Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

In the second place, St. Thomas shows that divine worship is not to be rendered to anything other than the first principle of all things ¹.

Concerning this, however, he does two things: first, he introduces certain false opinions; second, he attacks them ².

I. As to the first, he says that there were some who thought that the worship of latria is to be rendered not only to the first principle of things, but also to all creatures that are above human beings. For some thought that latria is to be rendered, after the supreme God: first, to celestial intellectual substances, which they called gods—whether they were entirely separate, or were the souls of the spheres or of the stars; second, to demons, whom they said were intellectual substances united to airy bodies, and posited them to be gods in comparison with human beings, namely as intermediaries between human beings and the gods; third, to the souls of the good deceased, whom they called heroes or manes.

2. Others, however, said that the worship of divinity is to be rendered to the whole world and to its individual parts, not by reason of the body, but by reason of the soul. For they thought that God is the soul of the world.

3. Still others, moreover, thought that divine worship is to be rendered to certain images, for the reason that they believed them to obtain certain supernatural powers, either from the influence of the celestial bodies, or from the presence of certain spirits. Whence also these were called idolaters, because they paid the worship of latria to idols, that is, to images.

II. As to the second ³, St. Thomas attacks opinions of this kind. And first, the first; second, the second ⁴; third, the third ⁵.

Concerning the first, he shows that it is unreasonable, for those who posit only one separate principle, to render divine worship—that is, that honor and that reverence which is rendered to God through sacrifices and things of this kind—to another.

And he argues first thus. The opinion that God is one, exalted above all things, cannot be strengthened in us through sensible things except by the fact that we render to Him something separate, which we call divine worship. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is proved. Because we render worship to God, as was said ⁶, in order that the true opinion about God may be strengthened in us also through sensible things.

Secondly. Exterior worship of this kind is necessary for man, as we said above, in order that the soul of man may be stirred up to spiritual reverence for God. But this takes place if that is rendered to God which is rendered to no other. Therefore, etc. — The minor is proved. Because custom has great power to move the mind of man. But human custom has this feature, that the honor which is rendered to the supreme ruler in a commonwealth, such as a king or emperor, is rendered to no other.

Thirdly. If the worship of latria were owed to someone because he is superior, not because he is supreme, it would follow that angel to angel, and one man to another, and that men mutually to one another ought to render latria. This is inappropriate. Therefore, etc. — The entailment is proved. Because one angel is superior to another angel, and one man to another; and a man who is superior with respect to one thing is inferior with respect to another.

Fourthly. There is a certain special benefit that he receives from the supreme God, namely that of creation. Therefore, man ought, in recognition of it, to render something special to God. And this is the worship of latria. — The consequence is proved. Because, according to the custom of men, a special return is owed for a special benefit.

Fifthly. God alone is Lord of all. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is proved. Because latria is called service. But service is owed to a lord. — The antecedent is proved. Because he is truly and properly a lord who dispenses precepts of acting to others, and takes the rule of acting from no one; for others are called ministers. But God, who is the supreme principle of things, through His providence disposes all things to their due actions. Whence both angels and superior bodies are said in Sacred Scripture to minister.

Sixthly. Sacrifice is to be rendered to the supreme God alone, although genuflections, prostrations, and other signs of honor of this kind can be rendered to men, yet with an intention other than to God. Therefore, latria is as well.

The consequence is proved. Because among the other things that belong to latria, sacrifice is singular. — The antecedent is proved. — Sacrifice is to be offered to God, as is clear from the opinion of all. But exterior sacrifice is representative of the interior true sacrifice, according to which the human mind offers itself to God. Therefore, exterior sacrifice is to be offered to him alone to whom the human mind offers itself in sacrificing. But it offers itself to the supreme God alone. Therefore, etc. — The subsumed minor is proved. Our mind offers itself to God as to the principle of its creation, the author of its action, and the end of its beatitude. But all these belong to the supreme principle of things alone, as is clear from the foregoing. Therefore, etc.

III. It should be noted in this place that St. Thomas argues from the sacrifices that are truly and justly rendered to God through the divine law; and he maintains that those sacrifices are to be rendered to the supreme God alone, and not to others. For concerning these it is true that they represent the interior sacrifice by which the soul offers itself to God as to the principle of creation, etc. For if there were talk of sacrifices made by idolaters, someone could say that they represent the sacrifice by which the mind offers itself to him to whom sacrifice is made, not as to the principle of creation, but as to having something of divinity and godhead.

It should be observed secondly that from the words by which St. Thomas says that prostrations, and other things of this kind that belong to latria, can be rendered to men, the sense of the conclusion proved here can be grasped. For when it is said that the worship of latria ought to be rendered to no other than God, this must be understood as to all things that belong to latria, although as to some things belonging to latria it can be rendered to someone else. — Likewise, as to those exterior things that can be rendered to another, it must be understood that they are not rendered to another with the intention with which they are rendered to God, namely, so that they are rendered to another as to the first cause and as to the author of all goods. For in this way they properly pertain to divine worship and to latria.

IV. Secondly, St. Thomas attacks the second opinion ⁷. And first, he compares it to the first position, saying that, although this position which says that God is nothing other than the soul of the world departs further ⁸ from the truth, and that which posits God to be separate and all intellectual substances to exist from Him is true, nevertheless they are more reasonably moved to render the worship of latria to diverse things, because, by rendering it to diverse things, they seem to render it to the one supreme God, to whom, according to their position, the diverse parts of the world are compared just as the diverse members of the body are to the soul of man.

2. Secondly, against the position itself he argues first thus. According to them, the worship of latria is to be rendered to the world not by reason of the body, but by reason of the soul, which they say is God. Therefore, it is to be rendered not to diverse things, but to one alone. — The consequence is proved. Because the soul is indivisible.

They could, however, say in response to this argument that the worship of latria is indeed to be rendered to diverse things, but nonetheless by reason of the one existing in all.

But this response is nothing. Because it is enough for St. Thomas to hold that to air, insofar as it is air, the worship of latria is not to be rendered; nor to fire, nor to the other parts of the universe, according as one is distinguished from another; but to the one alone which exists in all. And consequently it is inappropriately said that divine worship is to be rendered to all parts of the universe.

3. Secondly. When they say that God is the soul of the world, to which latria is owed, it is necessary that they understand this of the intellective soul: both because sensitive and vegetative operations do not belong to all parts of the universe; and because, even if they had them, the worship of latria would not be owed to them on account of them, just as it is not to brutes or plants. Therefore, according to their root, the worship of latria would have to be rendered not to diverse parts of the world, but to the whole world. — The consequence is proved. Because the intellective soul is not the perfection of determinate parts of the body, but in some way regards the whole, as is clear concerning our soul.

4. Thirdly. According to their position, either there is only one soul, which animates the whole world and all its parts; or one of the whole, and diverse souls of the diverse parts. If the first, it follows that the worship of divinity is owed to one alone, since the world is not called God except on account of the soul. — If the second, the same also follows. Because the souls of the parts must be ordered under the soul of the whole; for the proportion of perfections and perfectibles is the same. But when there are several ordered intellectual substances, the worship of latria is owed only to that which holds the supreme place among them, as was shown against the other position ⁹.

Likewise, it is manifest that certain parts do not have their own soul. Therefore, the worship of latria will not have to be rendered to them. And yet they worshipped inanimate bodies.

Likewise, man is superior in the order of nature at least to all inferior bodies, since he has a more perfect form. Therefore, the worship of latria would not have to be rendered to them by man, if the worship of latria were owed to them on account of their forms. — The consequence is proved. Because a superior does not owe the worship of latria to an inferior.

The same incongruities will follow, says St. Thomas, if anyone should say that the individual parts of the world have their own souls, but the whole does not have any common soul. For the supreme part of the world will have to have a more noble soul, to which alone, according to the premises, the worship of latria is owed.

V. Thirdly, against the third position, concerning images ¹⁰, which St. Thomas says is more unreasonable, he argues first thus. The worship of latria is not owed to celestial bodies, except perhaps on account of their souls. Therefore, neither to images because they have some power or dignity from celestial bodies according to their corporeal power, as these men said.

Secondly. They are beneath the grade of any man whatsoever, because they do not attain from celestial bodies so noble a perfection as is the rational soul. Therefore, etc.

Thirdly. The makers of these images are men. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is proved. Because a cause is more powerful than its effect.

If it be said that they have some power or dignity from the fact that certain spiritual substances adhere to them, this is not sufficient. Both because to no spiritual substance is the worship of latria owed except to the supreme one alone; and because the rational soul adheres in a more noble way to the body of man than a spiritual substance does to images, and thus man still remains in greater dignity, namely, as constituted in being by a more noble form; and because, since images of this kind are sometimes made for certain harmful effects, it is manifest, if they obtain their effect through spiritual substances, that those substances are vicious. And consequently they are inferior to good men.

2. It should be observed that, if divine worship is owed to someone by men, it is not owed to him except by reason of a certain excellence in goodness above men. Therefore, if any substances, even intellectual ones, do not excel men in goodness, but rather are inferior to them—just as the intellectual substances by which the aforesaid images obtain their effect, which are evil and vicious, are inferior in goodness to good men—it follows that divine worship is not to be rendered to those substances by good men. And it is according to this that the last argument introduced here proceeds.

The principal thesis is confirmed by the authority of Exodus 22 and Romans 1.

VI. From these things St. Thomas infers two corollaries. One is that men were provoked to the aforesaid undue worships by the instigation of demons. It is clear, because to stir up to undue things belongs only to a rational creature that is ill-disposed. — It is confirmed by the authority of the Psalm, and 1 Cor. 10.

The other is that, because the principal intention of the divine law is that man be subject to God, and that singular reverence be rendered to Him not only with the heart, but also with the mouth and with bodily work, therefore first the worship of many gods is forbidden; secondly, it is commanded that the divine name not be pronounced irreverently with the mouth by confirming what is false through it; thirdly, in order that the mind may be free for divine contemplation, rest from exterior exercises for some time is commanded, Exodus 20.

VII. Concerning the adoration of latria to be rendered to God alone, it must be considered that it is understood to be rendered to God alone first and per se. Because secondarily, and through another, it is not inappropriate for it to be rendered to someone else: just as also the honor to be rendered to a king is rendered to his legate by reason of the king, whose person he represents. For in this way, says St. Thomas, Tertia, q. 25 ¹¹, and III Sent., d. 9 ¹², the image of Christ and the cross are to be adored with the adoration of latria, insofar as they represent Christ crucified; in such a way that by one act of adoration Christ Himself is adored, and the cross or His image insofar as they represent Christ. But that act is terminated first and per se to Christ; secondarily, however, and by reason of the Christ represented, it is terminated to the cross or to the image.

St. Thomas notes, moreover, in the places alleged above, that an image can be considered in two ways: in one way, insofar as it is such a thing, for instance wood or stone; in another way, insofar as it is an image, that is, insofar as it stands under the respect of a representative. If it is considered in the first way, it is not to be adored with the adoration of latria, since it is something irrational, to which it cannot belong to be adored per se and by an act separate from the adoration of another—which would belong to it if, insofar as it is such a thing, it were adored. — If, however, it is considered in the second way, thus it is not inappropriate for it to be adored with latria. Because, since, as is said by Aristotle in the book On Memory and Reminiscence ¹³, one and the same is the movement toward the image insofar as it is an image and toward the thing of which it is the image, the adoration by which the image of Christ is adored insofar as it is the image of Christ and that by which Christ Himself is adored is the same. And consequently, just as the adoration by which Christ is adored is latria, so also the adoration by which His image is adored insofar as it is such, is latria.

VIII. Nor are the arguments of Holcot ¹⁴ valid, who argues that the image of Christ ought not to be adored with latria: both because latria is owed to God alone, but no image is God; and because the same honor would be owed to God and to a creature; and because one so adoring would confess that something other than God is God, for one honoring something with latria confesses that it is God.

For it is evident from the aforesaid that latria is owed to God alone first and per se; but that to something other than God it is not inappropriate for latria to be rendered through another, that is, insofar as it is the image of God, or His representative.

It is also evident that it is not inappropriate for the same honor to be owed to God and to a creature, but to God first and per se, to the creature insofar as it is representative of God.

Neither does it follow that one adoring the image of God confesses that something other than God is God. For one adoring something with latria does not confess that it is God unless his adoration is terminated to it first and per se.

IX. Through these things there is also clear the response to Durandus, who argues ¹⁵ that reverence for the exemplar or signified is never owed to the sign or image: because, however much the movement of the soul toward the image and toward the thing signified may be the same, the soul nonetheless never says that the image, insofar as it is an image, is the same with the exemplar.

For it is clear that we do not say latria is owed to the image of God insofar as it is His image because the soul says the one is the other, but because by the same act of adoration by which the image of God is adored insofar as it is His image, God Himself is adored, as that which is adored first and per se; while the image itself is adored by reason of God, of whom it is representative. But it is not inappropriate for the image of God to be adored with latria together with God Himself, just as it is not inappropriate for a king and his legate to be honored together, while the legate himself is honored insofar as he represents the person of the king. It would, however, be inappropriate if the image of God were adored per se with latria by an act by which God was not honored, because then it would be adored as such a thing, and not as the image of God.

X. From these things there is also clear the response to the objections that Giovanni Pico della Mirandola raises in his Apology ¹⁶. For he argues first: The image, as such, is distinct from the thing imaged. Therefore, if as such it terminates the adoration of latria, it follows that something other than God will be adored with latria.

Secondly: If the image and the thing imaged are one total object of adoration, either the image itself, which is a created relative being, is one part of this total object, or not. If the first, it follows that some created thing, from the genus of relation, will at least partially terminate the adoration of latria, which seems poorly Catholic. If the second, therefore it ought not to be said that one total object is made from those two.

Thirdly: The authority of the Philosopher ¹⁷ does not help. Because the Philosopher intends that the recollective movement by which the soul is moved by recollection toward the image as image is terminated also to the thing imaged. And it also has truth in this sense: that one having a definitive concept of the one understands that there is the other. But that every movement of the soul, especially of the will, is the same toward the image and toward the thing imaged, this the Philosopher in no way intends. — This is clear from a parallel: Because St. Thomas often says that the movement of the will by which it is borne toward the end and toward those things that are for the end, when it wills them on account of the end, is the same. And yet it is certain, according to him, that that movement as it attains the end is fruition; but as it attains those things that are for the end, it is use, and not fruition.

2. For in response to the first, it is clear from what has been said that it is not inappropriate for something other than God to terminate secondarily and through another the adoration of latria, namely insofar as that thing is adored as having toward Him the respect of a representative.

In response to the second, it is likewise said that they are one total object of adoration, of which object one part is the reason why adoration is simultaneously terminated to the other. Nor is it inappropriate that a created thing including a respect, and thus in some way belonging to the genus of relation, should terminate secondarily, and by reason of another, the adoration of latria. — Nor is this poorly Catholic. Indeed, to say the opposite is more alien to the Catholic faith, since according to the rite of the Catholic Church we see genuflections, prostrations, supplications, and other things of this kind, which belong to the adoration of latria, being made to the cross.

In response to the third, it is said first that the statement of the Philosopher is exceedingly to the point. Because where there is one on account of another, there is only one. And thus, where one is adored on account of another, there is only one total thing that is adored; and consequently one act of adoration is terminated to both. And universally in Aristotle it is true that there is one movement of the soul toward the image insofar as it is an image and toward the thing imaged, whatever movement of the soul that may be: because then they are considered as one object of the soul, and consequently by one act the soul is borne toward both, while it is actually borne toward them simultaneously.

It is said secondly that the statement of St. Thomas does not stand in the way; on the contrary, it confirms the thesis. Because he maintains that the act of the will by which one wills the end and those things that are for the end, insofar as he wills them on account of the end, is the same, as is found in De Veritate, q. 22, a. 14, and I-II, q. 12, a. 4; although that act, as it is terminated to the end, sometimes has the name fruition, but as it is terminated to those things that are for the end, has the name use. In the matter at hand, however, that one act of adoration by which God and His image are adored together cannot be latria with respect to the one, but with respect to the other another adoration; because the very acts in which both are extrinsically or intrinsically adored are the acts in which latria properly consists.