Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

Having set down the objections by which it was argued that sin could not be in the demons, St. Thomas wishes to determine the truth.¹ And he lays down four conclusions.²

I. The first is: In the demons there is sin of the will: that is, according to an act of the will.

First, it is proved by authority: 1 John 3; John 8; and Wisdom 2.

Second, it is proved by reason. And first, the false position of the Platonists is rejected; second, the true reason is set down.³ The position of the Platonists is that demons are aerial animals, having a sensitive part and passions, which are to us the cause of sin, namely, anger, hatred, and the like. Whence Apuleius says that they are passive in soul.

Perhaps also, according to the position of Plato, sensitive cognition, and consequently passions, could be posited in some intellectual substance, even though not united to a body. For since the sensitive soul, according to him, is incorruptible, it must have an operation in which the body does not share: and thus there would remain in them the same reason for sinning that is in us, namely, passion.

But both of these are impossible, says St. Thomas. The first indeed, because it was shown above that there are no other intellectual substances united to bodies besides souls.

The second indeed, namely, that the operations of the sensitive soul can exist without a body, is evident to be false from this, that when any organ of sensation is corrupted, the operation of the sense is corrupted: as is clear in sight and touch.

II. For the true reason, St. Thomas notes first that, just as in agent causes the secondary agent depends on the principal, so also in final causes the secondary end has a dependence on the principal: and that, just as sin occurs in agent causes when the secondary agent departs from the order of the principal agent, as is clear in limping, so sin of the will, whose object is the good and the end, occurs when the secondary end is not contained under the order of the principal end.

He notes secondly that every will naturally wills that which is the proper good of the one willing, namely, its very being perfect: and it cannot will the contrary of this. Therefore in that willing subject whose proper good is the ultimate end, not contained under another end, but under whose order all other ends are contained, no sin of the will can occur. Now such a willing subject is God alone, whose being is the supreme goodness, which is the ultimate end. But in any other willing subject, whose proper good must be contained under the order of another good, sin of the will can occur, if it is considered in its own nature: because, although a natural inclination of the will is present in every willing subject to willing and loving its own perfection, it is nevertheless not naturally implanted in it so to order its perfection to another end that it cannot fail from it, since the higher end is not proper to its nature, but to a higher nature; but this is left to its own choice. Which is indeed clear from the difference between things having a will and those that lack a will, which are not of free choice.

From these things St. Thomas infers that in the will of a separated substance sin could exist from the fact that it did not order its proper good, and its proper perfection, to the ultimate end, but adhered to its proper good as to an end.

III. For the clarity of what is said here, it should be noted first that, just as the causality of the agent is one thing, and the causality of the end another, so the dependence of one agent cause on another is one thing, and the dependence of a final cause on another end is another. For the causality of the agent cause consists in effecting: but the causality of the final cause consists in being desired, as that for the sake of which other things are desired and done by the agent. Therefore, for a secondary agent cause to depend on a principal cause is nothing other than for it to effect while the principal agent co-effects and moves it; but for it to fail from the order of the principal agent is nothing other than for it to effect something not according to what the movement and influence of the principal agent upon it demands, but according to the condition of its own defect. Similarly, therefore, in final causes, for a secondary end to depend on a principal end is nothing other than for it to be desired on account of the desire for the principal end, just as medicine is desired on account of the desire for health; and for a secondary end not to be contained under the order of the principal end is for it to be desired not on account of the desire and love for the principal end, but on account of itself alone. Therefore, just as sin happens in natural agents when a secondary agent produces an effect and not according to the influence and causality of the principal agent, as when monsters are produced; so in voluntary agents sin occurs when a secondary end is desired not on account of the desire for the principal end, but on account of itself; because then the act of the will is borne toward some secondary end, not according to what the causality of the principal end demands—which is that on account of the love and desire for itself every other secondary end should be desired—but only according to the condition of the secondary end itself.

2. It should be noted secondly, from the doctrine of St. Thomas in Qq. Verit., q. xxii, a. 7, that just as sin does not occur in nature when something is produced according to the order and inclination of nature, so also in voluntary things sin does not occur when the will wills that to which it is naturally inclined, and whose opposite it cannot will insofar as it is such. But because it happens that joined to that which the will naturally desires is something else that is not naturally willed, but freely; therefore in the desire for that which is naturally willed there can be sin, not indeed by reason of itself absolutely, but by reason of the adjunct, with respect to which the will is free. Because therefore in every willing subject there is a natural inclination of the will to its proper good and its own natural perfection; but toward the ordering of the proper good to the ultimate end there is not a natural inclination of the will, such that it cannot fail from the desire for its good according to such an order: therefore there is no sin in the desire for one's own perfection insofar as it is such, in those whose proper good is contained under the proper good of another as a secondary end under a principal; but there is sin if one's own perfection is desired not on account of the love of the other good under which its perfection is contained, and under which order it ought to be desired, according to that measure, namely, in which it is bound to this. Therefore St. Thomas excellently infers that in an intellectual substance sin could exist in this way, that it did not order its proper good to the ultimate end, but adhered to it as to an end: that is, that it loved its natural perfection not on account of the love of the ultimate end, which is God, but on account of itself alone, namely, by resting ultimately in it; when nevertheless it ought to love some further good ultimately, and order its natural good to it as to an end.

3. It should be observed, nevertheless, that since God can be considered in two ways, namely, as he is the principle of nature, and as he is the object of supernatural beatitude; the sin of the angel was not in that it did not order its good to God as he is the principle of natural good, because it is natural for the angel to love its good in that way on account of God; but it was in that it did not order its good to God as he is the object of supernatural beatitude, namely, by loving its own perfection ultimately, with no consideration of the supernatural beatitude to which God had ordered it. Whence in the First Part⁴ St. Thomas says that he sinned because he desired as the ultimate end of beatitude that to which he could arrive by the power of his nature, turning away his desire from supernatural beatitude, which is from the grace of God.

4. It should also be noted, when St. Thomas says that in secondary willing subjects sin can exist if they are considered in their own nature, that he added, if they are considered in their own nature, because it is not unfitting for an intellectual substance to become impeccable through grace: just as the Blessed are all in such a state in which they cannot sin, not indeed from the condition of nature, but from the gift of grace.

5. It should further be considered, from the doctrine of St. Thomas in the Fourth Book, d. xxvi,⁵ a. 1, that for something to be natural to man can be understood in two ways: in one way, because it is caused of necessity from the principles of nature; in another way, because nature inclines to it, but it is completed by means of free choice. Because therefore St. Thomas did not wish altogether to deny that it is natural to a created willing subject to order its perfection to another end—for it is natural to it in some way, insofar as it is inclined to this by reason, presupposing divine revelation concerning the supernatural end—but only that this is not natural to it in the first way: therefore he did not say absolutely that it is not naturally implanted in it to order its perfection to another end, but added, so that it cannot fail from it, as if to say: That indeed is natural to it in some way, insofar as it has some inclination to it from reason; nevertheless it is not natural to it as being caused of necessity from the principles of nature.

IV. Concerning that which is said, that in the will of a separated substance sin could have existed from the fact that it did not order its proper good to the ultimate end, but adhered to its proper good as to an end, it must be noted that there was a twofold position of the theologians concerning the sin of the demon. For some said that his sin was in this, that he desired as the ultimate end that to which he could attain by the power of his nature: that is, he loved his proper good and his proper perfection naturally suitable to him as the ultimate end and as his final beatitude, and took delight in it, not caring about the supernatural beatitude to be had through grace, which consists in the vision of God through essence.

Others, however, said that he sinned in this, that that beatitude which is given from grace, he indeed desired as the ultimate end, but he willed to have it not from divine aid, but through the power of his own nature. Understand this not indeed positively, as if this whole thing were willed by him, namely, the beatitude that is given from grace and the very mode of having it, namely, through his own power; but negatively, insofar as, namely, he willed such beatitude and considered nothing of grace and divine aid, although nevertheless, in desiring it, he ought to have desired it as to be had from divine grace. Anselm seems to be of this opinion when he says⁶ that he desired that to which he would have arrived if he had stood.

Although, however, St. Thomas seems to follow this second opinion in II Sent., d. v, q. 1, a. 2, and in Qq. de Malo, q. xvi, a. 3; nevertheless here, and in the First Part, q. lxiii, a. 3, he seems rather to adhere to the first opinion. For in this the angel seems to have desired the likeness of God, that just as God is blessed by himself and by his natural good, and is himself the ultimate end to himself; so also the angel himself, from his mode of desiring, willed to be the ultimate end to himself, and to be blessed by his natural good, as if his natural perfection were the supreme good, ordered to no other more perfect good.

2. Yet these two positions return in some way to the same thing, as St. Thomas says in the First Part, in the place cited above: for according to both positions, he desired to have final beatitude through his own power. For if he loved his proper and natural perfection, which is his natural knowledge, or whatever natural perfection of his proceeds from the principles of nature, as the supreme good and final beatitude: it is clear that he willed to have final beatitude through his own power; because natural perfection, proceeding from the principles of nature, proceeds from one's own power. If also he willed and desired to have the beatitude that is given to others from grace, not from another: it is clear that implicitly and interpretatively he willed to attain final beatitude from himself, and through his own power.

V. But concerning the aforesaid a doubt arises. For if, as is said here, it is not naturally implanted in the angel to order its perfection to another end, but this is left to its choice, and it can fail from this order: it follows that the angel could have sinned in the first instant. But St. Thomas everywhere holds this to be false and unfitting.⁷ Therefore that statement also cannot be true.

Now that this follows is shown thus. It was not naturally implanted in the angel in the first instant to order its perfection to another end, but it could fail from such an ordering. Therefore it could love itself, and not on account of God. But every elective act in one having grace, according to the doctrine of St. Thomas,⁸ is meritorious or demeritorious. Therefore that act would have been either merit or sin. But it would not have been merit: since no act is meritorious unless it tends into God actually or virtually. Therefore it would have been sin. And thus he would have sinned in the first instant.

2. For the clarity of this, it must be considered that, since grace inclines nature according to the mode of nature itself—for every form inclines its subject according to the mode of the subject itself, as is the mind of St. Thomas in the First Part, q. lxii, a. 3, ad 2—the inclination of the angelic nature to God, to whom grace and charity incline, must be according to the mode of naturalness or liberty of that nature toward those things that belong to the order of nature. Now according to the mind of St. Thomas in the First Part, q. lxiii, aa. 5 and 6, the angel absolutely indeed has power toward good and evil; but in the first instant of its being, it is moved naturally and determinately toward the good, so that it cannot be moved toward evil. Similarly, therefore, the grace in which the angels were created, absolutely indeed with a certain liberty inclined the angelic nature toward God as toward the ultimate end, so that the angel could both love itself on account of God, and love itself not on account of God; nevertheless in the first instant it inclined determinately and necessarily toward the love of God, so that it could not elicit an act of love concerning itself without loving itself on account of God.

3. To the doubt, therefore, the consequence is denied. — But to the proof it is said that it proceeds from a false foundation, namely, that the angel in the first instant was free to love itself on account of God, and to love itself not on account of God. For to the authority of St. Thomas it is said that for it to be in the choice of the angel to love itself in order to God, and without such order, can be understood in two ways: namely, absolutely; or, at some time, and for every measure of duration. In the first way it is true: and in that sense St. Thomas is speaking. For the will of the angel was inclined to its natural good in an opposite way from its inclination to this order toward God. For it was naturally inclined toward the natural good so that at no time could it will its opposite; but toward this order, speaking absolutely, it was freely inclined through grace, so that at some time it could love its good without order to God. And so in fact in the second instant it happened that some loved themselves without such an order. — But in the second way it is false: nor is St. Thomas speaking in that sense. For the angel was not free in the first instant of its creation so that in it it could love itself on account of God, and not on account of God; but it was determined to this from grace that, in loving itself, it loved on account of God, and could not love itself and not on account of God.

VI. Concerning the first mode of the angels' sin, which St. Thomas follows in this place,⁹ a doubt not to be passed over occurs. For if the angels sinned because they turned to their proper good as to an ultimate end, this was either through an act of natural love, or through an act of elective love. Not indeed the first: because, as is held in the First Part, q. lx, a. 1, ad 3, natural love is always right. — Nor also the second. Because St. Thomas says above in this chapter¹⁰ that there is in each one a natural inclination of the will to willing and loving its own perfection, so that it cannot will the contrary of this. Therefore it does not appear how the angels could have sinned concerning the natural good.

2. It will perhaps be answered, according to the mind of St. Thomas in this chapter, that although the will is naturally borne toward the proper good of the willing subject taken absolutely, nevertheless it is borne toward it under the aspect of ultimate end freely and electively: because, namely, it is in the power of the willing subject to order the natural good of the willing subject to a further end; or not to order it, but to rest in it as in the ultimate end.

3. But although one ought so to answer according to the mind of St. Thomas, nevertheless this response does not seem, following his principles, to satisfy the doubt. For if the aspect of ultimate end had been willed in the natural good so that the will had loved the proper and natural good of the willing subject, and in it had loved this condition which is being the ultimate end: the response would indeed sufficiently remove the doubt. But because St. Thomas holds that the angels did not sin through the election of evil, but only through the love of the good in an undue manner on the part of election, namely, by willing their proper good and not ordering it to the further end into which they ought to order it; and he holds that the cause of this disorder was the inconsideration of such an order, as is clear in the following chapter: therefore the doubt does not seem to be removed by that response.

For it is argued thus. In the instant in which the angels sinned through turning to their proper good, they sinned either through an act of purely natural turning to their proper good without order to a further end; or through an act in some way elective; or through the lack of an elective act that they ought to have had. Not the first: because in a purely natural act there cannot be sin. — Not the second. Because concerning a natural good there cannot be an elective act of the will unless it is proposed to the will with some non-natural condition: since it wills the natural good naturally, and cannot will its contrary, as was said. But in the instant in which the angel sinned, the natural good was not proposed to the will with this non-natural condition, namely, with an order to a further end: since he sinned from the inconsideration of such an order. Therefore there was not an elective act concerning the proper good not insofar as it was ordered to a further end. — Nor also the third. Because then the first sin of the angel would have been a sin of omission, and not a sin of pride, as St. Thomas holds.¹¹

VII. For the clarity of this difficulty, it must be considered that a volition can be called elective in two ways. In one way, as to the exercise of the act: because, namely, it is in the power of the will to elicit it or not to elicit it. In another way, as to the specification of the act: because, namely, if the will goes out to operation concerning some object, it can accept it or reject it.

It is said therefore first, that the difficulty moved is founded upon a false foundation: namely, that the will is so naturally borne toward the natural good of the willing subject that it is not free as to the exercise of the act, but that act always of necessity accompanies nature. For this is false. For although the will is so naturally borne toward the natural good that it cannot will its opposite, as St. Thomas says in this place, it is nevertheless in its power to elicit the act of willing concerning it or not to elicit it, and to continue such an act or to cease from it.

It is said secondly, that the response given¹² is good, and according to the mind of St. Thomas. For although the will of the angel, if it has an operation concerning its natural good, cannot not love it; it can nevertheless love it with an order to another good, and without such an order. Whence such an act by which the angel sinned was both natural, insofar as it was borne toward the natural good; and was elective, insofar as it could be borne toward it with an order to a further end, and without such an order. When, however, it is said that natural love is always right,¹³ this must be understood of that which is purely natural, but not of that which is partly natural and partly free: for such, on that part by which it is natural, is always right; but on that part by which it is free, it can be right, and not right.

2. To the reason against this response,¹⁴ moreover, it is said that he sinned through an act of turning to his proper good that was not indeed purely natural, nor purely elective: but partly natural and partly elective as to the specification of the act; but purely elective as to its exercise.

When, however, it is argued against this because there cannot be an elective act concerning a natural good unless that good is proposed to the will with some non-natural condition: — it is said first that this is false. For it suffices that the act be in the power of the will as to exercise, and that, when it is elicited, the intellect is bound to consider some non-natural condition, and the choosing will is bound to choose with that condition. Whence, since the angel in the second instant of his being was bound to consider the ordering of his natural good to the supernatural good, if he willed to elicit an act of turning toward himself; and thus was bound to love himself in order to God as He is the object of supernatural beatitude: because he elicited the act of his love freely without such an ordering, he sinned. — Nor nevertheless does it follow that his first sin was an omission, except concomitantly: namely, in that manner in which the omission of some circumstance is present in every sin.

3. But concerning this response a doubt occurs. For St. Thomas holds that an angel always actually understands himself: as is clear in De Veritate, q. 8, a. 6, ad 7. But volition follows cognition. Therefore he also always loves himself. Therefore the act by which he loves himself is never free, but always accompanies nature and is according to the inclination of nature: just as neither is the cognition by which he knows himself free.

It is answered that the saying of St. Thomas is understood of speculative cognition, but not of practical cognition, by which he judges that he is to be loved and cherished for that moment. But the will follows this practical cognition, not speculative cognition. Therefore it is not against the response. Whence what is said in Quaestiones de Malo, q. 16, a. 2, ad 6, that the will of an angel always wills, just as his intellect always understands, is not to be understood concerning one determinate object, but absolutely: because, namely, just as an angel always considers something, namely by considering now one thing, now another, so he always wills something, namely by willing now one thing, now another.

VIII. If anyone, however, should wish to hold that the act of love by which the angel loves himself is a natural act both as to the exercise of the act and as to its specification: he would have to say, first, that in no instant did the angel who sinned have an explicitly and purely elective act of sin, but always persevered in his natural act; since his natural good was always presented to him in the same way.

He would have to say, secondly, that in the second instant, in which the good angels were turned toward God, his act was interpretatively elective: inasmuch as he was able to love himself with an ordering to God just as the good angels also did, and he was bound to do this; which since he did not do, he sinned through an interpretative choice.

He would have to say, thirdly, that the second instant, in which he sinned, was not an instant intrinsic to his act, measuring the act of sin itself: but was an extrinsic instant, measuring namely the choice of the good angels, in which he too ought to have been turned toward God. — Unless perhaps it should be said that, although he did not have a new act of love of his natural goods in some new instant intrinsic to that act, he nevertheless had a new act of command (in the manner in which commanding belongs to the will), by which act the will commanded the intellect to consider his natural goods intensely and exactly; from which intense consideration there followed an intense love of natural goods; from which there then followed an inconsideration of the ordering to God, which was the cause of sin, as St. Thomas seems to intend in the following chapter. And thus he is said to have sinned in the second instant, measuring namely that command of the will: because in that instant he was bound, along with the love of his natural goods, also to love God as the object of supernatural beatitude.

IX. The second conclusion is ¹⁵: The intellectual substance sinned by desiring equality with God. It is proved by this reason. The intellectual substance willed to dispose other things regularly ¹⁶ from itself, and that its will should not be regulated by another superior. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. Because that is owed to God alone. — But the antecedent is proved. Because it is necessary that rules of action be taken from the end. But it set up the end in itself.

St. Thomas explains, however, that this is not so understood as if it desired that its good should be equal to the divine good. Both because this could not fall into its intellect; and because it would desire itself not to be: since the distinction of species arises according to the diverse grades of things. But it is understood in the manner touched upon in the argument.

2. For the evidence of the reason, it must be considered that the antecedent is not to be understood as if the angel willed explicitly, and as the thing desired, to dispose all other things regularly, and that his will should not be regulated by a superior: but implicitly and interpretatively, from the mode of desiring, he willed that. Just as, if someone should desire to be able to institute bishops, thinking nothing about the authority of the Supreme Pontiff, we would say that this person desires the Supreme Pontificate, not indeed explicitly, but implicitly, and consecutively from the mode of desiring, because instituting bishops not through the authority of another belongs to the Supreme Pontiff.

X. But against the aforesaid Scotus argues, In II Sent., d. 6, q. 1¹⁷. For first he argues that the angel could desire absolute equality with God, and not only according to a certain likeness. First, because he could love himself with the love of friendship, and could concupisce for himself every concupiscible good: since the will according to each act has all being as its object; but equality with God is a certain concupiscible good in itself.

Then, because impossibility does not stand in the way: since the will can be of impossible things, as is said in Ethics III¹⁸; and the damned hate God; and a sinner can will God not to be, and will that eminence of God to be in someone.

Thirdly, because the will, according to Augustine in the Book of Eighty-Three Questions, q. 30, can use things to be enjoyed, and enjoy things to be used.

2. Secondly, he answers the reasons of St. Thomas¹⁹. To the first indeed he says, first, that simple apprehension alone suffices for the appetite to desire that apprehended thing for another: just as the intellect apprehending whiteness and apprehending a raven can will whiteness for a raven. — He says secondly that the simple intellect can apprehend equality with God without error. — From these two it follows that what St. Thomas assumes is false, namely that it cannot fall into the intellect of a separate substance that its good should be equal to the divine good.

To the second he says, first, that the will can consequently will itself not to be. Just as one who sins mortally wills something in which he wills not to be subject to God; and in this consequently wills himself not to be; because he cannot be unless he is subject to God. — He says secondly that it is not necessary that it will the consequent if it wills the antecedent, when the consequent is not per se of the understanding of the antecedent. Now, however, the consequent, namely that the angel is not, is not of the understanding of the antecedent, namely of that which is his becoming equal to God. Therefore the reason does not follow.

XI. For the solution of these, it must be considered first that the appetite is not borne toward anything except insofar as that thing is judged to be pursued or avoided, and fitting or unfitting to the one desiring, or to another whom the one desiring treats as himself: since the object of the appetite is the good; but the good has the character of a perfective thing. Therefore, however much something is good according to its nature, unless it is judged fitting to the one desiring, it will never be desired. But something is not judged fitting to someone unless it is judged to be perfective of him. But a perfection perfects a subject insofar as it gives being to it. On that account, for any perfection to be desired, it is necessary that it be judged as capable of being united to it in some way according to being. From which it follows that what anyone judges impossible to belong to himself cannot be desired and longed for by him. And thus, if equality with God is judged by the angel as impossible to belong to himself, it cannot be desired and longed for by him. — Now, however, the case is that, since the angel, before he sinned, had an intact natural cognition and not one corrupted, namely neither through passion, since in him there is no passion, nor through sin; there could not be in him a false estimation concerning things naturally known, such that he would judge the impossible as possible. And consequently, since he naturally knew that his being was participated from some superior, as one perfectly knowing his own nature; he could not judge as possible that his being should be equaled to subsistent being itself and to being participated by no superior, such as the divine being is. For that reason he could not desire absolute equality of this kind. And this is the foundation of the first reason.

Nor is the distinction of Scotus in the place alleged above valid, namely that a certain volition is efficacious, and a certain volition is of complacency: and that, although an efficacious volition is not of an impossible thing, a volition of complacency can nevertheless be of an impossible thing, and in it merit and demerit consist. — For it is clear that it is most false that any volition which is with full consent ²⁰ can be of a thing absolutely and per se impossible, which namely it is entirely repugnant to be, of which sort is for a creature to be equaled to the Creator: although a certain volition can be of that which is impossible per accidens and as of now. For no one, to use his example, with full consent desires health which he thinks he cannot attain as of now, except because he judges his being healthy as something absolutely possible; and thinks that health is fitting for him, and proportioned to human nature; and would will it to be possible for him as of now.

2. It must be considered secondly that since, as is said here, the diversity of species arises according to diverse grades of things, something cannot arrive at the grade of a higher nature unless it changes species, and is transmuted into another species, and ceases to be of such a species: just as air cannot arrive at the grade of the nature of fire unless it is transmuted into the species of fire, and ceases to be air. Therefore the angel cannot ascend to the grade of the divine nature unless he loses his own being. And because a natural desire is present in each thing for the preservation of its own being, and each thing naturally shrinks from non-being; and the angel naturally knows that, by ascending to equality with God, positing that it were possible, he himself would cease to be: therefore it cannot be that he desires absolute divine equality.

3. But if it is urged that, although each thing naturally desires being, nevertheless per accidens and concomitantly someone, in order to flee misery, desires non-being, as happens in those who kill themselves out of despair; and that similarly the angel desires himself not to be per accidens and secondarily, namely by desiring divine equality, which he cannot attain without his own cessation: — it is answered first, from the doctrine of St. Thomas in the alleged question De Malo ²¹, in the response to the 5th argument to the contrary, that we must speak in one way concerning the appetite for the removal of some evil, and in another way concerning the appetite for the attainment of some good. For when someone wills something to be removed from himself, he treats himself as the terminus a quo. And because it is not necessary that the terminus a quo be preserved in motion, therefore someone can secondarily desire himself not to be, while he desires to lack miseries. But when someone wills some good for himself, he treats himself as the terminus ad quem. And because it is necessary that a terminus of this kind be preserved in motion, therefore he cannot desire for himself some good which he sees cannot be had without the destruction of himself. But it is clear that the angel, by desiring divine goodness, would desire some good for himself. Therefore the case of him and the case of the one who desires to be freed from misery are not similar.

It is answered secondly that non-being per accidens is also not desired except because the removal of some evil is desired. But in the appetite for divine equality, it is clear that no removal of evil is desired, but good is desired for oneself. Therefore the consequence is null.

XII. To the reasons of Scotus to the contrary ²² it is answered. To the first indeed, it is denied that the angel could concupisce every good for himself. For he could not concupisce for himself a good which he could not attain without the destruction of himself.

When it is said that the acts of concupiscence and friendship have all being as their object, it is denied. For friendship is not toward inanimate things. Nor, as has been said, can anyone, right reason remaining, on the part of the desired object desire for himself a good corruptive of himself.

2. To the second it is said that the impossibility of the desired thing also stands in the way of this appetite of the angel.

Nor is what is said in Ethics III valid, that the will is of impossible things. Because, as is said in Quaestiones de Malo, in the place alleged above ²³, ad 9, that is a certain incomplete will, by which someone would will that which is judged impossible if it were possible: but it is not the will following deliberation and a complete judgment, by which it is judged that something is to be willed, in which merit and demerit consist. Whence in the same place the Philosopher says that choice is not of impossible things, but the will is. For choice is the appetite of what has been pre-counseled ²⁴; and, as the Commentator says in the same place, it is of those things which are in us, that is, which we can attain by our own work. If anyone, however, takes the name of choice otherwise, he does not speak according to the mind of Aristotle.

Nor also does it stand in the way that the damned hate God, and would will Him not to be; and similarly the sinner. For this is per accidens, insofar as they apprehend Him under the aspect of one inflicting punishment, from which they would will to be freed. But this arises from a disturbance of cognition in them, which disturbance could not be in the angels before sin. — Moreover, here we are speaking of appetite per se, but not of appetite per accidens: because those saying that the sinning angel desired absolute divine equality said that he desired such equality per se.

It is also not true that a sinner can desire divine equality for another creature, unless this appears possible to him. Which false estimation could not be found in the angel before sin.

3. To the third it is said first that that saying is understood of the will following a perverse judgment of reason. Which, as we have said, could not be in the angel before sin.

It is said secondly that, if it is understood to be concerning the will universally, this has truth as to the mode of desiring only, but not as to the thing desired, in that in which there is no disturbance of cognition. And thus it is conceded that the will of the angel by sinning enjoyed things to be used: inasmuch as, by not ordering his own good to the divine good, he implicitly loved his own good as the highest good and as the ultimate end, which is to enjoy things to be used. From this, however, it does not follow that he desired absolute divine equality as a thing desired per se.

4. Moreover, the responses of Scotus to the reasons of St. Thomas ²⁵ are not valid. For the first response indeed says two false things. One is that simple apprehension suffices for it to desire that apprehended thing for another. For it is clear from the above ²⁶ that this is false: because appetite follows that cognition by which something is judged fitting or not fitting to the one desiring, or to another for whom something is desired. Whence the Philosopher, in the third book of De Anima, text 46 ²⁷, proves that the speculative intellect does not move, because it speculates nothing practicable, nor does it say anything concerning what is to be avoided or pursued. In the second book of De Anima also, text 154 ²⁸, he shows that phantasia does not move, according to what St. Thomas explains, because according to it we are as those considering in a painting fearful and confident things. For the will cannot will whiteness for a raven unless the intellect judges that it is good and fitting for a raven to be white, and consequently that that is possible to be: speaking of a perfect and complete will.

The other is that the simple intellect can apprehend the equality of God without error. For it is clear that this is false, speaking of the apprehension which appetite follows, concerning which the discussion is in the present proposal: but not of the cognition by which what the equality of God is, is apprehended absolutely. For, since equality is a certain relation of two to one another, divine equality cannot be apprehended as to be desired, unless it is apprehended as a certain mean between the divine perfection and the perfection of another, namely so that something is apprehended to be equal to God as good and fitting. But this does not occur by simple apprehension, but by composition of the intellect. Which cannot occur without error, if such equality between God and a creature is apprehended.

5. The second response also is null. For, as is clear from the above ²⁹, the will cannot consequently will itself not to be, as to the thing desired, unless there is error or ignorance on the part of the intellect. Which we have said cannot be in the angel before sin: since he naturally knows that he cannot attain divine equality without the destruction of himself.

XIII. The third conclusion is ³⁰: It is suitably said that the first sin of the demon was pride.

It is proved. Because to will to regulate others, and that one's own will not be regulated by a superior, is to will to be over others and in a certain way not to be subject. Which is the sin of pride.

XIV. Concerning this conclusion, and its proof, a doubt occurs. For to be over others and not to be subject is accepted either as the thing willed: or as accompanying volition. If it is accepted in the first way, then to will to be over others and not to be subject belongs indeed to pride insofar as it is a special sin: but this was not in the first sin of the angel, since St. Thomas says, Prima Pars, q. 63, a. 1, ad 4, and it was explained above ³¹, that the sin of the angel was not in this that he chose some evil, but only on the part of an inordinate choice.

If, however, it is accepted in the second way, then to will to be over others and not to be subject do not constitute the special character of the sin of pride, but is a condition following every sin. And thus it does not follow that the first sin of the angel was pride according to its species, as the conclusion posits.

XV. For the evidence of this, it must be considered, from the doctrine of St. Thomas, Secunda Secundae, q. 162 ³²; and in Quaestiones de Malo, q. 8 ³³, that the proper object of pride is a great and excellent good, in some way disproportionate to the one desiring, and exceeding his proper measure: whence pride is defined as the inordinate appetite for excellence, or, the appetite for perverse highness ³⁴. But it happens in an appetite for excellence of this kind that the measure is exceeded in many ways. Therefore there are many species of pride: which nevertheless all agree in this, that the rule of reason and the divine ordination is contemned. Whence not to be subject to the rule and divine ordination is an effect of pride, if it is considered in some act outside the will, and it accompanies every sin: for every sinner, insofar as he is such, transgresses the divine precept and the divine rule, and thus is not subject to the divine rule. If, however, it is considered as it is in the affection and act of willing, namely insofar as someone wills not to be subject to the divine rule, thus it is pride.

But it must be noted that this can happen in two ways. In one way, so that it holds itself explicitly on the part of the thing willed: because namely it is either the thing principally willed, or it is its mode expressly willed; insofar as someone either wills first this existence which is to be subject to no one; or wills some good, and wills to have that good not according to the measure handed down by a superior, but according to what he judges good for himself; so that both the good itself is first willed, but non-subjection in having it is secondarily willed, as its condition and mode. — In another way, so that it holds itself on the part of the mode of desiring only, and not on the part of the thing willed explicitly: namely insofar as someone wills and loves some created good in which there is no repugnance according to itself to reason, but he is pleased in it and delights in it not according to the order of the divine rule. For such a one, from the mode of desiring, wills not to be subject to God: although not on the part of the thing expressly willed. In which, since no other sin intervenes, it is necessary that that sin be of pride, to which contempt of a superior belongs.

2. The sin of pride of the devil, therefore, was to will to be in charge and not to be subject in the second way, but not in the first way, as is clear from what was said above ³⁵. For according to the way that St. Thomas follows here, his pride was in this, that he cleaved to his own good by not ordering it to another good, as he ought to have ordered it according to the divine rule, by which one is bound to love God Himself above all things, as the object of supernatural beatitude, and to order every other good to Him. In which transgression it is clear that he did not will to be subject, because from the mode of appetition he did not acknowledge a superior; and that there was an inordinate love of his own excellence, which pertains to pride.

According to the other way, however, which St. Thomas follows elsewhere ³⁶, his pride was in this, that he desired supernatural beatitude, which consists in the clear vision of God, by not desiring to attain it from divine grace, although he nevertheless ought to have desired it as something to be had from the grace of God. In which it is also evident that, from the mode of appetition, he willed not to be subject to God as regards the attainment of beatitude from grace: where there is an inordinate appetite for spiritual good and excellence.

3. But it must be noted that St. Thomas did not say simply that to will to regulate others, and that one's will not be regulated by another, is to will to be in charge and not to be subject, but he added in a certain way. Because namely the angel did not seek in no way to be subject to God: for he could not have sought this, as is said in the First Part and in the other places cited above, for he would have sought not to be, since no creature can be except by the fact that it participates in being under God. Yet he did seek in a certain way to be in charge of other creatures, and not to be subject to God: namely, as to the fact that he would regulate other things, and his will in willing would be regulated by no other. For considering the dignity of his nature, and delighting in it, from the mode of appetition he willed that goodness and beatitude should be derived from himself unto others, and that he should be the rule and law of the things to be done by others.

XVI. These things being supposed, to the doubt ³⁷ it is said that in neither of those ways, properly speaking, is to will not to be subject taken, as is clear from what has been said: but it is taken as included in the mode of appetition, and as interpretatively willed, from the fact that it was in the angel's freedom to will the spiritual good with attention to the divine rule, and without attention to it. But to will not to be subject to the divine rule even in this way pertains to pride. For pride differs from other sins, as is said in IIª IIae, q. 162, a. 6 and 7, because in other sins the turning away from God is a consequence: but to pride, whose act is contempt of God, it belongs per se.

This, however, is not to be understood as if in every act of pride not being subject to the divine rule is a thing explicitly willed: but because it is of the nature of pride, as it is distinguished from other sins, to be unwilling to be subject to the divine rule, either, I say, on the part of the thing explicitly sought, or from the mode of appetition. For since an act of pride is an act of the appetite tending toward a great and excellent good, there cannot be in the very act of pride any other reason for sin except that such a good is sought not according to the divine measure and rule. And so from the fact of not being subject to the divine rule, according as it is in the affect, namely as either expressly or interpretatively willed, the proper nature of pride is constituted. In other sins, however, there is not a turning away as regards the affect in itself: for he who wills to steal does not have in his affect this not being subject to God as the formal constitutive element of its nature, but rather the taking of another's property against the owner's will. But such a turning away on the part of the effect accompanies every sin: for whatever sin one may commit, he turns away from God while transgressing the divine precept and the divine rule.

2. But it must be noted that one must speak in one way about this willing not to be subject to the divine rule according as it stands on the part of the thing willed: and in another way according as it stands on the part of the mode of willing alone. For according as it stands on the part of the thing willed, it is necessary that it fall under actual consideration. For since the will is not borne toward what is unknown, if someone wills some thing and some condition of it per se, it is necessary that he know both the thing and the willed mode. — But according as it stands on the part of the mode of willing, it is not necessary that it fall under actual consideration. For it suffices that one be bound to consider at that time the rule of the superior and subjection to him, and not consider it. And in this way it happened to the devil. For considering his own good, namely the perfection of his nature and of his natural cognition, and loving it by a free act, in the manner explained above ³⁸, he was bound to consider its ordination to God as to the supreme good and ultimate end, and to order his good to Him. Because he did not do this, he sinned through pride: for there is an interpretative contempt of the divine rule there. — Similarly, if he sought supernatural beatitude, he was bound to consider divine grace, and to seek it as something to be had from divine grace. Because he did not do this, he sinned by being proud.

XVII. From these things it is clear that the opinion of Scotus is groundless, in II Sent., d. 6, the last question ³⁹, holding that the sin of the devil was not pride properly so called, but is rather reduced to lust: because it was an immoderate self-complacency, which, on account of the delight that it implies, pertains to lust.

For it is evident from what has been said ⁴⁰ that it was properly pride: since it was an immoderate appetite for excellence. Nor does it stand in the way that it was an immoderate self-complacency, and had delight joined to it. Because immoderate delight conjoined to the appetite for one's own excellence, and self-complacency, does not remove the character of pride. For just as a great and excellent good is taken as suitable, and from this has the character of the delectable; so in the appetite for it the first disorder and deformity is that such an excellent good is inordinately sought; and secondarily there is an immoderate complacency in oneself as delectable. — And besides, not all delight belongs to lust properly so called, but inordinate delight concerning sensible things of touch, such as venereal things.

XVIII. The fourth conclusion ⁴¹ is: From the first disorder of the will that was in the devil, there followed manifold sin in his will: namely, hatred toward God, as resisting his pride, and most justly punishing his fault; and envy toward man; and other things of this kind, namely those that arise from pride and envy.

It is explained. Because from one error concerning a principle, varied and manifold error follows.

It must be noted, from the teaching of St. Thomas in many places, especially in IV Sent., d. 48 ⁴² and 50 ⁴³; and IIª II^ae, q. 34, a. 1, that God in Himself, since He is goodness itself, cannot be held in hatred: but according to the effects that are contrary to an inordinate will, He can be held in hatred. Therefore, explaining the hatred of the demons toward God, he added, as resisting his pride, and most justly punishing his fault.

XIX. As to the second point ⁴⁴, the manner and order of the angels' sinning and not sinning is set forth. And two conclusions are put forward.

The first is: It was possible that some of the higher substances, or even the supreme one, should sin. It is proved. Because in whatever willing being under God, there can be a sin of the will, if it is considered in its own nature.

The second is: It is highly probable that the supreme one among them all sinned. It is proved. Because he would not have rested in his own good as in an end unless his good were exceedingly perfect.

From these things St. Thomas infers that it could have happened that some of the lower ones by their own will ordered their good to the supreme one, departing from the divine order, and that these sinned in like manner: but others, preserving the divine order in the movement of their will, rightly departed from the order of the sinning superior.

It is explained. Because intellectual substances are not only ordered under God, but also one of them, from the first to the last, is ordered under another. But when the proper good of someone has an order to several superiors, it is free for the one willing to depart from the order of any one of them, and not to depart: as is clear in a soldier, who is ordered under the king and under the general of the army, and good is the will of the soldier directing his will to the king and departing from the will of the general, if the general departs from the order of the king; on the contrary, however, it is bad, if he follows the will of the general against the will of the king.

Moreover, St. Thomas adds that how the will of each persists in goodness and malice will be shown in the fourth Book.

2. Concerning the second conclusion it should be noted, from the teaching of St. Thomas in the First Part, q. 63, a. 7; and in II Sent., d. 6, a. 1, that there was a twofold opinion of theologians concerning the sinning angel. For Damascene ⁴⁵, following the opinion of the Platonists, holds that the greatest of the sinning angels was set over the terrestrial order. But Gregory, in the Homily on the Hundred Sheep ⁴⁶, holds that he was the higher among them all. Therefore St. Thomas does not speak assertively on this matter, but considers the opinion of Gregory probable, for the assigned reason.

XX. But against this reason it could be objected ⁴⁷. Because either the lower substances also rested in their own good as in an end: or they ordered their good to the supreme one as to an end. If the first is given, it is clear that their good is not as perfect as the good of the supreme one. And yet they rested in it as in an end. Therefore the excess of goodness of the supreme substance over the goodness of the others is not a sufficient reason why he should rest in himself as in an end. And consequently the reason for the conclusion is null.

If the second is given, it follows that the lower substances did not sin in like manner by the sin of pride from an inordinate appetite for their own excellence as the supreme one did: for in this they would have sought no excellence, as subjecting themselves to an inferior, and departing from a superior, namely from God. But this is against St. Thomas, who holds that all sinned by the sin of pride. Therefore etc.

XXI. For the clarification of this doubt, it must be considered, from the teaching of St. Thomas in the places cited above, that the lower sinning angels agreed in something with the supreme sinning angel; and in something they were different from him. For they agreed first, in this, that they willed to attain their ultimate beatitude by the power of their own nature, and not from divine grace: just as the supreme one also willed.

They agreed secondly in that, just as the supreme one willed that all the lower ones should obtain through his grace the beatitude that he himself willed to attain by his own power; so also the lower ones willed to pour out beatitude itself into other lower ones.

They agreed thirdly in that, just as the supreme one did not so will to attain beatitude by the power of nature, and to pour it out into others, as being the first cause simpliciter and having no dependence on God, but as existing under God operating in nature, and having natural power from Him, yet not needing divine grace above the power of nature for the attainment of beatitude; so also it was in the lower ones.

They differ, however, first, because the sin of the first angel, by the order of nature and causality, preceded the sin of the others: inasmuch as, by manifesting his affection to the lower ones, he was to them an example and occasion of sin.

They differ secondly, because the supreme one, since by the order of nature and perfection he was immediately under God, and was preeminent over all others, willed indeed to attain beatitude without divine grace, but yet willed to be under God as under a superior giving him natural power by which he would be blessed; but the lower ones willed to be not only under God, but also under that superior sinning substance itself, as under the first who was blessed by his own natural power, and whose beatitude would be the exemplar of the beatitude of the others, just as their nature was also lower than his nature. And therefore they chose to be subject to the supreme substance itself, in this, that they would have him as prince for attaining beatitude without divine grace, by the power of nature alone.

2. But it must be noted that, just as the supreme substance did not seek to attain beatitude by the power of nature as if such a mode of attainment were expressly willed; nor did he explicitly seek to be in charge of others and to pour out beatitude into others; but only from the mode of appetition and implicitly ⁴⁸: so the lower ones did not expressly choose to be subject to the supreme one and to have him as prince for attaining beatitude by the power of nature and not from divine grace, but only from the mode of appetition. For from the fact that by the example of the supreme substance, as superior to them according to nature, they were moved to this volition thus deformed, and imitated him; it follows that they willed to have the supreme substance itself as prince in sinning, and consequently willed to be subject to him: just as, if a soldier, seeing his general steal, were moved by his example to steal, willing to imitate him as his superior, it would be said that he willed his general to be prince not only in military service, but also in theft.

3. But one doubt occurs. If the lower angels sought to attain beatitude not from divine grace, but by the power of nature alone, just as the supreme one did, it follows that they sought divine equality: for St. Thomas shows ⁴⁹ that the angel sought divine equality in this, that he willed to have ultimate beatitude through the power of his own nature. But the opposite of this St. Thomas seems to say in II Sent., d. 6, a. 1, where he says that it is not probable that that spirit who was also subject to another creature sought the equality of the Creator in any way.

He answers that indeed all sought divine equality according to likeness in some way, and in this was their pride. But as to what is said in II Sent., we can interpret it in a twofold way, following that opinion that they inordinately sought supernatural beatitude, which opinion St. Thomas holds in the same place in II Sent. ⁵⁰. First, that it is understood that the lower spirit did not seek divine equality of himself and primarily from the consideration of his own beauty and dignity, but only received from the most noble creature that occasion of seeking it. But the first intellectual substance sought such equality of himself primarily: while, considering the dignity of his own nature, he deemed that beatitude which consists in the vision of God through His essence to be suitable to his nature, as it was, and willed to obtain it while considering nothing of divine grace.

Secondly, it can be understood that he did not seek that divine equality which the first angel is said to have sought, namely that he should be in charge of the whole multitude of angels, and pour out beatitude into all. For from the consideration of his own nature, since he was not superior to all in the order of nature, he did not seem from the mode of appetition to seek this, but only that he should in some way pour it out into lower ones.

XXII. These things having been premised, to the principal doubt ⁵¹ it can first be said that the lower sinning ones rested in their own good as in an ultimate end, just as the supreme one who sinned did. Nor on this account is the reason set forth here removed. Because St. Thomas does not intend, from the fact that the first sinning substance rested in his own good absolutely, to argue that he was more worthy than the others, as the objection supposes: but from the fact that primarily, and moved by the example and occasion of no other, he rested in his own good as in an ultimate end. Whence also what St. Thomas seems to say here, that the lower ones ordered their good to the first sinning substance, is not to be understood as to an ultimate end: but as to an example and occasion of sinning, inasmuch as in sinning they did not follow the divine rule, but sought beatitude for themselves conformably to the appetite of the first sinning substance, namely loving their own good as an ultimate end, just as the supreme one who sinned did, but not ordering their good to beatitude to be obtained from grace, as was ordered by the divine law.

2. It can secondly be said that the supreme angel sinned in that he did not order his own good and his own perfection to God as to the object of supernatural beatitude, but rested in his own good as in an ultimate end: whereas the lower ones sinned in the same way, namely because they did not order their own good to supernatural beatitude, and to God as He is the object of supernatural beatitude; yet they did not rest in their own good as in an ultimate end, but ordered their good to the superior sinning angel as to an end. For just as the will of a soldier is bad when not ordered to the good of the king as to an end, but to the good of the general of the army against the will of the king, for instance if he seeks to make the general of the army rich by his works to the prejudice of the victory that the king intends: so the sin in the lower angels was that they loved their own good on account of the good of the first sinning angel, namely inasmuch as it is in some way exemplated by the angel himself who loves himself as an ultimate end; and they loved the first angel himself on account of himself, but not on account of God, contemplating his beauty and excellence, just as he also loved himself as an ultimate end; although they nevertheless ought to love him on account of God as on account of an ultimate end. And this the words of St. Thomas seem to mean when he says that it could have happened that some of the lower ones by their own will ordered their good to him, departing from the divine order.

When, however, it is urged against this that then they would not have sinned by the sin of pride: — I deny it. For it is said that they inordinately sought this excellence, that they might attain ultimate beatitude by the power of their own nature, and not need divine grace to acquire it, which excellence they would not attain while existing under the divine order. For while they refer their own good to the first substance ultimately, as to an ultimate end, namely by resting in his love, and desiring no further supernatural good; it follows that they will to attain ultimate beatitude by the power of nature, since they are borne into the love and knowledge of that first sinning substance by natural power.

XXIII. As to the third point ⁵², St. Thomas makes a comparison of a separate substance to man in sinning. For they agree, he says, in this, that both in man and in a separate substance sin happens from the fact that the will does not order its own good to God. They differ, however, because, since in one man there are several appetitive powers, of which one is ordered under another, but not in one separate substance; and sin happens in the will in whatever way the lower appetite is deflected: it happens that there is sin in man also through the fact that the good of the lower appetite is not regulated according to the higher appetite. In this way, however, sin cannot be in separate substances.

It must be noted, from the teaching of St. Thomas in Qq. de Malo, q. 16, a. 2, that, since appetite is nothing other than a certain inclination toward an appetible object; and inclination follows some form: just as natural appetite follows a natural form, so sensitive or intellectual appetite follows an apprehended form. Therefore, where there is both sensitive and intellective apprehension, as is in man, there is also both sensitive and intellective appetite: but where there is only intellective apprehension, as is in separate substances, there is only intellective appetite. And because evil cannot happen in the appetite from the fact that it disagrees with the apprehension which it follows, but from the fact that it disagrees with some higher rule; since sensitive apprehension has reason as its rule, and the cognition of reason has divine wisdom as its rule, it happens that there is sin in the appetite of man, both because sensitive apprehension, which the appetite follows, is not regulated by reason, and because human reason is not regulated by divine law and wisdom. In separate substances, however, sin can be solely through the fact that their intellectual cognition is not regulated by divine wisdom and law. The order, therefore, which is here posited between appetitive potencies, belongs to them by reason of the apprehensions which they follow: because, since to regulate belongs to cognition, the higher appetite does not have to move the lower by way of regulating and directing, except because the cognition of the higher order has to direct that which is of the lower order.