Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

I. After St. Thomas showed that it was necessary for a law to be given to man by God, he now wishes to show what it is that the divine law intends ¹.

Concerning this, moreover, he does two things: first, he shows what it intends by necessity of precept; second, what it intends by utility of counsel, in chapter 130.

Concerning the first, he does two things: first, he determines concerning the precepts that are presupposed by the precepts of the Decalogue, which are the precept of love and the precept of faith, as is said in I-II, q. 100, a. 4, ad 1; second, he determines concerning the precepts of the Decalogue, in chapter 119.

Concerning the first, he does two things: first, he shows that man is ordered to God through the divine law; second, how he is ordered to God, in the following chapter.

1. As to the first, this conclusion is set forth: The divine law intends principally to order man to God.

It is proved first thus. The end which God intends is God Himself. Therefore, the divine law intends principally to order man to God. — The consequence is proved. Because every legislator intends principally to lead men through laws to his own end: as is evident in the leader of an army and the ruler of a city.

II. Second. The end of the human creature is to adhere to God: since his happiness consists in this. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is proved. Because, since law is a certain plan of divine governing providence set before the rational creature; and the government of God's providence leads individual things to their proper ends: through the divinely given law man is chiefly ordered to his end.

For the evidence of these things, it must first be noted that, although divine providence, with respect to the entity it designates in God, is simply one, and has in itself no plurality, just as the divine knowledge does not; nevertheless, on the part of the objects at which it terminates, it has multiplicity, because many are the things that fall under providence and are led to their ends in various ways. And thus we can say that in God there are many providences, and many plans for ordering things to the end: for example, that the plan of the order of celestial bodies to their end is one providence, or one plan of divine providence; and the plan of the order of corruptible things to their ends is another providence, and another plan of divine providence; and likewise the plan of the order of human acts to their end is another plan of divine providence. On this account, therefore, St. Thomas said that law is a certain plan of divine providence, and not that it is absolutely the plan of divine providence: in order, I say, to show that the divinely given law is not universally divine providence, namely, according as it extends to all things provided for; but is a particular plan of divine providence by which human acts are led to their end.

It must be noted secondly, from the teaching of St. Thomas in the previously cited question, art. 4 ², that in order for some plan and ordination of the practical intellect to have the character of law with respect to man, it is required that it be promulgated, and by the very promulgation come to the knowledge of the men upon whom such a law is imposed: otherwise it would not have the force of obliging. For that reason, explaining the divinely given law, he says that it is a certain plan of divine governing providence set before—that is, promulgated to—the rational creature, and brought into the knowledge of men through Moses and others, and through Sacred Scripture.

III. Third. Those acts are chiefly intended by the divine law which are the best. But among all human acts, those are best by which man adheres to God, as being closer to the end. Therefore, etc. — The major premise is proved. Because the intention of any legislator is to make good those to whom he gives the law: whence also the precepts of the law must be concerning the acts of the virtues.

Concerning that proposition, The intention of any legislator is to make good those to whom he gives the law, it must be observed, from the teaching of St. Thomas in I-II, q. 92, a. 1, that this is understood either simply or secundum quid. For if the legislator intends the good simply, then he intends to make his subjects simply good. But if he intends a good that is useful or delectable to himself, or one repugnant to divine justice, then he intends to make them good not simply, but in order to such a regime: namely, that the subjects may be well obedient to his regime, which is a good in order to such a regime. A good legislator, however, always intends to make them simply good.

IV. Fourth. The divinely given law has efficacy among men from this: that man is subject to God. Therefore, etc. — The antecedent is proved. Because he who is not subject to a king is not bound by his law. — But the consequence is proved: because that must be chief in a law from which the law has efficacy.

But this reasoning seems not to be valid. For from the fact that the divine law has efficacy from this, that man is subject to God, it only follows that the chief thing in the divine law is that man be subject to God. But this is not to adhere to God, which was what was intended: for it is one thing to be subject to someone, and another to adhere to him.

He answers that the reasoning proceeds very well. For adhering in this place is not taken according to proximity of location, but according to adhesion of mind. And therefore to be subject to God through obedience, by which someone voluntarily subjects himself to the divine law, is the same as to adhere to God through the will. And on that account, when one is inferred, it is the same as if the other were inferred.

The conclusion is confirmed by the authority of Deuteronomy 10.