Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

After St. Thomas showed that the works of magicians cannot be done by the power of celestial bodies, he wishes next to investigate whence magical arts have their efficacy ¹.

I. And he posits this conclusion: Magical arts have their efficacy from some intellectual nature.

Concerning this, moreover, he does two things: first, he shows that they have efficacy from an intellectual substance; second, he shows that such an intellectual substance is not good, in the following chapter.

2. As to the first point, he proves the proposition by premising two things. The first is, Magicians in their operations use certain meaningful words to produce determinate effects.

The second is, that a word, inasmuch as it is meaningful, has no power except either from the intellect of the speaker, if some intellect is of such power that by its conception it can cause things, which conception it in some way presents to the effects to be produced by means of the word; or from the intellect of the one to whom the speech is directed, when through the meaning of the word received into his intellect ², he is induced to do something.

3. Then he argues as follows ³. Either those meaningful words uttered by magicians have efficacy from the intellect of the speaker, or from the intellect of the one to whom the speech of the person uttering such words is directed. Not the first. Therefore the second.

The minor premise is proved in two ways. First, because if there were some men who by words expressing the conception of their intellect could transmute things by their own power, they would be of a different species from other men, and would be called men equivocally: for since power follows essence, a diversity of power shows a diversity of essential principles. But the intellect of men is commonly found to be of this disposition, that its knowledge is caused by things, rather than that it can cause things by its conception.

Second, because some acquire the ability to perform such magical operations through instruction. But the power to act is not acquired through instruction, but only the knowledge of acting.

4. Nor can it be said that such men from their birth ⁴, by the power of the stars, obtain this power above others, so that, however much others may be instructed who do not have this from birth, they cannot be efficacious in such works: because it was shown above that celestial bodies cannot impress upon the intellect.

If it is said that the imagination also works something in the utterance of meaningful words, upon which imagination celestial bodies can act: — this cannot be with respect to the effects that are produced through such arts, since it was shown above that not all such effects can be produced by the power of the stars.

This reason is confirmed. Because the meaningful words that magicians use are invocations, supplications, adjurations, or even commands, as of one conversing with another.

II. Concerning what is said, that a word, inasmuch as it is meaningful, has no power, it should be noted that St. Thomas added inasmuch as it is meaningful because it would not be unfitting for a word, inasmuch as it is accompanied by the motion of the inner and outer air conveying the sound, to have some power. But inasmuch as it is meaningful, it has no power: because meaning, on the part of the word, is nothing other than the relation of reason of the sign to the signified; and it is clear that such a relation has no active power.

Concerning the other statement: namely, that if some men could transmute things by their own power through words, they would be men equivocally with others, it must be considered that St. Thomas added by their own power for this reason, because it is not unfitting for a man to be able to transmute something by his words through the power of another: just as a priest, by divine power, converts bread into the body of Christ by the words of consecration.

2. Concerning what is said, that the power to act is not acquired through instruction, a doubt arises. For art, and any practical science, is an active form. But an active form has the character of a power. Yet these are acquired through instruction. Therefore it is false that the power to act is not acquired through instruction.

He answers that the name power can be taken in two ways. In one way, as it signifies the active potency itself by which an agent acts: just as we say that heat is the power of fire. In another way, for that which is superadded to a potency, as its complement, after the manner of a permanent form: in which way the habits of the appetite are called moral virtues, and the habits of the intellect are called intellectual virtues. Power, therefore, in this place is not taken in the second way, according to which way art and practical science can be called a power, but in the first way: for, as St. Thomas says below, in Book IV, chap. LXXVII, through a habit some ability is not given to us, but that we may act well or badly. And in this sense it is false that every form which is in some way operative is a power.

III. A second principal argument is made. Magicians in the observances of this art use certain determinate characters and figures. And not as certain dispositions of matter toward some natural effect. Therefore only as signs. Therefore magical arts have efficacy from that intelligent being to whom the speech is directed.

The second part of the antecedent is proved. Because a figure is the principle of no action or passion: otherwise mathematical bodies would be active and passive. — But the first consequence is proved. Because no other determinate ⁵ thing can be given. — But the second is proved: because we do not use signs except toward other intelligent beings.

2. If anyone should say that, because some figures are appropriated to some of the celestial bodies, therefore lower bodies are determined through some figures to receive the impressions of some celestial bodies, as namely having figures similar and appropriated to them: — this does not seem to be said reasonably. First, because through figures matter is not disposed to be in potency to some form: since figure, according to its notion, as a mathematical entity, abstracts from all sensible matter and form; but only those things determine a patient to receive a special impression through which it comes to be in potency in some way; since a patient is not ordered to receive the impressions of an agent except through the fact that it is in potency.

Second, because some figures are appropriated to celestial bodies as their effects: since in these lower things they are caused by them. But the aforesaid arts do not use characters and signs as effects of celestial bodies, but they are the effects of a man operating through art. And thus the appropriation of figures seems to have no bearing on the matter at hand.

Third, because the bodies in which such figures are impressed are of the same suitability to receive celestial influence as other bodies of the same species: since through a figure no natural matter is disposed toward a form. But that something should act upon one of the things that are equally disposed on account of something appropriated to it found there, and not upon another, belongs not to an agent operating by necessity of nature, but by choice.

The proposition is confirmed from the very name given to such figures: namely, in that they call them characters. For, since a character is a sign — that is, what is called character in Greek is called a sign in Latin — it is given to be understood that they do not use them except as signs presented to some intellectual nature.

3. But someone could say to the aforesaid that from some celestial influence some power follows upon the constitution of the figure, which gives the species to the image, not according as it is a figure, but according as it causes the species of the artificial thing, which obtains power from the stars ⁶.

Yet nevertheless, concerning inscribed letters or other characters, it can only be said that they are signs.

This is confirmed through the sacrifices and prostrations which they use, which cannot be anything other than signs of reverence shown to some intellectual nature.

IV. Concerning the principal foundation of this reason, namely, Figure is the principle of no action, nor of passion, a doubt arises on two counts.

First, because figure seems to aid motion, or even to impede it. For broad bodies descend more slowly, but pointed ones more swiftly.

Second, because the soul is not caused except in organized matter having a determinate figure. But this would not be unless figure were a disposition of matter. Therefore etc.

2. A doubt is also raised concerning the proof of the foundation: namely, because mathematical bodies are not active and passive; and because mathematical things abstract from sensible matter and form. For someone could say, according to the intention of Albert in the second book of Minerals ⁷, and of the ancient magicians, that although mathematical things according to their notion abstract from sensible matter and form, they do not, however, abstract from these according to esse. And therefore, although as they are considered in mathematical abstraction they are not principles of action or passion, nevertheless, according as they are in sensible matter according to their esse, they are principles of both action and passion; for thus they are in some way natural.

Also, quantity is a mathematical thing. And yet, as is said in the Tertia, q. LXXVII, a. 2, it is the first disposition of matter. Therefore it is not repugnant to mathematical things to be a disposition of matter.

V. For the evidence of this, it must be considered that figure properly taken, of which there is discussion here, is nothing other, as is gathered from St. Thomas in the Third Book of the Sentences, d. XVI, q. II, a. 1, ad 1, than a quality resulting from the termination of quantity. And therefore, just as quantity is a mathematical thing, so also is figure. But mathematical things abstract from sensible matter according to their notion, although they are in such matter according to esse. And therefore according to their notion they abstract from action and passion, which do not occur except by reason of sensible matter or form: for every corporeal agent acts upon another through some sensible and material form; and everything that undergoes passion undergoes it through sensible matter, to which it belongs to be altered. Figure, therefore, existing as a mathematical entity, since it abstracts from sensible form and matter according to its notion, cannot be that by which an agent acts as an active principle; nor can it be that by which a patient undergoes passion and is altered as a passive principle, through which, namely, the subject is receptive of some form. And thus it is said that it can be the principle of neither action nor passion.

2. But when it is argued to the contrary first, because figure seems to aid motion, or even to impede it: — it is said that this is not because the figure itself is the principle by which the mover moves, or the moved is moved: but because according to the diversity of figures there is a diverse application of the mover to the moved; and according to the diverse application of the mover and the moved, the power of the mover penetrates more or less that which is moved, and thus causes a swifter or slower motion. Hence in IV De Caelo, text 44 and 45 ⁸, Aristotle and the Commentator state that heavy bodies of pointed figure divide continuous things quickly, but not broad bodies.

When it is argued secondly, that the soul is not introduced except in organized and duly figured matter: — it is said that this is not because figure is a disposition of matter through which it is receptive of the soul; but because the soul requires such a disposition of matter, upon which such a figure follows. For diverse figures follow upon diverse material forms: for which reason figure is the greatest indication of species in something that is one per se.

3. When also the argument of St. Thomas is attacked because, although mathematical things abstract from sensible matter according to their notion, they do not, however, abstract according to esse: — it is said that in order for something to be a principle by which a material agent acts to produce a natural effect, or by which a patient undergoes passion, it does not suffice that it have esse in sensible matter, but it is also required that in its notion it include sensible matter. For since that which acts is the composite itself of matter and form, and is something sensible, it is necessary that the principle by which it naturally acts have an order and dependence in itself upon sensible matter. Similarly, it is necessary that the disposition of natural matter for receiving some form have an order and dependence upon the matter itself according to its nature, just as the form to which it disposes also has an order and dependence upon matter. But that which has an order and dependence according to its proper nature upon matter cannot be understood or defined without matter. Therefore it is necessary that the principle of acting or undergoing passion naturally include matter in its notion, and be of the genus of natural things, not of the genus of mathematical things.

When in the last place the authority of St. Thomas is adduced saying that quantity is the first disposition of matter: — it is said that a disposition of matter can be taken in two ways: in one way, for that by which matter is prepared for the reception of some form, and becomes in potency to it; in another way, for every accident inhering in matter. Quantity, therefore, is the first disposition of matter in the second way: inasmuch as it is the first accident inhering in matter, and all other accidents are referred to matter through the mediation of quantity, as is said in the place cited before. But it is not a disposition in the first way: unless perhaps it be called a disposition sine qua non. Therefore what is brought forward is not against the proposition.

VI. Concerning what St. Thomas seems to intend, namely that the figures that are in such images are not the effect of celestial bodies ⁹, a doubt arises. Because such figures are made through motion. But everything that is made through motion seems to depend upon a celestial body. Therefore etc.

For the evidence of this, it must be considered that one must speak in one way of the natural figures of corporeal things, and in another way of the figures that are made through art. For since the heaven is a natural agent, and is the cause of every natural form, it is necessary that figures naturally following upon some substantial forms be referred to the heaven as to the universal cause of all lower corporeal things. But figures introduced through art do not follow upon the natural form of the substance, but are made according to the likeness of the conception which is in the mind of the artisan, and according to the choice of the artisan himself. Therefore the power of a celestial body, which extends only to natural forms, does not extend to such artificial figures.

To that which is argued to the contrary, therefore, it can first be said that, although such figures are made through motion, they are not, however, made through natural motion, but through voluntary motion proceeding from the artisan. But only natural motions depend upon the first motion, not voluntary ones: as is the mind of St. Thomas in Question xvi de Malo, a. 10, ad 5.

It could be said secondly that the heaven is the cause of every effect proceeding from motion if it follows upon the motion naturally; but not if it follows upon motion only from the disposition of the intellect and will, as an artificial figure follows upon motion.

2. Nor is what the ancient magicians say valid, as reported by Albert in the place cited before. For they say that all artificial things, inasmuch as they are such, proceed from celestial powers: because nature, which is moved by celestial power, is the principle of art, while the will, unless it resists, is drawn by nature. As is apparent in children, who manifest in themselves aptitudes for one art or another: in which if they are exercised, they become perfect; but if they resist and practice others, they never achieve perfection, on account of the inaptitude of nature for that art.

For to this it is said first that, if that reason proves anything, it proves only this, that the figures to the making of which some are inclined by nature proceed in some way from celestial bodies. But this does not stand in the way of the proposition. Because the figures of magicians are not only made by those having a natural inclination to make them, but also by those who do not have this natural inclination. Hence through this reason it cannot be universally concluded that such figures are made by celestial power.

It is said secondly: granted that all those making the aforesaid images had a natural inclination toward that art, it does not follow that the things that are made through magical arts are made by celestial power. For some are inclined to an art by nature inasmuch as from the disposition of the body and interior powers they are suited to the acquisition of that art: but after they have acquired the art, they do not operate through it as it is moved by a celestial body, but as the magician uses it at his choice, and as he arranges it in his mind. Hence it is not necessary that a figure produced through art be the effect of a celestial power. For the effect of a lower cause is not referred to a higher cause unless the lower cause produces it as it is moved by the higher.

VII. Concerning the introduction of the last response that could be given by magicians ¹⁰, a doubt arises. Because St. Thomas, in Secunda Secundae, q. xcvi ¹¹, holds that artificial things obtain no power from celestial bodies. But to this it seems repugnant that some power should follow upon the constitution of a figure according as it causes the species of an artificial thing.

But it should be noted that we can interpret this response in two ways. First, indeed, as if St. Thomas accepts it as true concerning figure, but not concerning letters and characters. But then it must be understood conformably to what was said above in the preceding chapter ¹²: not indeed that the figured thing, inasmuch as it is artificial, obtains any power from the stars, since the opposite of this was stated as the mind of St. Thomas himself in the Secunda Secundae; but that the artificial thing itself, by reason of the transmutation and alteration made in the matter during the constitution of the figure under a certain constellation, can obtain some power from the stars. And by this reason it can be said in some way that some power follows upon the constitution of the figure, inasmuch as the figure is the form of the artificial thing that constitutes its species: not, namely, by reason of the figure inasmuch as it is such, but by reason of the subject altered and constituted through it in the species of the artificial thing. Hence St. Thomas does not say absolutely that a power from the influence of heaven follows upon the constitution of the figure; but he added, according as it causes the species of the artificial thing, which obtains power from the stars; as if to say: — Celestial power does not follow upon that constitution and fabrication of the figure as it is the constitution of a figure; but as it is accompanied by the alteration and transmutation of natural matter by a celestial body, which matter is constituted in the species of the artificial thing through such a figure.

Secondly, we can interpret the introduction of the aforesaid response, namely, that St. Thomas does not accept it as true, but admits it as a certain subterfuge of the magicians with respect to figure, and shows that, with respect to letters and characters, they cannot take this subterfuge. For he means to say: — Although in some way magicians can escape the above-mentioned reasons by saying that no power from a celestial body follows upon figure inasmuch as it is a figure, yet some power can follow upon it inasmuch as it causes the species of the artificial thing: nevertheless they cannot escape the aforesaid reasons with respect to the letters that they inscribe upon images, and with respect to characters. For it is clear that these do not give species to artificial images.