Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

After it has been shown concerning divine providence that it extends to all things ¹, St. Thomas wishes to show how God can act apart from it.

Concerning this, however, he does two things: first, he shows that God can in one way act apart from the order of his wisdom ², but in another way cannot; second, he shows that he can act apart from the order implanted in things, in the following chapter.

Concerning the first, he does three things: first, he sets down certain distinctions; second, he shows the proposition ³; third, he eliminates certain errors ⁴.

I. As to the first, he touches upon two distinctions. The first is: Order is twofold: one is universal, which depends on the first cause, and embraces all things; the other is particular, which namely depends on some created cause, and contains those things which are subject to that cause. Such an order, however, is manifold, according to the diversity of causes; and one of them is contained under another, just as one cause is under another; and all are contained under that universal order, and descend from it, since they are found in things according as they depend on the first cause. — This is clarified by an example in politics. For all the domestics of one head of a household have a certain order according as they are subject to him.

It should be noted that, since all the effects of one cause have a certain order according as they depend on one cause, as St. Thomas said above, ch. 96, where, I say, several effects proceed from one cause; according as causes are manifold, so the orders of effects depending on those causes are manifold. And just as there is a universal cause, from which all things depend according to their being, but a particular cause from which determinate effects proceed, so the order is twofold: namely, universal, which embraces all things; and particular, which embraces only some effects. Now the order which is among the effects of one cause, if it is compared to the principle of that order, is one; but if it is compared to the effects themselves contained under the cause and proceeding from it in a certain order, while one precedes another and another follows, it has multiplicity according to the multitude of the ordered effects. It is also one by comparison to the principal end of that cause, inasmuch as all things are ordered to one end, which is intended by the cause. Therefore, because St. Thomas is speaking of the order of things by comparison to the cause and principle of the order, he speaks of the order of things contained under one cause as of one order; and he compares it to the order of things contained under another cause as to a single thing.

2. The second distinction is that we can consider the universal order according to which all things are ordered by divine providence both with respect to the things that are subject to the order and with respect to the intelligible character of the order, which depends on the principle of the order.

Note that by the intelligible character of the order St. Thomas understands the species and nature of the order, which is taken from the principle of the order. For since prior and posterior in any order are spoken of by comparison to the principle of the order, as is said in Metaphysics V ⁵, and as St. Thomas sets down in Quodlibet V, q. 10, a. 1 ⁶, and I Sent., d. 20, a. 3: the order receives its species from the principle itself; just as one order is according to place and another order is according to time, inasmuch as the one is taken by comparison to a principle of place, but the other by comparison to some principle of time. The order established for things by divine providence can therefore be considered either on the part of the things upon which the order is imposed and determined; or on the part of its principle, from which the order itself has it that it is called the order of divine providence, and of the divine will and knowledge; just as if we were to say that the order of certain things according to place can be considered either inasmuch as it is the order of such things, or inasmuch as it is an order according to place. And this is the sense of this distinction.

II. As to the second ⁷, two conclusions are laid down. The first is: God can do certain things apart from those that fall under the order of divine providence, nor is his power bound to these or those things. It is proved. Things proceed from God not by necessity of nature or of anything else whatsoever, as was shown in the second book, but from his simple will, especially as to the first institution of things. Therefore etc.

Note that St. Thomas adds, or of anything else whatsoever, to show that God acts neither by necessity of nature, nor by necessity of will, nor by necessity of intellect or justice: because, if he acted of necessity in any of these ways, it would follow that God could not do anything apart from those things that fall under the order of divine providence. Hence some of those who asserted this were moved because they said that God acts by necessity of nature, and consequently that his power is limited to certain effects; but others because they said that God acts by necessity of his wisdom and justice. Therefore, both foundations having been destroyed from the preceding, St. Thomas concludes that their position is false.

Note also that he adds, especially as to the first institution of things: because, as was shown in the Second Book ⁸, although the first divine effects depend on the simple divine will, nevertheless posterior effects have a certain necessity by supposition.

2. The second conclusion is: God cannot act apart from the said order, if it is considered as to the intelligible character depending on the principle. It is proved. That order proceeds from the knowledge and will of God ordering all things to his goodness as to an end. But God cannot act apart from these. Therefore etc.

The minor is proved by running through each item. For it cannot be that something is done by God that is not willed by him, since things proceed from him through the will. — Nor that it is not comprehended by his knowledge, since the will cannot be except concerning something known. — Nor that it is not ordered to his goodness as to an end, since his goodness is the proper object of his will. — Similarly, since God is utterly immutable, it cannot be that he wills something that he previously did not will, or that he begins to know something anew, or to order it to his goodness.

3. Therefore it is concluded, embracing both conclusions, that God can do nothing without its falling under the order of his providence, just as he cannot do anything that is not subject to his operation: although he can do other things than those that are subject to his providence and operation, if his power is considered absolutely. Nor can he do certain things that were not under the order of his providence from eternity, since he is immutable.

III. For the evident understanding of these conclusions, it must be considered that, when it is asked whether God can act apart from the order of his providence, the question can be twofold. The first is that a comparison be made of the divine power according to itself to the providence that God has concerning things, with respect to the objects of each: and the sense is, Does the divine power extend to other objects than to those that fall under divine providence? And in this sense the first conclusion was laid down: that it does. For it is the same to say, "God can do certain things apart from those that fall under divine providence," and to say, "The divine power extends to other objects than are the objects that fall under divine providence." Which is certainly true: because, as is said in the Prima Pars, q. 25, a. 5 ⁹, God's being able itself is not subject to divine preordination, since it is natural.

Secondly, the question can be that a comparison be made of the actual production itself of things to the divine preordination depending on knowledge and will: and the sense is, Can it be in act that the divine operation extends to something to which the divine preordination does not extend? And in this sense the second conclusion was laid down. For it is the same to say, "Apart from the order of divine providence, considered according to its intelligible character depending on the principle, God cannot act," and to say, "It cannot be that God actually does something and that it was not preordained." For this is most true: because, as is said in the place cited before, God's doing itself is subject to divine preordination, although his being able to do is not subject to it.

2. Secondly, it must be considered that it could happen from two things that God did something that was not preordained, and thus acted apart from the order of providence. Either, namely, because he would do it without cognition and will, which are the principles of that preordination: just as something is said to be done by a man apart from his cognition when he does not know that which he does. Or because his preordination would be changed, namely by ordering something that he did not previously order: just as a man would be said to be able to act apart from the cognition that he now has, because he can have some new cognition and operate according to it. Both of these, therefore, St. Thomas removes from God in his argument. The first, when he says that it is not possible that God do something that is not willed, and comprehended by his knowledge, and ordered to the divine goodness. But the second, when he says that it is impossible that God will something that he previously did not will, or that he begin to know something anew, or order it to his goodness. For it is clear that all these include the composite sense, namely that something previously was not in the divine will and knowledge, and afterwards is in them: which posits change in God.

3. It should also be noted, concerning what St. Thomas adds, if his power is considered absolutely, that he gives to be understood that common distinction concerning the absolute power of God and the ordinary power ¹⁰. For if the power of God is considered absolutely, namely with no respect had to the determination of divine wisdom, God can do other things apart from those that are subject to his providence and operation. But if it is considered as executing the command of wisdom and will, by which God determined that these effects are to be produced and not others, in which way considered it is named by us ordinary power, thus God cannot do other things than those that are subject to his providence.

IV. As to the third ¹¹, three errors are excluded that arise from a failure to consider the aforesaid distinction. The first is that of those who said that all things are of necessity just as they are; and even further, that God cannot do other things than those he does; extending the immobility of the divine order to the things themselves that are subject to the order. Against whom is the authority of Matt. 26: Thinkest thou not, etc.

The second is that of those who, on the contrary, transferred the mutability of the things that are subject to providence into the mutability of divine providence, positing that God, after the manner of man, is mutable in his will. Against whom is the authority of Num. 23: God is not, etc.

The third is that of those who said that divine providence does not extend to contingent things. Against whom is the authority of Lam. 3: Who is he that, etc.

Note that the first error and the third are directly against the first conclusion; but the second is against the second.