Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

After St. Thomas has shown that it belongs to divine providence to give laws to men, he wishes further to show that it belongs to it to punish or reward men ¹.

Concerning this, however, he does two things: first, he shows that human acts are punished or rewarded by God; second, he determines concerning punishment and reward, in the following chapter.

I. As to the first, he argues first as follows. It belongs to divine providence to impose a law upon men. Therefore, it belongs to God to punish or reward men. — The consequence is proved. Because it belongs to him to punish or reward to whom it belongs to impose a law: since lawmakers induce the observance ² of the law through rewards and punishments.

Secondly. God has imposed a certain order upon the acts of men in relation to the end of the good, that is, to the end from which all things have goodness. Therefore it is necessary, if that order is rightly established, that those who walk by it attain the end of the good, namely from God himself, which is to be rewarded; but that those who depart from it through sin are excluded from the end of the good, which is to be punished. — The consequence is proved. Because wherever there is some due order to an end, that order must lead to the end, whereas departure from the order must exclude the end: since those things that lead to an end derive their necessity from the end.

II. Thirdly. When in natural things the due order of natural principles and actions is preserved, there follows from the necessity of nature conservation and good in them; but corruption and evil follow when there is a departure from the due and natural order. Therefore also in human affairs it is necessary that, when man voluntarily observes or omits the order of the divine law, he attains good or evil, not from necessity, but from the dispensation of the ruler, which is to be rewarded or punished. — The consequence is proved. Because the observance and transgression of the order of divine providence, to which both natural things and human acts are subject, is established within the power of the human will, but not within the power of natural things. But effects must correspond to causes through fittingness.

2. But it seems that this reason is not conclusive. For just as in natural things the good or evil that follows is referred to nature itself as to a principle, because it is not within the power of natural things to follow their order or to depart from it; so, if effects must correspond to causes in human acts, it follows that the good and evil ought to be referred to the will itself, but not to the disposition of the ruler, because the observance and transgression of the due order is established within the power of the human will. And thus it does not follow that it belongs to God to reward or punish.

To this it is said that this reason presupposes that the good and evil that arise from action are in all things from the disposition of the ruler; but in some, namely in natural things, it is so ordered that good or evil arises for them from the necessity of nature; whereas in some, that is in voluntary agents, it is so disposed that it does not arise from the necessity of nature, but from the will of the ruler, reserving to himself the dispensation of good and evil. For among voluntary agents it is not fitting that the same one be he who merits and he who repays, but repayment belongs to a superior. And therefore, since man is borne to his operations not from a natural principle, but by the will, it follows that good and evil arise for him, not from the necessity of nature, but from the will of the ruler.

III. Fourthly. Human acts are subject to divine providence. Therefore the evil that happens in them must be enclosed under the order of some good. But this is most fittingly done by the fact that sins are punished. Therefore, etc. — The first consequence is proved. Because it belongs to divine goodness to leave nothing disordered in things. It is made clear in natural things. — But the subsumed minor premise is proved. Because thus those things which exceed their due quantity are comprehended under the order of justice. — It is made clear. Because man exceeds the due degree of his quantity by preferring his own will to the divine will. Which inequality indeed is removed while, against his own will, he is compelled to suffer something according to the divine will.

Fifthly. Divine providence moves all things to the execution of the order disposed by him. But the will is moved by its object, which is good or evil. Therefore it belongs to divine providence to propose goods to it as a reward, so that it may be moved to proceed rightly; and evils as a punishment, to the end that it may avoid disorder.

For the evidence of this reason, it must be considered, as is evident from what precedes ³, that the will is moved by its object, not indeed in the manner of an efficient cause, but in the manner of an end. But the end does not move unless it is proposed to the will. Therefore, since God moves each thing to the execution of its work according as its condition demands, it is fitting that he move the will by proposing to it good and evil: although he is also able to move it efficiently from within.

Sixthly. Most fittingly does man make progress toward the end of the good from the good and evil of another, while he is incited to act well by the fact that he sees those who work well being rewarded, and while he is recalled from evil by the fact that he sees those who act evilly being punished. Therefore both belong to divine providence. — The consequence is proved. Because divine providence has ordered things in this manner, that one may benefit another.

It is confirmed by the authority of Exodus 20, the Psalm, and Rom. 2.

Through this is excluded the error of those who say that God does not punish: namely of Marcion and Valentinus, who say that one is the good God, and another the just God, who punishes.