Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III
Francesco Silvestri (1474–1528)
Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles
First published 1926
In Book III of the Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Francesco Silvestri of Ferrara (Ferrariensis) expounds Aquinas's account of providence, human happiness, moral action, and divine grace. The commentary accompanies the Leonine text in volume XIV (1926). The present digital edition includes the Latin text and an English translation.
Prooemium
Caput I: Quod Omne Agens Agit propter Finem
Caput II: Quod Omne Agens Agit propter Bonum
Caput III: Quod Malum est Praeter Intentionem in Rebus
Caput IV: Rationes Quibus Videtur Probari quod Malum non Sit Praeter Intentionem
Caput V: Solutio Rationum Praemissarum
Caput VI: Quod Malum non est Aliqua Essentia
Caput VII: Rationes Quibus Videtur Probari quod Malum Sit Natura vel Res Aliqua
Caput VIII: Solutio Rationum Praemissarum
Caput IX: Quod Causa Mali est Bonum
Caput X: Quod Malum Fundatur in Bono
Caput XI: Quod Malum non Totaliter Consumit Bonum
Caput XII: Quod Malum Habet Aliquo Modo Causam
Caput XIII: Quod Malum est Causa per Accidens
Caput XIV: Quod non est Summum Malum
Caput XV: Quod Finis Cuiuslibet Rei est Bonum
Caput XVI: Quod Omnia Ordinantur in Unum Finem, qui est Deus
Caput XVII: Quomodo Deus Sit Finis Rerum
Caput XVIII: Quod Omnia Intendunt Assimilari Deo
Caput XIX: Quomodo Res Imitentur Divinam Bonitatem
Caput XX: Quod Res Intendunt Naturaliter Assimilari Deo in Hoc quod est Causa
Caput XXI: Quomodo Diversimode Res Ordinantur in Suos Fines
Caput XXII: Quod Motus Caeli est a Principio Intellectivo
Caput XXIII: Quomodo Appetunt Bonum Etiam quae Cognitione Carent
Caput XXIV: Quod Intelligere Deum est Finis Omnis Intellectualis Substantiae
Caput XXV: Utrum Felicitas Consistat in Actu Voluntatis
Caput XXVI: Quod Felicitas Humana non Consistit in Delectationibus Carnalibus
Caput XXVII: Quod Felicitas non Consistit in Honoribus
Caput XXVIII: Quod Felicitas Hominis non Consistit in Gloria
Caput XXIX: Quod Felicitas Hominis non Consistit in Divitiis
Caput XXX: Quod Felicitas non Consistit in Potentia Mundana
Caput XXXI: Quod Felicitas non Consistit in Bonis Corporis
Caput XXXII: Quod Felicitas Humana non Consistit in Sensu
Caput XXXIII: Quod Ultima Hominis Felicitas non Consistit in Actibus Virtutum Moralium
Caput XXXIV: Quod Ultima Felicitas non Sit in Actu Prudentiae
Caput XXXV: Quod Felicitas non Consistit in Operatione Artis
Caput XXXVI: Quod Ultima Felicitas Hominis Consistit in Contemplatione Dei
Caput XXXVII: Quod Felicitas Humana non Consistit in Cognitione Dei quae Communiter Habetur a Pluribus
Caput XXXVIII: Quod Felicitas Humana non Consistit in Cognitione Dei quae Habetur per Demonstrationem
Caput XXXIX: Quod Felicitas Humana non Consistit in Cognitione Dei quae est per Fidem
Caput XL: Utrum in Hac Vita Homo Possit Intelligere Substantias Separatas per Studium et Inquisitionem Scientiarum Speculativarum
Caput XLI: Quod non Possumus in Hac Vita Cognoscere Substantias Separatas sicut Ponit Alexander
Caput XLII: Quod non Possumus in Hac Vita Intelligere Substantias Separatas sicut Ponit Averroes
Caput XLIII: Quod Ultima Felicitas Hominis non Consistit in Cognitione Substantiarum Separatarum Qualem Praedictae Opiniones Fingunt
Caput XLIV: Quod non Possumus in Hac Vita Intelligere Substantias Separatas
Caput XLV: Quod Anima in Hac Vita non Intelligit Seipsam per Seipsam
Caput XLVI: Quod non Possumus in Hac Vita Videre Deum per Essentiam
Caput XLVII: Quod Ultima Hominis Felicitas non Sit in Hac Vita
Caput XLVIII: Quod Substantiae Separatae non Vident Deum per Essentiam ex Hoc quod Cognoscunt eum per Suam Essentiam
Caput XLIX: Quod in Naturali Cognitione Quam Habent Substantiae Separatae de Deo non Quiescit Earum Naturale Desiderium
Caput L: Quomodo Deus per Essentiam Videatur
Caput LI: Quod Nulla Creata Substantia Potest Sua Naturali Virtute Pervenire ad Videndum Deum per Essentiam
Caput LII: Quod Intellectus Creatus Indiget Aliqua Influentia Divini Luminis ad Hoc ut Deum per Essentiam Videat
Caput LIII: Rationes Quibus Videtur Probari quod Deus non Possit Videri per Essentiam, et Solutiones Earum
Caput LIV: Quod Intellectus Creatus non Comprehendit Divinam Substantiam
Caput LV: Quod Nullus Intellectus Creatus, Videndo Deum, Videt Omnia quae in Eo Videri Possunt
Caput LVI: Quod Omnis Intellectus, Cuiuscumque Gradus, Particeps esse Potest Divinae Visionis
Caput LVII: Quod Unus Alio Perfectius Deum Videre Potest
Caput LVIII: Quomodo Videntes Divinam Substantiam Omnia Vident
Caput LIX: Quod Videntes Deum Omnia Simul Vident in Ipso
Caput LX: Quod per Visionem Dei Aliquis Fit Particeps Vitae Aeternae
Caput LXI: Quod Videntes Deum in Perpetuum eum Videbunt
Caput LXII: Qualiter in Illa Ultima Felicitate Omne Desiderium Hominis Completur
Caput LXIII: Quod Deus Sua Providentia Gubernat Res
Caput LXIV: Quod Deus Conservat Res in esse
Caput LXV: Quod Nihil Dat esse Nisi Inquantum Agit in Virtute Divina
Caput LXVI: Quod Deus est Causa Operandi Omnibus Operantibus
Caput LXVII: Quod Deus est Ubique
Caput LXVIII: De Opinione Eorum qui Rebus Naturalibus Proprias Subtrahunt Actiones
Caput LXIX: Quomodo Idem Effectus Sit a Deo et a Natura Agente
Caput LXX: Quod Divina Providentia non Excludit Totaliter Malum a Rebus
Caput LXXI: Quod Divina Providentia non Excludit Contingentiam a Rebus
Caput LXXII: Quod Divina Providentia non Excludit Arbitrii Libertatem
Caput LXXIII: Quod Divina Providentia non Excludit Fortunam et Casum
Caput LXXIV: Quod Providentia Dei Sit Singularium Contingentium
Caput LXXV: Quod Providentia Dei Sit Omnium Singularium Immediate
Caput LXXVI: Quod Executio Divinae Providentiae Fit Mediantibus Causis Secundis
Caput LXXVII: Quod Mediantibus Creaturis Intellectualibus Aliae Creaturae Reguntur a Deo
Caput LXXVIII: Quod Substantiae Intellectivae Inferiores Reguntur per Superiores
Caput LXXIX: De Ordinatione Angelorum ad Invicem
Caput LXXX: De Ordinatione Hominum ad Invicem et ad Alia
Caput LXXXI: Quod Inferiora Corpora Reguntur a Deo per Corpora Caelestia
Caput LXXXII: Epilogus Praedictorum
Caput LXXXIII: Quod Corpora Caelestia non Imprimant in Intellectus Nostros
Caput LXXXIV: Quod Corpora Caelestia non sunt Causae Voluntatum et Electionum Nostrarum
Caput LXXXV: Quod Corporales Effectus in Istis Inferioribus non Sequuntur ex Necessitate a Corporibus Caelestibus
Caput LXXXVI: Quod Motus Caelestis Corporis non Sit Causa Electionum Nostrarum ex Virtute Animae Moventis, ut Quidam Dicunt
Caput LXXXVII: Quod Substantiae Separatae Creatae non Possunt esse Causa Directe Electionum et Voluntatum Nostrarum, sed Solus Deus
Caput LXXXVIII: Quod Motus Voluntatis Causatur a Deo, et non Solum Potentia Voluntatis
Caput LXXXIX: Quod Electiones et Voluntates Humanae Subduntur Divinae Providentiae
Caput XC: Quomodo Res Humanae ad Superiores Causas Reducantur
Caput XCI: Quomodo Dicitur Aliquis Bene Fortunatus, et Quomodo Adiuvatur Homo ex Superioribus Causis
Caput XCII: De Fato: an Sit, et Quid Sit
Caput XCIII: De Certitudine Divinae Providentiae
Caput XCIV: Quod Immobilitas Divinae Providentiae Utilitatem Orationis non Excludit
Caput XCV: Quod Deus non Omnes Orationes Exaudit
Caput XCVI: Quomodo Dispositio Providentiae Habeat Rationem
Caput XCVII: Quomodo Deus Possit Facere Praeter Ordinem Suae Providentiae, et Quomodo non
Caput XCVIII: Quod Deus Potest Operari Praeter Ordinem Rebus Inditum, Producendo Effectus absque Causis Proximis
Caput XCIX: Quod Ea quae Deus Facit Praeter Naturae Ordinem non sunt contra Naturam
Caput C: De Miraculis
Caput CI: Quod Solus Deus Facit Miracula
Caput CII: Quod Substantiae Spirituales Aliqua Mirabilia Operantur, quae tamen non sunt Vere Miracula
Caput CIII: Quod Opera Magorum non sunt Solum ex Impressione Caelestium Corporum
Caput CIV: Unde Magorum Operationes Efficaciam Habeant
Caput CV: Quod Substantia Intellectualis quae Praestat Efficaciam Magicis Operibus, non est Bona secundum Virtutem
Caput CVI: Quod Substantia Intellectualis Cuius Auxilio Magicae Artes Utuntur, non est Mala secundum Suam Naturam
Caput CVII: Rationes Quibus Probari Videtur quod in Daemonibus non Possit esse Peccatum
Caput CVIII: Quod in Daemonibus Possit esse Peccatum, et Qualiter
Caput CIX: Solutio Praemissarum Rationum
Caput CX: Quod Speciali Quadam Ratione Creaturae Rationales Divinae Providentiae Subduntur
Caput CXI: Quod Creaturae Rationales Gubernantur propter Seipsas, Aliae Vero in Ordine ad Eas
Caput CXII: Quod Rationalis Creatura Dirigitur a Deo ad Suos Actus non Solum secundum Ordinem ad Speciem, sed Etiam secundum quod Congruit Individuo
Caput CXIII: Quod Divinitus Hominibus Leges Dantur
Caput CXIV: Quod Lex Divina Principaliter Hominem Ordinat in Deum
Caput CXV: Quod Finis Legis Divinae est Dilectio Dei
In the second place, St. Thomas shows what sort of adherence the divine law intends 1.
Concerning this, moreover, he does two things: first, he shows that such adherence is through love; second, that it is also through faith, in chapter 118.
Moreover, because the love of one's neighbor is contained in the love of God, he first proves that the divine law orders man to the love of God; second, that it orders him to the love of his neighbor, in the following chapter.
I. As to the first, he lays down this conclusion: The intention of the divine law principally orders man to love God.
And he argues first thus. Man principally adheres to God through love. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is evident. Because the intention of the divine law is principally toward this: that man adhere to God.
The antecedent, however, is proved. Because, since man can adhere to God only by intellect and will, and not according to the lower powers; the adherence that is through the intellect receives completion through that which is through the will, by which man in a certain way rests in that which the intellect apprehends. But the will, in the case of that to which it cleaves on account of fear, cleaves on account of something else, namely so that it may avoid an evil threatening it if it does not adhere; but in the case of that to which it adheres on account of love, it adheres on account of itself. What, however, is on account of itself, is more principal than that which is on account of something else.
- For the evidence of this reason, it must be considered that we can consider the act by which the will adheres to something in two ways: in one way, by precision from the act of the intellect apprehending the thing willed; in another way, as it includes the act of the intellect, inasmuch as it is only of a known thing. If it is taken by precision, according as it is formally distinguished from the act of the intellect: thus man does not adhere to God most of all through the will, absolutely speaking, but rather through the intellect; since knowledge comes about through this, that the known is received in the knower, and the intellect in act is the understood in act 2; whereas to will is an inclination toward the thing willed.
If, however, it is taken through the inclusion of the act of the intellect: thus the greater adherence is through the will than through the intellect; for he adheres more to God who has God in himself through knowledge and rests in Him in some way through love, than he who only knows God and does not love Him. And in this way St. Thomas takes it that adherence through the will is greater than that which is through the intellect. Which is clear from the fact that he says the adherence that is through the intellect receives complement through that which belongs to the will. For from this he gives us to understand that adherence through the will and the intellect together is greater than adherence which is through the intellect alone: because that which is through the intellect alone lacks the complement of its perfection; but that which is through the intellect and the will has the complement of its perfection.
II. Secondly. The love of the Supreme Good makes men good most of all. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is proved. Because the end of any law, and most of all of divine law, is to make men good.
The antecedent, however, is proved thus. A man is called good from the fact that he has a good will, through which he reduces into act whatever good (namely, superadded good) is in him. But the will is good from the fact that it wills the good, and especially the greatest good, which is the end. Therefore, the more the will wills a good of this kind, the more a man is good. But a man wills more that which he wills on account of love than that which he wills on account of fear alone: since what is willed through fear is mixed with the involuntary. Therefore, etc.
III. Thirdly. The goodness of man is through virtue: since this makes its possessor good. Hence the law also intends to make men virtuous; and the precepts of the law concern acts of virtues. Therefore the love of the good is the ultimate thing intended in the divine law. — The consequence is proved. Because it belongs to the condition of virtue that the virtuous man act both firmly and delightfully. Which love does most of all.
Pay attention to the fact that this reasoning supposes the intention of the law to be that it make men good. For thus, since man is good from the fact that he acts through love of virtue, because he is good through virtue; and virtue demands that he act through love, otherwise he would not act firmly and delightfully, which belongs to the very notion of virtue: it follows exceedingly well that the intention of the divine law is that man love; and most of all the Supreme Good, which is God.
IV. Fourthly. Lawgivers by the command of the promulgated law move those to whom the law is given. Therefore they intend that they be moved most perfectly. Therefore the intention of the entire lawgiver 3 is that man love God.
The first consequence is proved. Because every agent intends perfection in that which it effects: namely, as much as it can; and as much as the nature of the effect demands. — The second, however, is proved: because those who tend toward God by loving Him are moved most perfectly toward Him. The reason for this, moreover, is that in all things that are moved by some first mover, a thing is moved so much the more perfectly the more it participates in the motion and likeness of the first mover. But God, who is the giver of the divine law, does all things on account of His love.
It is confirmed by the authority of 1 Tim. 1; and Matt. 22.
V. From these things St. Thomas infers that fittingly the new law, as being more perfect, is called the law of love: whereas the old law, as being more imperfect, is called the law of fear.
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Concerning this corollary a doubt arises. For the old law is a law given to men by God just as the new law is, which is the law of the Gospel. But it has been shown that the divine law orders men to the love of God, and not to fear. Therefore the old law ought not to be called the law of fear rather than of love: or, if it is to be called the law of fear, it is false that the divine law orders to love, universally speaking.
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For the evidence of this, it must be considered, from the doctrine of St. Thomas, I-II, q. 107, a. 1, that the old law and the new law are not distinguished in such a way as if they were two laws having entirely two ends, but rather there is one end of them, namely that men be subjected to God; but they are distinguished as the perfect and the imperfect in the same species; for the old law is more imperfect than the new law, and orders more remotely to the end of the law. And therefore the old law, which was given to the imperfect, was called the law of fear: because men were induced to the observance of the precepts and to subjection to God through the threat of punishments. But the new law, which is given to the more perfect, is called the law of love: because, since its principal character consists in grace itself bestowed on hearts, it induces men to the observance of the precepts not on account of fear of punishments, but on account of love of virtue and of God. Hence, even if the precepts of charity were given in the old law, nevertheless the law itself did not incline to this, that the divine precepts should be observed on account of love. But in the new law the precepts of charity are given, and through the law itself, which principally consists in the grace of the Holy Spirit bestowed on the hearts of the faithful, man is inclined per se, as to something proper, to be subject to Him on account of the love of God, and to cleave to Him through love.
What was said, therefore, that the divine law tends toward this, that man love God, must be understood of the divine law taken according to its perfection, but not of it according as it is given to the more imperfect. And therefore St. Thomas infers that the new law, as more perfect, is called the law of love, as if he were saying: When it was said that the divine law intends the love of God, it is understood of the perfect law, such as is the new law and the law of the Gospel, written in the hearts of men 4, whence it is called the law of love; it is not, however, understood of the imperfect law, such as is the old law, written on tablets, which is called the law of fear. — And through this the solution to the objections is clear.