Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

Francesco Silvestri

Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

Francesco Silvestri (1474–1528)

Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles

First published 1926

In Book III of the Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Francesco Silvestri of Ferrara (Ferrariensis) expounds Aquinas's account of providence, human happiness, moral action, and divine grace. The commentary accompanies the Leonine text in volume XIV (1926). The present digital edition includes the Latin text and an English translation.


Prooemium

Caput I: Quod Omne Agens Agit propter Finem

Caput II: Quod Omne Agens Agit propter Bonum

Caput III: Quod Malum est Praeter Intentionem in Rebus

Caput IV: Rationes Quibus Videtur Probari quod Malum non Sit Praeter Intentionem

Caput V: Solutio Rationum Praemissarum

Caput VI: Quod Malum non est Aliqua Essentia

Caput VII: Rationes Quibus Videtur Probari quod Malum Sit Natura vel Res Aliqua

Caput VIII: Solutio Rationum Praemissarum

Caput IX: Quod Causa Mali est Bonum

Caput X: Quod Malum Fundatur in Bono

Caput XI: Quod Malum non Totaliter Consumit Bonum

Caput XII: Quod Malum Habet Aliquo Modo Causam

Caput XIII: Quod Malum est Causa per Accidens

Caput XIV: Quod non est Summum Malum

Caput XV: Quod Finis Cuiuslibet Rei est Bonum

Caput XVI: Quod Omnia Ordinantur in Unum Finem, qui est Deus

Caput XVII: Quomodo Deus Sit Finis Rerum

Caput XVIII: Quod Omnia Intendunt Assimilari Deo

Caput XIX: Quomodo Res Imitentur Divinam Bonitatem

Caput XX: Quod Res Intendunt Naturaliter Assimilari Deo in Hoc quod est Causa

Caput XXI: Quomodo Diversimode Res Ordinantur in Suos Fines

Caput XXII: Quod Motus Caeli est a Principio Intellectivo

Caput XXIII: Quomodo Appetunt Bonum Etiam quae Cognitione Carent

Caput XXIV: Quod Intelligere Deum est Finis Omnis Intellectualis Substantiae

Caput XXV: Utrum Felicitas Consistat in Actu Voluntatis

Caput XXVI: Quod Felicitas Humana non Consistit in Delectationibus Carnalibus

Caput XXVII: Quod Felicitas non Consistit in Honoribus

Caput XXVIII: Quod Felicitas Hominis non Consistit in Gloria

Caput XXIX: Quod Felicitas Hominis non Consistit in Divitiis

Caput XXX: Quod Felicitas non Consistit in Potentia Mundana

Caput XXXI: Quod Felicitas non Consistit in Bonis Corporis

Caput XXXII: Quod Felicitas Humana non Consistit in Sensu

Caput XXXIII: Quod Ultima Hominis Felicitas non Consistit in Actibus Virtutum Moralium

Caput XXXIV: Quod Ultima Felicitas non Sit in Actu Prudentiae

Caput XXXV: Quod Felicitas non Consistit in Operatione Artis

Caput XXXVI: Quod Ultima Felicitas Hominis Consistit in Contemplatione Dei

Caput XXXVII: Quod Felicitas Humana non Consistit in Cognitione Dei quae Communiter Habetur a Pluribus

Caput XXXVIII: Quod Felicitas Humana non Consistit in Cognitione Dei quae Habetur per Demonstrationem

Caput XXXIX: Quod Felicitas Humana non Consistit in Cognitione Dei quae est per Fidem

Caput XL: Utrum in Hac Vita Homo Possit Intelligere Substantias Separatas per Studium et Inquisitionem Scientiarum Speculativarum

Caput XLI: Quod non Possumus in Hac Vita Cognoscere Substantias Separatas sicut Ponit Alexander

Caput XLII: Quod non Possumus in Hac Vita Intelligere Substantias Separatas sicut Ponit Averroes

Caput XLIII: Quod Ultima Felicitas Hominis non Consistit in Cognitione Substantiarum Separatarum Qualem Praedictae Opiniones Fingunt

Caput XLIV: Quod non Possumus in Hac Vita Intelligere Substantias Separatas

Caput XLV: Quod Anima in Hac Vita non Intelligit Seipsam per Seipsam

Caput XLVI: Quod non Possumus in Hac Vita Videre Deum per Essentiam

Caput XLVII: Quod Ultima Hominis Felicitas non Sit in Hac Vita

Caput XLVIII: Quod Substantiae Separatae non Vident Deum per Essentiam ex Hoc quod Cognoscunt eum per Suam Essentiam

Caput XLIX: Quod in Naturali Cognitione Quam Habent Substantiae Separatae de Deo non Quiescit Earum Naturale Desiderium

Caput L: Quomodo Deus per Essentiam Videatur

Caput LI: Quod Nulla Creata Substantia Potest Sua Naturali Virtute Pervenire ad Videndum Deum per Essentiam

Caput LII: Quod Intellectus Creatus Indiget Aliqua Influentia Divini Luminis ad Hoc ut Deum per Essentiam Videat

Caput LIII: Rationes Quibus Videtur Probari quod Deus non Possit Videri per Essentiam, et Solutiones Earum

Caput LIV: Quod Intellectus Creatus non Comprehendit Divinam Substantiam

Caput LV: Quod Nullus Intellectus Creatus, Videndo Deum, Videt Omnia quae in Eo Videri Possunt

Caput LVI: Quod Omnis Intellectus, Cuiuscumque Gradus, Particeps esse Potest Divinae Visionis

Caput LVII: Quod Unus Alio Perfectius Deum Videre Potest

Caput LVIII: Quomodo Videntes Divinam Substantiam Omnia Vident

Caput LIX: Quod Videntes Deum Omnia Simul Vident in Ipso

Caput LX: Quod per Visionem Dei Aliquis Fit Particeps Vitae Aeternae

Caput LXI: Quod Videntes Deum in Perpetuum eum Videbunt

Caput LXII: Qualiter in Illa Ultima Felicitate Omne Desiderium Hominis Completur

Caput LXIII: Quod Deus Sua Providentia Gubernat Res

Caput LXIV: Quod Deus Conservat Res in esse

Caput LXV: Quod Nihil Dat esse Nisi Inquantum Agit in Virtute Divina

Caput LXVI: Quod Deus est Causa Operandi Omnibus Operantibus

Caput LXVII: Quod Deus est Ubique

Caput LXVIII: De Opinione Eorum qui Rebus Naturalibus Proprias Subtrahunt Actiones

Caput LXIX: Quomodo Idem Effectus Sit a Deo et a Natura Agente

Caput LXX: Quod Divina Providentia non Excludit Totaliter Malum a Rebus

Caput LXXI: Quod Divina Providentia non Excludit Contingentiam a Rebus

Caput LXXII: Quod Divina Providentia non Excludit Arbitrii Libertatem

Caput LXXIII: Quod Divina Providentia non Excludit Fortunam et Casum

Caput LXXIV: Quod Providentia Dei Sit Singularium Contingentium

Caput LXXV: Quod Providentia Dei Sit Omnium Singularium Immediate

Caput LXXVI: Quod Executio Divinae Providentiae Fit Mediantibus Causis Secundis

Caput LXXVII: Quod Mediantibus Creaturis Intellectualibus Aliae Creaturae Reguntur a Deo

Caput LXXVIII: Quod Substantiae Intellectivae Inferiores Reguntur per Superiores

Caput LXXIX: De Ordinatione Angelorum ad Invicem

Caput LXXX: De Ordinatione Hominum ad Invicem et ad Alia

Caput LXXXI: Quod Inferiora Corpora Reguntur a Deo per Corpora Caelestia

Caput LXXXII: Epilogus Praedictorum

Caput LXXXIII: Quod Corpora Caelestia non Imprimant in Intellectus Nostros

Caput LXXXIV: Quod Corpora Caelestia non sunt Causae Voluntatum et Electionum Nostrarum

Caput LXXXV: Quod Corporales Effectus in Istis Inferioribus non Sequuntur ex Necessitate a Corporibus Caelestibus

Caput LXXXVI: Quod Motus Caelestis Corporis non Sit Causa Electionum Nostrarum ex Virtute Animae Moventis, ut Quidam Dicunt

Caput LXXXVII: Quod Substantiae Separatae Creatae non Possunt esse Causa Directe Electionum et Voluntatum Nostrarum, sed Solus Deus

Caput LXXXVIII: Quod Motus Voluntatis Causatur a Deo, et non Solum Potentia Voluntatis

Caput LXXXIX: Quod Electiones et Voluntates Humanae Subduntur Divinae Providentiae

Caput XC: Quomodo Res Humanae ad Superiores Causas Reducantur

Caput XCI: Quomodo Dicitur Aliquis Bene Fortunatus, et Quomodo Adiuvatur Homo ex Superioribus Causis

Caput XCII: De Fato: an Sit, et Quid Sit

Caput XCIII: De Certitudine Divinae Providentiae

Caput XCIV: Quod Immobilitas Divinae Providentiae Utilitatem Orationis non Excludit

Caput XCV: Quod Deus non Omnes Orationes Exaudit

Caput XCVI: Quomodo Dispositio Providentiae Habeat Rationem

Caput XCVII: Quomodo Deus Possit Facere Praeter Ordinem Suae Providentiae, et Quomodo non

Caput XCVIII: Quod Deus Potest Operari Praeter Ordinem Rebus Inditum, Producendo Effectus absque Causis Proximis

Caput XCIX: Quod Ea quae Deus Facit Praeter Naturae Ordinem non sunt contra Naturam

Caput C: De Miraculis

Caput CI: Quod Solus Deus Facit Miracula

Caput CII: Quod Substantiae Spirituales Aliqua Mirabilia Operantur, quae tamen non sunt Vere Miracula

Caput CIII: Quod Opera Magorum non sunt Solum ex Impressione Caelestium Corporum

Caput CIV: Unde Magorum Operationes Efficaciam Habeant

Caput CV: Quod Substantia Intellectualis quae Praestat Efficaciam Magicis Operibus, non est Bona secundum Virtutem

Caput CVI: Quod Substantia Intellectualis Cuius Auxilio Magicae Artes Utuntur, non est Mala secundum Suam Naturam

Caput CVII: Rationes Quibus Probari Videtur quod in Daemonibus non Possit esse Peccatum

Caput CVIII: Quod in Daemonibus Possit esse Peccatum, et Qualiter

Caput CIX: Solutio Praemissarum Rationum

Caput CX: Quod Speciali Quadam Ratione Creaturae Rationales Divinae Providentiae Subduntur

Caput CXI: Quod Creaturae Rationales Gubernantur propter Seipsas, Aliae Vero in Ordine ad Eas

Caput CXII: Quod Rationalis Creatura Dirigitur a Deo ad Suos Actus non Solum secundum Ordinem ad Speciem, sed Etiam secundum quod Congruit Individuo

Caput CXIII: Quod Divinitus Hominibus Leges Dantur

Caput CXIV: Quod Lex Divina Principaliter Hominem Ordinat in Deum

Caput CXV: Quod Finis Legis Divinae est Dilectio Dei

Caput CXVI: Quod Divina Lege Ordinamur ad Dilectionem Proximi

Caput CXVII: Quod per Divinam Legem Homines ad Rectam Fidem Obligantur

Caput CXVIII: Quod per Quaedam Sensibilia Mens Nostra Dirigitur in Deum

Caput CXIX: Quod Latriae Cultus Soli Deo est Exhibendus

Caput CXX: Quod Divina Lex Ordinat Hominem secundum Rationem circa Corporalia et Sensibilia

Caput CXXI: Qua Ratione Fornicatio Simplex secundum Legem Divinam Sit Peccatum: et quod Matrimonium Sit Naturale

Caput CXXII: Quod Matrimonium Debet esse Indivisibile

Caput CXXIII: Quod Matrimonium Debeat esse Unius ad Unam

Caput CXXIV: Quod Matrimonium non Debet Fieri inter Propinquos

Caput CXXV: Quod non Omnis Carnalis Commixtio est Peccatum

Caput CXXVI: Quod Nullus Cibi Usus est Peccatum secundum se

Caput CXXVII: Quomodo secundum Legem Dei Homo Ordinatur ad Proximum

Caput CXXVIII: Quod in Actibus Humanis sunt Aliqua Recta secundum Naturam, et non Solum Quasi Lege Posita

Caput CXXIX: De Consiliis quae Dantur in Lege Divina

Caput CXXX: De Errore Impugnantium Voluntariam Paupertatem

Caput CXXXI: De Modis Vivendi Eorum qui Voluntariam Paupertatem Sequuntur

Secondly, he sets forth objections against the particular modes of poverty.

I. The first mode is that the possessions of individuals be sold, and that all live in common from the price. This seems to have been observed by the Apostles in Jerusalem, as is clear from Acts 4.

Against this it is argued: First, because those who pursue such poverty will remain without the sustenance of life.

Secondly, because it is not easy for many, even those having great possessions, to take up this life. — And also the price of the possessions would not suffice for a long time.

Thirdly, because it is possible, and easy, for a price of this kind to be lost through the fraud of administrators, or by theft or robbery.

Fourthly, because, since it happens that men change location, it will not be easy to provide from such a price for those who must perhaps be scattered through diverse places.

II. The second mode is that they have possessions in common, by which individuals are provided for, as in most monasteries.

Against this it is urged that it seems to hinder the end of voluntary poverty. First, because it is necessary for many to be solicitous about managing possessions. — Secondly, because common possession is customarily a cause of discord. But discord especially hinders the mind's leisure for divine things.

III. The third mode is that they live by the labors of their hands. The Apostle followed this mode and urged it upon others, in 2 Thess. 3.

Against this it is argued, first, because it seems vain that someone, having abandoned what is necessary for the sustenance of life, should labor to acquire it again.

Secondly, because this does not seem suitable to the purpose of those taking up voluntary poverty. For it seems to require greater solicitude for someone to seek a livelihood for himself by his own labor than for him to use the things he has, especially if he has moderate wealth.

Thirdly, because the Lord, under the likeness of the birds and the lilies of the field, seems to forbid manual labor to the Apostles.

Fourthly, because this mode seems insufficient. First, because there are many who cannot pass their life through manual labor by any craft; and thus peasants and craftsmen would be in a better condition to attain the perfection of life than the wise and the wealthy; and it also happens that some who take up voluntary poverty become ill, or are otherwise hindered from manual work. — Secondly, because, since not a little time of labor suffices to seek the necessities of life, those who pursue voluntary poverty of this kind would consume the greater part of their life in manual labor, and thus they would be hindered from other spiritual exercises; and consequently voluntary poverty would hinder the perfection of life more than dispose toward it.

If it should be said that manual labor is necessary to remove idleness: — this does not suffice. First, because idleness would be better removed through occupations in the moral virtues, which riches serve instrumentally. — Secondly, because it would be vain to give a counsel concerning poverty for the sake of avoiding idleness, unless it were given to the end that men might be at leisure for nobler exercises than those that belong to the common life of men.

If it should also be said that such labor is necessary to tame concupiscences: — this is beside the point, because we are asking whether it is necessary that the voluntarily poor seek their livelihood by the labor of their hands. — And furthermore, it is possible for the concupiscences of the flesh to be tamed in many other ways; and the wealthy could also use manual labor for this end.

IV. The fourth mode is that they live from those things that are brought in by others. The Lord seems to have observed this mode with His disciples, as is clear from Luke 8.

Against this it is argued, first, because it does not seem reasonable that someone should abandon his own goods and live from another's.

Secondly, because it seems unfitting that someone should receive from another and repay him nothing. For it could be sustained that those should live in this mode who serve others in some office, for instance by ministering at the altar, preaching, and doing similar things, as is shown in Matt. 10 and 1 Cor. 9; but that others, who minister to the people in no office, should receive the necessities of life from them seems unfitting.

Thirdly. That mode of living is harmful to others who cannot suffice for themselves on account of poverty and illness, because they ought to be sustained from those things that are given to those who choose voluntary poverty. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is proved from the Apostle, 1 Tim. 5.

Fourthly. That mode of living hinders the perfection of virtue. For it hinders the freedom of the mind, which is especially required for virtue, because, when this is removed, men easily share in the sins of others, either by consenting, or by smoothing them over through flattery, or by dissembling. Therefore, etc.

Fifthly. It depends on the will of the giver that he give from his own goods. Therefore, by this mode sufficient provision is not made for the voluntarily poor.

Sixthly. This mode renders the voluntarily poor contemptible. For it is necessary that they explain their needs to others, and ask for necessities. But men consider themselves superior to those who have need to be sustained by them; and most give with difficulty. But this is unfitting, because those who take up the perfection of life ought to be held in reverence. Therefore, etc.

Seventhly. Begging has the appearance of evil, since many beg for the sake of gain. Therefore it is to be avoided. — The consequence is clear from the Apostle, Rom. 12, and from the authority of Aristotle.

Eighthly. This mode has the greatest amount of solicitude. For it seems to be of greater solicitude to acquire the goods of others than to use one's own. Therefore, etc.

If someone, moreover, should praise begging on account of humility: — he seems to speak unreasonably. For humility is not praised according as the height of virtue is despised, in respect of which we ought to be magnanimous, and it is derogated from. But by begging it is derogated from: both because it is more virtuous to give than to receive, and because it has the appearance of filthy lucre. Therefore, etc.

V. The last mode is that of some who say that those pursuing the perfection of life should have no solicitude, but that they ought to expect the sustenance of life from God alone, which seems to be said in Matt. 6.

But against this it is argued, first, because human solicitude is ordered to the end of eating. But it is foolish to will the end and to omit the things that are ordered to the end.

Secondly. Solicitude is not to be avoided except because it hinders the contemplation of eternal things. But a man, bearing mortal flesh, cannot live without doing many things. Therefore neither is solicitude for the things necessary for life to be omitted on account of the hindrance of contemplation.

Thirdly. For a like reason a man could say that he does not want to walk, or to open his mouth to eat, and similar things, but to expect that God should act. But this is to tempt God. Therefore, etc.

Caput CXXXII: Quomodo Paupertas Sit Bona

Caput CXXXIII: Solutio Rationum Supra Inductarum contra Paupertatem

Caput CXXXIV: Solutio Eorum quae Obiiciebantur contra Diversos Modos Vivendi Eorum qui Assumunt Voluntariam Paupertatem

Caput CXXXV: De Errore Eorum qui Perpetuam Continentiam Impugnant

Caput CXXXVI: Contra eos qui Matrimonium Virginitati Aequabant

Caput CXXXVII: Contra Eos qui Vota Impugnant

Caput CXXXVIII: Quod neque Merita neque Peccata Sint Paria

Caput CXXXIX: Quod Actus Hominis Puniuntur vel Praemiantur a Deo

Caput CXL: De Differentia et Ordine Poenarum

Caput CXLI: Quod non Omnia Praemia et Poenae sunt Aequales

Caput CXLII: De Poena quae Debetur Peccato Mortali et Veniali per Respectum ad Ultimum Finem

Caput CXLIII: Quod per Peccatum Mortale Ultimo Fine Aliquis in Aeternum Privatur

Caput CXLIV: Quod Peccata Puniuntur Etiam per Experientiam Alicuius Nocivi

Caput CXLV: Quod Iudicibus Licet Poenas Inferre

Caput CXLVI: Quod Homo Indiget Divino Auxilio ad Beatitudinem Consequendam

Caput CXLVII: Quod per Auxilium Divinae Gratiae Homo non Cogitur ad Virtutem

Caput CXLVIII: Quod Divinum Auxilium Homo Promereri non Potest

Caput CXLIX: Quod Praedictum Auxilium Gratia Nominatur. et Quid Sit Gratia Gratum Faciens

Caput CL: Quod Gratia Gratum Faciens Causat in Nobis Dilectionem Dei

Caput CLI: Quod Divina Gratia Causat in Nobis Fidem

Caput CLII: Quod Divina Gratia Causat in Nobis Spem

Caput CLIII: De Donis Gratiae Gratis Datae. in Quo de Divinationibus Daemonum

Caput CLIV: Quod Homo Indiget Divino Auxilio ad Perseverandum in Bono

Caput CLV: Quod Ille qui Decidit a Gratia per Peccatum, Potest Iterum per Gratiam Reparari

Caput CLVI: Quod Homo a Peccato Liberari non Potest Nisi per Gratiam

Caput CLVII: Qualiter Homo a Peccato Liberatur

Caput CLVIII: Quod Rationabiliter Homini Imputatur si ad Deum non Convertatur, Quamvis Hoc sine Gratia non Possit

Caput CLIX: Quod Homo in Peccato Existens sine Gratia Peccatum Vitare non Potest

Caput CLX: Quod Deus Aliquos a Peccato Liberat, et Aliquos in Peccato Relinquit

Caput CLXI: Quod Deus Nemini est Causa Peccandi

Caput CLXII: De Praedestinatione, Reprobatione, et Electione Divina

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