Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

After St. Thomas has treated of those things that are done by God beyond the usual course of nature in relation to nature, he now treats of them with respect to the nature of a miracle ¹.

Concerning this, however, he does two things: first, he treats of miracles themselves; second, he shows to whom it belongs to perform miracles, in the following chapter.

Concerning the first, he does two things: first, he shows what things can be called miracles; second, he sets down the grades and orders of miracles ².

I. As to the first, he says that those things are simply to be called miracles ³ which are done by divine power beyond the order commonly observed in things. — Now he clarifies this: because a miracle is said to be as it were full of wonder in itself. But that is simply wondrous which has a simply hidden cause. The simply hidden cause, however, is God.

For the clarification of the second proposition, he notes that, since we then wonder at something when, seeing the effect, we are ignorant of the cause; something is indeed wondrous with respect to this man only, but not simply, when the cause of the apparent effect is unknown to someone, but is not unknown to all; as is clear in one who, seeing an eclipse of the sun, wonders. But something is simply wondrous when the cause of some effect is simply hidden from all.

2. For the clarification of this, it must be considered, from his teaching in De Potentia, q. VI, a. 2, and II Sent., d. XVIII ⁴, 3, that for the nature of a miracle simply and properly so called two things are required, according as two things pertain to wonder, as can be gathered from I Metaphysicae ⁵. One is a cause in itself hidden from us, such as God is: namely, that that which is a miracle be produced or made by God alone. The other is that there be in the thing that from which it seems it ought to happen otherwise. Just as the resuscitation of a dead person is from God alone; and a dead body has it in itself to lack life perpetually, and thus has in itself that from which life ought not to be caused in it; and for that reason it is called a miracle. Where either of these conditions is lacking, it is not properly a miracle. Both conditions are touched upon in this place: the first, when it is said that those are simply to be called miracles which are done by divine power; the second, when it is said beyond the order commonly observed in things, for from the fact that something is done beyond such an order, it is evident that there is in the thing that from which it ought to be done otherwise.

3. On account of the lack of the second condition, the creation of the universe is not miraculous: because there is not in the thing that from which it ought to be otherwise. On the contrary, by natural order it ought to be so: since God alone is the author of all being. — Similarly, the creation of souls is not miraculous: because the soul cannot have being otherwise; and the customary order of production is that, with man disposing the matter, it is created by God in matter. If, however, God were to create some soul without the work of man disposing the matter, such a creation would be miraculous, as happening beyond the customary manner. — For the same reason, the justification of the ungodly which commonly occurs is not miraculous: because the rational soul, since it was made to the image of God, according to its nature is capable of God through grace; and justification can be brought about by God alone, and therefore it is not beyond the order of created nature. For although the will of the ungodly tends toward evil, and thus seems to have an order to the opposite of justification, according to the requirement of justice; yet because justification does not take place beyond the order of its proper cause, which is God, to whom alone it belongs to justify, therefore it is not miraculous; just as the heating of water by fire is not miraculous, although it is contrary to the inclination of the form of water. Nevertheless, a justification can be miraculous: namely, if it occurs beyond the customary course of justification, as was the justification of Paul, who immediately received a certain perfect righteousness ⁶.

It must be noted, however, that although, properly speaking, creation and justification are not miracles, because they do not have the complete nature of a miracle; yet improperly and imperfectly they can be called miracles, because they are great works, and can be done by God alone, who is a cause hidden from us. And therefore they are sometimes numbered by the Doctors among miraculous works. Hence St. Thomas says in Iª IIae, q. CXIII, the last article, that if in miraculous works it is considered that they can be done by divine power alone, with respect to this creation and justification, and universally every work that can be done by God alone, can be called miraculous.

II. As to the second, St. Thomas enumerates the grades of miracles ⁷. And he posits three grades. The highest is when something is done by God which nature can never do: as when two bodies are together at the same time, and similar things. And in this grade there is also an order: because the greater things are and the more remote from the capacity of nature, the greater miracles they are. — The second is when God does something that nature can do, but not through that order: as when a man after death returns to life. And in this grade also, that which is more remote from the capacity of nature is a greater miracle. — The third is when God does what is customary to be done by the operation of nature, yet without the operating principles of nature.

For the clarification of this distinction, it must be considered, from the First Part, q. 105, a. 8, that to the highest grade pertain those things that are entirely above nature with respect to the substance of what is done: namely, in such a way that that which is done by God can in no way be done by nature. — To the second grade pertain those things that indeed can be done by nature, but not in this: just as life indeed can be produced by nature, but not in the body of a dead animal. Hence what St. Thomas says here, that they cannot be done by nature through that order, is understood not of the order of the actual production of the form, but of the order and consequence of the produced form to the condition of the subject: for St. Thomas gave examples of the walking of a lame man after infirmity, of the life of someone after death, and of sight after blindness. — To the third grade pertain those things that exceed the capacity of nature with respect to the very order of doing and the mode of operating: for example, because they are done immediately, and not according to the customary course and order of nature; as when someone is immediately cured of a fever, and when the air is immediately, without natural causes, condensed into rains.

2. Concerning the magnitude of miracles, it must be considered that to say that something is a greater work of God than another of his works, and that it is a greater miracle, is not the same thing. For it can be a greater work of God, and yet it will be a lesser miracle. For that is called a greater work of God which is more noble and more excellent, and more manifests divine power: but that is called a greater miracle which participates more in the nature of a miracle, which consists in this, that something is done by God, and that there is in the thing something from which it seems that it ought to be done otherwise. But it is not unfitting that something be more excellent than another, and more manifest divine power, and yet have less of the nature of a miracle: as, for example, because there is not in created nature that from which it ought to happen otherwise, since created active nature has no order to it, but it is above the order of all things producible by nature. Thus we say that the creation of the universe, and the justification of the ungodly, are greater divine works than the sudden healing of someone from a fever, although that healing is a greater miracle, as having more of the nature of a miracle. On this account St. Thomas says in Ia IIae, in the article cited above, ad 1, that certain miraculous works, although they are lesser than the justification of the ungodly with respect to the good that is done, yet have more of the nature of a miracle: understand, because they have whatever pertains to the nature of a miracle; but justification has this alone of the nature of a miracle, that it is done by God, who is a cause in itself hidden from us.

III. Regarding what has been said, however, a twofold doubt arises. The first is because it was said that those things hold the first grade among miracles which, with respect to the substance of what is done, nature can never do. For to this seems to contradict what is said in the First Part, in the question cited above, art. 7, ad 1, where it is said that creation and justification are not properly called miracles, because they are not apt by nature to be done through other causes. For from this it follows that those things done by God which nature cannot do are not only not the highest miracles, but are not even properly miracles. Which is the opposite of what was said here.

The second doubt is ⁸ because among the highest miracles St. Thomas enumerates that the sea being divided provides a path for travelers. For this does not seem true: indeed it does not even seem to be a miracle. Because it could be done by the power of an angel, which is a power in created nature: for according to his teaching, corporeal matter obeys angels with respect to local motion ⁹; but it is evident that such a division of the sea can be brought about through the local motion of the water. Therefore, etc.

IV. To the first of these, one can answer in two ways. First, from the doctrine of St. Thomas in De Potentia Dei and II Sent., in the places cited ¹⁰, that the statement in the First Part is understood when there is not even in the thing that from which it ought to be otherwise. For because we then only wonder at something when it seems to us that it ought to be otherwise, those things which in no way, with respect to the substance of what is done, can be done by nature, nor is there in them that from which the opposite ought to be, cannot properly be called miracles: because they do not have in themselves the cause of wonder. And in this way creation and the justification of the ungodly, properly speaking, are not miracles: because they are not apt by nature to be done by another cause than by God, and the thing does not have in itself that from which it ought not to be so. There is, therefore, no contradiction. Because here there are placed in the highest grade of miracles those things which nature can in no way do, and there is in the thing that from which it ought to happen otherwise: but of these St. Thomas does not speak in the aforementioned place of the First Part, but only of those things which cannot be done by nature, nor is there even in the thing that from which the opposite ought to be.

2. Secondly, it can be answered, from the doctrine of St. Thomas in IV Sent., d. XVII, a. 5 ¹¹, and Ia IIae, in the article cited above, that the statement of the First Part is understood when there is in the recipient a natural order to receiving such an effect from God alone, and from no other. For those words, they are not apt by nature to be done through other causes, signify this, as if he were saying: Therefore creation and justification are not miracles, because that which is receptive of passive creation and of justification, according to the order of nature, is receptive of an effect of this kind from God alone, but not from any created cause. For such things do not take place, as such, beyond the order of nature: since they take place as their natural order requires. And therefore they are not properly miracles. For those things which are miracles do not have in the recipient a natural order to receiving that effect immediately from God alone; or, they are not of themselves apt by nature to receive that effect immediately from God alone; and therefore, when they are done, they are not done according to the order of their nature, but beyond their natural order.

From this it is clear that there is no contradiction in the words of St. Thomas. For here, when there are placed among the highest miracles those things which can in no way be done by nature, it is understood of those effects to the receiving of which immediately from God alone there is not a customary order of nature. But when it is said in the First Part that those things are not miracles which are not apt by nature to be done through other causes, it is understood of those things both which cannot be done through other causes, and whose receptive subjects have a natural order and aptitude for receiving those effects immediately from God alone.

3. But then the doubt remains: how, I say, is there in the soul receiving grace through justification a natural order to grace; since it is a supernatural gift of God, just as glory is?

It is said that the order of some receptive subject to some form can be called natural in two ways. In one way, because it follows the nature of the receptive subject in comparison to some created agent, which in this place is called a natural agent. And in this way the order of the soul to grace is not understood to be natural. — In another way, because the nature of the receptive subject is capable of that form; and it was instituted and ordered by God to this, that it receive such a form from him alone, and not from another; nor does such a nature have in itself anything repugnant to that form. For such a potency can be called obediential in some way, insofar as it is for receiving a form from God alone: it can also be called natural in some way, insofar as the nature of the subject was ordered by God to that form according to the divine institution, and was made capable of that form in itself. And in this way there is in the soul a natural order to grace. For God from the beginning instituted man so that he would be capable of grace and beatitude according to the soul, and that, unless he were an obstacle to himself, he would obtain it from God. According to this sense is understood the statement of Augustine, in the book De Praedestinatione Sanctorum ¹², that to be able to have faith, as also charity, belongs to the nature of men. But such a natural order is not found in miraculous works that are done by God alone. For the sun is not according to its nature ordered by God to go backward, but rather to proceed continuously: although beyond this customary order, in the time of Joshua, God made it go backward ¹³. The same holds in other cases.

V. To the second doubt ¹⁴ one could, first, say that such a division of the Red Sea as occurred in the time of Pharaoh ¹⁵, cannot be done by any created power. — And when it is proved because corporeal matter obeys angels with respect to local motion: — it would be said that that has truth where the order of nature instituted by God is not changed. Hence St. Thomas says in De Malo, q. XVI, a. 9, ad 2, that demons cannot truly change the features of a human body into beast-like ones, because this is beyond the order implanted in nature by God. And in art. 10, the last ad, he says that demons, although they can move some part of the earth, yet could not move the whole earth: because it is not proportioned to their nature to change the order of the elements of the world. In that division of the Red Sea, however, the order of nature instituted by God would be changed in some way: for God instituted the sea as continuous, and unstable and fluid, just as he also made the whole earth unchangeable. And thus the sea itself is taken, on account of the great quantity of waters, as the whole element of water: so that, just as angelic power could not split the whole earth into parts, so it could not divide the sea itself in that manner.

Secondly, it can be answered that St. Thomas sets down that example according to the mind of those philosophers who posited that separated substances move only the celestial bodies immediately, but cannot move these lower things except by means of the motion of the heaven: which opinion Aristotle seems to hold ¹⁶. For St. Thomas wished to give an example not only according to the truth of faith, but also according to the opinion of the philosophers, giving an example in those things which even the philosophers would concede cannot be done by a created power.