Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

After St. Thomas has shown how man is ordered by divine law regarding the use of venereal things, he consequently wishes to show how he is ordered regarding the use of food ¹.

I. And first he posits ² this conclusion: No use of food is of itself a sin.

It is proved first as follows. The due end of taking food is the preservation of the body through nourishment. Therefore whatever food can do this can be taken without sin. Therefore the taking of no food is of itself a sin.

The first consequence is proved. Because each thing is done according to reason when it is ordered according as it is fitting to its due end. But what is done according to reason is done without sin.

The second consequence, however, is left as manifest. Because, since by the name of food is understood whatever can pass into the nourishment of the body, every food, insofar as it is such, can preserve the body by nourishing it. And therefore, if whatever food can do this can be taken without sin, it follows very well that all food can be taken without sin. And thus it follows that the taking of no food is of itself a sin.

II. Secondly. No food is evil according to its nature, because every thing according to its nature is good, as was shown above: although it can be evil for someone, insofar as it is contrary to the health of his body. Therefore the taking of no food, insofar as it is such a thing, is of itself a sin: although it can be so if someone, contrary to reason, uses it against his health. — The consequence is proved. Because the use of no thing is of itself evil unless the thing itself is of itself evil.

Thirdly. To use things for that for which they exist is not of itself evil. But all things are for the sake of man. Therefore to use things either for eating or for whatever else they are useful to man is not of itself a sin.

III. Fourthly. Foods pertain immediately to the body, not to the soul. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. Because the defect of sin is derived from the soul to the body, but not conversely: for we speak of sin according as the will is disordered.

2. Concerning the proof of the consequence a doubt arises. For original sin seems to be derived from the flesh to the soul, since the soul itself contracts the stain of original sin from its union with the flesh. Therefore it does not seem universally true that the defect of sin is derived from the soul to the body, and not conversely.

He answers that we can understand original sin to be derived from the flesh to the soul in two ways. In one way, because it first infects the flesh, which together with the soul constitutes human nature as a part. And in this way it is false: because, as St. Thomas explains in many places, and particularly in Qq. de Malo, q. iv, a. 3, original sin is subjectively only in the rational soul insofar as it is a part of human nature. — Nor is it valid to say that it contracts the stain of original sin from its union with the flesh. Because this is not said as though the flesh itself, being first infected, infects the soul: but because the soul does not contract that stain except insofar as it is in act a part of human nature; but it does not become in act a part of human nature except through union with the flesh.

In another way, because it is in the carnal semen, from which man is generated, before it is in the soul. And thus it is true that it is in the semen as in an instrumental cause: but it is not true that it is in it as in a principal cause, or as in a subject. But the proof of St. Thomas is understood to mean that the defect of sin is derived from the soul to the body as from a principal cause and from the subject of sin, but not conversely from the body to the soul. And thus the objection is nothing.

IV. The second conclusion ³ is: The taking of food can be a sin insofar as it is repugnant to the rectitude of the will. Moreover, he explains that this happens in many ways: namely, either on account of repugnance to the proper end of food, as when someone for the sake of pleasure uses foods contrary to the health of the body; or on account of repugnance to the condition of the one who uses the food, or of those with whom he lives; or on account of repugnance to a law forbidding certain foods for some special reason; or to a rule forbidding the use of certain foods in order to restrain concupiscence (understand, where this would be prohibited by a rule binding under sin).

The conclusion is confirmed by the authority of the Lord in Matt. xv, and of the Apostle in I Cor. x and I Tim. iv.

Moreover, by this is excluded the error of certain people who say that the use of certain foods is of itself illicit, concerning whom the Apostle speaks in the same place.

V. From the aforesaid St. Thomas infers that neither is the possession of riches of itself illicit, if the order of reason is preserved.

It is proved. Because those things which are possessed externally are necessary for the taking of food, for the upbringing of offspring, for the sustenance of the household, and other bodily necessities. But these things are not illicit, except insofar as they depart from the order of reason.

It is confirmed. Because the Apostle, I Tim. ult., does not condemn the rich, but gives them a certain rule for using riches.

By this is excluded the error of certain people who, as Augustine relates in the book de Haeresibus, most arrogantly called themselves the Apostolics, because they did not receive into their communion those who use wives and those who possess proper goods. Who are therefore heretics, because, separating themselves from the Church, they think that those who use these things which they themselves lack have no hope.

VI. Concerning the possession of things and of riches, it should be considered, from the doctrine of St. Thomas II IIae, q. lxvi, a. 2, that in this we can consider two things: namely, the power of procurement and dispensation; and the use of those possessions and riches. As to the first: It is lawful for man to possess things as his own. Because in this way things are procured both more carefully and more orderly, and the state of men is more peaceful. — As to the second, however: It is not lawful to have riches as one's own, but they ought to be held as common: namely, so that man readily shares them for the necessities of others. — St. Thomas touches on both of these in this place. The first, when he says that neither is the possession of riches of itself illicit: for this pertains to the power of procurement and dispensation. — But the second when he says, if the order of reason is preserved: for this refers not only to the possession of things, which ought to be just, but also pertains to their use. Whence in his explanation he posits, and that he use them in a due manner for his own and others' benefit.

2. But if it is urged that according to natural right all things are common, and consequently the ownership of possessions or riches is against natural right: — he answers, from the doctrine of St. Thomas in the same place, and Iª IIae, q. xciv, a. 5, ad 3, that the common possession of all things is not said to be of natural right because nature inclines to this: but because nature did not introduce the distinction of possessions. Just as we can say that man's being naked is of natural right, because nature did not give him clothing, but art invented it. And therefore the ownership of possessions is not against natural right, just as neither is man's being clothed: but it is something superadded to natural right through human invention.