Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

After St. Thomas showed that the intellectual substance whose help the magical arts use is evil, he now wishes to explain how it is evil ¹.

Concerning this, moreover, he does two things: first, he shows that it is not evil according to its nature; second, he shows that it is voluntarily evil, in the following chapters.

I. As to the first, he posits this conclusion: It is not possible that there be natural malice in the intellectual substances whose help the magical arts use.

For the declaration of which, it must be noted, from the teaching of St. Thomas in De Malo, q. 16, a. 2, that since malice can be understood to be natural to something in two ways, namely, either because evil is its nature, or something of its nature, or something following upon its nature; or because there is in them a natural inclination to evil: this conclusion is understood in both senses. And therefore some arguments prove that such substances do not have a natural inclination to evil; while some prove that they are not evil in themselves, as if malice were their nature.

II. He argues first, therefore, in this way. If such substances naturally tend toward evil, they tend toward evil per se. This is impossible. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. Because what tends toward something according to its nature, tends toward it per se, not per accidens: just as the heavy tends downward. — The falsity of the consequent is proved. Because all things tend per se toward the good, but toward evil nothing tends except per accidens.

For the evidence of the consequence, it must be observed, from the teaching of St. Thomas on I Post. Anal., the chapter on per se ², that this phrase per se imports in the subject the relation of a cause with respect to that which is said to belong to it per se, so that, when the subject, or something of it, is the cause of that which is attributed to it, then that is said to belong to it per se. From this, moreover, it is clear that, if something belongs to something according to its proper nature, so that nature is the reason why it belongs to it, it must belong to it per se, and not per accidens. And thus it follows very well that if an intellectual substance is evil according to its nature, so that to be inclined to evil inasmuch as it is evil belongs to it by reason of its proper nature, it tends to evil per se, and not per accidens.

III. Secondly. Either such substances are causes, or caused: otherwise they would have no order to other things. If causes, then as follows. Evil is not the cause of anything except per accidens. But that which is per accidens must be reduced to that which is per se. Therefore there must be in them something prior to their malice, through which they are causes. But the first thing in each thing is its nature and essence. Therefore etc.

If they are caused, then as follows. Evil cannot be the effect of any cause except per accidens: since every agent, in acting, intends good. But that which is caused per accidens only, cannot be according to nature: since every nature has a determinate mode by which it proceeds into being. Therefore etc.

2. Concerning the first part of this argument a doubt arises. Because although everything per accidens is reduced to that which is per se, it is not necessary, however, that that which is per se be joined to that which is per accidens in the same subject. For what is the cause of finding a treasure per accidens is not necessarily its cause per se: but it is indeed reduced to some higher cause, which is its cause per se. And thus it is not necessary, if an intellectual substance is the cause of something per accidens, that there be in it something through which it is a cause per se.

He answers that, although with respect to one and the same effect the same thing need not be a cause per se and per accidens, it is nevertheless necessary that what is a cause per accidens be joined to that which is a cause per se, or be the same with it, either with respect to one effect or with respect to diverse effects. For the white thing, which is the cause per accidens of a house, is joined to the builder, who is the cause per se of the house; and he who digs a grave, who is the cause per accidens of finding a treasure, is the cause per se of the grave. And therefore, if some substance has something in itself, say malice, from which it has that it is only a cause per accidens and in no way per se; it is necessary that there also be something in it through which it can be a cause per se of either the same or another effect. Hence St. Thomas did not infer that there must be in them something prior to their malice through which they are causes of evil, but absolutely, through which they are causes. The objection, however, proceeds concerning a cause per se and per accidens with respect to one and the same effect only.

Or it can be said more briefly that it is not the mind of St. Thomas, as the objection supposes, that what is a cause per accidens of some effect is also its cause per se through some nature existing in it: but that, if something is a cause per accidens of something through something existing in it, there must be something else in it through which it belongs to it to be a cause per se; because a cause per accidens, with the accidentality resting on the part of the cause, is said to be that which is joined to a cause per se.

IV. Thirdly. If such substances were evil according to their nature, they would have no being. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. Because each of the beings has being according to the mode of its nature. But being, inasmuch as it is such, is good: whence all things desire it. — Note that this consequence is proved by the destruction of the consequent. For it holds: — They have some being. Therefore they are good according to nature: because being is a certain good, and belongs to a thing according to the mode of its nature.

Fourthly. Those things which are from the first being are good: because every agent acts like itself; but the first being is the highest good. But nothing can be without having being from the first being. Therefore etc.

Fifthly ³. Either such a substance would be evil simply: or evil to this, and with respect to this; as poison is evil to this, to which it is harmful, although to another it is food. Not simply. Because it is impossible that there be anything that is universally deprived of participation in good. For since the desirable and the good are the same, such a thing would have nothing in itself desirable. But it is clear that its own being is desirable to each thing. — Nor also to this. Because, since this happens from the fact that the particular good which is proper to this is contrary to the particular good which is the good of another, as the heat of fire is contrary to the coldness of water; that which according to its nature is ordered toward good, not a particular good, but good simply, cannot possibly, even according to this mode, be said to be naturally evil. But such is every intellect: for its good is in its proper operation, which is of universals, and of those things which are simply.

V. For the evidence of this argument, it must be considered first that, since simply has two meanings—for it signifies the same as absolutely and without addition ⁴; and the same as universally—in this place it is taken in the second signification, when it is said that nothing is simply evil. For the sense is that nothing existing in nature is universally and in every part evil. Whence, to intimate this, St. Thomas says that it is impossible for something to be that is universally deprived of participation in good. — Similarly, the sense is concerning the intellect, that it is not borne toward some particular good, but toward the good simply, that is, universally taken. Whence what he says, and of those things which are simply, is an exposition of what he had said, that the proper operation of the intellect is of universals.

2. It must be considered secondly, from the teaching of St. Thomas, Prima Pars, q. 63, a. 4, that universal good differs from particular good, because to the universal good no evil can be joined. For since evil is spoken of from the privation of some perfection, to say that some evil is joined to the universal good is to say that the universal good lacks some perfection, and thus it will not be universal good: whether universal good is taken according to perfection, or according to predication. But to a particular good some evil can be joined: because it is not unfitting for some particular thing to have one perfection and to lack another perfection, just as to fire is joined this evil which is to be consumptive of other things. From which it follows that, since every nature tends in some way to the good, that which tends to the universal good according to nature, in no way—neither per se, I say, nor per accidens—tends to evil according to nature: since to the universal good no evil is joined. But that which according to nature tends to some particular good can naturally tend to some evil: per accidens, however, inasmuch, namely, as some evil is joined to the good to which it is ordered. Whence, since the intellectual nature tends not to a particular good, but to the universal good, which is the object of its operation, it follows that it in no way naturally tends to evil. From which it remains, as St. Thomas infers, that it is not possible that any intellect be evil according to its nature: not only simply, as tending, namely, to the universally evil, since nothing existing is universally evil; but neither even secundum quid, as tending, namely, to some good to which the evil of another is joined, since it tends to the universal good, to which no evil can be joined, for the universal is the object of intellect and will.

VI. But a twofold doubt occurs. The first is, because someone could say that, although to the universal good according to perfection, such as the divine good is, no evil can be joined; nevertheless, to the universal good according to predication it is not unfitting that some evil be joined, because this sort of universal good has being in a particular good, to which some evil can be joined. But the intellect and the will are ordered to the universal good according to predication as to their object, and not to the universal good according to perfection. Whence from St. Thomas, Prima Pars, the place cited, it is held that it is ordered to some good according to the common character of good. Therefore it does not follow, if an intellectual nature is ordered to the universal good according to nature, that it is not naturally ordered to some evil, at least per accidens.

The second doubt is, because some good is said to be evil in some way also inasmuch as it is evil to something, as is clear in this place. But God is evil to the damned, inasmuch as He punishes them. Therefore God is in some way evil. But something is naturally inclined to God: namely, the intellectual substance, which loves Him naturally, as St. Thomas shows in Prima Pars, q. 60, a. 5. And nevertheless the intellectual nature is ordered to the good universally. Therefore it is false what is said here: namely, that that which according to its nature is ordered to good, not a particular good, but good simply, cannot be called evil even secundum quid, inasmuch, namely, as it is evil to something.

VII. To the first of these it is said that, although to the universal good as particularized in this good, some evil can be conjoined; nevertheless, to it taken absolutely, and according to the precise character of universal good, no evil is conjoined. Because just as the character of universal good in itself abstracts from all particular good, so it abstracts from all evil which accompanies particular good: for to the universal, inasmuch as it is such, nothing contrary to it can be conjoined; just as to the rational animal the irrational cannot be joined. But the intellect and the will are naturally and formally borne toward the good itself according to the universal character of good, not according to some particular character. For the intellect apprehends the good simply and absolutely: and the will similarly desires the good simply and absolutely, naturally desiring good as such, but not this or that good, except materially, inasmuch, namely, as the character of good is preserved in it.

2. To the second doubt it is said first, that St. Thomas is speaking of that which is evil to something from the perfection of its nature: because, namely, being harmful to another accompanies its nature. For that which is naturally ordered to a good to which evil is in this way joined, is naturally inclined to that evil per accidens, or to an evil secundum quid. And if something is ordered to a good to which the character of evil does not belong in this way, it is not said to be naturally inclined to evil even secundum quid. Now, it is said that to be harmful to the damned does not accompany the divine nature as following upon its perfection, but belongs to God from His free will. Therefore the argument does not follow.

It is said secondly, that St. Thomas is speaking of the inclination of a thing to good as to a per se and proper object. Because, namely, if some character of evil accompanies such a good, the thing is said to be naturally inclined to evil secundum quid: but if no character of evil is joined to that good, it is not said to be naturally inclined to evil even secundum quid. Now, although the intellectual nature is naturally inclined to God, it is nevertheless not inclined to Him as to a per se and proper object, but to the universal character of good. Therefore the argument does not follow.

VIII. Sixthly ⁵. By a natural order the intellectual substance wills the good. Therefore etc. — The antecedent is proved. Because in that which has an intellect, the good of the will is in that it follows the intellect: just as in us that is good which is according to reason; but what is outside this is evil. But by a natural order the intellect moves the appetite.

How the will is naturally and of necessity borne toward the good was shown in the preceding chapters ⁶. Similarly how the intellect moves the will ⁷.

Seventhly. No intellect naturally errs concerning the judgment of good. Therefore etc. — The antecedent is proved. Because, since the good of the intellect, and its natural end, is the knowledge of truth, false judgments in the operations of the intellect are like monsters in natural things, which are not according to nature, but outside nature. — The consequence, moreover, is proved. Because, since the will naturally tends toward the good understood as toward its proper object and end, it is impossible that any intellectual substance naturally have an evil will, unless it naturally err concerning the judgment of good.

The aforesaid argument is confirmed. The intellect cannot naturally wander from the knowledge of the true. Therefore neither can the will naturally fall away from the good. — The antecedent is proved. Because, since a cognitive power according to its nature is ordered to the knowledge of its object, none falls away from the knowledge of it except on account of some defect or corruption. It is illustrated in sight. But every corruption and defect is outside nature (namely, particular nature): since nature intends the being and perfection of a thing.

The conclusion is confirmed by the authority of the Apostle, 1 Tim. 4; and Gen. 1.

Through this is excluded the error of the Manichees; and the opinion which Porphyry recounts in the Letter to Anebo. Which indeed openly declares the malice of the demons whose help the magical arts use, but is blameworthy in this, that it says that this malice is naturally in them.