Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

After St. Thomas has determined concerning divine providence according as it extends to all things, he wishes to determine concerning it according as rational creatures are contained under it in a particular manner ¹.

Around this, however, he does two things. First, he shows that rational creatures are disposed by divine providence in another way than other creatures, according as they differ from others in the condition of their proper nature; secondly, that they are also disposed in another way according as they differ from others in the dignity of their end, ch. 147.

Around the first, he does two things. First, he shows that rational creatures are subject to divine providence in a certain special manner; secondly, he determines concerning that very particular manner in which they are subject to divine providence in the following chapters.

I. As to the first, he posits this conclusion: It is necessary that some special plan of providence be observed with respect to intellectual and rational creatures, beyond other creatures.

It is proved. Rational creatures excel other creatures in the perfection of nature and in the dignity of end. Therefore, the plan of order according to which rational creatures are subject to divine providence is one, and that according to which other creatures are ordered is another.

The antecedent is proved. Because the rational creature alone has dominion over its own act, freely moving itself to act; while other creatures are acted upon rather than act. And it alone attains to the very ultimate end of the universe by its own operation, namely, by knowing and loving God; while other creatures cannot attain to Him except through some participation in His likeness.

The consequence, however, is proved. Because every plan of work is varied according to the diversity of the end and of the things that are subject to the operation. And this is made clear both in the arts and in the governance of a city. For a physician acts in one way to drive out sickness, and in another way to preserve health ²; and in another way in bodies with different complexions. In the governance of a city, too, soldiers must be disposed in one way, so that they may be prepared for battle, and artisans in another, so that they may conduct themselves well with respect to their works.

II. For the evidence of these things, two points must be noted. One is that by the name of plan (rationis) in this place is understood the mode of divine providence and disposition and governance. Therefore, for there to be some special plan of providence with respect to rational creatures is nothing other than for them to be ordered and disposed in a certain particular manner in the divine mind, and also to be governed in a particular manner.

The other is that the difference of the end of the rational creature from the end of other creatures is not posited in this place as if God were not the end of all creatures, for the opposite of this was shown above ³; but because, although God is the ultimate end of all creatures, He is nevertheless the end of the rational creature and of others in different ways, and is the end of the rational creature in a more noble manner than of the others. For the others do not attain to God Himself in Himself by their operation, but only to some likeness of Him; whereas rational creatures attain God by their operation, while they understand and contemplate the very essence of God in itself, and love God Himself in Himself; whence it comes about that the formal end of the rational creature, which is nothing other than the operation by which it attains God Himself in Himself, is more perfect than the formal end of the other creatures, which is an operation attaining only some participated likeness of God.