Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III
Francesco Silvestri (1474–1528)
Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles
First published 1926
In Book III of the Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Francesco Silvestri of Ferrara (Ferrariensis) expounds Aquinas's account of providence, human happiness, moral action, and divine grace. The commentary accompanies the Leonine text in volume XIV (1926). The present digital edition includes the Latin text and an English translation.
Prooemium
Caput I: Quod Omne Agens Agit propter Finem
Caput II: Quod Omne Agens Agit propter Bonum
Caput III: Quod Malum est Praeter Intentionem in Rebus
Caput IV: Rationes Quibus Videtur Probari quod Malum non Sit Praeter Intentionem
Caput V: Solutio Rationum Praemissarum
Caput VI: Quod Malum non est Aliqua Essentia
Caput VII: Rationes Quibus Videtur Probari quod Malum Sit Natura vel Res Aliqua
Caput VIII: Solutio Rationum Praemissarum
Caput IX: Quod Causa Mali est Bonum
Caput X: Quod Malum Fundatur in Bono
Caput XI: Quod Malum non Totaliter Consumit Bonum
Caput XII: Quod Malum Habet Aliquo Modo Causam
Caput XIII: Quod Malum est Causa per Accidens
Caput XIV: Quod non est Summum Malum
Caput XV: Quod Finis Cuiuslibet Rei est Bonum
Caput XVI: Quod Omnia Ordinantur in Unum Finem, qui est Deus
Caput XVII: Quomodo Deus Sit Finis Rerum
Caput XVIII: Quod Omnia Intendunt Assimilari Deo
Caput XIX: Quomodo Res Imitentur Divinam Bonitatem
Caput XX: Quod Res Intendunt Naturaliter Assimilari Deo in Hoc quod est Causa
Caput XXI: Quomodo Diversimode Res Ordinantur in Suos Fines
Caput XXII: Quod Motus Caeli est a Principio Intellectivo
Caput XXIII: Quomodo Appetunt Bonum Etiam quae Cognitione Carent
Caput XXIV: Quod Intelligere Deum est Finis Omnis Intellectualis Substantiae
Caput XXV: Utrum Felicitas Consistat in Actu Voluntatis
Caput XXVI: Quod Felicitas Humana non Consistit in Delectationibus Carnalibus
Caput XXVII: Quod Felicitas non Consistit in Honoribus
Caput XXVIII: Quod Felicitas Hominis non Consistit in Gloria
Caput XXIX: Quod Felicitas Hominis non Consistit in Divitiis
Caput XXX: Quod Felicitas non Consistit in Potentia Mundana
Caput XXXI: Quod Felicitas non Consistit in Bonis Corporis
Caput XXXII: Quod Felicitas Humana non Consistit in Sensu
Caput XXXIII: Quod Ultima Hominis Felicitas non Consistit in Actibus Virtutum Moralium
Caput XXXIV: Quod Ultima Felicitas non Sit in Actu Prudentiae
Caput XXXV: Quod Felicitas non Consistit in Operatione Artis
Caput XXXVI: Quod Ultima Felicitas Hominis Consistit in Contemplatione Dei
Caput XXXVII: Quod Felicitas Humana non Consistit in Cognitione Dei quae Communiter Habetur a Pluribus
Caput XXXVIII: Quod Felicitas Humana non Consistit in Cognitione Dei quae Habetur per Demonstrationem
Caput XXXIX: Quod Felicitas Humana non Consistit in Cognitione Dei quae est per Fidem
Caput XL: Utrum in Hac Vita Homo Possit Intelligere Substantias Separatas per Studium et Inquisitionem Scientiarum Speculativarum
Caput XLI: Quod non Possumus in Hac Vita Cognoscere Substantias Separatas sicut Ponit Alexander
Caput XLII: Quod non Possumus in Hac Vita Intelligere Substantias Separatas sicut Ponit Averroes
Caput XLIII: Quod Ultima Felicitas Hominis non Consistit in Cognitione Substantiarum Separatarum Qualem Praedictae Opiniones Fingunt
Caput XLIV: Quod non Possumus in Hac Vita Intelligere Substantias Separatas
Caput XLV: Quod Anima in Hac Vita non Intelligit Seipsam per Seipsam
Caput XLVI: Quod non Possumus in Hac Vita Videre Deum per Essentiam
Caput XLVII: Quod Ultima Hominis Felicitas non Sit in Hac Vita
Caput XLVIII: Quod Substantiae Separatae non Vident Deum per Essentiam ex Hoc quod Cognoscunt eum per Suam Essentiam
Caput XLIX: Quod in Naturali Cognitione Quam Habent Substantiae Separatae de Deo non Quiescit Earum Naturale Desiderium
Caput L: Quomodo Deus per Essentiam Videatur
Caput LI: Quod Nulla Creata Substantia Potest Sua Naturali Virtute Pervenire ad Videndum Deum per Essentiam
Caput LII: Quod Intellectus Creatus Indiget Aliqua Influentia Divini Luminis ad Hoc ut Deum per Essentiam Videat
Caput LIII: Rationes Quibus Videtur Probari quod Deus non Possit Videri per Essentiam, et Solutiones Earum
Caput LIV: Quod Intellectus Creatus non Comprehendit Divinam Substantiam
Caput LV: Quod Nullus Intellectus Creatus, Videndo Deum, Videt Omnia quae in Eo Videri Possunt
Caput LVI: Quod Omnis Intellectus, Cuiuscumque Gradus, Particeps esse Potest Divinae Visionis
Caput LVII: Quod Unus Alio Perfectius Deum Videre Potest
Caput LVIII: Quomodo Videntes Divinam Substantiam Omnia Vident
Caput LIX: Quod Videntes Deum Omnia Simul Vident in Ipso
Caput LX: Quod per Visionem Dei Aliquis Fit Particeps Vitae Aeternae
Caput LXI: Quod Videntes Deum in Perpetuum eum Videbunt
Caput LXII: Qualiter in Illa Ultima Felicitate Omne Desiderium Hominis Completur
Caput LXIII: Quod Deus Sua Providentia Gubernat Res
Caput LXIV: Quod Deus Conservat Res in esse
Caput LXV: Quod Nihil Dat esse Nisi Inquantum Agit in Virtute Divina
Caput LXVI: Quod Deus est Causa Operandi Omnibus Operantibus
Caput LXVII: Quod Deus est Ubique
Caput LXVIII: De Opinione Eorum qui Rebus Naturalibus Proprias Subtrahunt Actiones
Caput LXIX: Quomodo Idem Effectus Sit a Deo et a Natura Agente
Caput LXX: Quod Divina Providentia non Excludit Totaliter Malum a Rebus
Caput LXXI: Quod Divina Providentia non Excludit Contingentiam a Rebus
Caput LXXII: Quod Divina Providentia non Excludit Arbitrii Libertatem
Caput LXXIII: Quod Divina Providentia non Excludit Fortunam et Casum
Caput LXXIV: Quod Providentia Dei Sit Singularium Contingentium
Caput LXXV: Quod Providentia Dei Sit Omnium Singularium Immediate
Caput LXXVI: Quod Executio Divinae Providentiae Fit Mediantibus Causis Secundis
Caput LXXVII: Quod Mediantibus Creaturis Intellectualibus Aliae Creaturae Reguntur a Deo
Caput LXXVIII: Quod Substantiae Intellectivae Inferiores Reguntur per Superiores
Caput LXXIX: De Ordinatione Angelorum ad Invicem
Caput LXXX: De Ordinatione Hominum ad Invicem et ad Alia
Caput LXXXI: Quod Inferiora Corpora Reguntur a Deo per Corpora Caelestia
Caput LXXXII: Epilogus Praedictorum
Caput LXXXIII: Quod Corpora Caelestia non Imprimant in Intellectus Nostros
Caput LXXXIV: Quod Corpora Caelestia non sunt Causae Voluntatum et Electionum Nostrarum
Caput LXXXV: Quod Corporales Effectus in Istis Inferioribus non Sequuntur ex Necessitate a Corporibus Caelestibus
Caput LXXXVI: Quod Motus Caelestis Corporis non Sit Causa Electionum Nostrarum ex Virtute Animae Moventis, ut Quidam Dicunt
Caput LXXXVII: Quod Substantiae Separatae Creatae non Possunt esse Causa Directe Electionum et Voluntatum Nostrarum, sed Solus Deus
Caput LXXXVIII: Quod Motus Voluntatis Causatur a Deo, et non Solum Potentia Voluntatis
Caput LXXXIX: Quod Electiones et Voluntates Humanae Subduntur Divinae Providentiae
Caput XC: Quomodo Res Humanae ad Superiores Causas Reducantur
Caput XCI: Quomodo Dicitur Aliquis Bene Fortunatus, et Quomodo Adiuvatur Homo ex Superioribus Causis
Caput XCII: De Fato: an Sit, et Quid Sit
Caput XCIII: De Certitudine Divinae Providentiae
Caput XCIV: Quod Immobilitas Divinae Providentiae Utilitatem Orationis non Excludit
Caput XCV: Quod Deus non Omnes Orationes Exaudit
Caput XCVI: Quomodo Dispositio Providentiae Habeat Rationem
Caput XCVII: Quomodo Deus Possit Facere Praeter Ordinem Suae Providentiae, et Quomodo non
Caput XCVIII: Quod Deus Potest Operari Praeter Ordinem Rebus Inditum, Producendo Effectus absque Causis Proximis
Caput XCIX: Quod Ea quae Deus Facit Praeter Naturae Ordinem non sunt contra Naturam
Caput C: De Miraculis
Caput CI: Quod Solus Deus Facit Miracula
Caput CII: Quod Substantiae Spirituales Aliqua Mirabilia Operantur, quae tamen non sunt Vere Miracula
Caput CIII: Quod Opera Magorum non sunt Solum ex Impressione Caelestium Corporum
Caput CIV: Unde Magorum Operationes Efficaciam Habeant
Caput CV: Quod Substantia Intellectualis quae Praestat Efficaciam Magicis Operibus, non est Bona secundum Virtutem
Caput CVI: Quod Substantia Intellectualis Cuius Auxilio Magicae Artes Utuntur, non est Mala secundum Suam Naturam
Caput CVII: Rationes Quibus Probari Videtur quod in Daemonibus non Possit esse Peccatum
Caput CVIII: Quod in Daemonibus Possit esse Peccatum, et Qualiter
Caput CIX: Solutio Praemissarum Rationum
Caput CX: Quod Speciali Quadam Ratione Creaturae Rationales Divinae Providentiae Subduntur
Caput CXI: Quod Creaturae Rationales Gubernantur propter Seipsas, Aliae Vero in Ordine ad Eas
Caput CXII: Quod Rationalis Creatura Dirigitur a Deo ad Suos Actus non Solum secundum Ordinem ad Speciem, sed Etiam secundum quod Congruit Individuo
Caput CXIII: Quod Divinitus Hominibus Leges Dantur
Caput CXIV: Quod Lex Divina Principaliter Hominem Ordinat in Deum
Caput CXV: Quod Finis Legis Divinae est Dilectio Dei
Caput CXVI: Quod Divina Lege Ordinamur ad Dilectionem Proximi
Caput CXVII: Quod per Divinam Legem Homines ad Rectam Fidem Obligantur
Caput CXVIII: Quod per Quaedam Sensibilia Mens Nostra Dirigitur in Deum
Caput CXIX: Quod Latriae Cultus Soli Deo est Exhibendus
Caput CXX: Quod Divina Lex Ordinat Hominem secundum Rationem circa Corporalia et Sensibilia
Caput CXXI: Qua Ratione Fornicatio Simplex secundum Legem Divinam Sit Peccatum: et quod Matrimonium Sit Naturale
Caput CXXII: Quod Matrimonium Debet esse Indivisibile
Caput CXXIII: Quod Matrimonium Debeat esse Unius ad Unam
Caput CXXIV: Quod Matrimonium non Debet Fieri inter Propinquos
Caput CXXV: Quod non Omnis Carnalis Commixtio est Peccatum
Caput CXXVI: Quod Nullus Cibi Usus est Peccatum secundum se
Caput CXXVII: Quomodo secundum Legem Dei Homo Ordinatur ad Proximum
Caput CXXVIII: Quod in Actibus Humanis sunt Aliqua Recta secundum Naturam, et non Solum Quasi Lege Posita
Caput CXXIX: De Consiliis quae Dantur in Lege Divina
Caput CXXX: De Errore Impugnantium Voluntariam Paupertatem
Caput CXXXI: De Modis Vivendi Eorum qui Voluntariam Paupertatem Sequuntur
Caput CXXXII: Quomodo Paupertas Sit Bona
Caput CXXXIII: Solutio Rationum Supra Inductarum contra Paupertatem
Caput CXXXIV: Solutio Eorum quae Obiiciebantur contra Diversos Modos Vivendi Eorum qui Assumunt Voluntariam Paupertatem
Caput CXXXV: De Errore Eorum qui Perpetuam Continentiam Impugnant
After St. Thomas has disputed against those who attack voluntary poverty, he intends subsequently to dispute against those who attack perpetual continence 1.
Concerning this, however, he does two things: first, he disputes against those who attack perpetual continence; second, against those who equated marriage to virginity, in the following chapter 2.
I. As to the first, he adduces the arguments of those who attack continence, and resolves them.
They argued, therefore, first in this way. The good of the species is more divine than the good of the individual. Therefore he sins more who abstains entirely from the act by which the species is preserved, than he would sin if he abstained from the act by which the individual is preserved. But the sexual union of male and female is ordained to the good of the species. Therefore etc.
St. Thomas answers that in those things that pertain to the necessity of each single person, namely to the sustentation of the individual, provision must be made for each one: and therefore it is necessary that each one use food and drink. But in those things that are necessary for the multitude, it is neither necessary nor possible that they be assigned to each one of the multitude: because many things are necessary for man, such as food, drink, and the like, which it is impossible to procure through one person. Therefore there must be diverse offices for diverse people: just as also in the body diverse members are ordained to diverse acts. Since therefore generation is not of the necessity of the individual, but of the species, it is not necessary that all men be devoted to it.
And it should be noted that the meaning of this response is that certain things are ordained to the preservation of the individual, without which the individual could not be preserved, such as the use of food and drink: and it is necessary that these be had by every individual. But certain things are ordained to the good of the multitude, without which, namely, the multitude could not be preserved, such as the act of generation: and it is not necessary that these be done by every individual, but it suffices that some of the multitude apply themselves to that work, while others are occupied in other offices. Whence the consequence is denied: because the rationale is not similar concerning those things that pertain to the necessity of the individual, and those that pertain to the necessity of the species. For unless this singular man attends to the former, he himself cannot be preserved. But it is not the case that, if he does not devote himself to the latter, the species will not be able to be preserved: for there are others by whose work it can be preserved.
- But a doubt arises. For St. Thomas uses food and drink as examples in both members of his distinction. And thus it seems that to use food and drink is both necessary for each one and not necessary for each one.
The answer is that it is the same example materially, but not formally. For food and drink can be considered in two ways. In one way, as to use. And thus it pertains to the first member. Whence St. Thomas said: It is necessary that every man use food and drink. In another way, as to procurement and preparation. And thus it pertains to the second member. For it is not necessary that the individual perish if he does not procure and prepare food and drink for himself: because it can be prepared for him by others. But the multitude would indeed perish if there were no one who procured food and drink. Whence St. Thomas said that many things are necessary for the multitude of men, such as food, drink, clothing, housing, and the like, which it is impossible to procure through one person.
II. Secondly. From the divine ordering, members fitted for generation are given to man, as well as an inciting concupiscible power, and other things of this kind. Therefore etc.
He answers from what has been said that, although those things that are ordained to the act of generation have been divinely provided for man as necessary for the whole species, it is not however necessary that each one attend to the act of generation. For there has been given to man the skill of building, and the power to fight: nor is it however necessary that all be builders or soldiers.
Thirdly. If it is good that one be continent, therefore it is better that many be. Therefore it is best that all be. This is inappropriate. Therefore etc.
From the aforesaid he answers that regarding those things that are necessary for the multitude, of which kind is the act of generation, although it is better as to individuals that one abstain, being devoted to better things, it is not however good that all abstain. This is also made clear from the order of the universe and from the body of an animal, in which it would not be better that the whole be such as the more noble part is. Whence it is clear that that consequence is invalid.
Fourthly. Chastity, like other virtues, consists in a mean. Therefore he acts against virtue who abstains entirely from concupiscences.
He answers, from those things that were said above concerning poverty, that, since the mean of virtue is not taken according to the quantity that is ordered by reason, that is, upon which reason has to impose a measure, but according to the rule of reason, which attains the due end and measures the fitting circumstances; to abstain from all pleasures of sexual matters contrary to reason is called the vice of insensibility; but if it be done according to reason, it is a virtue, which even 3 exceeds the common mode of man. Whence virginity is said to be related to the angels.
III. Fifthly. To resist concupiscences entirely, and to have a sort of continuous fight, causes greater disquiet to the soul than if someone were to use them moderately. Therefore it is opposed to the perfection of virtue: because disquiet of the soul is especially incompatible with the perfection of virtue.
St. Thomas answers: and he says first, that the solicitude and occupation that married people have concerning wives and other things is continuous; but the disquiet arising from the fight of concupiscences is for some hour. Which also is diminished by the fact that someone does not consent to them, and through abstinence, and other bodily exercises.
He says secondly, that the use of bodily pleasures draws the mind away more from its height, and hinders it from the contemplation of spiritual things, than does disquiet in resisting concupiscences. Because, since pleasure makes the appetite rest in the pleasurable object, through the use of pleasures, and especially sexual ones, the mind cleaves most to carnal things.
He says thirdly, that although it is said universally that it is better for a man to preserve continence than to make use of marriage, nothing prevents it from being better for a particular person. Which is shown from the words of the Lord, Who in Matthew, after mention was made of continence, says: Not all take this word, but he who can take it, let him take it.
- Concerning this last statement, it should be noted that, just as the law establishes universally what is to be done, because that is for the most part good and useful, yet in some case it is better not to observe the law; just as the law establishes that a deposit must be returned, and yet, if someone deposited a sword and afterwards became mad, the sword must not be returned to him: so it is said universally to be better for each one considered singularly that he be continent, because for the most part it is so; and yet for a particular person it will be better to make use of marriage, because, from his natural temperament, there will be less disquiet of mind for him in marriage than in continence, and he will be more able to be free for contemplation and spiritual things. And this is what St. Thomas intends in this last statement. But it is clear from that response that St. Thomas wishes to deny the antecedent through the first statement; and through the second also to deny the consequence.
IV. Lastly, there is adduced the precept of the Lord given to the first parents, when it is said in Genesis 1 and 9: Increase and multiply; and Matt. 19.
But St. Thomas says first, that the answer is clear from the aforesaid. For since that precept regards the natural inclination in men to preserve the species through the act of generation, it is not necessary to be put into execution by all, but by some.
He says secondly, that it was not expedient to abstain from the act of generation at every time: especially when the multiplication of generation was necessary 4, either because of the fewness of men, as in the beginning of the human race; or because of the fewness of the faithful people, when it was necessary that it be multiplied through carnal generation, as was the case in the Old Testament. And therefore the counsel concerning perpetual continence was reserved for the times of the New Testament, when the spiritual 5 people is multiplied through spiritual generation, namely through baptism.
- Concerning this which is said, that it was not lawful at every time to abstain from the act of generation, because, namely, it was not lawful in the beginning of the human race, nor in the Old Testament, there is a doubt. Because the opposite of this seems to be said in IV Sent., d. 33, q. 3, a. 2, ad 2, where St. Thomas says that one preserving virginity even in the time of Moses would not have sinned.
The answer is that we can speak of the time of the law of Moses in two ways: either, namely, as to the time following upon a sufficient multiplication of the faithful; or as to the time in which it was necessary that the faithful be multiplied through carnal generation, when a sufficient multiplication of those worshiping God had not yet been made. In the first way is understood what is said in IV Sententiarum. Whence he says in the same place that, a sufficient multiplication of those worshiping God having been made, one preserving virginity even in the time of Moses would not have sinned. In the second way is understood what is said in this place. Whence here also he says that it was not expedient to abstain from the act of generation when the multiplication of generation was necessary because of the fewness of the faithful people, as was the case in the Old Testament: understand this as to some time of the Old Testament. In the place also cited above, ad 1, he says that it would be superfluous if someone wished to preserve virginity when he ought not, as in the time of the law of Moses: understand similarly, as to some time of that law. In a similar way must be understood what is said in IV Sent., d. 49, q. 5, a. 3 6, ad 3, where it is said that in the time of the law of Moses, when the worship of God had to be propagated even through the carnal act, it was not entirely praiseworthy to abstain from the union of the flesh.