Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

After St. Thomas determined concerning punishment and reward in themselves, he now determines concerning them in relation to sin and good works¹. Concerning this, however, he does two things: first, he determines concerning the punishment that consists in the privation of the end, which is called the punishment of loss; second, concerning the punishment that is the experience of something harmful, which is called the punishment of sense, in the following chapter.

Concerning the first, he does two things: first, he shows that to mortal sin is owed total exclusion from the ultimate end, but to venial sin a difficulty of attaining to it; second, he shows that the punishment by which one is deprived of the ultimate end must be unending, in the following chapter.

I. As to the first, he argues first thus. According to the difference of sins, there must be a difference of punishments. But through mortal sin the intention of the mind is totally turned away² from order to God, who is the ultimate end of goods; whereas through venial sin, while the order of the human mind to the ultimate end remains, some impediment is introduced whereby it is retarded from freely tending toward the end. Therefore, one who sins mortally must be so punished as to fall away from man's end; but one who sins venially, so as to be retarded or to suffer difficulty in obtaining the end.

2. For the clarity of this reason, it must be considered that man does not sin mortally except when he prefers a creature to God, loving it more than God. This indeed appears when he chooses something else rather than to live according to God and to adhere to Him: for if he loved God more, he would rather choose to live according to Him and His precepts than to possess any temporal good; just as, because a man loves his own life more than pleasure, he is drawn back even from the greatest pleasure if he judges it to be infallibly destructive of his life. But a man sins venially when he conducts himself inordinately concerning the things that are for the end, inasmuch as he attends to them more or less than is due, while yet preserving the order and inclination to the due end: namely, because although he may be excessively attached to some thing, he would not on its account wish to offend God by acting against His precept. Hence, one who sins venially is likened to one who indeed tends toward a certain goal, but lingers too much on the way. On this account it is well said here that through mortal sin the intention of the mind is totally turned away from order to God, who is the ultimate end; but through venial sin it is not, but an impediment is introduced, by which man is retarded from freely tending toward the end: namely, because through mortal sin man establishes his end in a creature, loving it more than God, and departs from the love, both in habit and in act, by which he is bound to love God above all things; but through venial sin the actual love of God above all things is perhaps removed or diminished, while man is excessively attached to some creature, thinking nothing in act about God, and thus is impeded from the actual love of God; yet the habitual love of God is not removed, since through it charity is not removed, by which God is always habitually loved above all things by the one possessing it.

II. Secondly, it is argued from the same foundation. As the will is in men, so is natural inclination in natural things. But if its inclination to the end is taken away from a natural thing, it cannot attain that end at all; whereas if it has been impeded from its motion while the inclination to the end remains, when the obstacle is removed, it reaches the end, as is evident in a heavy body. Therefore it is so in men. But the intention of the will of him who sins mortally is completely turned away from the ultimate end; whereas the intention of him who sins venially remains turned toward the end, but is in some way impeded while he adheres more than is due to those things that are for the end. Therefore, to him who sins mortally is owed to be completely excluded from the attainment of the end; but to him who sins venially, to suffer difficulty before he reaches the end.

It should be noted that through mortal sin one is said to be excluded from the attainment of the end, but through venial sin to be impeded and retarded, because, since through mortal sin man suffers the defect of the principle leading to the end, namely charity, he can never, so far as comes from what is intrinsic, reach that end; whereas through venial sin man suffers a certain unseemliness of the act by which he was to proceed to the end, and is bound to the payment of temporal punishment, and therefore, unless that unseemliness is removed and the punishment paid, man cannot reach beatitude, which is the ultimate end; which is to be retarded from the attainment of the end.

III. Thirdly. If he whose intention is turned away from the ultimate end should attain the end itself, this will be by chance and by fortune: because when someone attains what he was not intending, it is by chance and by fortune. But this is unfitting. Because the ultimate end is the good of the intellect. But it is unfitting that the intellect should not attain its end through an intelligible way, but by fortune. Therefore etc.

It should be noted that the ultimate end of man, as was shown above³, is nothing other than the knowledge and vision of God, who is supreme Truth, through essence. But the knowledge of truth is the good and perfection of the intellect. Therefore it is well said that the ultimate end is the good of the intellect.

It should also be noted that, since each thing has an inclination toward its end according to the condition of its nature, it is fitting that each thing also attain its end according to the mode of its nature: for natural things attain their end naturally; but sensitive things, as such, sensibly, that is, from sensible apprehension. By the same reason, it is fitting that intelligible things attain their good and their end intelligibly, that is, from intelligible apprehension and the intention of the will following it. And because fortune is opposed to intelligible knowledge and to the intention of that which one attains, therefore it is not fitting that intelligible things, as such, should attain their end by fortune. Which indeed would happen if one who sins mortally, whose intention is completely turned away from the ultimate end, should attain the ultimate end itself apart from his intention. And this is the foundation of this reason.

2. But a doubt occurs concerning this. For it seems that one who sins venially sometimes attains the ultimate end apart from intention. For if someone should die in the very act of venial sin, for instance while speaking an idle word, thinking nothing about God, after the fault is expiated he will attain beatitude. And this is apart from intention, because he did not die with this intention. Therefore by fortune one can attain beatitude.

He answers that, although that man did not die with the actual intention of reaching the ultimate end, he nevertheless had a habitual intention of the end from the charity existing in him, and also a virtual intention, from the fact that he at some time ordered himself and his things toward God, and a contrary intention did not intervene. And thus not by fortune, but from intention does he attain the end.

IV. Fourthly. The end and the good is the perfection of the will just as form is of matter. Therefore it does not attain it unless it has been suitably disposed. Therefore it does not attain it if its intention is turned away from it. — The first consequence is proved from the likeness of matter and form. — But the second: because the will is disposed toward the end through the intention and desire of it.

Fifthly. Man through the works of the virtues, in which the chief thing is the intention of the due end, attains happiness. Therefore, if someone acts contrary to virtue, turned away from the intention of the ultimate end, it is fitting that he be deprived of the ultimate end. — The consequence is proved. Because in things ordered to an end, when the end is existing or future, it is necessary that the things that are for the end will be; and when they do not exist, the end will not be; otherwise the end is sought in vain through means of this kind.

2. Concerning this last statement a doubt occurs. For it happens that some end can be had without some determinate means, and yet it is not sought in vain through that means: just as through one potion someone seeks health, which he could acquire in another way, and yet it is not applied in vain, since through it he becomes healthy. And universally, when an end can be acquired through several means, none of those means is applied in vain when the effect follows.

He answers that St. Thomas is speaking here of means necessary for the end, without which the end cannot be had: as the intention of the due end is related to happiness. For concerning such things it is true that, if the end can be while they do not exist, the end is sought in vain through them, namely as through things that are necessary for the end. The objection, however, proceeds concerning a means that is not necessary for the end, although it too can lead to the end.

The conclusion is confirmed by the authority of Matt. 7.