Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III
Francesco Silvestri (1474–1528)
Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles
First published 1926
In Book III of the Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Francesco Silvestri of Ferrara (Ferrariensis) expounds Aquinas's account of providence, human happiness, moral action, and divine grace. The commentary accompanies the Leonine text in volume XIV (1926). The present digital edition includes the Latin text and an English translation.
Prooemium
Caput I: Quod Omne Agens Agit propter Finem
Caput II: Quod Omne Agens Agit propter Bonum
Caput III: Quod Malum est Praeter Intentionem in Rebus
Caput IV: Rationes Quibus Videtur Probari quod Malum non Sit Praeter Intentionem
Caput V: Solutio Rationum Praemissarum
Caput VI: Quod Malum non est Aliqua Essentia
Caput VII: Rationes Quibus Videtur Probari quod Malum Sit Natura vel Res Aliqua
Caput VIII: Solutio Rationum Praemissarum
Caput IX: Quod Causa Mali est Bonum
Caput X: Quod Malum Fundatur in Bono
Caput XI: Quod Malum non Totaliter Consumit Bonum
Caput XII: Quod Malum Habet Aliquo Modo Causam
Caput XIII: Quod Malum est Causa per Accidens
Caput XIV: Quod non est Summum Malum
Caput XV: Quod Finis Cuiuslibet Rei est Bonum
Caput XVI: Quod Omnia Ordinantur in Unum Finem, qui est Deus
Caput XVII: Quomodo Deus Sit Finis Rerum
Caput XVIII: Quod Omnia Intendunt Assimilari Deo
Caput XIX: Quomodo Res Imitentur Divinam Bonitatem
Caput XX: Quod Res Intendunt Naturaliter Assimilari Deo in Hoc quod est Causa
Caput XXI: Quomodo Diversimode Res Ordinantur in Suos Fines
Caput XXII: Quod Motus Caeli est a Principio Intellectivo
Caput XXIII: Quomodo Appetunt Bonum Etiam quae Cognitione Carent
Caput XXIV: Quod Intelligere Deum est Finis Omnis Intellectualis Substantiae
Caput XXV: Utrum Felicitas Consistat in Actu Voluntatis
Caput XXVI: Quod Felicitas Humana non Consistit in Delectationibus Carnalibus
Caput XXVII: Quod Felicitas non Consistit in Honoribus
Caput XXVIII: Quod Felicitas Hominis non Consistit in Gloria
Caput XXIX: Quod Felicitas Hominis non Consistit in Divitiis
Caput XXX: Quod Felicitas non Consistit in Potentia Mundana
Caput XXXI: Quod Felicitas non Consistit in Bonis Corporis
Caput XXXII: Quod Felicitas Humana non Consistit in Sensu
Caput XXXIII: Quod Ultima Hominis Felicitas non Consistit in Actibus Virtutum Moralium
Caput XXXIV: Quod Ultima Felicitas non Sit in Actu Prudentiae
Caput XXXV: Quod Felicitas non Consistit in Operatione Artis
Caput XXXVI: Quod Ultima Felicitas Hominis Consistit in Contemplatione Dei
Caput XXXVII: Quod Felicitas Humana non Consistit in Cognitione Dei quae Communiter Habetur a Pluribus
Caput XXXVIII: Quod Felicitas Humana non Consistit in Cognitione Dei quae Habetur per Demonstrationem
Caput XXXIX: Quod Felicitas Humana non Consistit in Cognitione Dei quae est per Fidem
Caput XL: Utrum in Hac Vita Homo Possit Intelligere Substantias Separatas per Studium et Inquisitionem Scientiarum Speculativarum
Caput XLI: Quod non Possumus in Hac Vita Cognoscere Substantias Separatas sicut Ponit Alexander
Caput XLII: Quod non Possumus in Hac Vita Intelligere Substantias Separatas sicut Ponit Averroes
Caput XLIII: Quod Ultima Felicitas Hominis non Consistit in Cognitione Substantiarum Separatarum Qualem Praedictae Opiniones Fingunt
Caput XLIV: Quod non Possumus in Hac Vita Intelligere Substantias Separatas
Caput XLV: Quod Anima in Hac Vita non Intelligit Seipsam per Seipsam
Caput XLVI: Quod non Possumus in Hac Vita Videre Deum per Essentiam
Caput XLVII: Quod Ultima Hominis Felicitas non Sit in Hac Vita
Caput XLVIII: Quod Substantiae Separatae non Vident Deum per Essentiam ex Hoc quod Cognoscunt eum per Suam Essentiam
Caput XLIX: Quod in Naturali Cognitione Quam Habent Substantiae Separatae de Deo non Quiescit Earum Naturale Desiderium
Caput L: Quomodo Deus per Essentiam Videatur
Caput LI: Quod Nulla Creata Substantia Potest Sua Naturali Virtute Pervenire ad Videndum Deum per Essentiam
Caput LII: Quod Intellectus Creatus Indiget Aliqua Influentia Divini Luminis ad Hoc ut Deum per Essentiam Videat
Caput LIII: Rationes Quibus Videtur Probari quod Deus non Possit Videri per Essentiam, et Solutiones Earum
Caput LIV: Quod Intellectus Creatus non Comprehendit Divinam Substantiam
Caput LV: Quod Nullus Intellectus Creatus, Videndo Deum, Videt Omnia quae in Eo Videri Possunt
Caput LVI: Quod Omnis Intellectus, Cuiuscumque Gradus, Particeps esse Potest Divinae Visionis
Caput LVII: Quod Unus Alio Perfectius Deum Videre Potest
Caput LVIII: Quomodo Videntes Divinam Substantiam Omnia Vident
Caput LIX: Quod Videntes Deum Omnia Simul Vident in Ipso
Caput LX: Quod per Visionem Dei Aliquis Fit Particeps Vitae Aeternae
Caput LXI: Quod Videntes Deum in Perpetuum eum Videbunt
Caput LXII: Qualiter in Illa Ultima Felicitate Omne Desiderium Hominis Completur
Caput LXIII: Quod Deus Sua Providentia Gubernat Res
Caput LXIV: Quod Deus Conservat Res in esse
Caput LXV: Quod Nihil Dat esse Nisi Inquantum Agit in Virtute Divina
Caput LXVI: Quod Deus est Causa Operandi Omnibus Operantibus
Caput LXVII: Quod Deus est Ubique
Caput LXVIII: De Opinione Eorum qui Rebus Naturalibus Proprias Subtrahunt Actiones
Caput LXIX: Quomodo Idem Effectus Sit a Deo et a Natura Agente
Caput LXX: Quod Divina Providentia non Excludit Totaliter Malum a Rebus
Caput LXXI: Quod Divina Providentia non Excludit Contingentiam a Rebus
Caput LXXII: Quod Divina Providentia non Excludit Arbitrii Libertatem
Caput LXXIII: Quod Divina Providentia non Excludit Fortunam et Casum
Caput LXXIV: Quod Providentia Dei Sit Singularium Contingentium
Caput LXXV: Quod Providentia Dei Sit Omnium Singularium Immediate
Caput LXXVI: Quod Executio Divinae Providentiae Fit Mediantibus Causis Secundis
Caput LXXVII: Quod Mediantibus Creaturis Intellectualibus Aliae Creaturae Reguntur a Deo
Caput LXXVIII: Quod Substantiae Intellectivae Inferiores Reguntur per Superiores
Caput LXXIX: De Ordinatione Angelorum ad Invicem
Caput LXXX: De Ordinatione Hominum ad Invicem et ad Alia
Caput LXXXI: Quod Inferiora Corpora Reguntur a Deo per Corpora Caelestia
Caput LXXXII: Epilogus Praedictorum
Caput LXXXIII: Quod Corpora Caelestia non Imprimant in Intellectus Nostros
Caput LXXXIV: Quod Corpora Caelestia non sunt Causae Voluntatum et Electionum Nostrarum
Caput LXXXV: Quod Corporales Effectus in Istis Inferioribus non Sequuntur ex Necessitate a Corporibus Caelestibus
Caput LXXXVI: Quod Motus Caelestis Corporis non Sit Causa Electionum Nostrarum ex Virtute Animae Moventis, ut Quidam Dicunt
Caput LXXXVII: Quod Substantiae Separatae Creatae non Possunt esse Causa Directe Electionum et Voluntatum Nostrarum, sed Solus Deus
Caput LXXXVIII: Quod Motus Voluntatis Causatur a Deo, et non Solum Potentia Voluntatis
Caput LXXXIX: Quod Electiones et Voluntates Humanae Subduntur Divinae Providentiae
Caput XC: Quomodo Res Humanae ad Superiores Causas Reducantur
Caput XCI: Quomodo Dicitur Aliquis Bene Fortunatus, et Quomodo Adiuvatur Homo ex Superioribus Causis
Caput XCII: De Fato: an Sit, et Quid Sit
Caput XCIII: De Certitudine Divinae Providentiae
Caput XCIV: Quod Immobilitas Divinae Providentiae Utilitatem Orationis non Excludit
Caput XCV: Quod Deus non Omnes Orationes Exaudit
Caput XCVI: Quomodo Dispositio Providentiae Habeat Rationem
Caput XCVII: Quomodo Deus Possit Facere Praeter Ordinem Suae Providentiae, et Quomodo non
Caput XCVIII: Quod Deus Potest Operari Praeter Ordinem Rebus Inditum, Producendo Effectus absque Causis Proximis
Caput XCIX: Quod Ea quae Deus Facit Praeter Naturae Ordinem non sunt contra Naturam
Caput C: De Miraculis
Caput CI: Quod Solus Deus Facit Miracula
Caput CII: Quod Substantiae Spirituales Aliqua Mirabilia Operantur, quae tamen non sunt Vere Miracula
Caput CIII: Quod Opera Magorum non sunt Solum ex Impressione Caelestium Corporum
After St. Thomas has shown that spiritual substances can produce certain effects that are marvelous to us, because marvelous effects appear especially in the works of magicians, he intends to treat of their cause 1.
Concerning this, however, he does two things: first, he shows that effects of this kind do not proceed from the power of heavenly bodies alone; second, that they proceed from some spiritual substance, in the following chapter.
I. As to the first, some have said that works of this kind are not done by any spiritual substances, but from the power of heavenly bodies. A sign of this seems to be that the position of the stars is observed for works of this kind, and certain aids of herbs and of other corporeal things are applied. But against them St. Thomas argues from those things that appear in the works of magicians.
First. In the operations of magicians there appear certain things that are the proper works of a rational nature: such as that answers are given concerning stolen goods, and other things of this kind. Therefore, not all effects of magicians can be caused by the power of heavenly bodies alone. — The consequence is proved. Because it is impossible that effects which are proper to an intellectual nature be caused by the power of a heavenly body.
Second 2: and this is a confirmation of the preceding argument. There appear some speaking with men in operations of this kind, and speaking about various matters. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is proved. Because speech is a proper act of a rational nature.
- But if someone should say that appearances of this kind occur not according to the exterior sense, but according to the imagination alone: — it is argued to the contrary. First, because apparitions of this kind happen to men who freely use their senses. But imagined forms do not appear to anyone as real things unless an alienation from the exterior senses takes place: since likenesses cannot be attended to 3 as things, unless the judgment 4 of the senses is bound.
Second, because for the most part through things seen in this way there comes to someone an intellectual knowledge of some things that exceed the capacity of his intellect: such as the revelation of hidden treasures, the manifestation of future events, and the truthful answering concerning the teachings of some science. But from imagined forms there cannot come to someone an intellectual knowledge beyond the natural or acquired capacity of his intellect. Which is shown from dreams, in which, even if there is some foreshadowing of future events, nevertheless not everyone who sees dreams understands what they signify.
II. For the evidence of both arguments, it must be considered first that those are called proper works of a rational nature which can proceed from an intellectual nature alone: just as those are called proper works of an animal which proceed from an animal alone and from nothing else, as sensing is the proper work of an animal, because animals alone sense. But it is clear that answering concerning stolen goods, and speaking with men and reasoning with them about various matters, belongs only to a nature having an intellect, which manifests its concepts to man through vocal sounds. For that reason St. Thomas calls works of this kind proper works of an intellectual nature.
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It should be noted secondly, when he says that from imagined forms there cannot come to someone an intellectual knowledge beyond his natural or acquired capacity, that the capacity of the human intellect is twofold, as is touched upon here: namely, one natural, the other acquired. For since, as is said in the First Part, q. LXXXIV, a. 2, ad 2, capacity sometimes names a power unimpeded for acting, according as the intellect has a power unimpeded for knowing, it is thus said to have a capacity for knowledge. But the intellect has a power of knowing something unimpededly in a twofold way. Namely, either from natural principles alone, of which sort are the possible intellect, the agent intellect, the habit of first principles, and the disposition of the interior senses: and this is called man's natural capacity for understanding. Or not from natural principles alone, but from some acquired habit, just as the intellect of a geometer has the power of unimpededly knowing geometrical things from the fact that he has the habit of geometry: and such a capacity is called an acquired capacity. But in order that the intellect of a man, whether according to natural or according to acquired capacity, be directed toward some knowledge, phantasms are indeed required, which are here called imagined forms; yet nevertheless from the formation of phantasms alone the intellect cannot reach any intellection that exceeds the natural or acquired capacity of the intellect: because the phantasms themselves do not concur in intellection except either as instruments of the intellect, through the mediation of which species are impressed upon the possible intellect by the agent intellect; or as objects in which man understands the nature represented through the intelligible species existing in the intellect. For this reason St. Thomas infers that those appearing or speaking must not be seen according to the imagination alone; or, if such a vision is according to the imagination, that it is done by the power of some higher intellect leading man through such imaginations into the knowledge of such things as are above the capacity of any man's intellect.
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But it should be noted that St. Thomas is not speaking only of the capacity of the intellect for understanding absolutely and in general, but also of the capacity of this or that man, according as one man is naturally more talented or more learned than another. For in this way it happens that what is above the capacity of the intellect of one man is not above the capacity of the intellect of another: just as knowing the order of the movement of the heavenly bodies is above the capacity of a peasant and an unlearned person, but not above the capacity of an astrologer. Therefore, when something is shown to someone through the works of magicians that exceeds the capacity of his intellect, although perhaps it does not exceed the capacity of another's, it is necessary that he be brought to that knowledge, if it is done through an alteration of the phantasia and the imagination, by the power of some higher intellect, and the heavenly power alone with imagined forms does not suffice. But a knowledge of this kind above the capacity of some man takes place, according to the doctrine of St. Thomas in II Sent., d. VII, q. II, a. 25, inasmuch as either phantasms preexisting in the imagination of the man himself are illuminated by the light of a higher intellect, and are composed or divided, so that from them, thus illuminated by the intellect, certain intentions are elicited from which there results in the possible intellect a knowledge of some things for the eliciting of which the illumination of the agent intellect would not suffice; or new species are formed in the imagination, according to some transmutation of the corporeal organ and of the spirits, by some intelligent being ordering the phantasms themselves to the knowledge of some things.
III. Concerning what St. Thomas says, that in dreams some foreshadowing of future events occurs, and yet not everyone who sees dreams understands what they signify, it must be noted, according to his doctrine in II Sent., in the place cited above, ad 6, and IIa IIae, q. xcv, a. 6, that in dreams there can be a foreshadowing of future events in four ways. First, when from the same intrinsic natural cause both the dream and the future event proceed: as when from the dominance of phlegm one dreams that he is eating sweets, there is signified either future sickness or future health; for the dominance of phlegm itself is sometimes the cause of both. — Second, when from the power of a heavenly body there are left in the body and imagination some impressions and some movements, which are signs of the heavenly movements in lower bodies; and from these movements there are fashioned in the imagination images and likenesses of those effects to which the heavenly movements dispose; just as there are also certain animals that by their movements foretell a future storm. — Third, when by God, through the ministry of angels, some things are revealed to men in dreams: as is clear in those things that were sometimes revealed to the prophets. — Fourth, when by the operation of demons some things appear to those who are sleeping, from which sometimes certain future events, known by the demons themselves, are revealed to them.
Because, therefore, it very often happens that some things appear in dreams that are signs of some future events, and yet the dreamer does not understand what is signified by those dreams, as happened to Pharaoh6: therefore St. Thomas says that in dreams future events are sometimes foreshadowed, and yet the dreamer does not understand the things that are signified.
IV. Third7, it is argued. Through the aforesaid operations some things are done which cannot be natural to any thing: such as that at the presence of someone every lock is opened to him, that someone is rendered invisible, and things of this kind. Therefore, through these operations things are done which cannot be done by the power of heavenly bodies. — The consequence is proved. What is done by the power of heavenly bodies is a natural effect. Therefore, what can be natural to no thing cannot be done by the power of heavenly bodies. Therefore, etc. The antecedent is proved: because it is natural forms that are caused in lower things from the power of heavenly bodies.
For the evidence of this argument, it must be considered that St. Thomas adduces it to show that the images that are fashioned by magicians for these effects—namely, that one carrying them upon himself may be rendered invisible, or that at his presence every lock may be opened to him—do not produce these effects from some power bestowed upon them and impressed by heavenly bodies, as the magicians themselves say. And the basis of the argument is that the forms that are produced by heavenly bodies in these lower things are not artificial forms, since these are made by art, but are natural forms educed from the potency of matter; for such forms alone are contained in the power of heavenly bodies. Therefore, if any actions proceed from images of this kind that do not proceed from some natural form, they will not proceed from them by the power of heavenly bodies. But it is clear that rendering a man invisible, and things of this kind, does not follow upon any natural form of a thing. Therefore, those actions cannot be referred to the power of a heavenly body. Whence that proposition which St. Thomas assumes, namely, What is done by the power of heavenly bodies is a natural effect, is understood in this way: that by the power of a heavenly body nothing is done by lower bodies except what follows upon the natural form of some thing: since bodies operate through forms, and from a heavenly body there proceeds only a form that is natural to some thing, but not an artificial form.
- But as to whether there is any natural thing that renders a man invisible, as is said of the heliotrope stone, if it is anointed with the herb of its own name, as Albert recounts in the second book of Minerals8: — it seems it must be said that there is not, according to St. Thomas. For even concerning that stone Albert says that it must be consecrated and marked with certain characters, which is a sign that that power does not belong to it from nature.
If, however, this should be found to be natural to some thing: — it would have to be said that magicians do not use that thing to which it naturally belongs for an effect of this kind, but rather images made and consecrated by themselves: as though a power of this kind belongs to the images not by reason of the natural form of the matter from which they are made, but by reason of the consecration and the characters. — But as to what St. Thomas says, that it can be natural to no thing that through it a man be rendered invisible, it will then have to be explained that it is not understood that this can naturally belong to no thing simpliciter, but that this is natural to no thing which magicians use in the fashioning of their images. And this is assumed from their doctrine concerning images, in which they teach that images ought to be made from gold, silver, wax, and things of this kind, which it is clear do not have this power from nature; and they never name the heliotrope stone, unless perhaps equivocally playing upon the name of the heliotrope, in order to deceive.
V. Fourth. It cannot happen by the power of heavenly bodies that some inanimate thing moves itself per se. But this is said to happen through magical arts. Therefore, etc. — The major premise is proved. Because to be moved per se follows upon having a soul. But to whomsoever that which is posterior is conferred by the power of heavenly bodies, that which is prior is also conferred.
VI. If it is said that that magical statue obtains some principle of life by the power of heavenly bodies: — against this it is argued first. In the making of some statue no substantial form is cast off, because the form of bronze, or of some such thing, remains. Therefore, a statue of this kind does not obtain any substantial form. Therefore, neither does it obtain any principle of life. — The first consequence is proved. Because it is impossible for something to receive a substantial form anew unless it casts off a prior form: since the generation of one thing is the corruption of another. — The second, indeed: because the principle of life in all living things is a substantial form; since to live is to be for living things, as is said in II De Anima.
To this argument it could be said, according to the opinion of Hermes, whose the aforesaid answer is 9, that it is not always necessary for the generation of a substantial form that the prior form be corrupted, but only then when such a form comes to be through extraction from matter. But the form of a statue of this kind does not come to be through eduction from matter, but through its induction into matter. Therefore, the argument does not follow.
But this answer is null. First, because, since the heaven is a natural agent, it cannot induce a substantial form into matter that is not educed from the potency of matter. — Second, because multiple substantial forms cannot be in the same subject: as was shown above 10, and as St. Thomas shows in many places.
- Secondly, it is argued against the principal answer 11. In statues of this kind moved per se there is not the sense of touch. Therefore, neither is there sense at all. Therefore, neither is there a principle of life. — The antecedent is proved. Because touch is not found without a mediumly tempered organ. But such a temperament is not found in stone, wax, or metal, from which a statue is made. — The first consequence is proved. Because sense cannot be where there is not touch. — The second, indeed: because the mover, in those things namely that are locally moved of themselves, is sense or intellect. But the intellect in generable and corruptible things is not without sense.
It would perhaps be said to this argument, according to the opinion of Hermes, that statues of this kind do not have a sense univocal with the senses of generable animals, but of another nature.
But this is an arbitrary assertion and without reason. Because, since statues of this kind are corruptible things, it is necessary to posit in them a principle of motion, if they are moved of themselves, such as Aristotle posits in all corruptible things that move themselves, namely, sense 12. And if sense of the same nature is posited in human beings and in the most imperfect animals, much more will sense in statues of this kind, if they are animate and have sense, be of the same nature with the lowest animals themselves, say oysters and shellfish, to which according to the mixture of matter they seem to be close.
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Third. If statues of this kind obtain a principle of life by heavenly power alone, through which they move themselves, it is necessary that they be the most ignoble among animals. But this is false, if they operate through an intrinsic principle of life. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is proved. Because living things that are generated from heavenly power alone are more ignoble among other animals: as is clear in things generated from putrefaction. — But the falsity of the consequent is proved. Because in their acts noble operations appear: since they give answers concerning hidden things.
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Fourth. If by the power of heavenly bodies they obtain a principle of life through necromantic art, it will be possible to find the generation of such things without art of this kind. But this is not found. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is proved. Because a natural effect produced by the power of heavenly bodies can happen to be found without the operation of art: just as, although someone by some craft may work toward the generation of frogs, it nevertheless happens that frogs are generated without any craft.
Through this is excluded the position of Hermes, recounted by Augustine in the eighth book of The City of God. — Which is also destroyed by divine authority in the Psalms.
St. Thomas notes finally that it is not altogether to be denied that in the aforesaid things there can be something of power from the power of heavenly bodies, toward those effects alone which some lower bodies can produce by the power of heavenly bodies.
VII. But concerning this last statement a doubt arises. Because St. Thomas in IIa IIae, q. xcvi, a. 2 13, seems to hold that no power from heavenly bodies can be in images of this kind beyond that which belongs to the natural matter from which they are made.
In the treatise also On the Occult Operations of Nature 14, he holds that it is not possible that an individual of some species should obtain some permanent power transcending the power of the elements beyond other individuals of the same species, from the fact that it is generated under a determinate position of the heavenly bodies.
These things, however, seem to contradict the things that are said here.
VIII. For the evidence of this, it must be considered that, since in artificial things there are two aspects, namely, the natural matter from which they are made, and the form of the artifact, which is an accident, we can consider necromantic, or even astrological, images of this kind in a twofold way: namely, either as to the matter, say of gold or of silver, from which they are fashioned; or as to the artificial form, which they obtain through art. If they are considered as to the artificial form or shape, thus they obtain no power from the impression of the heavenly bodies, as is said in the IIa IIae, in the place cited above, and in Quodlibet XII, a. 14 15: since an artificial form is nothing other than composition, order, and shape, as is said in I Physics 16, which can be the principle of no action or passion. — But if they are considered as to the matter from which they are fashioned, thus they can have some power for acting. Nor is it unfitting that an image should have some power from the fact that under such a position of the stars, through some transmutation and alteration of its matter, it has been made in a certain and determinate way, which another individual of the same species does not have. For although every other individual of the same species has every power following upon the specific form which one individual of one species, say of gold, has: nevertheless it is not unfitting that one individual, from the fact that it is altered and transmuted under a certain constellation through melting or through any other alteration, should obtain some power from the impression of heavenly bodies which other individuals of the same species, which were not altered and transmuted under such a constellation in that way and order, do not have. For gold reduced through casting and melting under some position of the stars into a certain shape has something of power for some effects which other gold does not have: not indeed that such a power is in the shape itself, say of the Lion or of the Scorpion or of whatever other heavenly sign, impressed upon the natural matter; but it is in the gold itself or the wax, or the other matter from which the image is made, on account of the alteration and transmutation of itself made under such a disposition of the stars, with the concurrence of fire and other particular agents applied to the matter itself in a certain way and order through art. Whence also, if other gold were altered through fire in a similar way, under the same position of the stars, even if it did not have that shape, it would acquire the same power.
- But shapes of this kind are inscribed upon gold or bronze or wax by magicians or astrologers from a pact entered into explicitly or tacitly with demons, for the deception of men: as is the mind of Augustine, X The City of God 17. For since the demons know that a power from the impression of heavenly bodies can be in matter thus altered and transmuted under such a constellation, they have led men into this vain and superstitious opinion, that they should impress the shape of the Lion, or of another planet, into that matter, as though in the shape itself, which is similar to the heavenly shape, a power of this kind were present, and there were something of divinity in the stars. They have also led men to believe that such images, from the impressed shape, have a power from the heavenly body for some effects to which inanimate bodies can in no way extend themselves, even by the power of heavenly bodies, as was shown above18: when nevertheless the demons themselves are the ones who work effects of this kind.
The sign, however, that the aforesaid images are made from some pact with demons is that certain letters or certain characters are imprinted on them, without which they say images of this sort have no efficacy; or they observe certain practices that of themselves are worth nothing toward any effect, such as that a statue be buried in the earth with its head inverted, and similar things. For it is manifest, as is said in the following chapter, that letters and characters have no efficacy for acting, but are only signs directed to some intellect, to which supplication is made either expressly or tacitly.
It can also be said that, when images of this sort are made by those who are not magicians, but astrologers, and nothing else is observed in the construction of such an image except that it be made under a certain constellation, a celestial figure is imprinted, not as though the figure itself possessed celestial power, but to signify that some power is present in that matter caused by that star whose figure is imprinted on the image.
- Therefore, what is said in this place—that some power can be present in images of this sort by the power of celestial bodies—is understood not by reason of the artificial figure and form, but by reason of the altered natural matter out of which images of this sort are made. — In the Secunda Secundae, however, where St. Thomas denies that any power can be present in them, he is speaking of them by reason of their artificial figure and form. And thus there is no contradiction.
Nor does what is adduced in the second place from the treatise On the Hidden Operations of Nature stand in the way of our proposal. Because there, as is clear from the progression of the argument, St. Thomas is speaking of the power that follows upon substantial form. Here, however, the discussion concerns a power newly communicated and imprinted on some natural matter through an alteration produced in a certain and determinate order.
IX. It must be noted, however, that we can understand in two ways that images of this sort have power only for those effects which some lower bodies can produce by the power of celestial bodies. First, that they can have some power which is natural to certain other bodies, and no other: for instance that, just as a magnet, by reason of its proper form, with the power of the heaven co-acting, can draw iron to itself, so to some image, whether necromantic or astrological, it can be given from the impression of a celestial body to draw iron to itself. And so concerning other powers which belong naturally to mixed bodies by the power of the heaven. — Second, that they can have not only a power which is natural to some mixed body according to its species, but they can also have from the impression of the heaven some power which belongs naturally to no mixed body, yet this power can extend only to those effects which can be produced through lower bodies by the power of the heaven, and not to others.
It seems to me, however, that the first sense is according to the mind of St. Thomas, but not the second. Both from his manner of speaking; — and because above, in one argument, 19 he said that what is natural to no thing cannot be produced by the power of celestial bodies. For he seems to mean that a corporeal power which is natural to some body can, by the power of the heaven, be communicated to those images for similar effects, even though such a power does not belong to the matter from which the image is made by reason of its proper species: just as it can be communicated to a wax figure by the power of the heaven to check the flow of blood, which naturally belongs to sapphire. Whence also in De Potentia, q. 6, art. 10, he says that for some things that seem to be produced by magic arts, namely for certain transmutations of bodies, the powers of natural higher and lower bodies can suffice. And the cause of this, I think, is that in the power of the sun are contained all forms, both substantial and accidental, which are found in lower bodies. And therefore, just as to iron, by the power of the form of fire acting upon it, a heating power is communicated, so also, by the power of the heaven, in which the form of fire is contained, some accidental form can be caused in something whereby it will be able to heat, even though that power is not natural to it.
- But then a doubt remains. For the powers and actions of such images are long-lasting. Powers and actions, however, that are not natural to something are not long-lasting: as is evident in heated water, which heats, but does not remain heated for long so that it can heat.
It is answered that, although powers that are beside nature for something are not long-lasting if they are caused in it by particular agents to which such powers naturally belong, nevertheless, if they are imprinted by a universal agent, of which sort is the heaven, they can be long-lasting. For things that are produced in lower bodies by the power of higher bodies are not simply beside nature, although they are sometimes beside this particular nature of such a species, as not following upon its specific form, as was clear above. 20 And therefore they can be long-lasting. And consequently, through powers of this kind, insofar as the celestial power is preserved in them, the aforesaid images have efficacy toward some effects.
It can also be said that the celestial power which is contained in these images is not perpetually in this matter of the image, but lasts only as long as the influx of that celestial disposition from which it was caused lasts: just as the heating power in water lasts only as long as the power of the heating fire lasts in it.
X. From these things it follows that, if by the natural power of some bodies it can happen that someone is stirred up to love, hatred, concupiscence, or something of this sort, from some bodily transmutation, or even falls into madness, it is not unfitting to say that the like can be produced by the aforesaid images through the power of the heaven. And by the same reason, if a human being can be freed from passions of this sort through a transmutation of the body by the natural power of some bodies, it is not unfitting to say that the same can be produced through images of this sort by the power of the heaven.
In this, however, it must be noted that, since a body does not act except through contact with that on which it acts immediately, it is foolish to say that from the power of an image placed by the fire a woman living in another house could be dried up and tormented. For if any power is present in the image for some bodily transmutation by the power of the heaven, the image itself must touch the body to be altered by some contact, whether mediate or immediate: for a magnet does not draw iron to itself unless it is in such proximity that it touches the iron itself either immediately per se, or through the air in which its power is received.
These things, however, I should say concerning images, saving always a better judgment, to which I willingly submit myself both in this and in other matters.
It must be observed, moreover, that St. Thomas added this last statement 21 for the solution of the argument by which the opposing opinion argued from a sign. 22 For when it was argued that the works of magicians are produced by the power of celestial bodies, namely by this sign, that a certain position of the stars is observed by magicians and the aids of corporeal things are employed: the answer is that this happens because both celestial bodies and other bodies cooperate toward some effects of magicians. Besides these effects, however, other works are produced by magicians to which corporeal power does not extend, as was clear in the arguments. And therefore it is necessary to refer them to some intellect.