Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

Having shown that rational creatures are subject to divine providence in a certain special way, St. Thomas wishes to determine concerning this special way ¹. Regarding this, however, he does two things: first, he sets down one way that is common to all intellectual substances; second, he sets down another that belongs only to rational substances, in which there is a plurality of individuals, in the following chapter.

As to the first way, he does two things: first, he shows that rational creatures are provided for on their own account, whereas the others are ordered toward the rational; second, he removes certain doubts ².

I. As to the first, he argues first from the very mastery of operation, thus. An intellectual creature, according to its knowledge, is master of its own act. Other things, however, do not have mastery of their act. Therefore intellectual creatures are provided for by God as though procured by God on their own account; but other creatures as though ordered toward rational ones.

The consequence is proved. Because that which is only acted upon by another has the character of an instrument; but that which acts by itself has the character of a principal agent. Moreover, all care that is applied to an instrument is referred to the principal agent as to an end; but that which is applied toward a principal agent, either by itself or by another, in so far as it is a principal agent, is for its own sake; since an instrument is not sought on its own account, but in order that the principal agent may use it.

2. Regarding what is said—that an intellectual nature according to its knowledge is master of its act—it should be noted that this is not said as if freedom formally resides in the intellect, for as is stated in De Veritate, q. 24, a. 6, it formally resides in the will; but because the root of freedom is the intellect itself, as is explained in the same question, art. 2. Whence also in I-II, q. 17, a. 1, ad 2, it is said that the root of freedom as its subject is the will, but as its cause is reason.

II. Against this argument it could be objected that it does not correctly conclude what was proposed. For either it does not conclude what is intended, or one must supply a premise that is false. For when it is said that other creatures have the character of an instrument because they are only acted upon, either it is understood that they have the character of an instrument in comparison to God, as to the principal agent using them as instruments; or it is understood that they have this in comparison to rational creatures, whose instruments they are. If the first, it does not follow that the other creatures are ordered toward rational ones, but toward God, whose instruments they are. If the second, what is assumed seems to be false, namely that all other creatures are instruments of an intellectual nature. For it is not apparent how through all creatures they operate toward their end, as a craftsman operates through instruments.

And furthermore, when it is said that the other creatures are only acted upon, from which they have the character of an instrument, it is understood that they are acted upon by God, but not by intellectual creatures. Therefore it is not to be understood that they are instruments of an intellectual creature, but of God.

2. It is answered that the other creatures having the character of an instrument is understood both in comparison to God and in comparison to intellectual creatures. For from the fact that they are only acted upon and do not actuate themselves to their proper acts, it belongs to them both to be instruments of God as agent;

When, however, it is objected first, because it is not apparent how through all creatures an intellectual nature operates toward its end: it is answered that in this it operates through all creatures, in that it uses all of them for its own benefit in some way; just as St. Thomas says of man, II Sent., d. 1, q. 2, a. 3, that benefit comes to him from base, and even harmful things, from the fact that through this he becomes more humble, and in base things he considers the glory and wisdom of God. Likewise, those things that do not come into the use of his work turn to his benefit while he has some knowledge of them, either in universal or in particular.

When it is objected secondly, because they are understood to be acted upon by God, but not by intellectual creatures: it is answered that, although as to actions of nature they are acted upon by God giving them nature, nevertheless from this it does not follow that they are instruments of God alone. For from the fact that they are acted upon, and do not have mastery of their operations, it follows both that they are instruments of God, and that by Him they have also been instituted as instruments of an intellectual creature, as of one operating freely and on this account being more worthy, as ordered toward its benefit and its use; for the less perfect is always for the sake of the more perfect.

III. Secondly. Every other creature is naturally subject to servitude; but the intellectual nature alone is free. Therefore etc. The antecedent is proved. Because that which has mastery of its act is free, for he is free who is his own cause, namely who is and operates for his own sake; but that which by a certain necessity is acted upon by another to operate is subject to servitude. And the consequence is proved. Because in any government, free persons are provided for on their own account, but slaves in order that they may be for the use of the free.

Thirdly. The intellectual nature alone attains God, who is the ultimate end of the universe, in Himself, namely by knowing and loving Him. Therefore etc. The consequence is proved. Because when there are certain things ordered to an end that cannot attain to it by themselves, it is necessary that they be ordered to those that do attain the end, which are ordered to the end on their own account. This is shown in an army: whose end is victory, for which soldiers are sought on their own account, while those guarding the horses and making the weapons are sought on account of the soldiers.

Note that soldiers, who are ordered to victory, are said to be sought on their own account, not according as the phrase propter se implies the character of an end absolutely, for it is incompatible that they be sought for victory as for an end, and yet that they themselves be absolutely the end; but the phrase propter se excludes an order to something else ordered to the end. And the sense is that they are not sought for the use of another ordered to obtaining victory, but are sought so that by their own act and their own virtue they may attain victory.

Fourthly. Among all the parts of the universe, intellectual natures are more noble, because they approach more to the divine likeness. Therefore etc. The consequence is proved. Because in any whole the principal parts are required on their own account for the constitution of the whole, while the others are for their conservation, or for some improvement of them.

IV. Fifthly. Intellectual natures have a greater affinity to the whole than other natures do: because each one is in a certain way all things, inasmuch as by its intellect it is comprehensive of all being; whereas any other substance has only a particular participation of being. Therefore etc. The consequence is proved. Because parts are ordered to the perfection of the whole: since they are for its sake, but not vice versa.

It should be noted that this reason proceeds on account of a certain likeness between the universe and an intellectual nature. For just as the whole universe contains all things, so also an intellectual substance by its knowledge comprehends whole being. And therefore, just as particular beings are ordered to the whole universe, so also to an intellectual substance.

It should also be noted that for this reason, in speaking of other substances, St. Thomas adds the word only, saying that they have only a particular participation of entity, lest anyone should think that an intellectual nature does not have a particular participation of being, but is universal being. For it too has a particular participation of being, because it is limited to a certain and determinate grade of being. But it differs from other natures because they have only a particular participation of being, and are not in any way all things; whereas an intellectual nature, although it is limited to a certain grade of being according to its natural esse, is nevertheless in a certain way all things according to its cognitive power, by which it is comprehensive of all things.

Sixthly. According to the course of nature, an intellectual substance uses all other things on its own account: either for the perfection of the intellect; or for the execution of virtue and the unfolding of knowledge, in the way a craftsman unfolds the conception of his art in bodily matter; or for the sustenance of the body united to the intellectual soul. Therefore etc. The consequence is proved. Because as each thing is acted upon in the course of nature, so it is naturally suited to be acted upon: that is, so it was instituted to be acted upon by the Author of nature.

V. Seventhly. Things that are always among beings are willed by God on their own account; but things that are not always are not willed on their own account, but on account of something else. But intellectual substances most especially approach to this, that they are always: since they are incorruptible according to esse, but mutable only according to choice. Therefore etc.

The major premise is proved. Because what someone seeks on its own account, he always seeks: since what is on its own account, is always. But what someone seeks on account of something else, it is not necessary that he always seek it, but according as it is suitable to that on account of which it is sought. Moreover, the esse of things comes from the divine will.

Regarding the proof of the major, it should be noted that St. Thomas takes as convertible to be always sought and to be sought on its own account: because, as is said here, that which is on its own account, that is, whose esse is not ordered to another, is always; and also conversely, that which is always, its esse is not on account of something else, but on its own account. Therefore, when it had to be proved that the things that are always among beings are willed by God on their own account, he assumes: What someone seeks on its own account, he always seeks; although, according to the correct mode of argumentation, it ought to have been assumed: What someone always seeks, he seeks on its own account. For he does this to show that, as far as the matter is concerned, it makes no difference which of those propositions is assumed for the proof of the major: since they are convertible.

VI. But a twofold doubt arises. The first is about this proposition: What someone seeks on its own account, he always seeks. For one willing health, which is sought on its own account, does not always will it: because he does not always think about it.

The second is about that proposition: What is on its own account, is always. For the world is on its own account, in the way in which to be on its own account is taken here, that is, not on account of some other part of the universe. And yet it is not always: because it received a beginning of its esse. Therefore etc.

2. To the first it is said that the sense of that proposition is not that what is sought on its own account is always sought in second act, as the objection assumes; but that what is willed on its own account is always willed at least habitually, because whenever it is proposed to the will, the will wills it. The reason for this is that that is said to be sought on its own account which has in itself sufficient goodness from which it ought to be desired, and does not only have goodness and appetibility from its order to another. But such a thing, whenever it is proposed, is accepted by the will and desired: since the ratio of the good is the ratio of the appetible. And thus health, whenever it is proposed to the will, is desired and loved. But it is not so with medicine, which is not desired always whenever it is proposed to the will, but only then when one sees that he cannot attain health without medicine.

To the second it is said that the sense of that proposition is that that which has esse on its own account and on account of its own goodness, and does not have esse only ordered to some part of the universe—as, namely, produced into esse only for this, that it may be useful to another—does not have in itself whence it ought to fail, as far as is from its esse: since it was not produced except for this, that it may be, and not for this, that it may turn to the benefit of another. But that whose esse is ordered to another is determined to the time in which it is useful to that to which it is ordered, so that it is not fitting for it to have esse except when the benefit of the other requires it. And on account of this, among beings that which was produced on its own account has esse always after it has been produced; but that which was produced into esse not on its own account, but only on account of another, is not always, but at some time ceases to be. The objection, however, proceeds as if the word always were taken as the same as without a beginning of duration; which sense St. Thomas, speaking of separate substances, excludes, when he does not say that they are absolutely always, but that they most especially approach to this, that they are always, from the fact that they are incorruptible.

3. Regarding what is said, that intellectual substances are mutable according to choice, it should be noted that this is not to be understood as if they are mutable from a good choice into an evil choice, or conversely from an evil one into a good one, as happens in men; but because among their good choices there is succession, while they choose now one thing, now another. And similarly it is with evil choices: because, I say, they have now one evil choice, now another.

VII. As to the second ³, St. Thomas removes certain objections that could be made. For it could be objected on two grounds that not all things are ordered to intellectual creatures. Namely, both because all its parts are ordered to the perfection of the universe; and because individuals are for the sake of their proper species.

2. To the first he responds that all parts are ordered to the perfection of the whole inasmuch as one serves another. This is shown in the lung, which is of the perfection of the human body inasmuch as it serves the heart. And thus it is not contradictory that other natures are for the sake of intellectual ones, and for the perfection of the universe. Because if those things were lacking which the perfection of the intellectual substance requires, the universe would not be perfect.

It should be noted that, although of one thing there is only one ultimate end, it is nevertheless not unfitting that of one thing there be several subordinate ends: just as rhubarb is ordered to the purging of cholera, and to health. Therefore it is not unfitting that other natures are proximately ordered to the intellectual nature, inasmuch as some benefit comes to it from all other natures, and in some way all other things are required for its perfection, as was shown above ⁴; and yet are further ordered to the perfection of the universe.

3. To the second he responds that individuals, through the fact that they are ordered to their species, have further an order to the intellectual nature. Because none of the corruptible things is ordered to man on account of one individual man only, but on account of the whole human species. But to this no corruptible thing could serve except according to its whole species. And thus the order of corruptible things to man requires the order of individuals to the species.

It should be noted that one must speak in one way of the order of the particular nature of some individual, and in another way of the order of the one instituting the universality of natures. For it is not unfitting for the nature of some individual to order some corruptible thing to one individual man only: just as the digestive power of Socrates orders the digestion of food to the nourishment of Socrates himself. But divine wisdom, ordering the parts of the universe and producing them into esse, did not produce any nature of corruptible things on account of one individual man only, but on account of the human species. What therefore is said here about the order of corruptible things to man is understood as to the order proceeding from the first Author of nature; but not of the order of this particular and singular nature.

4. It could also be objected that intellectual creatures are not ordered by divine providence on their own account, because then they would not be ordered to God and to the perfection of the universe.

But St. Thomas responds that that consequence is false. Because that is not said as if they are not further ordered to God and the perfection of the universe; but because the goods which they obtain through divine providence are not given to them for the benefit of another; whereas those which are given to others turn to their use by divine ordination.

The conclusion is confirmed by the authority of Deuteronomy 4, the Psalms, and Wisdom 12.

VIII. By this, moreover, is excluded the error of those positing that it is a sin to kill brute animals. For it is clear that this is false from the fact that by divine providence they are ordered in the natural order to the use of man, as is evident in Gen. 9. But if cruelty toward brutes is found to be prohibited in Sacred Scripture, this is done either to remove the mind of man from exercising cruelty toward men; or because the injury inflicted on animals turns to the temporal loss of man; or on account of some signification, as that about not muzzling the ox that treads out the corn is expounded by the Apostle, namely that it is understood of preachers, so that they may live by their labor, 1 Cor. 9.

It should be noted, from the doctrine of St. Thomas, II-II, q. 64, a. 1, ad 3, that sometimes indeed it is a sin to kill brutes: whence also in Sacred Scripture a penalty is appointed for the killer, as is evident in Exodus 22 ⁵ concerning one killing an ox or sheep belonging to another. But yet this is not by reason of the killing of the brute itself in se: but by reason of the harming of the neighbor in his property, which pertains to the sin of theft or robbery. For this reason it is said in this place that injury to brutes is sometimes prohibited in Scripture because harm to man results from it.