Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

After St. Thomas determined concerning the certainty of divine providence, he now determines concerning its reasonableness ¹.

Concerning this, however, he does three things. First, he shows that those things which are ordered by divine providence have some reason; second, he excludes certain errors, there: Thus therefore through the premises²; third, he infers a corollary, when he says: Thus therefore when it is asked³.

Concerning the first, he does two things: first, he shows the proposition; second, he shows that, although there is some reason of divine providence, there is nevertheless something in creatures which depends upon the simple will of God⁴.

I. As to the first, he proves the proposition by the following reason. From the end is taken the reason for the diversity of forms; from the diversity of forms is taken the reason for the order of things, that is, the diversity of degrees in the natures of things; from the diversity of forms follows the difference of operations and ends, and the diverse disposition of matter toward things; from this diverse disposition of matter follows the diversity of agents and patients; from the diversity of forms, matters, and agents follows the diversity of properties and accidents. Therefore, since by divine providence diverse accidents, actions and passions, and locations (namely according to higher and lower) are distributed, this does not happen without reason.

2. The first part of the antecedent is proved. God through His providence orders all things toward His goodness as toward an end, so that a likeness of it may, as far as is possible, be imprinted upon things. But the divine goodness cannot be perfectly represented by any single thing, since every creature falls short of its perfection. Therefore, in order that it might be represented in a more perfect manner, it was fitting that there be diversity in things. But things are diverse by the fact that they have diverse forms, from which they obtain their species. Therefore, etc. — The first consequence is proved through a simile in the explanation of a mental concept through the vocal word. For when a man sees that a concept of the mind cannot be sufficiently expressed by one vocal word, he multiplies words to express it. — It is also confirmed: because through the diversity of creatures the eminence of divine perfection can be considered.

The second part of the antecedent is proved. In forms there cannot be difference except by the fact that one exists as more perfect than another. Therefore also the diversity of things, which is through form, requires that in them there be order and degrees. Therefore, etc. — The assumption is proved. Form is nothing other than the divine likeness participated in things, as is evident from I Physics. And because according to it a thing has esse, but through the fact that a thing has esse it approaches the likeness of God; a likeness considered toward one simple thing cannot be diversified except according as it is more and less near or remote; the more closely something approaches the divine likeness, the more perfect it is; therefore, in forms there cannot be difference except by the fact that one is more perfect than another. — It is confirmed by the authority of the Philosopher in VIII Metaph., comparing the forms and natures of things to numbers. — It is also shown from the order of inanimate things, plants, irrational animals, and rational beings, in which we see a diversity according as some are more perfect than others: so much so that those which are supreme in an inferior genus seem near to the superior genus, and conversely; as also Dionysius says, chapter VII de Div. Nom. — Note that St. Thomas speaks of the diversity that is in forms, which is called formal diversity, namely that which is taken from the diverse intelligible notion of the form.

For such diversity requires an order among them: namely, that one be superior and the other inferior.

The third part of the antecedent is proved as to the first part, thus. The operation of a thing follows its form. Therefore, if there are diverse forms, they have diverse operations. The antecedent is proved: because everything acts according as it is in act; but it is in act through form. — As to the second part, it is proved: because through its proper action each thing attains its proper end. — As to the third part, it is proved thus. Besides forms that are subsistent per se, there are some that cannot subsist per se, but require matter as a foundation. Therefore, there must be a proportion between matters and forms. Therefore, it is necessary that diverse matters correspond to diverse forms: so that, namely, certain forms require simple matter, while others require composite matter; and according to diverse forms, there must be a diverse composition of parts. The first consequence is proved: because matter and form could not come together to compose one thing unless there were some proportion between them.

The fourth part of the antecedent is proved. Everything acts by reason of form, but undergoes action by reason of matter. Therefore, those things whose forms are more perfect and less material act upon those things whose forms are more imperfect and more material.

The fifth part of the antecedent is proved, as to the first and second parts indeed, because, since substance is the cause of accident, as the perfect of the imperfect, it must be that from diverse substantial principles diverse proper accidents follow. — As to the third part, because from diverse agents there are diverse impressions in patients.

The conclusion is confirmed by the authority of Scripture, which attributes the production and governance of things to wisdom and prudence: as Prov. III; Wisd. VIII and XI, where it is said: You have ordered all things in measure, number, and weight.

3. From what has been said it is reasonably inferred to have been said by Boethius, in the first book of his Arithmetic, that whatever things have been established by the primeval nature of things seem to have been formed by the ratio of numbers. For in the aforementioned order of divine providence it is posited that the first reason simpliciter is the divine goodness; but the first reason in creatures is the numerosity of things, for establishing which it is necessary that there be diverse degrees in forms, and matters, and agents and patients, and actions, and accidents.

II. Concerning these two propositions, By divine providence all things are ordered toward the divine goodness, so that its likeness, as far as is possible, may be imprinted upon things; and, The divine goodness cannot be perfectly represented by any single thing, note that we can interpret them in two ways. First, that by them St. Thomas does not intend that God wills, through a multitude of creatures, to manifest His goodness taken absolutely and imprint it upon things as far as is possible, so that the words "as much as" and "as far as" import an absolute adequation between the divine goodness representable by a creature and the representing likeness of creatures; nor that the multitude of creatures perfectly represents according to equality the divine goodness absolutely, which a single creature cannot perfectly represent; but he is speaking of the divine goodness as to be manifested according to the determination of divine wisdom; for just as through His wisdom God determined to communicate and manifest His goodness according to a certain likeness, so He determined to communicate it according to certain degrees of perfection. Speaking therefore of that likeness of the divine goodness to be imprinted upon things, thus determined through His wisdom, God through His providence determined that, as far as is possible, it be imprinted upon things: that is, that it be imprinted upon things in the most perfect manner in which it can be imprinted, and as much as the nature of the creature allows. Whence, since it cannot belong to a creature that all degrees of the divine goodness, to be communicated according to the determination of divine wisdom, be manifested and imprinted in any single thing, it was fitting that there be diversity in things. Similarly, one creature cannot represent the divine goodness perfectly, that is, according to all the degrees according to which God decreed to manifest it: but the universe of creatures indeed represents it perfectly, that is, according to all those degrees; although not perfectly absolutely, because there are infinite other degrees of divine goodness according to which it could be manifested.

2. But because St. Thomas below ⁵ seems to take as prior in the divine will the willing to communicate the divine goodness as far as is possible, before the willing to communicate it according to these determinate degrees of perfection: therefore we can interpret in a second way that the phrase "as far as" does not import an adequation of the communication of the divine goodness to the possibility of the creature's reception absolutely, so that the sense would be that God wills the likeness of His goodness to be imprinted upon things according to every degree that is not repugnant to a creature—for there are many degrees of divine likeness which it is not repugnant to be in creatures, and yet God has not determined to communicate them to creatures—but it explains and specifies the genus and ratio of the communication and imprinting. For since the form of something can be understood to be communicated to another in three ways, namely according to the same ratio and the same mode of being; according to the same ratio alone; and solely according to a certain participation of likeness: the sense is that through divine providence it is established that the likeness of the divine goodness be imprinted upon things, not indeed according to the same ratio; nor according to that mode of being by which the divine goodness is in itself, which namely contains all perfection unitedly and indivisibly, because that mode is not possible to a creature; but through a certain diffusion of likeness; for in that mode the divine goodness can be communicated to a creature. But this mode is that what is unitedly contained in the divine goodness is received in creatures manifoldly. And in this mode also the entire universe of creatures is said to represent the divine goodness in a more perfect manner than a single creature alone. Whence St. Thomas does not intend, in the second proposition, that in one thing it cannot be perfectly represented absolutely, while in many it can be, through receiving the divine nature according to the same ratio by which it is in God: but that it cannot be manifested in so perfect a manner in one as in many, according to the reception of some likeness of the divine goodness.

III. Concerning that proposition, From the diversity of forms and matters follows the diversity of properties and accidents, it must be noted that from matter according to itself, insofar as it is such, as it prescinds from form, no properties or accidents follow: since, as such, it signifies passive potency. But some such things are said to follow matter because they follow form as it is in matter so disposed: for according to the diversity of matter diverse accidents follow from the form. And also because from the nature composed of form and matter, according to the diverse condition of the matter, diverse accidents follow. Whence what is said here, that from the diversity of forms and matters diverse accidents follow, is to be understood of form and matter conjointly, not separately.

2. Concerning that interpretation which St. Thomas here sets forth of measure, number, and weight existing in things, it must be noted that he expounds them in one way in this place, and in another way in the Prima Pars, q. v ⁶, and De Veritate, q. XXI ⁷. For here he expounds them according as they are found in the universe of things; but in those places he expounds them according as they are found in each created thing. Yet according to the same principles is it considered in the universe of things and in each individual thing: as is evident to one comparing the things said here to the things said in the places cited above.

3. Concerning the conclusion itself⁸, it must be noted that divine providence is not therefore posited to have a reason as if something were the cause of it on the part of God providing: but because on the part of the particular effects of providence some reason and some cause can be assigned, when it is asked, Why is this? For when it is asked, Why is there a diversity of forms in created things? the end is answered as the cause: namely, that the divine goodness may be manifested in things, which could not be manifested through one thing. But if it is asked, Why is an order found in the perfections of things, so that one is greater and another less? the very order of forms is rendered as the proximate cause: because, namely, of the forms one is more perfect, while another is more imperfect. And so of the rest. And therefore it cannot be said that God governs creatures without reason, although the very act of the divine intellect providing does not have a cause.

IV. Second, St. Thomas shows that the reason according to which divine providence dispenses things is taken from the supposition of the divine will⁹. For the manifestation of this, he premises that operative reason, or operative argumentation or inquiry, and speculative inquiry agree indeed in this, that they begin from some principle, and through middle terms arrive at some intended end; but they differ, first, because in speculative matters the principle is the form and the quod quid est; whereas in operative matters it is the end, which is sometimes the form, sometimes something else. — Second, because in speculative matters the principle must always be necessary; but in operative matters it is sometimes necessary, as for a man to will happiness, while sometimes not, as for a man to will the building of a house. — Third, because in speculative matters the later things always follow from the prior of necessity; but not so in operative matters, but then only when the end cannot be attained except through this way; just as for one who wills to build a house, although he wills to build a house from his simple will, but not from the ratio of a house, it is necessary that he seek timber.

This being presupposed, the intended conclusion is proved thus. That creatures are produced into esse, although it has its origin from the ratio of the divine goodness, nevertheless depends upon the simple will of God: and similarly that He wills to communicate His goodness according to this or that measure of perfection, or according to this or that number of things. Supposing, however, that God wills to communicate His goodness, according as it is possible, to creatures, from this it receives its reason that creatures are diverse. And supposing that God wills to establish this number of things, and this measure of perfection for each thing, from this it receives its reason that it has such a form and such a matter. Therefore, although divine providence dispenses things according to a certain reason, this reason is nevertheless taken from the supposition of the divine will.

The antecedent is proved as to the first part. Because although God necessarily loves His goodness, it does not however follow necessarily that it be represented through creatures: since without this the divine goodness is perfect. Similarly, although God wills to communicate goodness, according as it is possible, to creatures, it does not follow necessarily however that He wills to communicate it according to this or that measure of perfection: since, namely, it can be manifested and communicated according to another perfection.

2. Concerning the second difference between operative and speculative reason, it must be noted that a principle's being necessary in operative matters is taken according to a proportion to a necessary principle in speculative matters. For since the intellect regards the true as its object, but the will regards the good and the appetible, the principle from which speculative—that is, scientific—reason proceeds, which tends toward the knowledge of truth, must be necessary by a necessity of truth: so, namely, that it contains necessary truth and cannot be false. But the principle of practical reason, which does not tend principally toward the knowledge of truth, but toward the operation of something desired and loved, when it is necessary, is understood to have the necessity of appetibility, so, namely, that it cannot not be desired. In this way we say that beatitude, which is the end of man, is a necessary principle of practical reason, because the will cannot not will it, if it goes forth into act concerning it. Similarly, when we place some order in the divine intellect and divine will, according to our mode of understanding, we say that the divine goodness is a necessary principle: because God necessarily loves it, and it has from the ratio of its perfection that it be loved, and that it cannot not be loved. On account of which St. Thomas said that the production of the creature has its origin from the ratio of the divine goodness¹⁰: according to which, namely, it belongs to it that God necessarily loves it. On the contrary, however, in operative matters a principle is said not to be necessary when it is not necessarily appetible: just as also in speculative matters a principle would be called not necessary if it did not contain necessary truth, but could be false. In this way we say that a house to be built is not a necessary principle: because a man does not necessarily will to build a house, for the reason that it does not belong to a house to be built from its proper ratio that it be loved and desired, but this proceeds from the free will of man.

3. Concerning the reason, it must be noted that St. Thomas posits this order in the divine will: — on the part, namely, of the things willed, not on the part of the will itself — that, I say, first God wills His own goodness; second, He wills to communicate it; third, He wills that there be diversity of creatures; fourth, He wills to communicate it according to these determinate degrees of perfection to creatures; fifth, He wills to give to this thing this matter and this form, but to that thing that matter and form. In this order, however, the first is necessarily willed absolutely; the third is willed on the supposition of the second; the last is willed on the supposition of the third; but the other intermediate things proceed from the mere free divine will; just as, when someone can travel to a place by diverse ways, that he chooses this one proceeds from his free will.

V. As to the second main point, from the premises St. Thomas excludes two errors¹¹: namely, both of the Mutakallimun in the law of the Saracens, as Rabbi Moses says, saying that all things follow the simple will of God without reason; and of others saying that the order of causes follows from divine providence by way of necessity. And although, says St. Thomas, certain words of Sacred Scripture seem to attribute all things to the simple will of God, as in the Psalms, and Job xi, and Rom. ix; and also Augustine, III De Trin., seems to say: yet they are not said so that reason may be removed from the dispensation of providence, but so that the will of God may be shown to be the first principle of all things.

VI. As to the third¹², it is inferred as a corollary that, when the "wherefore" concerning any natural effect is asked, we can render a reason from some proximate cause: provided that, as to the first cause, we reduce all things to the divine will. It is declared by an example: when, namely, it is asked, Why was the wood heated at the presence of fire? For if it is answered, Because God willed it: it is answered suitably, because the question is reduced to the first cause; but unsuitably, if other causes are excluded.