Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

In the second place, St. Thomas sets down the particular manner in which rational creatures are governed by divine providence ¹.

Concerning this, however, he does two things: first, he shows that the rational creature alone is directed to its acts not only according to the fittingness of the species, but also according to the fittingness of the individual; second, he sets down the manner of divine governance concerning the individuals themselves, in the following chapter.

I. As to the first, it should be noted that the natural acts of individuals, or acts whose principle is within them, are acts both of the individual and of the species, inasmuch as they follow upon the nature common to all individuals. But the acts of a rational creature differ from the acts of others. For the acts of others are ordered to the preservation and perfection of the species, and in them nothing is regarded except the good of the species in itself; and, if the good of the individual is regarded, this is only inasmuch as it is ordered to the species. But in the acts of an intellectual nature, what is regarded is not only the good and perfection of the species, but also the good of the individual in itself. And therefore it is said that the rational creature alone is directed to its acts not only according to what is fitting to the species, but also according to what is fitting to the individual: that is, God directs and regulates its acts not only on account of the good of the species, but also according as they pertain to the good of the individual; because, namely, in it He intends not only the preservation of the species, but also the good of the individual itself, even if it were not to redound to the good of the species.

2. He argues first, then, as follows. The rational creature, namely according to the individual, is subject to divine providence as governed and provided for on its own account, not only on account of the species, as other creatures are. Therefore it receives direction from God to its acts not only on account of the species, but also according to the individual. — The antecedent is proved. Because an individual that is governed only on account of the species is not governed on its own account. — But the consequence is proved: because, since a thing seems to exist on account of its operation, each thing is governed to its act according as it is subject to divine providence.

For the evidence of this reason, it must be considered that to be governed on one's own account can be taken in two ways. In one way, as excluding all ordering to another. And thus to be governed on one's own account excludes being governed for the good of another. And in this way an individual of a rational nature is not understood to be governed on its own account. For it was shown above ² that intellectual nature itself is ordered to the perfection of the universe. — In another way, as excluding an ordering to another alone: namely, that it is not willed and intended only on account of another, but also on account of its own good, so that it has in itself that whereby it is willed even if it were not ordered to another. And thus to be governed on one's own account does not also exclude an ordering to another. For one and the same thing can in this way be governed both on its own account and on account of another: inasmuch, namely, as it is both ordered to the good of another, and also has in itself that whereby it is willed. And in this way it is understood in this place that rational nature, even according to the individual, is governed and provided for on its own account.

II. Secondly. If this were not so, it would not be in man to act or not to act, but it would be necessary that he follow the natural inclination common to the whole species. This is false. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. Because in those things that are directed in their acts only according to what pertains to the species, it is not to act or not to act: since the things that follow upon the species are common and natural to all individuals contained under the species; but natural things are not in our power.

For the evidence of this reason, it must be considered that we must speak in one way of the faculty itself of acting or not acting, and in another way of the operation that is subject to such a faculty. For the faculty of acting or not acting is natural to man, and follows upon the whole species, nor is it in our power to have it or not to have it. But the operation itself that is subject to such a faculty is not natural, nor does it follow upon the whole species, taking natural for that which follows upon nature of necessity: for there is no human operation, inasmuch as it is such, that follows of necessity of nature as to exercise. For although understanding is said to be natural to man inasmuch as the intellective power is natural to man, yet actual understanding itself is not so natural to man as to follow upon nature of necessity, otherwise it would be necessary for man always to understand, given the things that are necessary on the part of the intellect for acting: but it is in man's power actually to understand or not to understand. And thus also this determinate act of understanding does not follow upon the whole human species, although the faculty of understanding follows upon the whole species. The sense, therefore, of St. Thomas's consequence is that, if man were directed in his acts only according to what pertains to the species, there would not be in man the faculty whereby he could actually produce the action and omit the operation itself, but he would produce it by natural necessity: because that operation would follow upon the species, and thus would be natural, and consequently would not be in man's power.

III. Thirdly. In the rational creature many actions appear for which the inclination of the species is not sufficient. Therefore etc. — The antecedent is proved by this sign, that those actions are not similar in all. — But the consequence is proved: because, since divine providence extends to all singular things, even the least, in whatever things there are some actions beyond the inclination of the species, it is necessary that they be regulated in them by divine providence, beyond the direction that pertains to the species.

It should be noted in this place that, since action is proportioned to the principle of action, it is necessary, where the same formal principle is found, and disposed in the same way, that a similar operation also be found there: for we see that all craftsmen having the same perfection of art, if they operate according to that art, operate in the same way. Since, therefore, the things that pertain to the species are found in the same way in all individuals of the species, it is necessary that an operation that follows upon the species be done in the same way by all. And if it is not done in the same way by all, it is not an operation that necessarily follows upon the common species. And therefore St. Thomas fittingly brings forward as a sign that some actions in men are beyond the inclination of the species, the fact that they are not similar in all.

IV. Fourthly. The rational creature alone is capable of the direction by which it is directed to its acts not only according to the species, but also according to the individual: since it has intellect and reason, whence it can perceive how something is variously good or evil according as it is fitting to different individuals, times, and places. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. Because God provides for each nature according to its capacity: since He established them such as He knew were suited to attain the end through His governance.

Note, in accordance with the things said in the preceding sections ³, that man differs from other animals in this, that the other individuals of animals are produced only for the preservation of the species; and therefore all their actions, by which the individual itself is also preserved in esse, are ordered to the good of the species itself, inasmuch as through such maintenance of individuals the species is preserved. Whence they are not capable of being directed in their operations except as far as the good and perfection of the species demands. But each individual man is produced not only for the preservation of the species, but also on his own account: since the soul of each one is perpetual and immortal, and the body has from it an ordering to immortality ⁴. Therefore the actions of a human individual are ordered not only to the good of the species, but also to the good and perfection of the individual itself. And on this account each individual man is capable of direction to his acts not only according as the good and perfection of the species demands, but also according as the good and perfection of the individual in itself demands. And on this account intellect was given to each man, by which he can perceive how something is variously good or evil for different individuals. The sense, therefore, of that antecedent is that the rational creature alone is capable of direction to its acts not only as to the acts that follow upon the species, but also as to the acts of this individual inasmuch as it is this individual, distinct from another individual of man; and not only according as the good and perfection of the species demands, but also according as the good and perfection of the individual inasmuch as it is such demands.

V. Fifthly. The rational creature participates in divine providence not only according to being governed, but also according to governing itself in its proper acts, and also other things. Therefore the governance of the acts of the rational creature inasmuch as they are personal acts belongs to divine providence. — The consequence is proved. Because a lower providence is subject to the divine as supreme. — But the antecedent is proved: because the rational creature is so subject to divine providence that it is not only governed by it, but can also in some way know the rationale of providence.

2. Concerning this proposition, The rational creature can know the rationale of providence, it must be considered that here by rationale of providence we can understand two things: namely, either the reason and cause of the governance of things by God, which governance is also sometimes called providence; or the conception of the divine intellect concerning the ordering of things to the end, which is called providence. In the first way, the sense is that it knows the why of such a thing being governed thus, and such a thing thus: for example, that God governs lower bodies through celestial bodies because celestial bodies are more noble and more excellent, as being incorruptible. — But in the second way, the sense is that man knows the very disposition of the divine intellect concerning the ordering of things to the end. And thus it is an intransitive construction, so that the sense is: It knows the rationale of providence, that is, the rationale which is providence itself. For providence is a kind of rationale, as is clear from the preceding ⁵.

We can interpret the saying of St. Thomas in both ways: because from both senses the intended conclusion follows very well. For from the fact that man knows the order of divine governance existing in things, he has it that he can govern himself and other things to the likeness of divine governance. Similarly, from the fact that he knows divine providence itself which is in the divine mind, he can govern himself and other things. Which does not belong to brutes, which do not have such knowledge.

But although both senses can be adapted to the text, the second nevertheless seems more intended, from that word in some way added, when he says that the rational creature is so subject to divine providence that it can in some way know the rationale of providence. For it seems to be the same as if he were to say:

The rational creature cannot indeed perfectly know the rationale of divine providence, namely by knowing the divine mind itself as it is in itself, just as we cannot perfectly know other divine things either; but nevertheless it can in some part discover such a rationale by study and diligence. And therefore, since it is elevated to this knowledge so as to know in some way the rationale of divine governance, it also belongs to it to govern itself and other things to the likeness of the divine providence and governance that it knows, by imitating the rules of divine governance.

VI. Sixthly. The rational soul is capable of perpetuity not only according to the species, but also according to the individual. Therefore the acts of a rational creature are directed by divine providence not only by that rationale by which they pertain to the species, but also inasmuch as they are personal acts. — The consequence is proved. Because the personal acts of a rational creature are properly the acts that are from the rational soul.

It should be noted that from the conclusion inferred here and in the preceding reason, the sense of the proposed conclusion is obtained ⁶. For since the acts of this particular man are both acts of man and acts of this man and of this person; when it is said that the rational creature alone is directed by God to its acts not only according to the fittingness of the species, but also according to the fittingness of the individual, it is understood that the acts of the rational creature are directed by God not only inasmuch as they are acts of man, that is, as to that which belongs to them from the fact that they are acts of one having human nature; but also inasmuch as they are acts of this person inasmuch as it is this person; that is, as to that which belongs to them as they are acts of this singular man, distinct from others.

It should also be noted that this reason presupposes that which was shown in the preceding reasons ⁷, namely that things that are always are provided for on their own account.

2. Concerning the proof of the consequence, it must be considered that, although the same form of man is corporeal form, vegetative soul, sensitive soul, and rational soul, and exercises the operations of all such forms; nevertheless those acts are properly of man inasmuch as he is man, which proceed from that form inasmuch as it is rational. And because a person, properly speaking, among men is the individual of man itself inasmuch as it is rational, therefore St. Thomas fittingly says that the personal acts of a rational creature are properly those acts that proceed from the rational soul, namely inasmuch as it is rational.

The conclusion is confirmed. Because in the Scriptures the care of men is specially attributed to God: as in the Psalms; and 1 Cor. 9, namely to show that God has care of human acts even inasmuch as they are personal, which clearly does not belong to brutes.

VII. Concerning the conclusion proved in many ways in this chapter, no small doubt occurs. For if man falls under divine providence on his own account not only as to the species, but also as to individuals, it follows that more men are saved than are damned. But that this is false is conceded by almost all: since there is a great multitude of unbelievers, all of whom are damned; and of Christians very many are also damned. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. Because everything that is provided for, especially on its own account, attains the end for the most part, unless it be an erring providence.

It is answered, as far as can be gathered from the doctrine of St. Thomas, I Sent., d. 39, q. 2, a. 2, ad 4, that the consequence is false. — For the proof of which, it is said that the assumption is not true of that which is open to either side in operating toward the end, which, I say, operates toward the attainment of the end through free choice: although it is true of that which operates through nature, which is determined to one. But man, inasmuch as he is of an intellectual nature, does not operate through nature, but through free choice, which is open to either side. Therefore the argument does not follow.

VIII. But against this response it can be urged that then the reason of St. Thomas in the First Part, q. 63, a. 9, by which he proves that more angels remained than sinned, would be null. For he argues thus. Sin is contrary to natural inclination. But things that happen contrary to nature occur in the minority of cases: since nature attains its effect either always or for the most part. Therefore etc. — For it is said, according to the given response, that both the minor premise is false, and also what is assumed for its proof, concerning things that happen contrary to a nature open to either side, of which sort is the angelic nature. Either, therefore, this reason will not conclude; or it will also be true in every free nature that for the greater part it will attain its end.

2. To this doubt a twofold response occurs to me. The first can be gathered in I Sent., at the place cited. And it is that a free agent open to either side is twofold. One, indeed, in which the principle and perfection directing toward right operation is innate: and therefore it is a perfect and complete agent in itself. And in this way the angelic nature is a free agent: since all habits were naturally con-created with it. — The other, however, is a free agent to which the secondary perfections by which it is directed toward operating are not innate, but it is in potency to them: and therefore it is not a perfect and complete agent. And in this way human nature is a free agent: for the intellective soul is in the beginning like prime matter, as the Commentator says ⁸; and like a tablet on which nothing is written, as is said in III De Anima ⁹.

When, therefore, that assumption concerning a free agent open to either side was denied, it is understood of a free agent in the second way, of which sort is man: but not of a free agent in the first way, of which sort is an angel. Therefore the reason assumed in the First Part concludes very well concerning the angel: because, although it had freedom for operating, yet it was not entirely open to either side, since through innate habits it was inclined to right work. But it would not conclude concerning man, who from the beginning is entirely open to either side with respect to any right work whatever, although he is in some way inclined toward the absolute good, and is an incomplete agent from the beginning of his origin.

3. The second response can be gathered from the First Part, at the place cited, ad 1. For we must speak in one way of an angel, and in another way of man. For since in angels there is only an intellectual nature, sin, which is contrary to intellectual nature, is contrary to the whole nature of the angel. And because what is contrary to a whole nature occurs in the minority of cases, therefore fewer of the angels sinned. — But in man, because there is not only an intellectual nature, but also a sensual nature, sin, which is directly contrary to the intellectual nature, is not contrary to the whole nature of man: because it is not contrary to the sensual nature. Therefore sin can be in the majority: while man, setting aside the good of reason, follows, according to the inclination of the sensitive nature, sensible goods, which are known to more than intellectual goods.

Nor is it an objection that sensitive nature is born to be regulated by reason, and thus sin seems to be contrary to sensitive nature also. — For it is said that, although sin is contrary to sensitive nature as it is regulable by reason, it is not nevertheless contrary to sensitive nature as it is sensitive: because, as regulable by reason, it pertains to rational nature. And thus also sin contrary to sensitive nature as regulable by reason is contrary to rational nature: but not contrary to sensitive nature as it is sensitive. And consequently it is not contrary to the whole nature of man.