Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

In the second place, St. Thomas answers the objections made against the particular ways of living in poverty ¹.

I. To the first of the objections made against the first way, which is to live from the price of sold possessions ², he answers that indeed that way is not sufficient for a long time. And therefore the Apostles instituted this way of living for the faithful only in Jerusalem: because they foresaw through the Holy Spirit that they were not to dwell together in Jerusalem for a long time, on account of the persecutions and on account of the destruction of the city. Hence, when passing over to the Gentiles, among whom the Church was to be established and to endure, we do not read that they instituted this way of living.

To the second, he says that the fraud that can be committed by dispensers is no obstacle: because this is common to every way of living in which some live together with one another. But it seems to happen with more difficulty that those pursuing perfection of life commit fraud. — Secondly, he says that a remedy is applied to this through the prudent institution of faithful dispensers.

Note that St. Thomas intends to deny the consequence, and also the antecedent, in what he says about it being easy for fraud to be committed by dispensers in this way of living.

He does not resolve the third: because its solution is clear from the response to the first.

II. To what is objected against the second way, which is to live from common possessions ³, he denies the assumption. To the first proof of it, he says first that through the care of one or of a few, possessions can be managed in a proper manner, while others are freely at leisure for spiritual things. — Secondly, he says that nothing of the perfection of life is lost even for those who take up this care on behalf of others: because what they seem to lose is compensated by the service of charity, in which the perfection of life also consists.

To the second proof, he denies the assumption in the case at hand. Because those who despise temporal goods cannot quarrel over common temporal things, from which they ought to expect nothing beyond the necessities of life. And especially since the dispensers ought to be faithful. — Secondly, he says, denying the consequence, that since even the wicked use good things badly, this way cannot be rejected on the ground that some abuse it.

III. To the first against the third way of living, which is to live by manual labor ⁴, the assumption is denied. Because the possession of riches required care both in procuring and also in guarding them, and drew the affection of man to itself. But this does not happen while someone seeks daily sustenance for himself by manual labor.

2. To the second, he denies the assumption. To the proof of it, he says that in order to gather riches, indeed, or superfluous food from manual labor, one must spend much time and apply great care; but not in order to acquire what is sufficient for the sustenance of life.

3. To the authority of the Lord in the Gospel, he says that through those words the Lord did not prohibit manual labor, but rather the anxious and afflictive care of the mind for the necessities of life. This is shown because He did not say, Do not work, but, Be not solicitous. Moreover, the Lord proves this a fortiori from the divine providence by which the birds and the lilies are sustained, which cannot work with those labors by which men acquire for themselves the necessary sustenance.

4. To the fourth, he denies the assumption. To the first proof of it, he says that it happens in fewer cases that someone cannot acquire necessary sustenance for himself by manual labor. But an ordinance is not to be repudiated on account of a defect that happens in fewer cases: because this happens both in natural things and also in voluntary ordinances. Hence even riches can be taken away by theft or robbery, just as he who lives by manual labor can be disabled. — Secondly, he says that a certain remedy remains concerning this: namely, that for him who cannot work, provision is made either by others of the same society, or also by those who possess riches, according to the law of charity and natural friendship. This is shown from the admonition of the Apostle in 2 Thess. 3. — From these things it is clear that the consequence is denied.

To the second proof, he says first that those who are content with modest things, which suffice for necessary food, need not spend a great deal of time in seeking necessities by manual labor. — Secondly, he says that they are not much hindered from other spiritual works: especially since, while working with their hands, they can think about God and praise Him, and do other things of this sort which those living by themselves ought to observe. — Thirdly, he says that lest they be too much hindered in spiritual things, they can also be aided by the benefactions of other faithful.

5. When the responses given there are attacked ⁵, St. Thomas admits his attacks. He adds nevertheless that, although voluntary poverty is not assumed for the purpose of removing idleness or taming concupiscence by manual labor, there is still no doubt that manual labor is efficacious for the aforesaid things, even under a modest ⁶ necessity of sustenance, that is, even if someone does not need to labor much on account of acquiring the necessities of life. But nevertheless, since idleness can be removed by other more useful occupations, and the concupiscence of the flesh subdued by stronger remedies, the necessity of working does not press on account of these things upon those who otherwise have, or can have, that from which they may live: but the necessity of sustenance alone compels one to work with the hands. This is shown in 2 Thess. 3.

6. For the understanding of these things, two points are to be noted from the teaching of St. Thomas in II-II, q. 187, a. 3. The first is that under manual labor are understood all secular occupations by which men lawfully earn sustenance, whether they earn it with hands, with feet, or with the tongue. For because the hand is the instrument of instruments ⁷, through the work of the hands every operation is understood by which someone can lawfully earn sustenance.

The second is that, since working with the hands is ordered to seeking sustenance, to removing idleness, and to restraining concupiscence: according as it is ordered to seeking sustenance, it falls under the necessity of a precept insofar as it is necessary for such an end. Because that which is ordered to an end has necessity from the end: namely, that it is necessary to the extent that the end cannot be without it. And therefore he who does not have whence he can live from elsewhere is bound to work with his hands; but he who otherwise has whence he can lawfully live is not bound under a precept. — But according as it is ordered to removing idleness, or to the mortification of the body, it does not fall under the necessity of a precept considered in itself: because the flesh can be mortified, or idleness removed, in many other ways.

St. Thomas meant the first of these statements when he said that the necessity of sustenance alone compels one to work with the hands. And the other when he said that, because idleness can be removed by other more useful occupations, and the concupiscence of the flesh subdued by stronger remedies, the necessity of working does not press upon those who otherwise have, or can have, that from which they may live.

IV. To the first against the fourth way of living, which is to live from those things that are contributed by others ⁸, he denies the assumption. Because those who take up voluntary poverty in order to follow Christ leave all things for this purpose, that they may serve the common utility, enlightening the people with wisdom, instruction, and example, or sustaining them with prayer and intercession. But it is not unfitting that he who has left his own on account of something that turns to the utility of others should be sustained from those things that are given by others. — This is illustrated by the example of soldiers and the rulers of the state.

2. To the second, he says first that these render greater things, namely, spiritual things in exchange for temporal things: as is clear from the Apostle, 2 Cor. 8.

Secondly, he says that those who take up voluntary poverty provoke others to virtues by their examples, namely, to the contempt of riches. — It must be noted that through this second statement St. Thomas wishes to answer what was said in the objection, namely, that it could be maintained that those who serve the people in some office may receive the necessities of life from others, but not concerning others who minister to the people in no office. For it is clear that even these are useful to others by their voluntary poverty, while by their example they provoke them to good, and help them by their prayers: although they minister to them in no particular office. And therefore they can receive the necessities of life from others.

3. To the third, he says that these are more useful to other poor people than harmful: because they provoke others to works of mercy by words and examples, leading them to the contempt of riches. For the less someone loves riches, and is intent upon virtue, the more easily he distributes riches for the necessities of others.

4. To the fourth, he denies the assumption. To the proof of it, he denies that this way of living hinders the freedom of the mind. For since voluntary poor people ought to be perfect in every virtue, they do not lose the freedom of the mind on account of the modest things they receive from others for the sustenance of life: because a man does not lose freedom of the mind through those things which he despises, if they are given to him.

5. To the fifth, he denies the consequence. Because the sustenance of the poor does not depend on the will of one person, but on the will of many. Moreover, it is not probable that in a multitude of faithful people there are not many who with a prompt mind relieve the necessities of those whom they hold in reverence on account of the perfection of virtue.

6. To the sixth, he says first that it is not unfitting if such poor people expose their necessities to others, and ask for necessities both for themselves and for others. Because we also read that the Apostles did this: not only receiving necessities from those to whom they preached, as though by authority; but also receiving from begging on behalf of the poor who were in Jerusalem. — Secondly, he says that this begging does not render men contemptible, if it is done moderately: namely, for necessity, not for superfluity; and without importunity, having considered the condition of the persons from whom it is asked, and of the place and time. Which must be observed by those who pursue the perfection of life.

7. To the seventh, he denies the antecedent. For begging does not have any appearance of filthy lucre unless it is done with importunity and indiscreetly, for superfluity or pleasure.

8. To the eighth ⁹, St. Thomas does not answer, because its solution is clear from the solutions given above. For it is clear that it is false that greater care is required for acquiring the goods of others, as much as suffices for the sustenance of life, than for the gathering or preserving of riches, which is required if someone is to use riches for a long time.

9. To the attack on that response which posits that begging is to be praised on account of humility ¹⁰: he says first that begging is done with a certain abjection, because just as to be acted upon is less noble than to act, so is receiving than giving; although, on account of something adjoined, a compensation can be made.

Secondly, he says that it belongs to humility to assume spontaneously those things that are of abjection, not indeed simpliciter, but according as it is necessary: because, since humility is a virtue, it works nothing indiscreetly.

Thirdly, he says that it belongs to humility if someone does not refuse on account of abjection that which is necessary to be done on account of virtue: for instance, if charity demands that some abject office be rendered to one's neighbors. From which it is inferred that, if it is necessary for pursuing the perfection of the poor life that someone beg, to bear this abjection belongs to humility.

Fourthly, he says that sometimes also to assume abject things belongs to virtue even if our office does not require this: either that by our example we may provoke others upon whom it is incumbent, that they may bear it more easily, just as a general sometimes performs the office of a soldier; or on account of a remedy, for instance, if someone's mind is prone to immoderate excellence, he usefully, having observed due moderation, uses abject things, either voluntarily or imposed by others, to suppress the elation of the mind.

10. It must be noted that from the things said St. Thomas wishes to deny that proposition, By begging, virtue is detracted from. And when it is proved first, because it is more virtuous to give than to receive: it is clear from the things said that, if receiving is taken absolutely, that is true; but if it is taken with something adjoined, namely, that on account of virtue someone uses that abjection which is joined to receiving from another, it is not true.

When it is also proved because it has the appearance of filthy lucre: it is clear that this is false when begging, which is done with a certain abjection, is assumed on account of virtue.

V. In the last place, the error of those thinking that all care concerning the seeking of food was forbidden by the Lord ¹¹ (which was also refuted above ¹²), St. Thomas says is entirely unreasonable. First, because it would follow that man ought to do nothing temporal ¹³: since every act requires care (namely, in order that it be done well and laudably). But this is neither possible nor reasonable to be observed. — Both because, since bodily actions are ordered to those things that are necessary for the preservation of life, if someone omits them, he neglects his life, which everyone is bound to preserve. — And because to expect help from God in those things in which someone can help himself through his own action, having omitted his own operation, is characteristic of a foolish person, and of one tempting God: and is contrary to the divine ordinance, and to His goodness, by which God provides for things not by doing all things immediately, but by moving other things to their own actions.

Moreover, he explains how the words of the Lord are to be understood, saying that, since it is in our power to act, but it is not in our power that our actions achieve their due effect, on account of the impediments that can happen; the Lord commands that we ought not to be solicitous about that which does not pertain to us, but to the divine ordinance, namely, about the outcomes of our actions. But He did not prohibit us from being solicitous about that which pertains to us, namely, about our work. From which it follows that he does not act against the precept of the Lord who has care about the things to be done by himself: but he who is solicitous about those things that can emerge even if he performs his own operations, so that to meet events of this sort he omits due actions. For this seems to pertain to the error of the Gentiles, who denied divine providence. For this reason the Lord concludes that we should not be solicitous for the morrow: not so, namely, that we do not preserve those things that are necessary to us for the morrow; but lest we be solicitous about future events, with despair of divine help; or lest the care that will have to be had on the morrow preoccupy us. Hence it is added: For the day's own malice is sufficient for it.

From all the aforesaid things St. Thomas infers that it is clear that those who pursue voluntary poverty can live in diverse ways: moreover, that any way is so much the more praiseworthy, the more it renders the mind of man immune from the care of temporal things and occupation concerning them.

Concerning this matter of voluntary poverty, St. Thomas treats diffusely in II-II, in the place cited above, and in the treatise Contra impugnantes Religionem ¹⁴.