Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

Francesco Silvestri

Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

Francesco Silvestri (1474–1528)

Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles

First published 1926

In Book III of the Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Francesco Silvestri of Ferrara (Ferrariensis) expounds Aquinas's account of providence, human happiness, moral action, and divine grace. The commentary accompanies the Leonine text in volume XIV (1926). The present digital edition includes the Latin text and an English translation.


Prooemium

Caput I: Quod Omne Agens Agit propter Finem

Caput II: Quod Omne Agens Agit propter Bonum

Caput III: Quod Malum est Praeter Intentionem in Rebus

Caput IV: Rationes Quibus Videtur Probari quod Malum non Sit Praeter Intentionem

Caput V: Solutio Rationum Praemissarum

Caput VI: Quod Malum non est Aliqua Essentia

Caput VII: Rationes Quibus Videtur Probari quod Malum Sit Natura vel Res Aliqua

Caput VIII: Solutio Rationum Praemissarum

Caput IX: Quod Causa Mali est Bonum

Caput X: Quod Malum Fundatur in Bono

Caput XI: Quod Malum non Totaliter Consumit Bonum

Caput XII: Quod Malum Habet Aliquo Modo Causam

Caput XIII: Quod Malum est Causa per Accidens

Caput XIV: Quod non est Summum Malum

Caput XV: Quod Finis Cuiuslibet Rei est Bonum

Caput XVI: Quod Omnia Ordinantur in Unum Finem, qui est Deus

Caput XVII: Quomodo Deus Sit Finis Rerum

Caput XVIII: Quod Omnia Intendunt Assimilari Deo

Caput XIX: Quomodo Res Imitentur Divinam Bonitatem

Caput XX: Quod Res Intendunt Naturaliter Assimilari Deo in Hoc quod est Causa

Caput XXI: Quomodo Diversimode Res Ordinantur in Suos Fines

Caput XXII: Quod Motus Caeli est a Principio Intellectivo

Caput XXIII: Quomodo Appetunt Bonum Etiam quae Cognitione Carent

Caput XXIV: Quod Intelligere Deum est Finis Omnis Intellectualis Substantiae

Caput XXV: Utrum Felicitas Consistat in Actu Voluntatis

Caput XXVI: Quod Felicitas Humana non Consistit in Delectationibus Carnalibus

Caput XXVII: Quod Felicitas non Consistit in Honoribus

Caput XXVIII: Quod Felicitas Hominis non Consistit in Gloria

Caput XXIX: Quod Felicitas Hominis non Consistit in Divitiis

Caput XXX: Quod Felicitas non Consistit in Potentia Mundana

Caput XXXI: Quod Felicitas non Consistit in Bonis Corporis

Caput XXXII: Quod Felicitas Humana non Consistit in Sensu

Caput XXXIII: Quod Ultima Hominis Felicitas non Consistit in Actibus Virtutum Moralium

Caput XXXIV: Quod Ultima Felicitas non Sit in Actu Prudentiae

Caput XXXV: Quod Felicitas non Consistit in Operatione Artis

Caput XXXVI: Quod Ultima Felicitas Hominis Consistit in Contemplatione Dei

Caput XXXVII: Quod Felicitas Humana non Consistit in Cognitione Dei quae Communiter Habetur a Pluribus

Caput XXXVIII: Quod Felicitas Humana non Consistit in Cognitione Dei quae Habetur per Demonstrationem

Caput XXXIX: Quod Felicitas Humana non Consistit in Cognitione Dei quae est per Fidem

Caput XL: Utrum in Hac Vita Homo Possit Intelligere Substantias Separatas per Studium et Inquisitionem Scientiarum Speculativarum

Caput XLI: Quod non Possumus in Hac Vita Cognoscere Substantias Separatas sicut Ponit Alexander

Caput XLII: Quod non Possumus in Hac Vita Intelligere Substantias Separatas sicut Ponit Averroes

Caput XLIII: Quod Ultima Felicitas Hominis non Consistit in Cognitione Substantiarum Separatarum Qualem Praedictae Opiniones Fingunt

Caput XLIV: Quod non Possumus in Hac Vita Intelligere Substantias Separatas

Caput XLV: Quod Anima in Hac Vita non Intelligit Seipsam per Seipsam

Caput XLVI: Quod non Possumus in Hac Vita Videre Deum per Essentiam

Caput XLVII: Quod Ultima Hominis Felicitas non Sit in Hac Vita

Caput XLVIII: Quod Substantiae Separatae non Vident Deum per Essentiam ex Hoc quod Cognoscunt eum per Suam Essentiam

Caput XLIX: Quod in Naturali Cognitione Quam Habent Substantiae Separatae de Deo non Quiescit Earum Naturale Desiderium

Caput L: Quomodo Deus per Essentiam Videatur

Caput LI: Quod Nulla Creata Substantia Potest Sua Naturali Virtute Pervenire ad Videndum Deum per Essentiam

Caput LII: Quod Intellectus Creatus Indiget Aliqua Influentia Divini Luminis ad Hoc ut Deum per Essentiam Videat

Caput LIII: Rationes Quibus Videtur Probari quod Deus non Possit Videri per Essentiam, et Solutiones Earum

Caput LIV: Quod Intellectus Creatus non Comprehendit Divinam Substantiam

Caput LV: Quod Nullus Intellectus Creatus, Videndo Deum, Videt Omnia quae in Eo Videri Possunt

Caput LVI: Quod Omnis Intellectus, Cuiuscumque Gradus, Particeps esse Potest Divinae Visionis

Caput LVII: Quod Unus Alio Perfectius Deum Videre Potest

Caput LVIII: Quomodo Videntes Divinam Substantiam Omnia Vident

Caput LIX: Quod Videntes Deum Omnia Simul Vident in Ipso

Caput LX: Quod per Visionem Dei Aliquis Fit Particeps Vitae Aeternae

Caput LXI: Quod Videntes Deum in Perpetuum eum Videbunt

Caput LXII: Qualiter in Illa Ultima Felicitate Omne Desiderium Hominis Completur

Caput LXIII: Quod Deus Sua Providentia Gubernat Res

Caput LXIV: Quod Deus Conservat Res in esse

Caput LXV: Quod Nihil Dat esse Nisi Inquantum Agit in Virtute Divina

Caput LXVI: Quod Deus est Causa Operandi Omnibus Operantibus

Caput LXVII: Quod Deus est Ubique

Caput LXVIII: De Opinione Eorum qui Rebus Naturalibus Proprias Subtrahunt Actiones

Caput LXIX: Quomodo Idem Effectus Sit a Deo et a Natura Agente

Caput LXX: Quod Divina Providentia non Excludit Totaliter Malum a Rebus

Caput LXXI: Quod Divina Providentia non Excludit Contingentiam a Rebus

Caput LXXII: Quod Divina Providentia non Excludit Arbitrii Libertatem

Caput LXXIII: Quod Divina Providentia non Excludit Fortunam et Casum

Caput LXXIV: Quod Providentia Dei Sit Singularium Contingentium

Caput LXXV: Quod Providentia Dei Sit Omnium Singularium Immediate

Caput LXXVI: Quod Executio Divinae Providentiae Fit Mediantibus Causis Secundis

Caput LXXVII: Quod Mediantibus Creaturis Intellectualibus Aliae Creaturae Reguntur a Deo

Caput LXXVIII: Quod Substantiae Intellectivae Inferiores Reguntur per Superiores

Caput LXXIX: De Ordinatione Angelorum ad Invicem

Caput LXXX: De Ordinatione Hominum ad Invicem et ad Alia

Caput LXXXI: Quod Inferiora Corpora Reguntur a Deo per Corpora Caelestia

Caput LXXXII: Epilogus Praedictorum

Caput LXXXIII: Quod Corpora Caelestia non Imprimant in Intellectus Nostros

Caput LXXXIV: Quod Corpora Caelestia non sunt Causae Voluntatum et Electionum Nostrarum

Caput LXXXV: Quod Corporales Effectus in Istis Inferioribus non Sequuntur ex Necessitate a Corporibus Caelestibus

Caput LXXXVI: Quod Motus Caelestis Corporis non Sit Causa Electionum Nostrarum ex Virtute Animae Moventis, ut Quidam Dicunt

Caput LXXXVII: Quod Substantiae Separatae Creatae non Possunt esse Causa Directe Electionum et Voluntatum Nostrarum, sed Solus Deus

Caput LXXXVIII: Quod Motus Voluntatis Causatur a Deo, et non Solum Potentia Voluntatis

Caput LXXXIX: Quod Electiones et Voluntates Humanae Subduntur Divinae Providentiae

Caput XC: Quomodo Res Humanae ad Superiores Causas Reducantur

Caput XCI: Quomodo Dicitur Aliquis Bene Fortunatus, et Quomodo Adiuvatur Homo ex Superioribus Causis

Caput XCII: De Fato: an Sit, et Quid Sit

Caput XCIII: De Certitudine Divinae Providentiae

Caput XCIV: Quod Immobilitas Divinae Providentiae Utilitatem Orationis non Excludit

Caput XCV: Quod Deus non Omnes Orationes Exaudit

Caput XCVI: Quomodo Dispositio Providentiae Habeat Rationem

Caput XCVII: Quomodo Deus Possit Facere Praeter Ordinem Suae Providentiae, et Quomodo non

Caput XCVIII: Quod Deus Potest Operari Praeter Ordinem Rebus Inditum, Producendo Effectus absque Causis Proximis

Caput XCIX: Quod Ea quae Deus Facit Praeter Naturae Ordinem non sunt contra Naturam

Caput C: De Miraculis

Caput CI: Quod Solus Deus Facit Miracula

Caput CII: Quod Substantiae Spirituales Aliqua Mirabilia Operantur, quae tamen non sunt Vere Miracula

Caput CIII: Quod Opera Magorum non sunt Solum ex Impressione Caelestium Corporum

Caput CIV: Unde Magorum Operationes Efficaciam Habeant

Caput CV: Quod Substantia Intellectualis quae Praestat Efficaciam Magicis Operibus, non est Bona secundum Virtutem

Caput CVI: Quod Substantia Intellectualis Cuius Auxilio Magicae Artes Utuntur, non est Mala secundum Suam Naturam

Caput CVII: Rationes Quibus Probari Videtur quod in Daemonibus non Possit esse Peccatum

Caput CVIII: Quod in Daemonibus Possit esse Peccatum, et Qualiter

Caput CIX: Solutio Praemissarum Rationum

Caput CX: Quod Speciali Quadam Ratione Creaturae Rationales Divinae Providentiae Subduntur

Caput CXI: Quod Creaturae Rationales Gubernantur propter Seipsas, Aliae Vero in Ordine ad Eas

Caput CXII: Quod Rationalis Creatura Dirigitur a Deo ad Suos Actus non Solum secundum Ordinem ad Speciem, sed Etiam secundum quod Congruit Individuo

Caput CXIII: Quod Divinitus Hominibus Leges Dantur

Caput CXIV: Quod Lex Divina Principaliter Hominem Ordinat in Deum

Caput CXV: Quod Finis Legis Divinae est Dilectio Dei

Caput CXVI: Quod Divina Lege Ordinamur ad Dilectionem Proximi

Caput CXVII: Quod per Divinam Legem Homines ad Rectam Fidem Obligantur

Caput CXVIII: Quod per Quaedam Sensibilia Mens Nostra Dirigitur in Deum

Caput CXIX: Quod Latriae Cultus Soli Deo est Exhibendus

Caput CXX: Quod Divina Lex Ordinat Hominem secundum Rationem circa Corporalia et Sensibilia

Caput CXXI: Qua Ratione Fornicatio Simplex secundum Legem Divinam Sit Peccatum: et quod Matrimonium Sit Naturale

Caput CXXII: Quod Matrimonium Debet esse Indivisibile

Caput CXXIII: Quod Matrimonium Debeat esse Unius ad Unam

Caput CXXIV: Quod Matrimonium non Debet Fieri inter Propinquos

Caput CXXV: Quod non Omnis Carnalis Commixtio est Peccatum

Caput CXXVI: Quod Nullus Cibi Usus est Peccatum secundum se

Caput CXXVII: Quomodo secundum Legem Dei Homo Ordinatur ad Proximum

Caput CXXVIII: Quod in Actibus Humanis sunt Aliqua Recta secundum Naturam, et non Solum Quasi Lege Posita

Caput CXXIX: De Consiliis quae Dantur in Lege Divina

Caput CXXX: De Errore Impugnantium Voluntariam Paupertatem

Caput CXXXI: De Modis Vivendi Eorum qui Voluntariam Paupertatem Sequuntur

Caput CXXXII: Quomodo Paupertas Sit Bona

Caput CXXXIII: Solutio Rationum Supra Inductarum contra Paupertatem

Caput CXXXIV: Solutio Eorum quae Obiiciebantur contra Diversos Modos Vivendi Eorum qui Assumunt Voluntariam Paupertatem

Caput CXXXV: De Errore Eorum qui Perpetuam Continentiam Impugnant

After St. Thomas has disputed against those who attack voluntary poverty, he intends subsequently to dispute against those who attack perpetual continence .

Concerning this, however, he does two things: first, he disputes against those who attack perpetual continence; second, against those who equated marriage to virginity, in the following chapter .

I. As to the first, he adduces the arguments of those who attack continence, and resolves them.

They argued, therefore, first in this way. The good of the species is more divine than the good of the individual. Therefore he sins more who abstains entirely from the act by which the species is preserved, than he would sin if he abstained from the act by which the individual is preserved. But the sexual union of male and female is ordained to the good of the species. Therefore etc.

St. Thomas answers that in those things that pertain to the necessity of each single person, namely to the sustentation of the individual, provision must be made for each one: and therefore it is necessary that each one use food and drink. But in those things that are necessary for the multitude, it is neither necessary nor possible that they be assigned to each one of the multitude: because many things are necessary for man, such as food, drink, and the like, which it is impossible to procure through one person. Therefore there must be diverse offices for diverse people: just as also in the body diverse members are ordained to diverse acts. Since therefore generation is not of the necessity of the individual, but of the species, it is not necessary that all men be devoted to it.

And it should be noted that the meaning of this response is that certain things are ordained to the preservation of the individual, without which the individual could not be preserved, such as the use of food and drink: and it is necessary that these be had by every individual. But certain things are ordained to the good of the multitude, without which, namely, the multitude could not be preserved, such as the act of generation: and it is not necessary that these be done by every individual, but it suffices that some of the multitude apply themselves to that work, while others are occupied in other offices. Whence the consequence is denied: because the rationale is not similar concerning those things that pertain to the necessity of the individual, and those that pertain to the necessity of the species. For unless this singular man attends to the former, he himself cannot be preserved. But it is not the case that, if he does not devote himself to the latter, the species will not be able to be preserved: for there are others by whose work it can be preserved.

  1. But a doubt arises. For St. Thomas uses food and drink as examples in both members of his distinction. And thus it seems that to use food and drink is both necessary for each one and not necessary for each one.

The answer is that it is the same example materially, but not formally. For food and drink can be considered in two ways. In one way, as to use. And thus it pertains to the first member. Whence St. Thomas said: It is necessary that every man use food and drink. In another way, as to procurement and preparation. And thus it pertains to the second member. For it is not necessary that the individual perish if he does not procure and prepare food and drink for himself: because it can be prepared for him by others. But the multitude would indeed perish if there were no one who procured food and drink. Whence St. Thomas said that many things are necessary for the multitude of men, such as food, drink, clothing, housing, and the like, which it is impossible to procure through one person.

II. Secondly. From the divine ordering, members fitted for generation are given to man, as well as an inciting concupiscible power, and other things of this kind. Therefore etc.

He answers from what has been said that, although those things that are ordained to the act of generation have been divinely provided for man as necessary for the whole species, it is not however necessary that each one attend to the act of generation. For there has been given to man the skill of building, and the power to fight: nor is it however necessary that all be builders or soldiers.

Thirdly. If it is good that one be continent, therefore it is better that many be. Therefore it is best that all be. This is inappropriate. Therefore etc.

From the aforesaid he answers that regarding those things that are necessary for the multitude, of which kind is the act of generation, although it is better as to individuals that one abstain, being devoted to better things, it is not however good that all abstain. This is also made clear from the order of the universe and from the body of an animal, in which it would not be better that the whole be such as the more noble part is. Whence it is clear that that consequence is invalid.

Fourthly. Chastity, like other virtues, consists in a mean. Therefore he acts against virtue who abstains entirely from concupiscences.

He answers, from those things that were said above concerning poverty, that, since the mean of virtue is not taken according to the quantity that is ordered by reason, that is, upon which reason has to impose a measure, but according to the rule of reason, which attains the due end and measures the fitting circumstances; to abstain from all pleasures of sexual matters contrary to reason is called the vice of insensibility; but if it be done according to reason, it is a virtue, which even exceeds the common mode of man. Whence virginity is said to be related to the angels.

III. Fifthly. To resist concupiscences entirely, and to have a sort of continuous fight, causes greater disquiet to the soul than if someone were to use them moderately. Therefore it is opposed to the perfection of virtue: because disquiet of the soul is especially incompatible with the perfection of virtue.

St. Thomas answers: and he says first, that the solicitude and occupation that married people have concerning wives and other things is continuous; but the disquiet arising from the fight of concupiscences is for some hour. Which also is diminished by the fact that someone does not consent to them, and through abstinence, and other bodily exercises.

He says secondly, that the use of bodily pleasures draws the mind away more from its height, and hinders it from the contemplation of spiritual things, than does disquiet in resisting concupiscences. Because, since pleasure makes the appetite rest in the pleasurable object, through the use of pleasures, and especially sexual ones, the mind cleaves most to carnal things.

He says thirdly, that although it is said universally that it is better for a man to preserve continence than to make use of marriage, nothing prevents it from being better for a particular person. Which is shown from the words of the Lord, Who in Matthew, after mention was made of continence, says: Not all take this word, but he who can take it, let him take it.

  1. Concerning this last statement, it should be noted that, just as the law establishes universally what is to be done, because that is for the most part good and useful, yet in some case it is better not to observe the law; just as the law establishes that a deposit must be returned, and yet, if someone deposited a sword and afterwards became mad, the sword must not be returned to him: so it is said universally to be better for each one considered singularly that he be continent, because for the most part it is so; and yet for a particular person it will be better to make use of marriage, because, from his natural temperament, there will be less disquiet of mind for him in marriage than in continence, and he will be more able to be free for contemplation and spiritual things. And this is what St. Thomas intends in this last statement. But it is clear from that response that St. Thomas wishes to deny the antecedent through the first statement; and through the second also to deny the consequence.

IV. Lastly, there is adduced the precept of the Lord given to the first parents, when it is said in Genesis 1 and 9: Increase and multiply; and Matt. 19.

But St. Thomas says first, that the answer is clear from the aforesaid. For since that precept regards the natural inclination in men to preserve the species through the act of generation, it is not necessary to be put into execution by all, but by some.

He says secondly, that it was not expedient to abstain from the act of generation at every time: especially when the multiplication of generation was necessary , either because of the fewness of men, as in the beginning of the human race; or because of the fewness of the faithful people, when it was necessary that it be multiplied through carnal generation, as was the case in the Old Testament. And therefore the counsel concerning perpetual continence was reserved for the times of the New Testament, when the spiritual people is multiplied through spiritual generation, namely through baptism.

  1. Concerning this which is said, that it was not lawful at every time to abstain from the act of generation, because, namely, it was not lawful in the beginning of the human race, nor in the Old Testament, there is a doubt. Because the opposite of this seems to be said in IV Sent., d. 33, q. 3, a. 2, ad 2, where St. Thomas says that one preserving virginity even in the time of Moses would not have sinned.

The answer is that we can speak of the time of the law of Moses in two ways: either, namely, as to the time following upon a sufficient multiplication of the faithful; or as to the time in which it was necessary that the faithful be multiplied through carnal generation, when a sufficient multiplication of those worshiping God had not yet been made. In the first way is understood what is said in IV Sententiarum. Whence he says in the same place that, a sufficient multiplication of those worshiping God having been made, one preserving virginity even in the time of Moses would not have sinned. In the second way is understood what is said in this place. Whence here also he says that it was not expedient to abstain from the act of generation when the multiplication of generation was necessary because of the fewness of the faithful people, as was the case in the Old Testament: understand this as to some time of the Old Testament. In the place also cited above, ad 1, he says that it would be superfluous if someone wished to preserve virginity when he ought not, as in the time of the law of Moses: understand similarly, as to some time of that law. In a similar way must be understood what is said in IV Sent., d. 49, q. 5, a. 3 , ad 3, where it is said that in the time of the law of Moses, when the worship of God had to be propagated even through the carnal act, it was not entirely praiseworthy to abstain from the union of the flesh.

Caput CXXXVI: Contra eos qui Matrimonium Virginitati Aequabant

Caput CXXXVII: Contra Eos qui Vota Impugnant

Caput CXXXVIII: Quod neque Merita neque Peccata Sint Paria

Caput CXXXIX: Quod Actus Hominis Puniuntur vel Praemiantur a Deo

Caput CXL: De Differentia et Ordine Poenarum

Caput CXLI: Quod non Omnia Praemia et Poenae sunt Aequales

Caput CXLII: De Poena quae Debetur Peccato Mortali et Veniali per Respectum ad Ultimum Finem

Caput CXLIII: Quod per Peccatum Mortale Ultimo Fine Aliquis in Aeternum Privatur

Caput CXLIV: Quod Peccata Puniuntur Etiam per Experientiam Alicuius Nocivi

Caput CXLV: Quod Iudicibus Licet Poenas Inferre

Caput CXLVI: Quod Homo Indiget Divino Auxilio ad Beatitudinem Consequendam

Caput CXLVII: Quod per Auxilium Divinae Gratiae Homo non Cogitur ad Virtutem

Caput CXLVIII: Quod Divinum Auxilium Homo Promereri non Potest

Caput CXLIX: Quod Praedictum Auxilium Gratia Nominatur. et Quid Sit Gratia Gratum Faciens

Caput CL: Quod Gratia Gratum Faciens Causat in Nobis Dilectionem Dei

Caput CLI: Quod Divina Gratia Causat in Nobis Fidem

Caput CLII: Quod Divina Gratia Causat in Nobis Spem

Caput CLIII: De Donis Gratiae Gratis Datae. in Quo de Divinationibus Daemonum

Caput CLIV: Quod Homo Indiget Divino Auxilio ad Perseverandum in Bono

Caput CLV: Quod Ille qui Decidit a Gratia per Peccatum, Potest Iterum per Gratiam Reparari

Caput CLVI: Quod Homo a Peccato Liberari non Potest Nisi per Gratiam

Caput CLVII: Qualiter Homo a Peccato Liberatur

Caput CLVIII: Quod Rationabiliter Homini Imputatur si ad Deum non Convertatur, Quamvis Hoc sine Gratia non Possit

Caput CLIX: Quod Homo in Peccato Existens sine Gratia Peccatum Vitare non Potest

Caput CLX: Quod Deus Aliquos a Peccato Liberat, et Aliquos in Peccato Relinquit

Caput CLXI: Quod Deus Nemini est Causa Peccandi

Caput CLXII: De Praedestinatione, Reprobatione, et Electione Divina

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