgative and to be ended, as the argument concludes. Which is shown because, just as according to human laws some are punished with death, not indeed for the amendment of themselves, but of others, as is clear also from Prov. xix; some are also excluded from the state by perpetual exile for the greater purity of the state, according to the counsel of Prov. xxii: so also according to the divine judgment nothing prevents some from being separated from the fellowship of the good perpetually and being punished forever, so that men may cease from sinning out of fear of such punishment, and the fellowship of the good may be rendered purer from their separation, as is said in Apoc. xx ⁹.

3. From this response St. Thomas intends to have that which he explicitly posits in Iª IIae, q. lxxxvii, a. 2 ¹⁰ and 3 ¹¹, and elsewhere: namely, that punishment is not always for the amendment of him who is punished, nor is it always medicinal to him; but it is indeed for the amendment of others, so that at least through fear of punishment they may cease from sinning. And therefore it is not necessary to posit that all punishments are purgatorial, as though they were medicines of him who is punished, ordered to his salvation: but there are certain punishments which are only retributions, and have only the nature of punishment; just as a robber is hanged, not for his amendment, but so that others may cease from theft out of fear of punishment.