Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

Having set forth the objections of those who attack voluntary poverty, St. Thomas wishes to determine the truth and show how voluntary poverty is good and how it is evil¹.

Concerning this, moreover, he does two things: first, he shows how riches are related to good and evil; second, how poverty is good or evil².

I. As to the first, he sets down four conclusions. The first is: Riches are a certain good of man, but a secondary one.

It is proved. They are necessary for the good of virtue, since by them we sustain the body and help others. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is proved: because things that are for the end must derive their goodness from the end.

It should be noted that both parts of the conclusion are sufficiently proved from that proposition. For if things ordered to the end derive their goodness from the end, that which is ordered to a good must be a certain good insofar as it is such. It must also be a secondary good: because, as is said here, the end is the principal good, while other things ordered to it are secondary goods.

II. The second conclusion is: Riches are good only insofar as they are profitable for the practice of virtue. But if that measure is exceeded, so that the practice of virtue is hindered, they are no longer to be counted among goods, but among evils.

It is proved. Riches are ordered to the good of virtue as to an end, and as a secondary good to the principal one. But things that are for the end receive their measure according to the requirement of the end. Therefore, they are good only insofar as they are ordered to the practice of virtue. — The major is clear from what was first said, and also from the opinion of those who say that virtues are man's greatest goods, while riches are his least goods.

From this conclusion St. Thomas infers that it happens to be good for some to have riches, namely, those who use them for virtues; but to be evil for some, namely, those who are drawn back from virtue by them.

III. The third conclusion is: The contemplative virtues need riches in one way, and the active virtues in another.

It is explained. Because the contemplative virtues need them only for the sustenance of nature, but the active virtues, beyond this, also for helping others with whom one must live. — From this it follows that the contemplative life is more perfect than the active even in this, that it needs fewer things.

It should be noted, from the Philosopher in X Eth.³, that a life is by so much more perfect in itself and absolutely as a man in it is more self-sufficient, as having from himself sufficiency for his own perfection and conservation. But a thing is by so much more self-sufficient as it needs fewer other things for its being and for its conservation. Therefore, St. Thomas very well adduces that the contemplative life is more perfect than the active in the use of exterior things, from the fact that it needs fewer things.

It should be noted further that the active life consists in the exercise of the moral virtues, for to this life the Philosopher, in X Eth.⁴, orders the moral virtues. Moreover, riches serve them instrumentally⁵, so that without them many of the moral virtues cannot be exercised: for it is evident that one who does not have what is to be given cannot practice liberality. Therefore, it is well said that the active life needs riches also for helping others.

IV. The fourth conclusion is: For those pursuing that perfection which the teaching of Christ urges, namely, that a man be totally free for divine things, the least of exterior riches suffices: namely, as much as is necessary for the sustenance of life.

It is proved. Because this perfection seems to belong to the contemplative life, for which the least of exterior things suffices. — It is also confirmed by the authority of the Apostle, I Tim. 6.

V. As to the second⁶, he shows from what precedes how poverty is good or evil. And he states five points.

The first is that it is praiseworthy insofar as it frees man from those vices in which some are entangled through riches.

The second is that, insofar as it removes the anxiety that arises from riches, it is useful to some, namely, those who are so disposed as to be occupied with better things, that is, with the contemplation of divine things; but to some it is harmful, namely, to those who, freed from this anxiety, fall into worse occupations. — This is clear through Gregory in Moralia, book VI.

The third is that, insofar as it hinders the sustenance of others and of oneself, it is simply evil, unless such assistance can be compensated for by a greater good. This indeed can occur in the case of the assistance by which neighbors are helped in temporal matters: for it can be compensated for by the fact that a man, lacking riches, can more freely be at leisure for divine and spiritual things. But it cannot occur in the case of one's own sustenance: because on the pretext of no good ought a man to take away from himself the sustenance of life.

The fourth, which is inferred from the preceding, is that poverty is then praiseworthy when a man, freed from earthly anxieties, is more freely at leisure for divine and spiritual things, while a lawful manner of sustaining life remains.

The fifth is that, the less anxiety the manner of living in poverty requires, the more praiseworthy the poverty is, but not in proportion as the poverty is greater. — It is proved. Because, since poverty is not good in itself, just as other exterior things are not, but only insofar as it is profitable for virtue, the measure of its goodness is according to the manner in which a man is freed through it from things that hinder leisure for divine things.

2. Concerning this last statement, it must be considered that from it we can gather that it is not evil for religious to have as much riches as are required for their fitting sustenance, when the lack of riches increases anxiety concerning the acquisition of temporal things and hinders the mind from being able to be free for divine things. Because, as is said here, poverty is not good in itself, but only when it removes the anxiety that hinders from the contemplation of divine things. And therefore, when it does not diminish anxiety concerning temporal things and hindrances to contemplation, but rather increases them, it is not only not good, but rather evil. And because in this season, as charity grows cold among men and the religious orders that follow voluntary poverty are multiplied, religious cannot acquire the sustenance of life from others except with the greatest anxiety and distraction of mind, by which they must necessarily be drawn away from the contemplation of spiritual things; for that reason it is perhaps more fitting that they have in common that from which they can have the necessaries of life, than that they devote their effort to mendicancy.