Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III
Francesco Silvestri (1474–1528)
Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles
First published 1926
In Book III of the Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Francesco Silvestri of Ferrara (Ferrariensis) expounds Aquinas's account of providence, human happiness, moral action, and divine grace. The commentary accompanies the Leonine text in volume XIV (1926). The present digital edition includes the Latin text and an English translation.
Prooemium
Caput I: Quod Omne Agens Agit propter Finem
Caput II: Quod Omne Agens Agit propter Bonum
Caput III: Quod Malum est Praeter Intentionem in Rebus
Caput IV: Rationes Quibus Videtur Probari quod Malum non Sit Praeter Intentionem
Caput V: Solutio Rationum Praemissarum
Caput VI: Quod Malum non est Aliqua Essentia
Caput VII: Rationes Quibus Videtur Probari quod Malum Sit Natura vel Res Aliqua
Caput VIII: Solutio Rationum Praemissarum
Caput IX: Quod Causa Mali est Bonum
Caput X: Quod Malum Fundatur in Bono
Caput XI: Quod Malum non Totaliter Consumit Bonum
Caput XII: Quod Malum Habet Aliquo Modo Causam
Caput XIII: Quod Malum est Causa per Accidens
Caput XIV: Quod non est Summum Malum
Caput XV: Quod Finis Cuiuslibet Rei est Bonum
Caput XVI: Quod Omnia Ordinantur in Unum Finem, qui est Deus
Caput XVII: Quomodo Deus Sit Finis Rerum
Caput XVIII: Quod Omnia Intendunt Assimilari Deo
Caput XIX: Quomodo Res Imitentur Divinam Bonitatem
Caput XX: Quod Res Intendunt Naturaliter Assimilari Deo in Hoc quod est Causa
Caput XXI: Quomodo Diversimode Res Ordinantur in Suos Fines
Caput XXII: Quod Motus Caeli est a Principio Intellectivo
Caput XXIII: Quomodo Appetunt Bonum Etiam quae Cognitione Carent
Caput XXIV: Quod Intelligere Deum est Finis Omnis Intellectualis Substantiae
Caput XXV: Utrum Felicitas Consistat in Actu Voluntatis
Caput XXVI: Quod Felicitas Humana non Consistit in Delectationibus Carnalibus
Caput XXVII: Quod Felicitas non Consistit in Honoribus
Caput XXVIII: Quod Felicitas Hominis non Consistit in Gloria
Caput XXIX: Quod Felicitas Hominis non Consistit in Divitiis
Caput XXX: Quod Felicitas non Consistit in Potentia Mundana
Caput XXXI: Quod Felicitas non Consistit in Bonis Corporis
Caput XXXII: Quod Felicitas Humana non Consistit in Sensu
Caput XXXIII: Quod Ultima Hominis Felicitas non Consistit in Actibus Virtutum Moralium
Caput XXXIV: Quod Ultima Felicitas non Sit in Actu Prudentiae
Caput XXXV: Quod Felicitas non Consistit in Operatione Artis
Caput XXXVI: Quod Ultima Felicitas Hominis Consistit in Contemplatione Dei
Caput XXXVII: Quod Felicitas Humana non Consistit in Cognitione Dei quae Communiter Habetur a Pluribus
Caput XXXVIII: Quod Felicitas Humana non Consistit in Cognitione Dei quae Habetur per Demonstrationem
Caput XXXIX: Quod Felicitas Humana non Consistit in Cognitione Dei quae est per Fidem
Caput XL: Utrum in Hac Vita Homo Possit Intelligere Substantias Separatas per Studium et Inquisitionem Scientiarum Speculativarum
Caput XLI: Quod non Possumus in Hac Vita Cognoscere Substantias Separatas sicut Ponit Alexander
Caput XLII: Quod non Possumus in Hac Vita Intelligere Substantias Separatas sicut Ponit Averroes
Caput XLIII: Quod Ultima Felicitas Hominis non Consistit in Cognitione Substantiarum Separatarum Qualem Praedictae Opiniones Fingunt
Caput XLIV: Quod non Possumus in Hac Vita Intelligere Substantias Separatas
Caput XLV: Quod Anima in Hac Vita non Intelligit Seipsam per Seipsam
Caput XLVI: Quod non Possumus in Hac Vita Videre Deum per Essentiam
Caput XLVII: Quod Ultima Hominis Felicitas non Sit in Hac Vita
Caput XLVIII: Quod Substantiae Separatae non Vident Deum per Essentiam ex Hoc quod Cognoscunt eum per Suam Essentiam
Caput XLIX: Quod in Naturali Cognitione Quam Habent Substantiae Separatae de Deo non Quiescit Earum Naturale Desiderium
Caput L: Quomodo Deus per Essentiam Videatur
Caput LI: Quod Nulla Creata Substantia Potest Sua Naturali Virtute Pervenire ad Videndum Deum per Essentiam
Caput LII: Quod Intellectus Creatus Indiget Aliqua Influentia Divini Luminis ad Hoc ut Deum per Essentiam Videat
Caput LIII: Rationes Quibus Videtur Probari quod Deus non Possit Videri per Essentiam, et Solutiones Earum
Caput LIV: Quod Intellectus Creatus non Comprehendit Divinam Substantiam
Caput LV: Quod Nullus Intellectus Creatus, Videndo Deum, Videt Omnia quae in Eo Videri Possunt
Caput LVI: Quod Omnis Intellectus, Cuiuscumque Gradus, Particeps esse Potest Divinae Visionis
Caput LVII: Quod Unus Alio Perfectius Deum Videre Potest
Caput LVIII: Quomodo Videntes Divinam Substantiam Omnia Vident
Caput LIX: Quod Videntes Deum Omnia Simul Vident in Ipso
Caput LX: Quod per Visionem Dei Aliquis Fit Particeps Vitae Aeternae
Caput LXI: Quod Videntes Deum in Perpetuum eum Videbunt
Caput LXII: Qualiter in Illa Ultima Felicitate Omne Desiderium Hominis Completur
Caput LXIII: Quod Deus Sua Providentia Gubernat Res
Caput LXIV: Quod Deus Conservat Res in esse
Caput LXV: Quod Nihil Dat esse Nisi Inquantum Agit in Virtute Divina
Caput LXVI: Quod Deus est Causa Operandi Omnibus Operantibus
Caput LXVII: Quod Deus est Ubique
Caput LXVIII: De Opinione Eorum qui Rebus Naturalibus Proprias Subtrahunt Actiones
Caput LXIX: Quomodo Idem Effectus Sit a Deo et a Natura Agente
Caput LXX: Quod Divina Providentia non Excludit Totaliter Malum a Rebus
Caput LXXI: Quod Divina Providentia non Excludit Contingentiam a Rebus
Caput LXXII: Quod Divina Providentia non Excludit Arbitrii Libertatem
Caput LXXIII: Quod Divina Providentia non Excludit Fortunam et Casum
Caput LXXIV: Quod Providentia Dei Sit Singularium Contingentium
Caput LXXV: Quod Providentia Dei Sit Omnium Singularium Immediate
Caput LXXVI: Quod Executio Divinae Providentiae Fit Mediantibus Causis Secundis
Caput LXXVII: Quod Mediantibus Creaturis Intellectualibus Aliae Creaturae Reguntur a Deo
Caput LXXVIII: Quod Substantiae Intellectivae Inferiores Reguntur per Superiores
Caput LXXIX: De Ordinatione Angelorum ad Invicem
Caput LXXX: De Ordinatione Hominum ad Invicem et ad Alia
Caput LXXXI: Quod Inferiora Corpora Reguntur a Deo per Corpora Caelestia
Caput LXXXII: Epilogus Praedictorum
Caput LXXXIII: Quod Corpora Caelestia non Imprimant in Intellectus Nostros
Caput LXXXIV: Quod Corpora Caelestia non sunt Causae Voluntatum et Electionum Nostrarum
Caput LXXXV: Quod Corporales Effectus in Istis Inferioribus non Sequuntur ex Necessitate a Corporibus Caelestibus
Caput LXXXVI: Quod Motus Caelestis Corporis non Sit Causa Electionum Nostrarum ex Virtute Animae Moventis, ut Quidam Dicunt
Caput LXXXVII: Quod Substantiae Separatae Creatae non Possunt esse Causa Directe Electionum et Voluntatum Nostrarum, sed Solus Deus
Caput LXXXVIII: Quod Motus Voluntatis Causatur a Deo, et non Solum Potentia Voluntatis
Caput LXXXIX: Quod Electiones et Voluntates Humanae Subduntur Divinae Providentiae
Caput XC: Quomodo Res Humanae ad Superiores Causas Reducantur
Caput XCI: Quomodo Dicitur Aliquis Bene Fortunatus, et Quomodo Adiuvatur Homo ex Superioribus Causis
Caput XCII: De Fato: an Sit, et Quid Sit
Caput XCIII: De Certitudine Divinae Providentiae
Caput XCIV: Quod Immobilitas Divinae Providentiae Utilitatem Orationis non Excludit
Caput XCV: Quod Deus non Omnes Orationes Exaudit
Caput XCVI: Quomodo Dispositio Providentiae Habeat Rationem
Caput XCVII: Quomodo Deus Possit Facere Praeter Ordinem Suae Providentiae, et Quomodo non
Caput XCVIII: Quod Deus Potest Operari Praeter Ordinem Rebus Inditum, Producendo Effectus absque Causis Proximis
Caput XCIX: Quod Ea quae Deus Facit Praeter Naturae Ordinem non sunt contra Naturam
Caput C: De Miraculis
Caput CI: Quod Solus Deus Facit Miracula
Caput CII: Quod Substantiae Spirituales Aliqua Mirabilia Operantur, quae tamen non sunt Vere Miracula
Caput CIII: Quod Opera Magorum non sunt Solum ex Impressione Caelestium Corporum
Caput CIV: Unde Magorum Operationes Efficaciam Habeant
Caput CV: Quod Substantia Intellectualis quae Praestat Efficaciam Magicis Operibus, non est Bona secundum Virtutem
Caput CVI: Quod Substantia Intellectualis Cuius Auxilio Magicae Artes Utuntur, non est Mala secundum Suam Naturam
Caput CVII: Rationes Quibus Probari Videtur quod in Daemonibus non Possit esse Peccatum
Caput CVIII: Quod in Daemonibus Possit esse Peccatum, et Qualiter
Caput CIX: Solutio Praemissarum Rationum
Caput CX: Quod Speciali Quadam Ratione Creaturae Rationales Divinae Providentiae Subduntur
Caput CXI: Quod Creaturae Rationales Gubernantur propter Seipsas, Aliae Vero in Ordine ad Eas
Caput CXII: Quod Rationalis Creatura Dirigitur a Deo ad Suos Actus non Solum secundum Ordinem ad Speciem, sed Etiam secundum quod Congruit Individuo
Caput CXIII: Quod Divinitus Hominibus Leges Dantur
Caput CXIV: Quod Lex Divina Principaliter Hominem Ordinat in Deum
Caput CXV: Quod Finis Legis Divinae est Dilectio Dei
Caput CXVI: Quod Divina Lege Ordinamur ad Dilectionem Proximi
Caput CXVII: Quod per Divinam Legem Homines ad Rectam Fidem Obligantur
Caput CXVIII: Quod per Quaedam Sensibilia Mens Nostra Dirigitur in Deum
Caput CXIX: Quod Latriae Cultus Soli Deo est Exhibendus
Caput CXX: Quod Divina Lex Ordinat Hominem secundum Rationem circa Corporalia et Sensibilia
Caput CXXI: Qua Ratione Fornicatio Simplex secundum Legem Divinam Sit Peccatum: et quod Matrimonium Sit Naturale
Caput CXXII: Quod Matrimonium Debet esse Indivisibile
Caput CXXIII: Quod Matrimonium Debeat esse Unius ad Unam
Caput CXXIV: Quod Matrimonium non Debet Fieri inter Propinquos
Caput CXXV: Quod non Omnis Carnalis Commixtio est Peccatum
Caput CXXVI: Quod Nullus Cibi Usus est Peccatum secundum se
Caput CXXVII: Quomodo secundum Legem Dei Homo Ordinatur ad Proximum
Caput CXXVIII: Quod in Actibus Humanis sunt Aliqua Recta secundum Naturam, et non Solum Quasi Lege Posita
Caput CXXIX: De Consiliis quae Dantur in Lege Divina
Caput CXXX: De Errore Impugnantium Voluntariam Paupertatem
Caput CXXXI: De Modis Vivendi Eorum qui Voluntariam Paupertatem Sequuntur
Secondly, he sets forth objections against the particular modes of poverty1.
I. The first mode is that the possessions of individuals be sold, and that all live in common from the price. This seems to have been observed by the Apostles in Jerusalem, as is clear from Acts 4.
Against this it is argued: First, because those who pursue such poverty will remain without the sustenance of life.
Secondly, because it is not easy for many, even those having great possessions, to take up this life. — And also the price of the possessions would not suffice for a long time.
Thirdly, because it is possible, and easy, for a price of this kind to be lost through the fraud of administrators, or by theft or robbery.
Fourthly, because, since it happens that men change location, it will not be easy to provide from such a price for those who must perhaps be scattered through diverse places.
II. The second mode is that they have possessions in common, by which individuals are provided for, as in most monasteries.
Against this it is urged that it seems to hinder the end of voluntary poverty. First, because it is necessary for many to be solicitous about managing possessions. — Secondly, because common possession is customarily a cause of discord. But discord especially hinders the mind's leisure for divine things.
III. The third mode is that they live by the labors of their hands. The Apostle followed this mode and urged it upon others, in 2 Thess. 3.
Against this it is argued, first, because it seems vain that someone, having abandoned what is necessary for the sustenance of life, should labor to acquire it again.
Secondly, because this does not seem suitable to the purpose of those taking up voluntary poverty. For it seems to require greater solicitude for someone to seek a livelihood for himself by his own labor than for him to use the things he has, especially if he has moderate wealth.
Thirdly, because the Lord, under the likeness of the birds and the lilies of the field, seems to forbid manual labor to the Apostles.
Fourthly, because this mode seems insufficient. First, because there are many who cannot pass their life through manual labor by any craft; and thus peasants and craftsmen would be in a better condition to attain the perfection of life than the wise and the wealthy; and it also happens that some who take up voluntary poverty become ill, or are otherwise hindered from manual work. — Secondly, because, since not a little time of labor suffices to seek the necessities of life, those who pursue voluntary poverty of this kind would consume the greater part of their life in manual labor, and thus they would be hindered from other spiritual exercises; and consequently voluntary poverty would hinder the perfection of life more than dispose toward it.
If it should be said that manual labor is necessary to remove idleness: — this does not suffice. First, because idleness would be better removed through occupations in the moral virtues, which riches serve instrumentally. — Secondly, because it would be vain to give a counsel concerning poverty for the sake of avoiding idleness, unless it were given to the end that men might be at leisure for nobler exercises than those that belong to the common life of men.
If it should also be said that such labor is necessary to tame concupiscences: — this is beside the point, because we are asking whether it is necessary that the voluntarily poor seek their livelihood by the labor of their hands. — And furthermore, it is possible for the concupiscences of the flesh to be tamed in many other ways; and the wealthy could also use manual labor for this end.
IV. The fourth mode is that they live from those things that are brought in by others. The Lord seems to have observed this mode with His disciples, as is clear from Luke 8.
Against this it is argued, first, because it does not seem reasonable that someone should abandon his own goods and live from another's.
Secondly, because it seems unfitting that someone should receive from another and repay him nothing. For it could be sustained that those should live in this mode who serve others in some office, for instance by ministering at the altar, preaching, and doing similar things, as is shown in Matt. 10 and 1 Cor. 9; but that others, who minister to the people in no office, should receive the necessities of life from them seems unfitting.
Thirdly. That mode of living is harmful to others who cannot suffice for themselves on account of poverty and illness, because they ought to be sustained from those things that are given to those who choose voluntary poverty. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is proved from the Apostle, 1 Tim. 5.
Fourthly. That mode of living hinders the perfection of virtue. For it hinders the freedom of the mind, which is especially required for virtue, because, when this is removed, men easily share in the sins of others, either by consenting, or by smoothing them over through flattery2, or by dissembling. Therefore, etc.
Fifthly. It depends on the will of the giver that he give from his own goods. Therefore, by this mode sufficient provision is not made for the voluntarily poor.
Sixthly. This mode renders the voluntarily poor contemptible. For it is necessary that they explain their needs to others, and ask for necessities. But men consider themselves superior to those who have need to be sustained by them; and most give with difficulty. But this is unfitting, because those who take up the perfection of life ought to be held in reverence. Therefore, etc.
Seventhly. Begging has the appearance of evil, since many beg for the sake of gain. Therefore it is to be avoided. — The consequence is clear from the Apostle, Rom. 123, and from the authority of Aristotle.
Eighthly. This mode has the greatest amount of solicitude. For it seems to be of greater solicitude to acquire the goods of others than to use one's own. Therefore, etc.
If someone, moreover, should praise begging on account of humility: — he seems to speak unreasonably. For humility is not praised according as the height of virtue is despised, in respect of which we ought to be magnanimous, and it is derogated from. But by begging it is derogated from: both because it is more virtuous to give than to receive, and because it has the appearance of filthy lucre4. Therefore, etc.
V. The last mode is that of some who say that those pursuing the perfection of life should have no solicitude, but that they ought to expect the sustenance of life from God alone, which seems to be said in Matt. 6.
But against this it is argued, first, because human solicitude is ordered to the end of eating. But it is foolish to will the end and to omit the things that are ordered to the end.
Secondly. Solicitude is not to be avoided except because it hinders the contemplation of eternal things. But a man, bearing mortal flesh, cannot live without doing many things. Therefore neither is solicitude for the things necessary for life to be omitted on account of the hindrance of contemplation.
Thirdly. For a like reason a man could say that he does not want to walk, or to open his mouth to eat, and similar things, but to expect that God should act. But this is to tempt God. Therefore, etc.