Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III
Francesco Silvestri (1474–1528)
Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles
First published 1926
In Book III of the Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Francesco Silvestri of Ferrara (Ferrariensis) expounds Aquinas's account of providence, human happiness, moral action, and divine grace. The commentary accompanies the Leonine text in volume XIV (1926). The present digital edition includes the Latin text and an English translation.
Prooemium
Caput I: Quod Omne Agens Agit propter Finem
Caput II: Quod Omne Agens Agit propter Bonum
Caput III: Quod Malum est Praeter Intentionem in Rebus
Caput IV: Rationes Quibus Videtur Probari quod Malum non Sit Praeter Intentionem
Caput V: Solutio Rationum Praemissarum
Caput VI: Quod Malum non est Aliqua Essentia
Caput VII: Rationes Quibus Videtur Probari quod Malum Sit Natura vel Res Aliqua
Caput VIII: Solutio Rationum Praemissarum
Caput IX: Quod Causa Mali est Bonum
Caput X: Quod Malum Fundatur in Bono
Caput XI: Quod Malum non Totaliter Consumit Bonum
Caput XII: Quod Malum Habet Aliquo Modo Causam
Caput XIII: Quod Malum est Causa per Accidens
Caput XIV: Quod non est Summum Malum
Caput XV: Quod Finis Cuiuslibet Rei est Bonum
Caput XVI: Quod Omnia Ordinantur in Unum Finem, qui est Deus
Caput XVII: Quomodo Deus Sit Finis Rerum
Caput XVIII: Quod Omnia Intendunt Assimilari Deo
Caput XIX: Quomodo Res Imitentur Divinam Bonitatem
Caput XX: Quod Res Intendunt Naturaliter Assimilari Deo in Hoc quod est Causa
Caput XXI: Quomodo Diversimode Res Ordinantur in Suos Fines
Caput XXII: Quod Motus Caeli est a Principio Intellectivo
Caput XXIII: Quomodo Appetunt Bonum Etiam quae Cognitione Carent
Caput XXIV: Quod Intelligere Deum est Finis Omnis Intellectualis Substantiae
Caput XXV: Utrum Felicitas Consistat in Actu Voluntatis
Caput XXVI: Quod Felicitas Humana non Consistit in Delectationibus Carnalibus
Caput XXVII: Quod Felicitas non Consistit in Honoribus
Caput XXVIII: Quod Felicitas Hominis non Consistit in Gloria
Caput XXIX: Quod Felicitas Hominis non Consistit in Divitiis
Caput XXX: Quod Felicitas non Consistit in Potentia Mundana
Caput XXXI: Quod Felicitas non Consistit in Bonis Corporis
Caput XXXII: Quod Felicitas Humana non Consistit in Sensu
Caput XXXIII: Quod Ultima Hominis Felicitas non Consistit in Actibus Virtutum Moralium
Caput XXXIV: Quod Ultima Felicitas non Sit in Actu Prudentiae
Caput XXXV: Quod Felicitas non Consistit in Operatione Artis
Caput XXXVI: Quod Ultima Felicitas Hominis Consistit in Contemplatione Dei
Caput XXXVII: Quod Felicitas Humana non Consistit in Cognitione Dei quae Communiter Habetur a Pluribus
Caput XXXVIII: Quod Felicitas Humana non Consistit in Cognitione Dei quae Habetur per Demonstrationem
Caput XXXIX: Quod Felicitas Humana non Consistit in Cognitione Dei quae est per Fidem
Caput XL: Utrum in Hac Vita Homo Possit Intelligere Substantias Separatas per Studium et Inquisitionem Scientiarum Speculativarum
Caput XLI: Quod non Possumus in Hac Vita Cognoscere Substantias Separatas sicut Ponit Alexander
Caput XLII: Quod non Possumus in Hac Vita Intelligere Substantias Separatas sicut Ponit Averroes
Caput XLIII: Quod Ultima Felicitas Hominis non Consistit in Cognitione Substantiarum Separatarum Qualem Praedictae Opiniones Fingunt
Caput XLIV: Quod non Possumus in Hac Vita Intelligere Substantias Separatas
Caput XLV: Quod Anima in Hac Vita non Intelligit Seipsam per Seipsam
Caput XLVI: Quod non Possumus in Hac Vita Videre Deum per Essentiam
Caput XLVII: Quod Ultima Hominis Felicitas non Sit in Hac Vita
Caput XLVIII: Quod Substantiae Separatae non Vident Deum per Essentiam ex Hoc quod Cognoscunt eum per Suam Essentiam
Caput XLIX: Quod in Naturali Cognitione Quam Habent Substantiae Separatae de Deo non Quiescit Earum Naturale Desiderium
Caput L: Quomodo Deus per Essentiam Videatur
Caput LI: Quod Nulla Creata Substantia Potest Sua Naturali Virtute Pervenire ad Videndum Deum per Essentiam
Caput LII: Quod Intellectus Creatus Indiget Aliqua Influentia Divini Luminis ad Hoc ut Deum per Essentiam Videat
Caput LIII: Rationes Quibus Videtur Probari quod Deus non Possit Videri per Essentiam, et Solutiones Earum
Caput LIV: Quod Intellectus Creatus non Comprehendit Divinam Substantiam
Caput LV: Quod Nullus Intellectus Creatus, Videndo Deum, Videt Omnia quae in Eo Videri Possunt
Caput LVI: Quod Omnis Intellectus, Cuiuscumque Gradus, Particeps esse Potest Divinae Visionis
Caput LVII: Quod Unus Alio Perfectius Deum Videre Potest
Caput LVIII: Quomodo Videntes Divinam Substantiam Omnia Vident
Caput LIX: Quod Videntes Deum Omnia Simul Vident in Ipso
Caput LX: Quod per Visionem Dei Aliquis Fit Particeps Vitae Aeternae
Caput LXI: Quod Videntes Deum in Perpetuum eum Videbunt
Caput LXII: Qualiter in Illa Ultima Felicitate Omne Desiderium Hominis Completur
Caput LXIII: Quod Deus Sua Providentia Gubernat Res
Caput LXIV: Quod Deus Conservat Res in esse
Caput LXV: Quod Nihil Dat esse Nisi Inquantum Agit in Virtute Divina
Caput LXVI: Quod Deus est Causa Operandi Omnibus Operantibus
Caput LXVII: Quod Deus est Ubique
Caput LXVIII: De Opinione Eorum qui Rebus Naturalibus Proprias Subtrahunt Actiones
Caput LXIX: Quomodo Idem Effectus Sit a Deo et a Natura Agente
Caput LXX: Quod Divina Providentia non Excludit Totaliter Malum a Rebus
Caput LXXI: Quod Divina Providentia non Excludit Contingentiam a Rebus
Caput LXXII: Quod Divina Providentia non Excludit Arbitrii Libertatem
Caput LXXIII: Quod Divina Providentia non Excludit Fortunam et Casum
Caput LXXIV: Quod Providentia Dei Sit Singularium Contingentium
Caput LXXV: Quod Providentia Dei Sit Omnium Singularium Immediate
Caput LXXVI: Quod Executio Divinae Providentiae Fit Mediantibus Causis Secundis
Caput LXXVII: Quod Mediantibus Creaturis Intellectualibus Aliae Creaturae Reguntur a Deo
Caput LXXVIII: Quod Substantiae Intellectivae Inferiores Reguntur per Superiores
Caput LXXIX: De Ordinatione Angelorum ad Invicem
Caput LXXX: De Ordinatione Hominum ad Invicem et ad Alia
Caput LXXXI: Quod Inferiora Corpora Reguntur a Deo per Corpora Caelestia
Caput LXXXII: Epilogus Praedictorum
Caput LXXXIII: Quod Corpora Caelestia non Imprimant in Intellectus Nostros
Caput LXXXIV: Quod Corpora Caelestia non sunt Causae Voluntatum et Electionum Nostrarum
Caput LXXXV: Quod Corporales Effectus in Istis Inferioribus non Sequuntur ex Necessitate a Corporibus Caelestibus
Caput LXXXVI: Quod Motus Caelestis Corporis non Sit Causa Electionum Nostrarum ex Virtute Animae Moventis, ut Quidam Dicunt
Caput LXXXVII: Quod Substantiae Separatae Creatae non Possunt esse Causa Directe Electionum et Voluntatum Nostrarum, sed Solus Deus
Caput LXXXVIII: Quod Motus Voluntatis Causatur a Deo, et non Solum Potentia Voluntatis
Caput LXXXIX: Quod Electiones et Voluntates Humanae Subduntur Divinae Providentiae
Caput XC: Quomodo Res Humanae ad Superiores Causas Reducantur
Caput XCI: Quomodo Dicitur Aliquis Bene Fortunatus, et Quomodo Adiuvatur Homo ex Superioribus Causis
Caput XCII: De Fato: an Sit, et Quid Sit
Caput XCIII: De Certitudine Divinae Providentiae
Caput XCIV: Quod Immobilitas Divinae Providentiae Utilitatem Orationis non Excludit
Caput XCV: Quod Deus non Omnes Orationes Exaudit
Caput XCVI: Quomodo Dispositio Providentiae Habeat Rationem
Caput XCVII: Quomodo Deus Possit Facere Praeter Ordinem Suae Providentiae, et Quomodo non
Caput XCVIII: Quod Deus Potest Operari Praeter Ordinem Rebus Inditum, Producendo Effectus absque Causis Proximis
Caput XCIX: Quod Ea quae Deus Facit Praeter Naturae Ordinem non sunt contra Naturam
Caput C: De Miraculis
Caput CI: Quod Solus Deus Facit Miracula
Caput CII: Quod Substantiae Spirituales Aliqua Mirabilia Operantur, quae tamen non sunt Vere Miracula
Caput CIII: Quod Opera Magorum non sunt Solum ex Impressione Caelestium Corporum
Caput CIV: Unde Magorum Operationes Efficaciam Habeant
Caput CV: Quod Substantia Intellectualis quae Praestat Efficaciam Magicis Operibus, non est Bona secundum Virtutem
Caput CVI: Quod Substantia Intellectualis Cuius Auxilio Magicae Artes Utuntur, non est Mala secundum Suam Naturam
Caput CVII: Rationes Quibus Probari Videtur quod in Daemonibus non Possit esse Peccatum
Caput CVIII: Quod in Daemonibus Possit esse Peccatum, et Qualiter
Caput CIX: Solutio Praemissarum Rationum
Caput CX: Quod Speciali Quadam Ratione Creaturae Rationales Divinae Providentiae Subduntur
Caput CXI: Quod Creaturae Rationales Gubernantur propter Seipsas, Aliae Vero in Ordine ad Eas
Caput CXII: Quod Rationalis Creatura Dirigitur a Deo ad Suos Actus non Solum secundum Ordinem ad Speciem, sed Etiam secundum quod Congruit Individuo
Caput CXIII: Quod Divinitus Hominibus Leges Dantur
Caput CXIV: Quod Lex Divina Principaliter Hominem Ordinat in Deum
Caput CXV: Quod Finis Legis Divinae est Dilectio Dei
Caput CXVI: Quod Divina Lege Ordinamur ad Dilectionem Proximi
Caput CXVII: Quod per Divinam Legem Homines ad Rectam Fidem Obligantur
Caput CXVIII: Quod per Quaedam Sensibilia Mens Nostra Dirigitur in Deum
After St. Thomas has determined concerning the precepts that are presupposed to the precepts of the Decalogue, he begins to determine concerning the precepts of the Decalogue themselves 1.
Concerning this, moreover, he does two things: first, he determines concerning the precepts by which man is ordered to God; second, concerning the precepts by which he is ordered to his neighbor, chap. 121. — Concerning the first, he does two things: first, he shows that through the divine law man is ordered to divine worship; second, he shows that that worship is to be shown to no other, in the following chapter.
Concerning the first, he does three things: first, he shows that worship of this kind, which consists in certain bodily things, was fittingly ordered through the divine law; second, he refutes the opinion of certain persons 2; third, he sets down the fittingness of the names by which worship of this kind is named 3. I. As to the first, he sets down this conclusion: It was fittingly provided for man by God that a commemoration of divine things should be made for him even in sensible things. It is proved. It is connatural to man to receive knowledge through the senses; and it is most difficult to transcend sensible things. Therefore, the attention of man, whose mind is not strong enough to contemplate divine things in themselves, had to be recalled to divine things—which is the intention of the law—through sensible things. How, moreover, the mind of man might be elevated to God through the sensible things contained in the divine law, St. Thomas shows by running through the individual kinds. For sensible sacrifices, which man offers to God, were instituted not because God has need of them, but so that it might be represented to man that he ought to refer himself and all his goods to God as to an end, as to the Creator, Ruler, and Lord of all things. — Sanctifications through sensible things, by which man is washed or anointed, and the like, with the utterance of sensible words, were instituted so that through sensible things it might be represented to man that the procession of intelligible gifts in him comes from without and from God, whose name is expressed by sensible vocal sounds. — Prostrations, however, genuflections, and the like, were instituted not that God might be moved by such things, as though God had need of them, but that men might provoke themselves to divine things; and at the same time with this, that we might profess that God is the author of soul and body, to whom we render both bodily and spiritual services.
II. As to the second 4, St. Thomas says that it is no wonder if the heretics who deny that God is the author of our body rebuke the rendering of bodily services of this kind to God. But they themselves are also rebuked. Because they do not remember that they are men, when they judge that the representation of sensible things is not necessary for them for interior knowledge and affection. The opposite of which is evident from experience.
III. As to the third 5, St. Thomas assigns the reason for five names by which we designate the rendering of these bodily things to God. For it is called, first, the worship of God: because we are said to cultivate those things toward which we display care through our works; but concerning God we display care by our act, not for His benefit, but for our own. He also adds that by interior acts we properly worship God, because through them we tend directly toward God; yet exterior acts themselves also pertain to the worship of God, inasmuch as through them our mind is elevated to God. Worship of this kind is called, secondly, religion: because man by acts of this kind in a certain way binds himself, lest he wander away from God. And also because by a certain natural instinct he feels himself bound to render reverence to God in his own way. Religion itself is called, thirdly, piety: because through it honor is shown to God, the Parent of all. And therefore those who are opposed to the things that pertain to divine worship are called impious. That which we render in honor is called, fourthly, service: because our whole being is in the power of God, and all that is in us we owe to Him, wherefore He is truly our Lord. It is called, fifthly, latria. For because God is Lord not accidentally, as is every 6 man (namely, who has dominion), but by nature: therefore service is owed in one way to God, and in another way to man, to whom we are subject accidentally, inasmuch as he has some particular dominion in things, and his dominion is derived 7 from God (namely, above the debt of nature). Therefore the service that is owed to God is specially called latria among the Greeks.
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Concerning this name divine worship, or worship of God, it must be noted, from the teaching of St. Thomas in II^a II^ae, q. 81, a. 1 8, that one is said to cultivate certain things when we frequent them either by remembrance, or by honoring, or by presence: just as farmers are so called because they cultivate the fields, and frequent them by their presence and labor; and inhabitants are so called because they cultivate the places which they inhabit. In this sense his words in this passage must be understood, when he says that we are said to cultivate those things toward which we apply care through our works: for the sense is that we are said to cultivate those things which we frequent by our works, care, and diligence. But some things we frequent by our works for their benefit: just as we cultivate fields that they may bear fruit. But we are not said to frequent God by our works for His benefit and advantage: rather, we frequent Him by remembrance and honoring, because through acts of this kind we make progress toward God, as was said above. On account of this, the rendering of honor which we display to God through sensible things, but first and foremost through the interior remembrance and veneration of Him, is fittingly named the worship of God, because it is the frequent remembrance and honoring of God.
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Concerning that which is said, that man is a lord accidentally, but God by nature, it must be noted that one must speak in one way of the dominion by which one regulates and directs another in his works, and in another way of the dominion by which whatever is in the subject belongs to the lord and is owed to him. Likewise, one must speak in one way of the aptitude for dominating, and in another way of actual domination. If we speak of dominion in the first way, thus, as to the aptitude and fittingness of domination, some men are lords not accidentally, but by nature. For those who are vigorous in intellect are naturally lords: as is said in Prov. 11 9, He that is a fool shall serve the wise; and it belongs to the Philosopher in his Politics 10. — But as to actual domination, no one is a lord by nature, but accidentally: inasmuch as some choose to be subject to the direction and governance of one man. And quite often we see those who are vigorous in intellect being subjected and regulated, but the dull and uncultivated ruling and governing. If, however, we speak of dominion in the second way, thus it is manifest that it belongs to man accidentally. For we see him who was truly the lord of another, and whose servant the other was, become the servant of another. Which is a sign that dominion of this kind is not according to nature, since natural things do not vary, but rather belongs to man accidentally and beyond nature. Therefore St. Thomas speaks of this second dominion in this place. Which is clear from the fact that, speaking of God's dominion, he says, because all that is in us we owe to Him, and on this account He is truly our Lord. — It can also be understood of actual domination, which we also said belongs to man accidentally. Yet the first is better.
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Concerning the name latria, it must be considered that it does not signify the worship of God among theologians as though this were the proper meaning of the word. For as Suidas 11 and other Greeks say, latria is servitude or service for hire: for it is originally derived from this noun latron, which signifies reward and hire. But I think this name was adopted by Catholic Greeks to signify particularly the worship of God, and the service that is rendered to God, because those who render service to God with a sincere mind expect a great reward and a great hire.