Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

After St. Thomas showed that it belongs to God to punish and to reward, he now determines concerning punishment and reward itself ¹. Now concerning this he does two things: first, he determines concerning them absolutely; second, in relation to sin, ch. CXLIII.

Concerning the first he does two things: first, he shows the distinction and order of punishments; second, he explains their inequality, in the following chapter.

I. As to the first, he posits a twofold order of punishments ². The first is the order according to itself. And it is this: that the greatest punishment is for a human being to be excluded from beatitude; after this, to be deprived of virtue, and of whatever perfection of the soul's natural powers for acting well; then, the disorder of the natural powers of the soul; after this, harm to the body; finally, the removal of exterior goods.

It is explained. Because, since it belongs to the nature of punishment that it be an evil and contrary to the will, and evil is the privation of good, the difference and order of punishments must correspond to the difference and order of goods. But the order of goods is that the highest good of a human being is happiness, which is his ultimate end; then virtue, as what is nearest to this end, and whatever else profits toward the good operation of human beings, by which one arrives at beatitude; then the due disposition of reason and of the powers subject to it; then the soundness of the body, which is necessary for unimpeded operation; finally exterior goods, which we use as aids to virtue.

2. It should be noted that the order sought here between goods and evils is not according to duration or according to the way of generation, but according to nature and the way of perfection: namely, so that that is called the first good which is highest, and that the first evil which exceeds all the evils of a human being. Now this order among goods is taken according to the order of the end, and of those things that are for the end. For the end holds the first place. But among those things that are ordered to the end, the closer something is to the end, the more it is preeminent among the goods of a human being, as is said here. And because the end of a human being consists in the operation by which he is joined to God, and one arrives at that end through action, something is that much closer to the end, and therefore more perfect, the more immediate it is to the operation by which one arrives at beatitude. And because virtue is closer and more immediate to an operation of this kind than the due disposition of reason and of the powers subject to it, since it is required as the perfect form of reason and of the other potencies subject to it in order that an operation due and suitable to the end may be elicited, virtue therefore holds preeminence over the disposition of reason. In the same way, because the good of reason and of the subject powers is closer to an operation of this kind than the goods of the body, and the goods of the body closer than exterior goods—since the goods of the body are ordered to the goods of the soul, and exterior goods to the goods of the body—the good of reason therefore holds preeminence over the good of the body, and the good of the body over the good of exterior things, speaking always of the per se order of goods.

II. The second order ³ of punishments is according to the estimation of certain human beings, to whose will that which is privative of a greater good is less contrary, and consequently seems less penal, since it belongs to the nature of punishment that it be contrary to the will. For among these, injuries of the body and losses of exterior things are considered the greatest punishment; but the disorder of the soul, the loss of virtue, and the forfeiture of the divine fruition are counted by them as little or nothing. For which reason, since they esteem and know sensible and bodily goods more than intelligible and spiritual ones, they also fear bodily punishments more than spiritual ones. — From this also it proceeds that they do not think human sins are punished by God, because they see that for the most part it is well with sinners as to things of this kind, but ill with the virtuous ⁴.

2. But St. Thomas says that such divine disposition ought not to seem wondrous to those who consider rightly. And he notes three things. The first is that, since exterior and bodily goods are good for a human being only insofar as they profit the good of reason, but evil insofar as they impede it, God, who knows the measure of human virtue, sometimes supplies goods of this kind to a virtuous human being as a help to virtue, but sometimes withdraws the aforesaid from him, lest they be an impediment to virtue and to divine fruition for him. From which it follows, since punishment is an evil, that for a virtuous human being it is not a punishment to be deprived of goods of this kind for the aid of virtue; but on the contrary it is for a punishment to the wicked if such things are granted to them, by which they are provoked to evil. Which is shown by the authority of Wis. 14.

The second is that the loss of bodily and exterior goods, even when it is for the progress of virtue in a human being and not unto evil, is called a punishment improperly, from the fact that it is against the will.

The third is that punishment is not in a human being except by some preceding fault. — It is proved. Because both according as it is against the will, and according as it is an evil for a human being, and according as it is for the progress of virtue in a human being, it happens from some disorder of the human being. But such disorder is either a fault, or proceeds from some preceding fault.

The major premise is explained as to all its parts. As to the first part indeed: because that a human being does not value things according to what they are, but prefers bodily to spiritual things, happens from a disorder of the human being. — As to the second indeed: because those things that are good in themselves would not be turned to evil for a human being through abuse unless some disorder existed in the human being. — As to the third indeed: because that it should be necessary that those things which the will accepts as naturally good for a human being be withdrawn for the progress of virtue comes from some disorder of the human being.

The minor premise is promised below to be explained. Nevertheless, as far as pertains to the third part, it is shown because through preceding sin a certain disorder is made in human affection, so that it is afterward more easily inclined to sin.

3. For the clarity of this third point, it must be considered that from what was said before St. Thomas presupposes that punishment happens to a human being from bodily and exterior things in three ways. First, from their withdrawal contrary to the human being's will. For such withdrawal is penal insofar as it is contrary to the will, because it belongs to the nature of punishment that it be contrary to the will. — Second, from their granting when this is turned to evil for the human being. It is penal because it belongs to the nature of punishment properly so called that it be an evil. — Third, from their withdrawal for the progress of virtue. For such withdrawal, insofar as it profits toward virtue, although properly speaking it results in a benefit for the human being and is not properly penal, nevertheless is improperly and abusively penal, because it is contrary to the human being's will absolutely, although, as is said here, it is sometimes willed according as reason looks to the end.

He touched upon the first mode when he proved that punishment, according as it is contrary to the will, proceeds from the disorder from which a false estimation comes. For he intends that the withdrawal of goods of this kind is for this reason contrary to the will, and consequently penal, because a human being falsely estimates bodily and exterior goods to surpass spiritual ones, and thus values them more than he ought. And because such a false estimation proceeds from some disorder, the same must be said of punishment itself. — He touched upon the second mode when he said that those things that are good in themselves would not be turned to evil for a human being through abuse unless some disorder existed in the human being. For the granting of these goods is turned to evil for a human being, and is for that reason a punishment to him, because he abuses the things granted unto evil. — He touched upon the third mode when he said that it comes from a disorder of the human being that it is necessary that those things which the will accepts be withdrawn for the progress of virtue.

III. Concerning that which is said, that it is contrary to the will of a human being absolutely to be deprived of bodily and exterior goods, although it is sometimes willed according as reason looks to the end: — it must be considered that nothing prevents something from being in itself contrary to the will, and yet being willed in relation to some end. For since the object of the will is the good and the appetible, that which is not appetible in itself, but has something contrary to appetibility, is repugnant to the will. But because it happens that what is not appetible in itself has appetibility from its relation to some end, as happens with bitter medicine in relation to health, it therefore comes about that what, considered in itself, is contrary to the will as a certain evil, is willed from its relation to the end which someone loves more than the other good that is deprived through the evil. Because therefore the withdrawal of the aforesaid goods is evil in itself, as depriving a human being of goods ordered to him, it is therefore said to be absolutely contrary to the human being's will. Yet nevertheless, because it is sometimes ordered to the progress of virtue, which a human being loves more than bodily and exterior goods themselves, the will therefore accepts it as reason orders it to this end.

IV. Finally, it must be considered that through this discourse St. Thomas best satisfies the doubt that was raised ⁵. For when it was said that the sins of human beings are not punished by God, because sinners for the most part abound in bodily and exterior goods: — it is clear from what was said before that from this sins are not said to be unpunished; rather, they are punished more, because the granting of goods of this kind turns into a punishment for the wicked and for sinners, while they are provoked to evil by them.

When it is also confirmed, because the virtuous are sometimes deprived of these goods, and thus seem to be punished without fault: — it is clear from what was said before, first, that that is not properly a punishment for virtuous human beings, since this turns into a good for them, that is, into the progress of virtue. — It is clear, second, that insofar as the withdrawal of such goods is in some way penal to them, as being contrary to the will, it is not inflicted except on account of some preceding fault, at least original sin. And thus God does not punish them without fault.

V. From this is clear the response to Durandus, whom Capreolus adduces, dist. xxxvi of II Sent. ⁶. For he argues that punishment is not always inflicted for fault, because punishments are sometimes inflicted on the just so that merits may be increased through patience, as happened in Job ⁷; sometimes also to manifest the glory of God, as in the man born blind ⁸. For in these it is clear that punishment is not inflicted for fault.

But to this it is said, from the foregoing, that those punishments (which are nevertheless called punishments improperly) are inflicted for some fault. Because it would not be necessary that merits be increased, or the glory of God be manifested, through penalities of this kind, were it not for some preceding disorder of nature, which proceeded from original sin. Hence in the state of innocence it would not have been necessary for a human being to be helped toward the progress of virtue, and things of this kind, through such penalities; nor through them would the glory of God have been manifested; as is had from the doctrine of St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. lxxxvii, a. 7; and II Sent., d. xxxvi, q. 1, a. 4.

Nor does what he objects stand in the way, saying that the punishment of sense is not owed to original sin. — For it is said that this is true after this life, but not in this life, where many penalities are related consecutively to original sin, although they are not directly owed to it. But concerning this there will be discussion below, when original sin is treated ⁹.