Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

Since St. Thomas has shown in what way God can act outside the order of His wisdom ¹, he wishes further to show how He can act outside the order implanted in things by Himself ². Concerning this, however, he does two things: first, he shows the proposition; second, he determines concerning the very things done by God outside the order of nature, in the following chapter.

Concerning the first he does three things: first, he proves the proposition; second, he removes a certain doubt ³; third, he assigns the reason for the passing over of this order by God ⁴.

I. As to the first, he proposes this conclusion: that God can act outside the order implanted by Him in things, which is that lower things are moved through higher things: namely, by producing some effect in lower things while a higher agent, who, I say, is below God, operates nothing toward this.

And he argues first thus ⁵. God acts through will, and not through necessity of nature. Therefore He can immediately, without an intermediary, produce any effect whatever that does not exceed His power. Therefore He can make lesser effects, which occur through lower causes, immediately, without secondary causes.

The first consequence is proved. Both from the difference between an agent by necessity of nature and an agent by will: namely, because a natural agent of greatest power cannot immediately produce a small effect, but an agent by will well can. And from the example of the craftsman: for the most perfect craftsman can make a work of the sort that an imperfect craftsman makes. — But the second consequence is left as manifest.

2. Concerning the consequent of the first consequence, it must be noted that this word immediately (statim) properly indeed signifies without intermission, and at a time immediately following, or with a small interval of time: but it is also derived from this to signify the same as immediately by the intermediation of causality and efficiency, as if some effect were said to be produced immediately by some cause because between the cause and such an effect there falls no duration of another thing produced by such a cause, or another operating cause. When, therefore, it is said that an agent by will can immediately without an intermediary produce any effect whatever that does not exceed its power, the word immediately is not taken in its proper signification, because here St. Thomas does not intend to treat of the intermediation of duration between cause and effect; but it is taken figuratively, as meaning the same as with no mediating effect, and with no other cause intervening. Hence the phrase without an intermediary is an exposition of that term immediately.

3. Concerning the difference assigned here between an agent by necessity of nature and an agent by will, it must be considered that an agent by necessity of nature acts through the form through which it is in act: — hence it is said here that an effect cannot follow from it except according to the mode of its active power, and in the manner of that form — but an agent by will acts through the form that it conceives. Therefore it is necessary that the effect of a cause acting from necessity of nature be proportioned to the form through which the agent is in act; but the effect of an agent by will is proportioned to the conception and ordination of the agent. Therefore St. Thomas well says that a natural agent that is of greatest power cannot immediately, that is, with no other lower cause concurring, produce a small effect, but produces an effect proportioned to its power; but an agent by will, like a most perfect craftsman, can immediately produce an effect of the sort that an imperfect agent itself produces. For the most perfect craftsman can conceive such a work as an imperfect craftsman makes, and make a work in the likeness of that conceived form, with no imperfect craftsman intervening. But a natural agent of most perfect power of necessity works an effect similar to its natural form; and consequently it cannot by itself alone bring about a small work, and one disproportionate to its power.

II. But a doubt arises in the words of St. Thomas. For he says that an agent of greatest power immediately produces an effect proportioned to its power; and yet he adds that in such an effect there is sometimes found less power than in the cause. For there seems to be a contradiction in an effect being proportioned to the power of the cause, and yet there being in it less power than in the cause: for if there is in it less power than in the cause, it is no longer proportioned to the power of the cause.

He answers that it happens in two ways that an effect is proportioned to a cause. In one way, through equality of perfection, as is evident in those things that are produced by a univocal cause: for a begotten man is of equal essential perfection with the generating man. In another way, through the adequateness of causality and dependence: namely, because the causality of the cause cannot extend to anything greater, and the effect itself is the most noble thing that can depend on it. An effect proportioned to the power of the cause in the first way must be of equal power for acting with its cause. For we see that a univocal effect of its cause, when it has come to perfection, can produce every effect that its cause could, so far as pertains to the condition of the form; although sometimes it is impeded by the indisposition of the matter. And then for the effect to be proportioned to the power of the cause, and for it to be of lesser power, implies a contradiction. — But an effect proportioned in the second way to the power of the cause does not have to be of equal power with its cause, as is evident in the effect of an equivocal cause: for no effect of the sun immediately produced by it is of equal power with the sun; for the effect is contained in its equivocal cause according to the likeness of a more excellent form, as St. Thomas says in many places ⁶. And therefore for an effect of this kind to be proportioned in this way to the power of the cause, and for it to be of lesser power than the cause is, implies no contradiction. In this second way St. Thomas takes an effect to be proportioned to the power of the cause, but not in the first way. Therefore the objection does not follow.

III. Secondly ⁷. The divine power is compared to all active powers as universal power to particular powers. And God is an agent through intellect, which is cognoscitive not only of first and universal causes, but of all particular ones. Therefore He can immediately produce every effect that any particular agent produces.

The consequence is proved. Because a universal cause can be determined to produce a particular effect in a two-fold way: namely, both through a middle particular cause, as the power of the sun to man through the power that is in the seed, and the power of a universal proposition through the assumption of a particular proposition; and through the intellect, which apprehends a determinate form, and produces it into effect.

2. For the clarity of this reason, it must be considered that for one cause to be capable of the effect of another cause, it is required both that it have a power that extends to that effect, and that it be determined to that effect. For whichever of these should be lacking, that effect could not come from such a cause. Therefore, in order to show that God has a power extending to all particular effects, St. Thomas assumed that the divine power is compared to all active powers as universal power to particular powers: for a universal power extends to every effect of a particular cause, since a particular cause acts by the power of a universal cause. But in order to show that the universal divine power can be determined to every particular effect without the concurrence of another particular cause, he assumed that the divine intellect is cognoscitive not only of its own essence, which is as it were a universal active power, and of first causes, but also of all particular things. For a universal cause acting through intellect is determined to a particular effect, not only through a middle particular cause, but also sometimes by the sole determination of the intellect, without the concurrence of any other particular cause.

IV. But this reason seems not to be valid. For it does not seem to follow: The builder has a power extending to producing a house. And he knows not only the universal causes of a house, but also the particular ones, and the particular instruments. Therefore he can immediately produce a house. For he needs certain and determinate instruments, without which he cannot bring about a house. — Therefore neither is this valid: God has a power extending to every particular effect. And He knows the particular causes of all things. Therefore He can produce every single effect immediately.

It is said that the reason concludes very well if it is well understood. For the comparison of the universal divine power is made not to any instruments having only the character of an instrument, which namely operate not through their own form, but only as moved by the principal agent; but to particular causes producing effects similar to themselves through their own forms, and subordinated to the universal cause itself. For then the reason proceeds thus: The divine power can do, without its proper cause, every effect to which it can be determined through its intellect. But it can be determined through its intellect to every effect of any particular agent. Therefore it can do, without its proper cause, every effect that any particular agent can do. — He presupposes the major premise from the preceding ⁸, where it was shown that the divine will and divine knowledge are most efficacious per se for acting whatever has been conceived by the divine intellect as to be produced. — But he proves the minor premise, because the divine intellect understands not only universal causes, but also particular ones; and consequently it can determine the divine power to the effects of particular causes.

From this it is evident that the instance brought against the reason is null. Both because in this reason the comparison of the divine power to particular causes is not made as to instruments precisely, as is done in the instance brought forward. — And because the knowledge and will of a builder are not per se efficacious for producing a house, as are the divine knowledge and divine will.

V. Thirdly. God in the first establishment of things immediately produced all things into being through creation. Therefore He can immediately produce, or move ⁹ to some effect, every single thing, without intermediate causes. — The consequence is proved. Because, since accidents follow the substantial principles of a thing, he who immediately produces the substance of a thing can immediately work around the thing itself whatever things follow upon its substance, as is evident concerning a generator.

2. Note that the force of the reason consists in this: that although lower causes have an essential order to higher causes, so that without them they cannot enter into their natural actions and natural effects, with God establishing this very order — for fire would not heat or generate another fire if the motion of the heaven were to cease — nevertheless God, who created all things immediately, can move every single thing to its natural operation, which follows upon the substance of the thing, without the concurrence of a higher acting cause, just as, if the motion of the heaven ceased, He could move fire to heating; because, since He immediately produced the substance of the thing according to its species, He can also move the thing itself immediately to every operation following the nature of the thing; just as a generator, giving the form, also gives all the properties and motions following upon it. Similarly, since He immediately produced all things through creation, it is clear that even now He can produce every single effect immediately, namely without the concurrence of intermediate causes. From which it is evident that He can act outside the order implanted in things by Himself.

VI. Fourthly. The order of things flows from God into things according as it is premeditated in His intellect. This is explained through a likeness in human affairs: for the ruler of a city imposes on each person ¹⁰ the order premeditated in himself. But the divine intellect is not of necessity determined to this order, so that it can understand no other. Therefore He can, outside lower causes, work an effect proper to those causes. — The minor is proved. Because we also can understand another order of things: for instance, that God should form man from the earth without seed.

Fifthly. The representation of the divine goodness in things is the end of the production of things by God: — understand this of the end intrinsic to the things themselves. But the divine goodness can, outside this order of things, be represented in another way. Therefore the divine will is not determined to this order of causes and effects, but that it can will another. Therefore etc. — The minor is proved: which, however, St. Thomas sets down only implicitly. Because the order implanted in things does not represent the divine goodness perfectly. But that which is not represented perfectly through some modeled thing can again be represented in another way.

Concerning the inferred consequent, it must be noted that it can be understood in two ways that the divine will is not determined to this order, and can will another order. In one way, such that we understand the divine will to be able to cease willing this order of things that it imposed on things, and to be able to have another volition of another order anew. And it is not understood in this sense. For this would be to posit mutability in the divine will. — In another way, such that we understand the divine will not to have a necessary relation and inclination to this order imposed on things, as if it could not have willed another order from eternity, but necessarily willed this order. And it is understood in this sense: and it is true. For it was shown in the preceding sections ¹¹ that the divine will has a necessary relation to no created thing: since no created thing is such that without it the divine goodness cannot be. Hence just as we say that God from eternity willed this order of things, so we say that He was able to will another order of things; and that He willed from eternity that in fact another order would sometimes be in some things outside the order of nature; as is evident in those things that God sometimes works miraculously, which must not be said not to have been willed and foreordained by God from eternity, since the divine will is immutable.

VII. Sixthly. From the fact that the soul imagines something and is vehemently affected toward it, there sometimes follows a change in the body toward health or sickness, without the action of natural principles that are naturally suited to cause health or sickness. Therefore much more from the divine will can some effect follow in creatures without its natural causes. — The consequence is proved. Because the whole creature is more subject to God than the human body is to its soul: since the soul is proportioned to the body as its form, but God exceeds all proportion of the creature, and consequently has a greater and more ample power.

For the clarity of the antecedent, it must be considered that it is not to be understood as if the imagination of the soul per se immediately causes health or sickness in the body, for St. Thomas denies this in the Tertia, q. XIII, a. 3, ad 3, and below in chapter CIII; but because from the imagination there follow some passions of the appetite, through which in some way the motion of the heart and spirits is varied, from which, when retracted to the heart or diffused to the limbs, there sometimes follows an alteration in the body toward sickness or health, especially when the matter is disposed. But as to what St. Thomas says, that from the imagination such a change occurs without the action of natural principles that are naturally suited to cause sickness or health, it is understood that it does not occur by the mediation of all the principles by which alterations of this kind are accustomed to come about in the natural order, for instance by the mediation of the putrefaction of some humor, or by the mediation of some indigestion of food in the stomach; but from the sole causation of the passion caused by the imagination itself, from which passion, through the varied motion of the heart and spirits, alterations of this kind follow.

VIII. Seventhly. The proper effect of elementary powers is sometimes brought about by a heavenly power without the action of an element: as when the sun heats without the action of fire. Therefore much more can the divine power, without the action of created causes, produce their proper effects. — The consequence is clear. Because in the order of nature the active powers of the elements are contained under the powers of heavenly bodies: just as, namely, all other powers are contained under the divine power.

But in this reason St. Thomas seems to assume the opposite of what he assumed in the first reason ¹². For there he said that from an agent by necessity of nature an effect cannot follow except according to the mode of its active power, and therefore an agent of greatest power cannot immediately produce a small effect: from which it follows that the heaven, which is an agent from necessity of nature and is of greatest power, cannot immediately produce heat, which is the effect of fire, since it is a small effect in comparison to the heavenly power, or the effect of any other lower thing. But in this reason he says the opposite of this.

He answers that there is no contradiction. For it is not contradictory that the sun does not produce a small effect, or an effect of an element, immediately by itself alone; and that it sometimes produces an elementary effect, for instance heat, without the action of the element. For although without the action of fire the sun sometimes heats water or iron, nevertheless it does not do this immediately by itself alone, but through many intermediaries this small effect comes from the sun.

If, however, it be urged that St. Thomas, in Qq. de Malo, q. xvi, a. 9 and 10, says that a weak effect comes from a remote agent, and gives the example of the sun immediately causing the generation of imperfect animals: — he answers that he does not intend to remove every intermediary in causes of this kind that operate naturally, but only an agent univocal with the effect. For the sense is that a weak effect can come from a more remote agent, with no univocal agent concurring toward its production.

IX. As to the second, he removes a certain doubt ¹³. For someone could urge against the determination made by this reason: God implanted this order in things. Therefore it cannot be without a change in Him that He should operate outside this order. But He cannot be changed. Therefore etc.

St. Thomas answers by denying the consequence. Because the order implanted in things is not that the same thing should happen everywhere or always ¹⁴, but for the most part, and in fewer cases otherwise, either on account of a defect of power, or on account of the indisposition of the matter, or on account of some stronger agent; as when nature generates a man with six fingers on a hand. And both fall under divine providence. Hence in opposition to the reason, it is argued thus: Through some created power it can come about that the natural order is changed from that which is for the most part into that which is rarely, without a change of providence. Therefore much more can the divine power do something without prejudice to its providence, outside the order implanted in natural things.

For the clarity of this response, it must be considered that, just as God from eternity ordained that some causes should produce their effects for the most part, so He ordained from eternity that in the minority of cases they should fail. And therefore without prejudice to providence it happens that they sometimes fail. Similarly, just as from eternity God through His providence ordained that there should be such an order and such a course in natural things, so from eternity He ordained that He would sometimes act outside this order implanted in things. And therefore it is without a change of His providence that He sometimes operates outside this instituted order.

X. As to the third, St. Thomas shows why God sometimes acts outside the order of nature ¹⁵. And he says that He does this sometimes for the manifestation of His power: because in no way can it be better manifested that the whole of nature is subject to the divine will, than through this mode, through which it is shown that God worked the order of things by a free will.

Nor ought this reason to be considered frivolous. Because, since all corporeal creatures are ordered to the intellectual creature, while the end of an intellectual nature is divine knowledge, it is no wonder if, for the sake of offering knowledge about God to the rational creature, some change is made in corporeal nature.