Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

From what has been said, ¹ St. Thomas infers one corollary: namely, that neither are all good works equal, nor are all sins equal.

Concerning this, moreover, he does three things: first, he proves the conclusion; second, he adduces reasons to the contrary, and resolves them; ² third, he infers a certain distinction concerning sin. ³

Concerning the first, he does two things: first, he proves that not all acts of the virtues are equal; second, that neither are all sins equal. ⁴

I. As to the first, he argues first as follows. Counsels are given concerning continence, poverty, and the like. Therefore these are better goods than to make use of marriage and to possess temporal things, in accordance with which it is possible to act virtuously, the order of reason being preserved. Therefore not all acts of the virtues are equal. — The first consequence is proved. Because counsel is not given except concerning a better good.

For the evidence of this reason, it must be considered, from the teaching of St. Thomas in Iª IIae, q. cviii, a. 4; and Quodl. V, a. 19, ⁵ that precepts differ from counsels because, since a precept implies the character of what is owed, but a counsel does not, precepts are given concerning those things that are necessary for the attainment of the end of eternal beatitude; counsels, however, are concerning those things through which a human being can better and more expeditiously attain the aforesaid end, although without them one can arrive at the end. Hence in the observance of the counsels the observance of the precepts is included, but not vice versa: for he who gives up all things does not seize what belongs to another nor steal; but not conversely does he who does not seize what belongs to another give up all things. Because therefore it is a better good to observe the precepts, without which one cannot arrive at beatitude, and beyond this something else, through which one can better and more easily arrive at beatitude, than to observe the precepts alone; for this reason it is well said, both here and elsewhere, ⁶ by St. Thomas that counsel is concerning a better good.

2. From this it is clear that Scotus spoke poorly, in II Sent., d. xxi, ⁷ that venial sin is distinguished from mortal sin because mortal is against a precept, but venial is against a counsel. For it is clear that one is not bound to keep the counsels, since without them one can attain the end; and consequently that not observing them is no sin. Otherwise he who does not give all his goods to the poor, and he who does not preserve all manner of chastity, would sin: for these things are counseled to us.

II. Second. The better the object is, the more virtuous also is the act according to its species: because acts receive their species from objects. The end also is better than those things that are for the end: and of these, something is so much the better the closer it is to the end. Therefore among human acts that one is the best which is borne immediately toward the ultimate end, namely God: after which, an act is so much the better according to its species the closer its object is to God.

Third. It happens that some acts approach reason more than others. Therefore etc. — The antecedent is proved. Because acts of reason have more of the good of reason than the acts of the lower powers, which reason commands. — But the consequent is proved: because the good in human acts is according as they are regulated by reason.

Note that by the name "act of reason" are understood not only acts of the intellect as they are distinguished from the will, but all practical acts of the intellective part: according as the whole human mind is called reason.

Fourth. It happens that someone performs what is to be done out of greater love than another. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. Because the precepts of the law are best fulfilled out of love.

III. Fifth. It happens that an intention, ⁸ even the same one, is greater in one than in another. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved: — and it is manifest, if human acts are rendered good from the will.

Note, from the teaching of St. Thomas in Iª IIae, q. xii, ⁹ that by the name "intention" is understood an act of the will concerning an end, whether ultimate or proximate, according as it is the term of something that orders to it: for we are said to intend health not only from the fact that we will it, but because we will to arrive at it through something else. When therefore St. Thomas says that it happens that the same intention is greater in one than in another, he does not understand it of the numerically same act of the will tending to the end, but of the same according to species. For one wills to attain the same end through certain means with greater fervor and a more intense will than another: and this is for the same intention to be greater in one than in another. And because, other things being equal, a greater and more fervent intention of the will concerning the good is better, for that reason human acts, because they are rendered good by the will, are so much better, other things being equal, the greater the intention of the will with which they are performed.

Sixth. It happens that one virtue is better than another. Therefore etc. — The consequence is clear. Because, if human acts are rendered good from virtues, the act that is of a better virtue must be better.

It must be noted that in these two reasons St. Thomas uses a conditional to prove the consequence, so that from the manner of speaking he may give it to be understood that the reason is self-evident. For it is fitting in those things that we hold most certainly, and are conceded by all, to use this manner of speaking. For we sometimes say, "If it is true that God is just, that man will not escape unpunished": as if we were saying, "Because it is most true that God is just, that man will pay the penalties for his crimes."

The conclusion is confirmed by the authority of 1 Cor. vii.

IV. Second, St. Thomas shows that not all sins either are equal. ¹⁰ And he says that this appears by the same reasons.

First: since through one sin there is a greater departure from the end than through another. In which is touched the reason corresponding to the second reason stated above. For just as goodness in human acts is considered according to approach to the end, so badness will be considered according to departure from the end.

Second: since the order of reason is more perverted. In which is touched the reason corresponding to the third reason. For just as the good in human acts is to be in accordance with reason, so the evil is to be contrary to reason.

Third: since greater harm is inflicted on the neighbor. In which is touched the reason corresponding to the fourth reason. For just as precepts are best fulfilled out of love, so what is against them occurs when one acts against the love either of God or of the neighbor, by inflicting harm on the neighbor.

It is confirmed by the authority of Ezek. xvi.

V. Through this is excluded the error of those who say that all merits and sins are equal.

It must be noted that this opinion, as St. Thomas recounts in Iª IIae, q. lxxiii, a. 2; and II Sent., d. xlii, ¹¹ a. 5; and in Qq. de Malo, q. ii, a. 9, was first that of the Stoics, which Cicero also imitated in the Paradoxa. ¹² For the Stoics thought that virtue consists entirely in an indivisible; and therefore, however much one departs from this indivisible, nothing of goodness remains. And thus, since through every sin whatsoever there is a departure from this indivisible, they thought that all sins are equal.

Moreover, St. Thomas weakens this foundation in II Sent., ¹³ Both because it is false that virtue consists entirely in an indivisible: as is clear through Aristotle, II Ethics. ¹⁴ - And because, although that were true, the character of goodness nevertheless does not consist in an indivisible. Because it happens that a perfection is superadded to a perfection, each of which causes the character of goodness. And therefore, if two perfections are subtracted, a lesser goodness remains than if one alone is subtracted.

Certain heretics, having imitated this error, said that there is no inequality either between sins, or between merits, or between rewards, or between punishments.

VI. As to the second, St. Thomas adduces the reasons by which the aforesaid error could be confirmed. ¹⁵

For that all virtuous acts are equal will seem able to be confirmed by this reason: that of all good acts there is the same end of the good.

That all sins are equal, however, by this reason: because sin in human acts happens from this alone, that someone passes beyond the rule of reason. But he who departs in a small way from reason passes beyond the rule of reason just as he who does so in a great way. - It is confirmed. Because if a boundary is set for someone that he may not transgress, it matters nothing to the judge whether he has transgressed much or little.

2. To the first, St. Thomas says, by denying the consequence, that although there is one ultimate end of the good, nevertheless acts that have goodness from it receive a diverse grade of goodness, according as some are better than others, and closer to the ultimate end. Hence also in acts of the will there will be a grade of goodness according to the diversity of goods at which the will and its act terminate.

It must be noted that St. Thomas calls the "end of the good" in this place the end of the goodness that is in acts, namely from the order to which the act has that it is good. But the ultimate end, from which all things have goodness, is one, namely God. But proximate ends are many: which have a grade of goodness among themselves from a diverse approach to the ultimate end. And therefore from the unity of the ultimate end of all goods it cannot be argued that all goods are equal: nor, consequently, that all virtuous acts that are concerned with goods of this kind are equal in goodness.

3. To the second, he says that in all things whose perfection and good consist in a certain commensuration, the more one departs from the due commensuration, the greater the evil will be. It is shown in health, beauty, and truth. But the good of virtue consists in a certain commensuration: for it is a mean, established according to the due limitation of circumstances, between contrary vices. Therefore, the more one departs from this harmony, the greater is the badness.

From this response St. Thomas intends to deny the consequence, if the minor premise is understood, as it seems it must be understood, according to similitude only, namely that, just as he who departs in a small way from reason passes beyond the rule of reason, so also does he who departs in a great way. - If, however, it were understood according to equality, namely that he who departs in a small way from reason passes beyond the rule of reason just as much as he who departs in a great way: the minor itself would be false.

To the confirmation, he says that it is not similar to transgress virtue, and the boundaries set by a judge. Because, since virtue is a good in itself, to transgress it is an evil in itself; but to transgress a boundary set by a judge is not an evil in itself, but per accidens, namely inasmuch as it is prohibited. But in those things that are per se, it is necessary that, just as what is simpliciter follows from what is simpliciter, so the greater follows from the greater; but not in those things that are per accidens.

VII. As to the third, St. Thomas posits one distinction concerning sins: namely, that a certain sin is mortal, but a certain sin is venial. ¹⁶ A mortal sin is one that deprives the soul of spiritual life. And because the spiritual life of the soul consists in the will's adhering through love to God and the neighbor, as is shown from the similitude of bodily life, therefore whatever sins are opposed to the intention of the ultimate end and to love are mortal. If, however, these being preserved, someone falls short in some right order of reason, it will be a venial sin.

VIII. For the evidence of this distinction, it must be noted first, from the teaching of St. Thomas in Iª IIae, q. lxxii, ¹⁷ II Sent., d. xlii; ¹⁸ and De Malo, q. vii, ¹⁹ that these names "mortal" and "venial" imply differences of the guilt of sin: for we call that sin venial which is worthy of pardon, that is, which does not exclude the termination of punishment; but mortal which is worthy of death, that is, it merits eternal punishment, and excludes the termination of punishment. Hence, because guilt is not the very essence of sin, but follows upon it, mortal and venial are not essential differences of sin, but accidental ones: according as every difference that is not of the essence of a thing is called accidental to it. But although these differences are outside the essence of sin, among themselves they are nevertheless essentially distinguished: just as whiteness and blackness are essentially distinct among themselves, and yet divide animal only accidentally when it is divided by white and black.

2. It must be considered second, that these differences, mortal and venial, sometimes follow the very specific difference of sins in themselves; but sometimes they do not follow the specific difference, but are found in one and the same species of sin. When they follow the specific difference of sins, the sins themselves are called such ex genere. Hence it is said that a certain sin is mortal ex genere, but a certain sin is venial from its genus: not indeed that this is a division of a genus into species, but of an analogon into its significates. And because the genus and species of sin are taken from the object, that is said to be mortal from its genus, or worthy of eternal death, which is concerned with matter repugnant to the end of human acts, which is charity or the love of God and neighbor, because it removes the principle of spiritual life, namely charity, which being removed, the soul cannot be healed from an intrinsic principle. But that is said to be venial ex genere which is concerned with matter that is not contrary to this end, although it has some inordinateness, while it lacks the due order to the end: for such does not remove the principle of spiritual life; therefore, as far as it is of itself, it can be healed.

When, however, mortal and venial do not follow the specific difference of sins, but are found in one and the same species of sin, the sin is not called each of these from its genus, but one is said to be from its genus, while the other is on the part of the sinner, and per accidens. For when it happens that someone sins concerning matter repugnant to charity not from deliberation, as happens in sudden movements, then such a sin is venial on the part of the agent: although another sin, similar to it in species, is a mortal sin. Hence such a sin, which considered in particular is venial per accidens on account of the imperfection of the act, is said to be of the genus of mortal sin. - Similarly, when it happens that someone sins concerning matter not repugnant to charity, by establishing the ultimate end in it, or by ordering it to some sin mortal from its genus, as when someone orders an idle word to committing adultery; then such a sin is indeed of the genus of venial sin, but on account of the perverse intention of the agent it is mortal per accidens.

3. It must be considered third that, since many things happen to the sin underlying this accidental difference which is mortal, and many things happen to the sin underlying this accident which is venial; in this place St. Thomas investigated only the essential characters of sins upon which the differences of mortal and venial originally follow per se, so that they can be called such from their genus, and according to which not only the differences themselves that are formally implied by these names "mortal" and "venial" have to be distinguished essentially, but also the sins themselves that underlie differences of this kind. And because these characters are, to be a voluntary act concerning matter repugnant to charity, and, to be a voluntary act concerning matter not repugnant to charity; for that reason he assigned this distinction alone of mortal and venial sin, all others having been omitted. For thus it is clear that mortal and venial, taken not only formally, but also materially, have opposition to one another, nor can they meet in one species of sin: although on the part of the agent, something in the same species may be mortal, and something venial.

From this it is clear that it can be said to the arguments of Aureole, recounted by Capreolus, distinctio xliii of II Sent., ²⁰ by which he proves that sin is essentially divided by mortal and venial, that they indeed conclude what is true, though not well. For it is true that these differences, mortal and venial, are essentially distinguished among themselves. It is also true that those sins that per se underlie those differences, which namely are called such from their genus, are essentially distinct. It is not true, however, of them according as on the part of the agent mortal or venial sin are distinct.