Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

Having determined the truth, St. Thomas answers the arguments adduced above¹. Regarding this, however, he does two things: first, he resolves the arguments brought against poverty absolutely²; second, in the following chapter, he resolves those that attack particular ways of living in poverty³.

I. As to the first, to the first argument, which proceeded from the natural appetite in man for gathering the necessities of life, he answers: and he says first, that from this natural inclination it is not necessary for everyone to be occupied with this work; but, because many things are necessary for human life, different things must be done by different persons, so that, namely, some are farmers, some keepers of animals, and so on for others. It is also necessary that some devote themselves to spiritual matters for the betterment of others, because human life needs not only bodily things, but more so spiritual things. — This is illustrated from bees, among whom not all devote themselves to the same task.

He says secondly, that this distribution of offices among different persons is brought about by divine providence, according as some are more inclined to this office than to others.

2. For the clarity of this answer, it must be considered that the natural inclination toward that which is necessary for each one is twofold. One is toward that which is necessary for each one in such a way that it cannot be satisfied for him by another, as for every animal there is a natural inclination to eating; and such an inclination of nature is so ingrained in each one that every individual of nature is moved by natural necessity, through itself, toward that to which nature inclines. The other is that which indeed inclines toward something necessary for each one, but in this one can be aided by another, as for a thirsty man there is a natural inclination to seek drink, which nevertheless can be sought and supplied to him by another; and this natural inclination is not so ingrained in each individual of nature that it must by natural necessity occupy itself with the work to which nature inclines, but it suffices that it either be moved toward it through itself or be aided by another individual. Such is the natural inclination to the gathering of those things that are necessary in life. For when the necessities of life can be gathered for someone by no other man, he is moved toward this by natural necessity; but when he can be provided with the necessities of life through another who gathers them, he is not moved toward such gathering by natural necessity, but, while the natural inclination itself remains, a man can be occupied in other works, with certain others devoting themselves to the gathering of wealth and providing him with the necessities of life. On account of which St. Thomas says in IIª IIae, q. CLXXXVII, a. 3, ad 1, that individuals are not bound to those precepts of the law of nature that pertain to the good of the many, but it suffices that one devote himself to one office and another to another: for instance, that some be craftsmen, some farmers. The same can also be gathered from what he will say below, ch. CXXXVI. From this it is clear that it was fittingly said by St. Thomas that there is not a natural inclination in man to gather the necessities of life in such a way that it is necessary for everyone to be occupied with this. And therefore that consequence by which it was inferred that it is against the law of nature to disperse what has been gathered, is false.

II. To the second he answers by admitting what is ultimately inferred; but he says that those who abandon temporal things do not deprive themselves of the necessities of life, because there remains to them a probable hope of sustaining their life, either from their own labor or from the benefactions of others; for what is had from friends is in a way had by ourselves.

Note that from this answer that consequence is denied: By the substance of external goods human life is preserved. Therefore, just as one's life, so also one's external substance each one is bound to preserve through himself. For it suffices that it be preserved through others, from whom there is a probable hope of having as much as shall be necessary.

III. To the third he says that he who deprives himself through voluntary poverty of the ability to assist others in temporal things in order to acquire spiritual things, through which he can assist others, does not act against the good of human society; because it is greater to assist another in spiritual things than in temporal things.

From this it is clear that the assumed proposition, It is natural to men that one help another in necessities, is to be understood of either spiritual or temporal necessities. And therefore the consequence is null.

IV. To the fourth he says that riches are a certain good of man according as they are ordered to the good of reason, but not in themselves. And therefore nothing prevents poverty from being a better thing, if through it something is ordered to a more perfect good ⁴.

It must be noted that through this answer St. Thomas intends to concede the first conclusion that is inferred, namely that it is good to have the substance of this world. It must be understood, however, according as it is ordered to the good of reason. — But he denies the ultimate consequence, namely, Therefore to cast away substance through voluntary poverty is evil. For it is not evil to cast away a lesser good on account of a greater good.

V. To the fifth he says that poverty is not to be cast away as an evil in itself on account of some vices that may accidentally ⁵ sometimes arise from it. Because, since neither riches nor poverty are in themselves a good of man, but according as they are ordered to the good of reason, nothing prevents some vice from arising from either of them, when they do not come into man's use according to the rule of reason.

From this it is clear that the antecedent is false, Poverty is an occasion of evil, namely in itself (in which sense it is to be understood that occasions of evils are to be avoided); although sometimes its use is evil, because it is not according to the rule of reason.

VI. To the sixth he says first, that the mean of virtue is taken not according to the quantity of external things that come into man's use, as is clear in the magnanimous and the magnificent man, but according to the rule of reason, inasmuch as it neither exceeds it nor falls short of it.

He says secondly, that the rule of reason does not only measure the quantity of the thing that comes into use, but the condition of the person, and his intention, and the opportunity of place and time, and other things of this kind.

He says thirdly, applying what has been said to the proposal, that although someone through voluntary poverty leaves all things, he is nevertheless not contrary to virtue, nor does he act prodigally, since he does this for a due end and with the other due conditions observed. This is shown by comparison to one who exposes himself to death from the virtue of fortitude.

2. It must be noted, from the doctrine of St. Thomas, Iª IIae, q. LXIV ⁶, that the first thing said here is not to be understood as if in no virtue is the mean of virtue taken according to the quantity of the thing—for in justice the mean of reason is the mean of the thing—but because not in all virtues is the mean taken according to the quantity of the thing, but according to conformity to the rule of reason.

To the authority of Solomon, he says that he is speaking of forced poverty, which is wont to be an occasion of stealing.