Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

After St. Thomas has determined concerning the divine law with respect to the precepts by which man is ordered to God, he wishes to determine concerning it with respect to the precepts ordering man toward the neighbor ¹.

Concerning this, however, he does two things: first, he premises a certain necessary point; second, he pursues his intent, in chap. 128. — Now he premises that it belongs to the law of God to order man concerning bodily and sensible things.

But concerning this he does two things: first, he shows in general that it belongs to the divine law to order man concerning the affection for and use of bodily and sensible things; second, he shows in particular how it orders man concerning the use of venereal things and foods, in the following chapter.

I. With respect to the first, he argues first as follows. The undue use of bodily and sensible things either wholly turns the mind away from God, when the end of the will is established in them; or it retards the mind's intention from God, when we are affected toward such things beyond what is necessary. Therefore it belongs to the divine law to order man concerning the affection for and use of things of this kind. — The consequence is proved. Because the divine law is principally given for this, that man may cleave to God.

It should be noted that, since the ultimate end is only one, when the mind cleaves to one thing as to an ultimate end, it can love nothing else at that time as an ultimate end. On this account St. Thomas well says that the undue use of bodily things wholly turns the mind away from God when the end of the will is established in them: because, namely, when the end of the will is established in a bodily thing, so that nothing further is desired or loved, but the bodily thing itself is loved above all, the mind entirely abandons God, by not loving Him. And this happens through mortal sin. — But when we are affected toward things of this kind not as toward an ultimate end, but there is only some inordination concerning them, while the habitual ordering to God as to an end remains, as happens when someone sins venially, the mind is not wholly turned away from God, since it has Him habitually as an end; but the mind's intention is retarded from God, because through such inordinate affections concerning bodily things that spiritual progress by which man cleaves more to God through actual love is impeded; and the attainment of glory, which consists in the vision of God, is retarded through an inordination of this kind, as is stated in De Malo, q. 7, a. 2, ad 14.

II. Secondly. It belongs to divine providence that individual things keep their order. But the divine law is the plan of providence proposed to man by God. Therefore it belongs to it so to order man that in him individual things keep their order. But just as the mind of man is ordered under God, so the body is ordered under the soul, and the lower powers under reason. Therefore man is so to be ordered by the divine law that the lower powers are subject to reason; and the body to the soul; and exterior things serve man for his necessity. Therefore etc.

It should be noted that, as was clear from what precedes ², divine providence is the plan of the order of all things to their end. And consequently, since all things pertaining in any way to man fall under divine providence, providence itself is also the plan of human affairs. And because law is nothing other than the plan and rule by which the acts of certain things are directed, therefore it is fittingly said that the law of human acts is the plan of divine providence proposed and manifested to man by God.

It should also be noted, because in the conclusion a certain clause is added that does not seem to have been assumed in the premises, namely, and that exterior things serve man for his necessity, that either that clause is missing in the premises in the text through the fault of the scribes: or it is understood when it is said that the body is ordered under the soul. For just as the body of man is ordered under the soul as more imperfect than it, so exterior bodily things are contained under man, whose form is the intellective soul.

III. Thirdly. Every law rightly proposed induces to virtue. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. Because virtue consists in this, that both interior affections and the use of bodily things are regulated by reason.

Note that St. Thomas on this account says a law rightly proposed induces to virtue, and not absolutely a law, because there can be some laws proposed by tyrants that do not induce to virtue, but to evil. But these are not laws rightly, but rather perversely and evilly instituted.

IV. Fourthly. Since the law is proposed to reason, man would not follow the law unless all other things pertaining to man were subject to reason. Therefore it belongs to the divine law to command that all things that belong to man be subject to reason. — The consequence is proved. Because it belongs to every legislator to establish by law those things without which the law cannot be observed.

For the evidence of this reason, it must be considered that, since to govern belongs to a superior with respect to an inferior, a law according to which someone ought to regulate and govern another is not given to him unless that other is subjected to his command: for in vain would a law according to which someone was to govern a kingdom be given to him, unless the kingdom itself were subjected to him. Because therefore the divine law is proposed by God and given to human reason for this, that it may regulate and govern all the acts of man insofar as he is man, it is necessary that man himself as to all that is his be subjected to reason, and consequently as to every affection for and use of bodily things. And this is the foundation of this reason.

V. The conclusion is confirmed by the authority of the Apostle, Rom. 12, and 1 Thess. 4.

Moreover, by this is excluded the error of those who say that those alone are sins by which the neighbor is either offended or scandalized.

It should be noted that this error is very well excluded from what has been said. For since sin is to act contrary to the divine law and contrary to reason, while the divine law and human reason impose a measure concerning the affection for and use of sensible things: not only does someone sin if he offends or scandalizes the neighbor, but also if he is unduly and contrary to the order of reason affected toward sensible things, or uses them unduly.