Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

After St. Thomas has disputed against Vigilantius, who attacked voluntary poverty, and against those who attack perpetual continence, he wishes to dispute against those who attack vows and obedience ¹.

Concerning this, however, he does two things: first, he adduces their argument and resolves it; second, he argues against them ².

I. He says first, then, that it seemed to some to be foolish to bind oneself by vow to obey someone, or to keep anything whatsoever: namely, on this ground, because it seems to detract from the praiseworthiness of virtuous acts that they are done out of the necessity of obedience or of a vow. For every good, the more freely it is done, the more virtuous it seems to be. But the greater the necessity by which someone is bound to observe something, the less freely he seems to do it.

2. But St. Thomas answers that these men seem to be ignorant of the nature of necessity. And he says two things.

First, that since necessity is threefold—namely, of coaction; and proceeding from an interior inclination; and from the end—the necessity of coaction diminishes the praise of virtuous acts, because it is contrary to the voluntary; but not the other two necessities. Indeed, the necessity proceeding from an interior inclination increases it: it makes the will tend intensely into the act of virtue; and, if the habit of virtue has reached the end of perfection, it introduces a certain necessity for acting well, as in the Blessed; yet on this account nothing of the will's freedom is lost, nor of the goodness of the act. It is the same concerning the necessity of the end: for what one does as necessary for the end is on this very account praiseworthy; and the more praiseworthy, the better the end was.

He says secondly that the necessity of observing what one has vowed, or of obeying him to whom one subjects oneself, is only a necessity of the end: for it is necessary for the vower to do this or that if the vow is to be fulfilled, or obedience kept. And therefore, since these ends are praiseworthy, inasmuch as by them man subjects himself to God, the aforesaid necessity diminishes nothing of the praise of virtue.

From that response it is clear that, once the minor premise concerning the necessity of coaction is admitted, the other implied proposition—namely, that such is the necessity of observing a vow and fulfilling obedience—is false. If, however, the minor premise itself is understood of the other of the two necessities, it is false: because necessity of this kind takes away neither freedom nor the voluntary.

II. But concerning this a doubt arises. For as is said in Qu. de Malo, q. xvi, a. 5, free choice is so called from the fact that it can tend to different things. But man cannot tend to different things with respect to that good to which he is inclined by an interior necessity: as is clear in the Blessed, who always actually love God, and cannot not actually love him with the love of charity. Therefore such necessity does not stand with freedom. Therefore it is badly said that necessity of this kind takes away nothing from the freedom of the will.

It is answered that, since freedom is taken in two ways—namely, as it is opposed to the necessity of coaction, and as it is opposed to the necessity of natural inclination—it does not belong to the ratio of freedom insofar as it is opposed to the necessity of coaction that it be able to tend to different things, but that one act by the inclination of the will. This can belong even to an agent acting from natural inclination: for the will wills that into which man is borne by the natural inclination of the will, since the act of the will is nothing other than the inclination of the willing subject into something. On the other hand, what one does by the necessity of coaction, he does unwillingly, and against his will. — But it belongs to the ratio of freedom insofar as it is opposed to the necessity of natural inclination that it be able to tend to different things: because it does not have a determination to one. Whence in Verit., q. xxii, a. 6, St. Thomas says that the will is called free insofar as it does not have necessity. St. Thomas is speaking, then, of this in the place cited; but here he is speaking of freedom as it is opposed to coaction.

III. Secondly, St. Thomas argues against the aforesaid error ³, showing that, while some things are fulfilled which someone has vowed, or which are commanded him by one to whom he has subjected himself for God's sake, those things are worthy of greater praise and remuneration. Moreover, he proves this by a threefold argument ⁴.

For the first argument, he premises two points. One is that it happens that one act belongs to two vices: when the act of one vice is ordered to the end of another vice. And similarly it happens that the act of one virtue is ordered to another: as when someone gives of his own goods in order to have the friendship of charity with another. — The other is that a virtuous act of this kind has greater praise from charity, to which it is ordered, than from liberality, whose act it is according to its species. Whence, if it be remiss in that which belongs to liberality, it is more praiseworthy from the fact that it is ordered to charity, and worthy of greater reward, than if it were done more liberally not in an order to charity.

Then as follows. If someone does some work of virtue without a vow—for instance, he fasts or is continent—it will be an act either of chastity or of abstinence. If, however, he does it from a vow, it is further referred to the virtue of religion, to which it belongs to vow something to God, which virtue is more excellent than chastity and abstinence, inasmuch as it causes us to be rightly related to God. Therefore what he does ⁵ from a vow is more praiseworthy, even if he takes no pleasure in abstinence or chastity, from the fact that he takes pleasure in the more excellent virtue, which is religion.

2. When it is said that to vow is an act of religion, it should be noted, from the teaching of St. Thomas in IIa IIae, q. lxxxviii, a. 5 and 6, that acts which are done from a vow, insofar as they are of this kind, belong to divine worship, as certain sacrifices. Because a vow is a certain promise made to God; but a promise is nothing other than the ordering of that which is promised to him to whom it is promised; and thus a vow is a certain ordering of those things which one vows to divine worship or service. But to order the act of any virtue whatever to the worship and service of God belongs to the virtue of religion. Therefore it is fittingly said that to vow is an act of religion.

3. But a doubt arises concerning what St. Thomas adds: even if he takes no pleasure in chastity or abstinence ⁶. For it seems to belong to the ratio of a habit that it produces pleasure in its work: as is clear from the Philosopher in Ethics II ⁷. Therefore it does not seem well said that someone performing a work of chastity or abstinence in an order to religion takes no pleasure in the work itself: as the argument seems to suppose.

To this one can also answer in three ways. First, that St. Thomas does not assert that, but speaks conditionally, saying that it is so, even if the one acting takes no pleasure in the chastity or abstinence itself.

Secondly, that he is not speaking here of those acts according as they proceed from the habit of chastity and abstinence, but according as they are materially works of chastity and abstinence: just as someone also at times performs just deeds, yet not from the habit and virtue of justice.

Thirdly, from the teaching of St. Thomas in IIa IIae, q. cxxiii, a. 8, ad 2, according to the mind of the Philosopher in Ethics III ⁸, it can be answered that to act with pleasure does not exist in all virtues, except insofar as one attains the end. For the works of virtues can according to their nature be sorrowful, although on account of the end they are pleasurable.

IV. Secondly ⁹. If someone does something for God's sake, he offers that act to God. But if he does this from a vow, he offers to God not only the act, but also the potency. Therefore his purpose is toward offering something greater to God. Therefore that act will be more virtuous, even if in execution another should seem more fervent.

The last consequence is proved. Because, since the end is the most important thing in virtue, if the end is more eminent, although someone behaves more remissly in the act, his act will be more virtuous: just as, if someone proposes to make a long journey for the sake of the good of virtue, but another a short one, he who intends something greater for the sake of virtue will be more praiseworthy, although in the progress of the journey he proceeds slowly ¹⁰.

When it is said that the vower offers to God not only the act, but also the potency, it should be noted that this is to be understood in this way: that the vower not only gives to God the act to which he bound himself by vow, but also offers to God the power of acting, because henceforth he cannot lawfully act against what he vowed. And therefore he is said to offer something greater to God than one who does not act from a vow: just as one who gave a man a tree with the fruits would give more than one who gave the fruits only ¹¹.

V. Concerning this argument a double doubt arises. The first is because, although it is assumed that if the end is more eminent, the act will be more virtuous, it is not subsumed, as ought to be subsumed, that the end of one doing something from a vow is more eminent, but that the vower proposes to do something greater for God's sake. But this does not belong to the end, but to that which is ordered to the end. Whence also the example that is assumed for the manifestation of that proposition does not seem to the purpose: for that one proposes to make a longer journey for the sake of virtue than another does not show that he acts on account of a more eminent end, since the end of both is virtue; but that he orders something greater to the same end.

2. The second is because this consequence does not seem to hold: One who does something from a vow offers something greater to God than one who does it not from a vow. Therefore his act is more virtuous. For, as is clear from Mark 12 ¹² and Luke 21 ¹³, the poor widow who cast two copper mites into the treasury is praised more by the Lord than the rich, who cast in much.

VI. To the first, it is said that we can speak of the end in two ways: in one way, of the thing itself absolutely which is the end; in another way, of that which someone intends concerning the thing which is the end; just as the end of the greedy man is the possession of money, or its use. For one operation to be more virtuous or more praiseworthy than another, it suffices that it have a more eminent end in either of those ways. It is said, therefore, that the minor is excellently subsumed concerning the end in this argument, but in the second way. For the thing which is the end in the present case is materially God; but the very subjection to God is the end as that which is intended concerning God, which can be called the end as the attainment of the thing which is the end. And because he who does something for God's sake from a vow intends a greater subjection to God than he who acts not from a vow, therefore the end of his work is more eminent than the end of the work of one not acting from a vow. Whence St. Thomas in the IIa IIae ¹⁴, treating this argument, says that he who vows something and does it subjects himself more to God than he who only does it. — The example is also to the purpose. For although the length of the journey, taken absolutely, has the ratio of that which is ordered to the end, nevertheless the labor intended through it for acquiring virtue has the ratio of a proximate end. And therefore, because the one proposing to make a long journey for the sake of virtue intends greater labor in acquiring virtue than the one proposing to make a short journey, he therefore intends a more eminent end.

2. To the second, it is said that to do something greater for God's sake, other things being equal, is more virtuous, because it shows a greater love of God: just as one who does something greater and more difficult for the sake of a friend shows that he loves him more. Therefore he who subjects himself more to God acts more virtuously. — But that widow is no obstacle. Because although that which she offered was little, and less than that which the rich were offering, considering the quantity of the thing absolutely, it was nevertheless great in comparison to her, who was very poor. Whence, considering her poverty, she was offering more than the rich. Moreover, the Lord shows this when he says that all cast in of that which was in abundance to them, but she, of her penury, cast in all that she had ¹⁵. And thus it is clear that there was not parity on the part of those offering.

VII. Thirdly ¹⁶. He who has vowed that he will do something has willed it more intently ¹⁷, that is, with greater intention, than he who simply arranges to do it. Therefore from this intention the execution of the vow is rendered praiseworthy with a certain intention, even when the will is either not actually borne into the work, or is borne remissly. Therefore what is done from a vow is done more praiseworthily than what is done without a vow: other things being equal, however. — The antecedent is proved. Because the vower not only willed to do it, but willed to establish himself so as not to fall away from doing it. — But the first consequence is proved: because the will preceding the act remains virtually in the entire attainment of the act, and renders it praiseworthy, even when there is no thought concerning such a purpose of the will in the execution of the work.

For the clarity of this argument, it must be considered that when someone vows something, the intention of the will is borne into two things: namely, into that which he vows he will do, and into the immobility and firmness of the will; for he wills his will to be established and stabilized in doing it, so that it may not be lawful for him henceforth to recoil from that purpose. On this account it is said that the one who vows that he will do something is borne more intently into it than the one who does not vow and acts, whose will is borne only into the act. And because this intention of the vower is praiseworthy, and more praiseworthy than the intention of one proposing that he will do some good but not vowing; and it remains virtually in the execution of the work even when there is no thought concerning such a purpose of the will: therefore the act itself in execution, from that first intention of the vower by which he arranged to act firmly and immovably, has a certain praiseworthiness which the work done not from a vow does not have. On this account St. Thomas excellently infers from that first intention of the vower that the act done from a vow is more praiseworthy than is an act which is not done from a vow.

The last words of St. Thomas, however, should be noted: namely, other things being equal. For from this it is given to be understood that, speaking of the same act—for instance, of abstinence, chastity, and the like—it is more praiseworthy to do it from a vow than to do it without a vow, when the same and equal circumstances occur; but where other things are not equal—for instance, that one should do with greater charity that which he does without a vow than another does that to which he is bound by a vow, and similar cases—it is not necessary that it be more praiseworthy to act from a vow than to act without a vow.

St. Thomas treats this matter most fully in the Secunda Secundae, in the place cited above ¹⁸; and in the Treatise On the Perfection of the Spiritual Life, chapter 12 ¹⁹.