Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

To the arguments brought forward above, by which it was argued that a spiritual substance cannot sin, St. Thomas replies¹.

1. To the first four indeed², which proceeded from the fact that no sin of the will can exist without error, while in the intellect of separated substances error could not precede sin: he replies that we are not forced to say that error was in the intellect of the separated substance by judging some good that is not good; but only by not considering the higher good, to which its own proper good was to be referred; the reason for which inconsideration could be the will freely and intensely turned toward its own proper good.

2. For the evidence of this response, it must be considered first, that there cannot be sin in the will unless there is in some way a defect in reason: because the will does not go out into act except by means of the apprehension of the intellect. But this defect can happen in two ways: in one way, through a false judgment of the intellect, as when it judges something to be good which is not good; in another way, through this, that the intellect does not consider that which it is bound to consider while the will goes out to choice. Because, therefore, the separated substance, willing and desiring final beatitude, which consists in the vision of God, ought to have desired to obtain it from divine grace; and loving its own proper good, ought to have referred it ultimately to God: therefore, while it desired beatitude not considering the divine grace by which it might obtain it, and while it loved its own proper good not considering its ordering to the divine good, there was a defect in its intellect, which is called inconsideration. On account of this St. Thomas says that there was not error in the intellect of the separated substance by judging as good that which was not good, but by not considering the higher good.

3. It must be considered secondly, from the teaching of St. Thomas in Qq. de Malo, q. 1, a. 3, that in all things of which one must be the measure of the other, evil indeed is not to be regulated and not to be measured by its rule. Nevertheless, not to attend actually to the rule and measure is not in itself evil: because the soul cannot, nor is it bound always to attend actually to the rule. But evil consists in this, that someone, not attending to the rule of the work, proceeds to the work: just as a craftsman does not sin from the fact that he does not always hold the measure, but from the fact that, not holding the measure, he proceeds to cutting. In a similar way, it was not a sin in the angel in itself that he did not consider the divine rule: but from the fact that, not attending to the divine rule, he proceeded to the choice of either a natural or a supernatural good. Therefore, what St. Thomas says—that there was an error in the intellect of the separated substance in not considering the higher good—is not to be understood as if that inconsideration itself were the first sin: but because he sinned by desiring the good without attending to the divine rule, according to which that desiring was to be regulated.

4. It must be considered thirdly that, although in choosing an intellectual substance is bound to use the divine rule as the measure of its own choice, it is not nevertheless required that it always attend actually to the rule while it proceeds to choice, but it suffices that it use the divine rule virtually, as is said in Virtutibus, q. II, a. 11³: namely, while at some time it orders all its things to God, and afterwards a contrary intention does not intervene; for the virtue of the first purpose remains in all subsequent acts. But although this is true in posterior acts, namely insofar as the virtue of the first act is preserved in them, yet in the first elective act of the will this cannot be preserved: since no other elective act precedes it, whose virtue could be preserved in it. Therefore it is necessary that the willing substance itself, in its first purely and merely elective act, attend actually to the divine rule. Which if it does not do, it sins. The reason, therefore, why in the first purely and merely elective act the intellectual substance sinned, is because it made a choice without considering the divine rule, to which in choosing it was bound actually to attend. And thus it is posited that inconsideration was a quality and condition of the angelic sin.

5. It must be considered lastly, that for this fact of not using the rule, one ought not indeed to seek any other first and radical cause besides the freedom of the will, as is said in the place previously cited⁴: but nevertheless we can assign some proximate cause, arising from the freedom of the will. For because a created intellect cannot understand many things at once insofar as they are such, while it is intensely turned to the consideration of one thing, it must of necessity be drawn away from the consideration of another. And in the same way it must be said of the will: namely, that while it is intensely turned to the love of one thing, it cannot, as such, love another diverse thing. And thus we can say that the freedom of the will, by which one wills to consider one thing intensely, is the first cause of the inconsideration of the other; but the proximate cause is the intense consideration of the one. On account of this, St. Thomas, willing to assign both causes of the separated substance's inconsideration of the divine rule, says both that the reason for that inconsideration could be the will intensely turned toward its own proper good (understand: and the intense consideration of its own proper good); and that it is free to the will to be turned more or less to this or to that ⁵.

II. But then a doubt occurs. For if the reason for that inconsideration was the will intensely turned toward its own proper good, because the will and intellect cannot be borne at once toward diverse things: it follows that that opinion which posits that the angel sinned from the fact that he desired supernatural beatitude and not from divine grace ⁶, cannot be held. For the will of the angel intensely turned toward its own proper good could not at the same time be borne toward a supernatural good. And thus he did not sin by desiring a supernatural good. — Or, if he could at the same time be borne toward it, by the same reason he could at the same time will that good from grace, and at the same time the intellect could consider concerning divine grace itself. And thus the intense turning of the will toward its own proper good was not the reason for that inconsideration: since such consideration could stand together with that intense turning toward its own proper good.

2. It is answered, and it is said first, that St. Thomas in this place responds conformably to the position that he follows: which, I say, posits that the angel sinned from the fact that he did not order his own proper good to the ultimate end, but adhered to it as to an end ⁷. For according to this it is said that the reason why he did not consider the higher good, to which his own proper good was to be ordered, could be the intense consideration and intense love of natural goods. And it should be noted that it is not said to have been so absolutely, but to have been able to be so: because we cannot attain with certitude and evidence the things that pertain to the sin of the angels. From which it is clear that it is not necessary to apply the response given here to the other opinion.

3. It is said secondly, that this response can also be suitably adapted to the other opinion. For the intellect and will, although they cannot be borne toward diverse things insofar as they are diverse, can nevertheless be borne toward diverse things insofar as they are in some way one: just as the will wills at the same time that which is toward the end insofar as it is such, and the end itself. And thus at the same time the will, by intensely loving the proper good of the angel, could at the same time desire for itself the supernatural good as the ultimate perfection of its own proper good.

When, however, it is urged that, by the same reason, it could at the same time desire the supernatural good from divine grace: — it is said that indeed the angel could at the same time, in desiring for himself the supernatural good, desire it from divine grace, as the good angels did; but it could also happen that so great was the love of beatitude and of self, by which he desired for himself supernatural beatitude, that he did not attend to divine grace, and thus those things were not apprehended after the manner of one. For it is evident that someone sometimes desires something with such ardor that he neglects to consider the manner of attaining it. And therefore St. Thomas said that it could happen so, but not absolutely that it was so.

III. To the fifth objection he replies that indeed the separated substance desired nothing except one good, which is proper to it: but it sinned from the fact that it omitted the higher good, into which it ought to have been ordered.

From this response it is clear that that proposition ⁸, That whose good is one only, and in which there is no composition of diverse goods, cannot err in its appetite, is false. For although perhaps it cannot sin, as is said in Qq. de Malo, q. xvi, a. 2, ad 9, by desiring some evil for itself as if good, because on account of the simplicity of its nature, it is not possible to give in it that something is good for it according to one part which is not good for it according to another, yet it can sin by desiring its proper good not according to the rule of a superior.

IV. To the sixth objection he replies that the separated substance by sinning omitted the mean of virtue insofar as it did not subject itself to the higher ⁹ order. For it gave more to itself than it ought, but less to God.

He says secondly, that in such a sin the mean is not omitted on account of a superabundance of passion, but only through an inequality of justice, which is around operations.

2. From this response it is clear that it is false that in spiritual things there is not superabundance and defect in order to their rule ¹⁰. For there can be in them superabundance and defect insofar as someone can transgress the rule and measure according to which they ought to be desired, according to more and less.

It should be noted, however, that the matter of moral virtues is twofold, namely passion and operation, around which virtue places the mean. The mean of reason around passions consists in this, that someone bears himself around passions according as right reason dictates. But the mean around operations, generally speaking, consists in this, that someone preserves equality in giving and receiving. It happens therefore by sinning that the mean is transgressed either around passions, namely while someone is affected by interior passions not according to commensuration to the rule of reason: or around actions, namely while someone does not preserve equality in giving and receiving, but takes more to himself than he ought, and gives less to another than is fitting. Because therefore passions are not in separated substances, but operations certainly are, on that account St. Thomas says that the mean was not omitted by them through a superabundance of passion, but through an inequality of justice, which is around operations.

3. But then a doubt occurs. For it seems, according to this response, that the first sin of the angel was not pride, but injustice. The opposite of which was shown above ¹¹.

It is answered that injustice can be taken in two ways. In one way, as it implies inequality in exterior actions which are of one man toward another man. And thus it is a special vice: and was not in the sinning separated substance. — In another way, according as it implies a certain inequality between God and a man operating contrary to the rule of divine wisdom. And thus it accompanies every sin, and was in the sinning angel. When, however, it is inferred, Therefore the first sin of the angel was not pride: the consequence is denied, according to the sense of what was said. For it is said that the first special sin was pride, yet it had the general conditions that accompany every sin.

V. To the seventh objection he replies that the reason is not the same concerning a separated substance, and concerning heavenly bodies. For heavenly bodies, just as all things that lack reason, are only acted upon and do not actuate themselves. And beyond this, in them indisposition of matter has no place. Therefore they can never fail from the rectitude of the first rule: although other bodies, from the indisposition of matter, sometimes cannot sufficiently receive the rectitude of the first rule ¹². Intellectual substances, however, are not only acted upon, but also actuate themselves to their proper acts: and the more so, the more perfect their nature is. Therefore the perfection of nature does not prevent sin from being able to happen in them from the fact that they adhere to themselves, not attending to the order of a superior agent.

2. It should be noted that by the first rule we can understand that which is simply first in respect of all things, which is the disposition and ordination of divine wisdom. We can also take the first proportionally to the regulated things: so that the first rule of heavenly bodies is the moving substance; but the first rule of a separated substance is divine wisdom; and the first rule of lower bodies is heavenly bodies.

If it be taken in the second way: thus, since from what precedes ¹³ it is established that from the indisposition of matter it often happens that the effect in these lower things does not follow according to the order of the heavenly body, it is manifest that lower bodies sometimes do not sufficiently receive the rectitude of the first rule.

But if we take it in the first way, the doubt remains that bodies, on account of the indisposition of matter, can fail from the rectitude of the first rule: since the disposition of all matter is subject to divine wisdom.

But it must be said that the rules of divine wisdom are nothing other than the ordinations and dispositions of things, by which things are ordered by divine wisdom to their actions and to their ends: which rules indeed pertain to the antecedent divine will. But as is clear from what precedes ¹⁴, it is not unfitting that the antecedent divine will sometimes is not fulfilled. And therefore, although the disposition of all matter is subject to divine wisdom, it is not nevertheless unfitting that some corporeal power is ordered by divine wisdom to the production of some effect, and yet that effect, on account of the indisposition of matter, does not follow: just as the power of human seed is ordered to the production of a man with two hands, and yet a man is sometimes born with only one hand.

VI. Concerning the aforesaid, because it has been shown that an angel could sin and in fact sinned, there is a doubt in the teaching of St. Thomas as to how many delays (or pauses) are to be posited in the sinning angels. For some of the Thomists posit two only: namely the first instant, in which all angels were good, and merited beatitude; but the second, in which the evil sinned and were miserable, while the good were beatified.

Others, however, posit three instants: and they say that in the first, all had a merely natural act; in the second, the evil demerited and the good merited; in the third, the good were blessed, but the evil miserable.

2. Although, however, either opinion can be sustained in some way, the first nevertheless seems expressly to be of the mind of St. Thomas in the First Part, q. LXIII, a. 5, ad 4; and a. 6, in corp. and ad 4. But in this opinion a doubt arises first, how in the teaching of St. Thomas it can be sustained that in the first instant all had a free act, which is required for a meritorious act. Both because in Qq. Mali, q. XVI ¹⁵, ad 4, 14, 15, and 22, he seems to maintain that the first act of the angels was natural. — And because in the First Part, where cited above, VI, ad 3, he says that in the first instant they had a natural movement toward the good. — And because in the same place, ad 4, he says that the first instant corresponds to the angelic operation by which it turned toward itself through evening knowledge.

Secondly, a doubt arises how in the second instant they could sin, if in the first they merited: since St. Thomas holds in the First Part, where cited above, ad 3, and in other places, that angels have a free choice that is inflexible after choice. — But to this it will be spoken in the fourth book ¹⁶, where the immutability of the human will after death will be treated.

VII. In response to the first doubt, therefore, Capreolus, in the Second Book, d. IV ¹⁷, leaning toward this opinion that the first act of the angels was natural, interprets the words of St. Thomas in two ways where he says, in the First Part, that all had a meritorious act in the first instant. First, that they merited, not by eliciting a meritorious act, but because, through the grace which they had, they were worthy of beatitude. — Secondly, that they had a meritorious act which was an elective love, not of God, but of themselves, informed by grace, and clothed with the due circumstances.

But neither of these expositions seems to me to be according to the mind of St. Thomas. Not indeed the first. Because he himself in the First Part, where cited above, a. 6, expressly shows that he is speaking of merit which is an act of free choice informed by grace. — Nor also the second. Because for a meritorious act it does not suffice that it be an elective act of one having grace, but it is required that it be elicited according to the inclination of grace and charity, which are the principle of meriting. But these incline toward loving God for His own sake, and other things on account of God as the object of supernatural beatitude: as St. Thomas shows in III Sent. ¹⁸, and IIª IIae ¹⁹, and in several other places. Therefore there cannot be any meritorious act unless, virtually at least and not only habitually, it includes the love of God. But it was said above ²⁰, that the first act cannot virtually include a love of this kind: since no elective act, or even a natural one, precedes it.

Therefore it seems must be held, according to the mind of St. Thomas, that all merited in the first instant through an act of free choice which was an elective love of God, or of their own proper good in order to God, as He is the principle of supernatural beatitude.

VIII. To the first point to the contrary, however ²¹, it can be answered that St. Thomas followed one way in Qq. de Malo, and another in the First Part, because both can be saved. For in Qq. Mali, he held that way which posits that the angel sinned because in an undue manner, that is, not from grace, he desired supernatural beatitude, which consists in the vision of God. In the First Part, however, he held the opinion which posits that the sin of the angel was in this, that he was turned inordinately toward himself, namely without order to God and to the rule of the divine will, as was declared above ²². Whence, just as in those places he followed diverse ways concerning the object willed by the sinning angel, so it is not unfitting to say that also as regards the first act of the angels he followed diverse opinions: holding namely in the First Part that all in the first instant had an act of free choice and a meritorious act; but in Qq. de Malo, holding that their first act was natural.

To the second it is said first that, although the first act was elective, it was not nevertheless purely elective, but had something of naturalness ²³. For it was free as to the exercise of the act, and as to the specification to this or that condition of the object; but it was natural as to the determination to the good. For the angel in the first instant was so determined to the good that he could not will evilly, although he could love himself with order to God as He is the author of supernatural beatitude, and without such order. In which nevertheless he would not have sinned if he had loved himself without such order: because he was not bound to this in the first instant. But he was moved toward himself with such order, aided by divine benefit. St. Thomas intends, therefore, in the cited place that he had a natural movement to the good in general, and to his natural good, nor could he not will his perfection, supposed that he elicited an act around it, for he could not will evilly: not, however, that he had a merely natural act.

To the third it is said that, although the first instant corresponded to the operation by which the angel turned toward himself by evening knowledge, it does not nevertheless follow that such an operation was merely natural: because even the knowledge by which someone knows that he is to be loved in order to God, and which is referred to the praise of God, is evening knowledge when it is through a created medium. But that knowledge is morning knowledge which is referred to the praise of God, but is through an uncreated medium: as St. Thomas declares in Verit., q. VIII, a. penult. and ult.

2. It should be noted, however, that it belongs to an angel to merit in one way in the first instant, and in another way in the second: as is the mind of St. Thomas in Quodlibet IX, a. 8; and Prima, LXIII, a. 5, ad 4; and a. 6, ad 3. For the merit that was in the first instant could be mortified and impeded from leading to beatitude; but not the merit that was in the second instant in the good angels. The reason for this is that, since in the first instant there was not full liberty extensively, because in it the angel could not will evilly, but in the second instant there was all-embracing liberty, namely toward evil and good, it is necessary that the state of wayfaring of the angels consist of two instants, in the last of which he was bound actually to refer himself to God as to an ultimate end, inasmuch as in it he had the full use of free choice. Hence merit in the first instant was not merit ultimately, but only as in the way, and impedibly; but merit in the second instant was merit as at the term of the way and ultimately, which could not be impeded from leading to beatitude, inasmuch as it was the ultimate disposition toward beatitude. Whence also what St. Thomas says in Prima, q. LXII, a. 4 ²⁴, and LXIII ²⁵, that merit in the angels preceded reward in duration, is understood of the merit that was in the first instant, which namely was merit only as in the way, and as a remote disposition to beatitude; but not of the merit that was in the second instant, which, I say, was merit as at the term of the way and as the ultimate disposition to beatitude. For the former is merit from imperfect grace, but the latter is merit from consummate grace; just as also in Christ, who was at once wayfarer and comprehensor, perfect grace was the principle of meriting. For just as in the same instant there is contrition in him who is justified, and the infusion of grace, according to the doctrine of St. Thomas in Iª IIᵃᵉ ²⁶ and in Qq. de Verit. ²⁷, and in natural things in the same instant there is the ultimate disposition to form, and the introduction of the form: so in the same instant there is ultimate merit and beatitude in the angels.

3. From these things it is clear that the reasoning of Scotus, in dist. five of the Second Book of the Sentences ²⁸, by which against St. Thomas he proves that there could not have been in the second instant both merit and reward for the good angels, on the grounds that St. Thomas says merit precedes reward in duration, is null. For St. Thomas is speaking of merit as in the way, and not of merit as at the term of the way, according to what he himself expounds in Quodlibet IX, a. 8.

It is also clear that that reasoning is null by which he proves that, if all angels merited in the first instant, none could place an obstacle in the second instant: namely because all then merited up to the 'now' of rewarding, and those meriting up to the 'now' of rewarding are rewarded in it. — For it is said that the evil did not merit up to the 'now' of rewarding inclusively, but rather in it they demerited. Nor is it true that in the 'now' of the reward they are entirely outside the way. Rather, the 'now' in which they were first to receive the reward was for them the intrinsic term of the way, in which they could ultimately merit or demerit, and at the same time receive punishment or reward.

4. It must be noted, however, that although Christ through the same grace was both blessed and merited, just as the angels in the second instant, this nevertheless was not in the same manner. For the angels in the second instant merited for themselves essential beatitude; but Christ did not, but rather merited for himself the impassibility of the soul and the glory of the body, whereas for us he merited essential beatitude.

IX. Let these things be said following the opinion of others, who say that the good angels in the second instant both merited and received beatitude. Considering more diligently, however, it does not seem to me to be of the mind of St. Thomas that any angels merited in the second instant. First, because in the First Part, q. lxii, a. 4 and 5, he holds that an angel cannot simultaneously have fruition and merit his fruition: since the one is of imperfect grace, while the other is of perfect and consummate grace. — And also because, as is said in De Veritate, the last question, a. 6, for the state of meriting it is required that one lack that which he is said to merit.

Second, because he himself in the same place ²⁹, a. 5, holds that the angels arrived at beatitude through a single meritorious act. But in question lxiii, a. 5 and 6, he holds that all merited in the first instant. For from these two points it expressly follows that they did not merit in the second instant: for if they merited in the second, since they also merited in the first, it follows that they reached beatitude not through one meritorious act, but through two.

If it is said that St. Thomas in those places is speaking of merit only as in the way, and not of merit as at the term of the way: — this does not seem to be according to his mind. For in q. lxiii, a. 5 and 6, he maintains that, since the demons merited in the first instant, they would have been blessed in the second instant unless they had placed an obstacle by sinning. Therefore the mere absence of an impediment was sufficient, according to him, for them to receive beatitude; but another merit was not required. — Furthermore, since he determined most diligently in the First Part concerning the beatification and damnation of the angels, if his intention had been that a twofold merit existed in the angels, one as in the way simply, the other as at the term of the way, he would surely be reprehensible for having made no mention at all of that diversity of merits. For since he determined that an angel arrives at beatitude through one meritorious act, he ought certainly to have declared of which merit that was to be understood. For in Iª IIᵃᵉ, q. cxii, a. 2, speaking of the preparation for grace, since he saw that there was a twofold preparation for grace, one namely which is simultaneous with grace, the other which precedes grace, he made mention of both in the reply to the first objection. Since therefore he made mention of only one merit of the angels, it must be said that he intended there to have been only one merit in them: and that indeed in their first instant.

2. On account of which, following his determination in the First Part, saving always a better judgment, it must be said first, that in the process of the angels, whether toward beatitude or toward misery, there were two instants. In the first of which, speaking absolutely, in no way could they demerit and sin, but they well could not merit negatively, and merit: and in fact all merited. But in the second, they could absolutely both merit and demerit: and in fact some demerited and were made wretched, while others indeed were made blessed, but did not merit. For that they could merit, and not merit negatively, that is, have no merit, is clear because in the first instant they merited through an act of free choice, as is said in the same place, a. 6. Therefore they could not elicit that meritorious act: otherwise that act would not have been free, for liberty relates to opposites. Therefore they could lack merit. — But that in the same first instant they could not sin and demerit, St. Thomas proves in the aforementioned question, a. 5; and in De Malo, q. xvi, a. 4, positing that in the first instant they were determined to the good. — Moreover, that in the second instant, speaking absolutely, they could merit, is clearly evident from this, that since they could at some time merit, because they were ordered to beatitude and were created in grace, if they had not merited in the first instant, as it was possible for them not to merit, they would have merited in the second instant.

It must be said secondly that, this supposition having been made that all merited in the first instant, all indeed could sin and demerit in the second instant, but in it no one could merit. The reason for the first is: because it is not repugnant that an angel at the term of the way be deprived of grace through sin, and at the same time be confirmed in evil. But the reason for the second is: because it is repugnant for merit and reward to be in the same instant: since, as was said a little before ³⁰, merit proceeds from imperfect grace, while the reward proceeds from consummate grace.

X. But against this determination certain doubts arise. The first is. If, positing that the angel merited in the first instant, he could not merit in the second instant, it follows that in no instant did the angel have liberty toward good and evil: and consequently he never had full liberty. But this is unfitting. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. For in the first instant, according to this opinion, he could only tend toward good; but in the second, only toward evil. But no more instants than two are given in the way of the angels. Therefore in no instant were they free toward good and evil.

The second doubt is ³¹. If in the second instant the good were blessed, and did not merit in it, while the evil demerited: it follows that the way of the good and evil angels was not equal. For in the second instant the good were entirely outside the way, since in it they had no merit, but only the reward; and thus their way was only throughout the first instant. But the evil were still in the way, because they demerited; and so their way lasted through two instants.

The third doubt is ³². As a meritorious operation is to beatitude, so a demeritorious operation is to misery and damnation: for through merit one arrives at beatitude, but through demerit at damnation. But, as is said in II Sent., d. xi ³³, a. 1, whenever anyone is placed in ultimate perfection, which is beatitude, his operation is not meritorious. Therefore, when anyone is placed in ultimate imperfection, which is damnation, no operation of his is demeritorious. Therefore it is ill posited that in the same second instant the angel sinned and was damned.

It is confirmed. Because in II Sent., d. vii, q. 1, a. 2, it is said that the angels are confirmed in good or evil after conversion and aversion.

The fourth doubt is ³⁴, because St. Thomas, in Quodlibet IX, a. 8; and II Sent., d. v ³⁵, the last article, holds that in the same instant the angels merited as at the term of the way, and were blessed.

XI. To the first doubt it is said that for the angel to have had liberty toward good and evil in the second instant, positing that he merited in the first, can be understood in two ways: in one way, of liberty toward meritorious good, and the evil that is sin; in another way, of liberty toward good absolutely, whatever it may be, and toward sin. If it is taken in the first way, the falsity of the consequent is denied. For it is said first, that it does not detract from a free nature in itself that, from something voluntarily added to it, the use and exercise of liberty belonging to it absolutely be taken away in some instant. For just as it does not detract absolutely from the liberty of Socrates, by which he can sit and not sit, that, positing his voluntary sitting at some time, he does not for that time have the liberty of sitting and not sitting as to exercise, because when he sits, for that time he cannot not sit: so it does not detract absolutely from the liberty of the angel, by which he can absolutely merit and demerit, that from the meritorious act freely and voluntarily elicited by him in the first instant, the exercise of such liberty is taken away in the second instant, inasmuch as, merit having been posited in the first instant, beatitude follows in the second instant, unless some impediment by sinning is placed against it.

It is said secondly that, although, that supposition having been made, in no instant can the angel use liberty toward good and evil, nevertheless in the second instant liberty itself is in actus primus and actus signatus: because it is the potency by which he was able absolutely to will well and evilly, unless he had merited in the first instant; just as at the time when someone sits, there remains the free potency by which he could sit and not sit if he were not sitting in actu.

It is said thirdly that, although in no instant does the angel then have liberty toward meritorious good and evil, nevertheless in the whole time constituted of the first and second instant, he has this liberty: inasmuch as in the first instant he can merit, while in the second he can demerit.

2. If, however, it is understood in the second way, namely of the good in common and absolutely, whether, I say, it be meritorious or not meritorious, the consequence is denied. For from the fact that it is posited that he could not merit in the second instant, liberty toward good and evil simply is not taken away, but only toward meritorious good. For in the second instant, although the angel could not merit, he was nevertheless able to be converted to God by a beatific conversion, which is a certain good; and to be turned away from him, which is evil.

XII. To the second doubt ³⁶, the consequence is denied. For although the good angel did not merit in the second instant, while the evil one demerited, it is nevertheless not prevented that the second instant belonged in the same way to the way of the good as to the way of the evil. For it is said that the way of all the angels consisted of two instants: inasmuch as all could merit in the first; but in the second, all could merit and demerit, speaking absolutely; or at least demerit, supposing that they merited in the first instant.

2. When it is proved, because the good were entirely outside the way: - it is said first, that they were no more outside the way than the evil. For just as the evil were in the way, not as distant from the term, but as existing at the term of the way ³⁷, for the second instant itself was the term of their way; so also the good.

It is said secondly, that for an angel to be in the way in some instant as at the term of the way, it is not required that in it he merit in actu or demerit, but it suffices that in it he was absolutely able both to merit and to demerit, or at least to demerit.

3. But this response does not seem to remove the difficulty. For if the second instant belonged to the way of the angels, it follows that the angel in the second instant was a wayfarer. And, according to you, he was also a comprehensor: since in it he was blessed. Therefore he was simultaneously a wayfarer and a comprehensor. But this is unfitting: since this belongs to Christ alone ³⁸. Therefore etc.

It is answered: and it is said first, that he is properly called a wayfarer who is in the way as distant from the term of the way, but not he who is in the way as existing at the term of the way: for St. Thomas seems to intend this in the cited Quodlibet ³⁹, ad 2. And therefore, because the good angel in the second instant was not in the way as distant from the term, but as existing at the term of the way, in which he received beatitude, therefore properly he was not a wayfarer, but a comprehensor only.

It is said secondly that, if wayfarer is taken for one who is in any way in the way, whether he be there as distant from the term of the way, or as existing at the term of the way, in which, speaking absolutely, he could merit and not merit; it is not unfitting to say that in the second instant he was simultaneously a wayfarer and a comprehensor.

When, however, it is said that this is proper to Christ: - it is answered that this is not true except by taking wayfarer for that which is in the way as distant from the term of the way. For Christ was a wayfarer inasmuch as he was distant from the impassibility of the soul and from the glory of the body, which he merited by his works: and he was a comprehensor inasmuch as he simultaneously enjoyed the divine essence.

XIII. To the third doubt ⁴⁰, the similarity in the proposed matter is denied. For although merit and demerit agree in this, that merit disposes to glory, just as demerit to misery; nevertheless they differ in this, that merit, according to the aforementioned things ⁴¹, includes something repugnant to beatitude, namely imperfect grace; but demerit includes nothing that has repugnance to damnation.

To the confirmation it can be said first that that saying of St. Thomas is understood on the supposition that they did not merit in the first instant. For he seems in the second book of the Sentences to follow that opinion that the angel sinned by unduly desiring supernatural beatitude for himself: according to which opinion, as was said above ⁴², it is posited that in the first instant they did not merit, but had an act concerning natural things only.

It can also be said secondly that St. Thomas does not intend to posit any instant after the instant of aversion in which they are confirmed in evil. But the sense is that in the very act of aversion they are established in evil, just as also in the very act of conversion, which was in the second instant, they were confirmed in good.

XIV. To the fourth doubt ⁴³ it is said that in the cited places, as appears expressly from the words themselves, St. Thomas is not speaking according to his own opinion, but according to the opinion of those who said that the angels after the first instant simultaneously received grace and glory, which opinion in II Sent. ⁴⁴ he says was then the more common one. Whence, since many modes of receiving beatitude were assigned by those who followed that opinion, namely by having it with merit, or without merit; he shows that that mode is more probable which posits that the angel simultaneously merited and was blessed, and he posits a mode by which the emerging doubts could be answered while preserving that opinion. But just as he does not hold their opinion, neither there nor in the First Part ⁴⁵, but thinks that opinion more probable which posits that the angels were created in grace, and first merited, then were blessed: so neither does he accept those responses, but rather posits their opposite expressly in the First Part. Wherefore to wish to gloss his determination in the First Part, against the sense of the words, toward the understanding of those things which he adduces in those places, is to wish to drag his opinion toward the opinion of others, which he does not approve.

2. It must be observed, however, that those instants which we posit as belonging to the way of the angels are not to be taken after the manner of the instants of continuous time, which pass rapidly; but they are instants of discrete time, which, as was said elsewhere ⁴⁶, can coexist with some part of continuous time.

XV. According to this way it is clear that the reasonings of Scotus against St. Thomas ⁴⁷ are null. For in one he supposes that we say the angel merited in the second instant. But we do not say this.

When, however, in the other he assumes that those meriting up to the 'now' of rewarding receive the reward in that very 'now', it is established that this is false, if it is understood universally in every nature. For such a 'now' is not the 'now' of rewarding in the angels except under this condition, if no impediment is placed in it.

Nor is it similar concerning the instant of a human's death and concerning the instant of the angels' rewarding. For a human in the instant of death does not have being, but has his first non-being; for an ultimate being of a permanent thing is not given. Therefore in that instant he cannot operate. But an angel in the 'now' of rewarding has being. Therefore it is not repugnant to him both to have some operation in it, and demerit.