Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

After St. Thomas showed that all things are subject to divine providence, he wishes to determine concerning the quality of divine providence itself¹. Concerning this, however, he does two things: first, he treats of its certitude; second, of its ratio, in chapter XCVII. Concerning the first he does two things: first, he shows that divine providence is certain; second, that its certitude does not exclude the utility of prayer, in the following chapter. Concerning the first he does three things: first, he sets down those things which seem to create difficulty in this matter; second, he proves the proposed thesis²; third, he answers the objections³. I. As to the first, he touches on five things which seem to bring difficulty. The first is that the Philosopher proves, in VI Metaphysics, that if we posit every effect to have a cause per se; and that, any cause per se being posited, it is necessary that the effect be posited: it follows that all future things happen of necessity. Therefore it must be said either that not all things are subject to divine providence, whose opposite was shown above; or that, providence being posited, it is not necessary that its effect be posited, and consequently that it is not certain; or that all things happen of necessity, since providence is from eternity. The second is that then this conditional will be true: If God provided this, this will be. And consequently, just as the antecedent is necessary, since it is eternal, so also the consequent will be necessary: for the consequent of every conditional whose antecedent is necessary must be necessary. And so it will follow that all things proceed from necessity. The third is this. If it has been provided by God that someone is to reign, either it is possible that he not reign, or it is not. If the second: therefore it is impossible that he not reign. Therefore it is necessary that he reign. If the first: with the possible posited in being, nothing impossible follows⁴. But it follows that divine providence fails. Therefore this is not impossible. And so it follows that, if all things have been provided by God, either providence is not certain, or all things happen of necessity. The fourth is that, as Cicero argues in book II of On Divination, if all things are provided, all things are done by fate; and there will be no free judgment of the will; and, by the same reasoning, all contingent causes will be removed. The fifth is that providence does not take away intermediate causes that are contingent and able to fail. Therefore the effect of providence can fail. Therefore etc. II. As to the second⁵, two conclusions are posited⁶. The first is this: Divine provision cannot be wholly made void. It is proved by two suppositions, which were shown in the preceding. One is that the order of divine providence embraces all things: since it is the cause of all existing things, conferring being on all things; and consequently bestowing conservation on all; and conferring perfection in the ultimate end, which is namely to be assimilated to God. The other is that, since providence is so much the more perfect in premeditating the order as the order of providence can be carried down further even to the least things; and in this, that the premeditated order is imposed on things, the providence of the governor is the worthier and more perfect the more universal it is and the more it unfolds its premeditation through more ministries, because even the disposition of the ministries itself holds a great part of the provided order: it is necessary that, since divine providence consists in the summit of perfection, in providing it order all things by the sempiternal premeditation of its wisdom, however tiny they may appear; and that whatever things operate anything act instrumentally, moved by it, and, by obeying it, minister to the order of providence, thought out from eternity, so to speak, to be unfolded in things. Note that St. Thomas adds 'so to speak' in order to make understood that it is not properly said that the order of divine providence is thought out, since in God there is no cogitative power: but it is an improper locution, naming the very act of the intellect 'cogitation', from some likeness of the cogitative power to the intellect. 2. With these suppositions, he argues as follows. The execution of divine providence cannot be impeded because some agent impedes something contrary to it by acting: since all things that can act must of necessity minister to it in acting. Nor yet because of the defect of some agent or patient: since every active and passive power is caused in things according to the divine disposition. Nor finally through the change of providence itself: since God is wholly immutable, as was shown above. Therefore divine provision cannot be wholly made void. III. For the evidence of this, it must be considered first that one must speak in one way of divine power and in another way of the power of heavenly bodies, although both are universal. For against divine power, because it gives the power of acting to all causes and all causes are its instruments, nothing can resist by acting contrary to that power: for if it acted contrary to it, it would no longer be its instrument, because it would not act as moved by God. — Likewise, the active or passive power by which it operates as by intermediate causes cannot fail it, if God wills to operate through intermediate causes: since he himself, by the infinity of his power, can give to all second causes whatever power he wishes.

But to a particular heavenly power some cause can resist by acting contrary to it: for instance, if some star inclines toward rain, there can be some cause resisting it by working toward dryness. — Also, free judgment can resist even the universal power of the heavenly body, which, as was shown above⁷, is not directly subject to heavenly power. — Likewise, a sufficient intermediate cause can fail the heavenly power: for instance, if the heavenly power inclines toward the generation of a male, the active power of the generating man can fail this influx in some generation; namely when the power of the generating man, which heaven uses, has been weak and powerless. — Finally, the suitable disposition of matter, which it presupposes for its action, can fail the heavenly power, since it is a corporeal agent of limited power.

Therefore the order of heavenly power toward some effect can be made void and impeded in many ways. But the order of divine providence cannot be made void. And for this reason that order is certain: but that one is uncertain and fallible.

2. It must be considered secondly, from the doctrine of St. Thomas, Verit., q. vi, a. 3, that the certitude of cognition is one thing and the certitude of order is another. For the certitude of cognition is considered in this, that a thing is judged to be just as it is. But the certitude of order is considered in this, that a cause infallibly produces its effect. When, therefore, it is said that divine providence is certain, it is understood that any effect of divine providence will happen infallibly. And this St. Thomas signified when he said that divine provision cannot be wholly made void: for some ordination or provision is said to be able to be made void when it can be impeded that what was ordained should happen.

IV. But a doubt occurs. For St. Thomas seems to hold the opposite of what is said here, in Qq. Verit., q. vi, a. 1; and I Sent., d. xl, q. 1, a. 2. For there he holds that predestination differs from providence in this, that predestination regards the order of those to be saved into beatitude, and the outcome of the order: whence it is not of any except those who attain glory. But providence regards the order to the end only, not however the outcome of the order, because not all things which are ordered to the end attain the end: for all men are ordered by divine providence to beatitude, and yet not all attain beatitude. For from these things he seems to will that the order of divine providence is not certain and infallible: rather, that it can be made void.

V. It is answered, and it is said first, that one must speak in one way of providence as to the common ratio of providence, and in another way as to some particular mode of it: just as one must speak in one way of animal as to the common ratio of animal, and in another way as to some determinate species of it. If we speak of providence as to its common ratio, insofar as it is providence absolutely, thus providence regards the order to the end only: not however the outcome and the attainment of the end. Therefore its concept is nothing other than the ratio of the order of each thing into its particular end, and into the common end which is divine goodness. — But if we speak of providence as to some particular mode of it, thus it is not unfitting that it regard also the outcome and the attainment of the end: as is clear in that particular mode of providence which is called predestination; and in that mode of providence by which necessary things are provided; and also in that mode by which he wills some contingent thing to attain its end.

2. It is said secondly, that it is universally true that the order of divine providence placed in the things provided, in the mode in which it looks to divine providence, is certain and infallible and cannot be made void: as is said here, and is also had in Prima, q. xxii, a. 2, ad 1, and a. 4; likewise q. xxiii, a. 6; likewise q. ciii, a. 7. For since some things are ordered to the end by divine providence in two ways: in one way, because by divine providence it is determined only that they have those things by which they can arrive at their end; in another way, because by it not only is it determined that they have those things by which they can arrive at the end, but also that they arrive at the end itself — in both ways the determination of divine providence is certain and infallible. For those things which are so ordered to the end that they not only have those things by which they can attain the end, but also that they attain the end itself, attain both infallibly. But those things which are ordered to the end only in the first way attain infallibly those things by which they can attain their end.

3. What, therefore, is said here is understood to this sense: that what is ordained by divine providence happens infallibly, in the mode in which it was ordained and provided. In Qq. however de Verit., and in I Sent., St. Thomas speaks of providence as to that which befits it according to the common ratio of providence. And it is understood that not all things ordained by divine providence to some end attain their end: but all those ordained to beatitude by divine predestination do attain beatitude. Because some things are ordained to the end by divine providence only in the first way: and so that order to the end is fallible by comparison with particular causes; not however by comparison with divine providence, which did not ordain those who do not attain the end to attain the end, but only this, that they should have fitness for the attainment of the end. It is evident, moreover, that these do not contradict: that providence does not regard the outcome of the order to the end with respect to all things which are in some way ordered to the end by divine providence, but with respect to some things regards the order to the end only, not however the outcome of the order; and yet that the intended order, in the mode in which it is provided, cannot be made void, but is certain and infallible.

4. But if it be urged that providence pertains to the consequent will; and the consequent will is always fulfilled; and thus it seems that providence regards the outcome of the order in all things; and consequently that what is said in Verit. will be false, and retracted in the Prima Pars and in this place: — it is answered that, since providence includes two things, namely the willing of the end in some way, and the willing of the order of things to the end; with respect to the order of things to the end, it pertains to the consequent will, and thus what is provided is always fulfilled, because everything that is provided to have an order to some end attains that order; with respect to the end, however, it pertains to the antecedent will, as to some things provided, as St. Thomas wills in Verit., and I Sent.; for by providence, as is said there, all men are ordered to beatitude, and yet not all attain beatitude; although as to some things it pertains also to the consequent will. Whence the assumption is false as to providence with respect to the end, if it be taken universally.

VI. The second conclusion is⁸: From the certitude and immobility of divine providence it does not follow that all things which happen from divine providence happen of necessity.

For its proof, St. Thomas supposes two things. The first is that, since every agent tends to the good and the better that it can; and the good and the better are not considered in the same way in the whole and in the parts; rather, it would be better for the part if it reached the grade of a superior part, but for the whole the disparity between parts is better, without which the order and perfection of the whole cannot be, as is declared in the human body: there is a difference between the particular agent and the universal agent, because the particular agent tends to the good of the part absolutely, and makes it as good as it can in its own genus; but the universal agent tends to the good of the whole. Whence some defect is outside the intention of the particular agent which is according to the intention of the universal agent. This is declared in the generation of the female, and in corruption and diminution, which are of the intention of universal nature, that is, of the power of the universal agent; not however of the intention of particular nature, since each thing flees defect but tends to perfection, as far as in it lies.

The second supposition is that among the parts of the universe the first distinction appears according to the contingent and the necessary. For the higher things among beings are necessary, incorruptible and immovable: but the lowest are corrupted as to being, moved as to their dispositions, and produce their effects contingently.

2. With these suppositions, he wills to argue as follows. Every agent that is a part of the universe intends, as much as it can, to persist in its being and natural disposition, and to establish its effect. But God, who is the governor of the universe, intends that of his effects one indeed be established by way of necessity, another contingently; and according to this he adapts diverse causes to them. Therefore there falls under the order of divine providence not only that this effect be, but that this be contingently, another however necessarily. Therefore some of the things which are subject to divine providence are necessary, some contingent, and not all necessary. Therefore etc. — The antecedent, for both its parts, is clear from the suppositions. — But the first and second consequence are manifest of themselves.

VII. Concerning this proposition, Some defect is outside the intention of the particular agent which is according to the intention of the universal agent, it must be considered first that intention, properly speaking, is found only in intellectual things: for it is an act of the will tending to an end. Because, however, intention of this kind is a certain inclination of the will following the apprehension of a thing by way of an end, the name intention has been transferred to signify the inclination of a natural form to something. And according to this, something is said to be according to the intention of universal nature because the power of the universal cause is inclined to it and moves other things to it: but something is said to be according to the intention of particular nature because the power of the particular cause has an inclination to it.

It must be considered secondly that, because power follows form and not matter — for each thing acts according as it is in act, not according as it is in potency — therefore something is properly said to be of the intention of nature which is according to the inclination of the form, not however that which befits the thing by reason of matter; although even that which befits the thing by reason of matter is said to befit it naturally. Corruption, therefore, and the defect and diminution of some thing, are not of the intention of the thing itself, because it is not according to the inclination of the form, since it belongs to the form to give being and to perfect: but in some things they follow from the necessity of matter. And for this reason those defects are called natural: for matter is also nature, as is clear from II Physicorum⁹. Well, therefore, is it said here that the corruption and defect of a thing is outside the intention of nature, or of the particular agent: although it is of the intention of the universal agent, intending the multiplication of individuals and the conservation of generation, which cannot be without the corruption of some things.

It must be considered thirdly, from the doctrine of St. Thomas, IV Sent., d. xxxvi, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2, that it is not unfitting that something be outside the first intention of particular nature which yet is of its second intention: namely when the inclination of the natural power is first to one thing, secondarily, however, if that cannot happen, it is to another. When, therefore, it is said here that the generation of the female is outside the intention of the particular agent, it is understood of the first intention only, not however of the second. For although the power which is in the seed is borne by first intention to the generation of a male, yet, if that cannot happen, either from the defect of matter or from any other cause, it is borne secondarily to the generation of a female, as to that which is near to the thing first intended.

VIII. As to the third¹⁰, he answers the objections made. To the first indeed, this consequence is denied: Divine providence is the cause of this future effect. And it is not only in present and past time, but from eternity. Therefore such an effect is of necessity going to be. — For divine providence is per se the cause that this effect happen contingently. And this cannot be made void.

Note that the sense of this answer is that it is not true that, once the per se cause of some effect is posited, with which posited the effect must be posited, the effect must happen necessarily absolutely: but it is true that the effect must happen in the mode in which it is contained under the cause. For if it be the cause of the effect as to its being absolutely, not however as to the mode of necessity or contingency: then indeed it is necessary that such an effect happen necessarily absolutely. And to this sense the argument of Aristotle proceeds. — But if it be the cause of the effect not only as to being, but also as to the determinate mode of producing, namely of necessity or contingency: it is necessary that the effect happen necessarily with that mode.

Because, therefore, things are contained under divine providence not only according to being, but also according to the mode of producing, insofar as it is determined by divine providence in what way any thing must happen; and it is not determined by it that all things happen of necessity, but that some happen necessarily, as the motions of the heavens, some however contingently, as these lower things: it does not follow that all things happen necessarily absolutely, but that some happen infallibly from necessity, some however contingently.

2. To the second, it is answered by the same. Namely that that conditional is true; and that that consequent is necessary, namely, this will be; but in the mode in which it is provided. For if it is provided that it happen contingently, infallibly it will happen contingently.

To the third, it is said in the same way, that it is possible that he not reign if it be considered according to itself, that is, if its being be considered absolutely in order to its proximate cause: because it is provided that this happen contingently. But if it be considered as provided, that is, as to the mode of happening fixed for it by divine providence, it is impossible that it not happen contingently.

Notice that St. Thomas satisfies the argument in few words. If we wish to apply this to all the assumed propositions, we must say: When it is asked whether it is possible for this man not to reign, or not, it is said that it is possible for him not to reign absolutely and considered in himself, namely in relation to his particular cause; but it is impossible for him not to reign contingently, as has been provided. When the first part is challenged because, if a possibility is posited in being, no impossibility follows, yet it follows that divine providence fails and is not certain: the minor premise is denied. For it does not fall under divine providence that this man will reign with absolute necessity, but that he will reign contingently. Hence it cannot be posited in being that this man does not reign contingently, given the supposition that it has been provided that he reign contingently, although, considered in himself, he is able not to reign. If, however, it is posited in being that this man does not reign, it follows that it had not been provided that he would reign absolutely; but it does not follow that providence fails. When, on the other hand, the second part is challenged, it is conceded that it is necessary for him to reign contingently, but not absolutely. From this it is clear that that conditional proposition—namely, the one inferring that if all things are provided by God, then either providence is not certain or all things happen of necessity—does not follow from the premises, if it is understood that all things happen of necessity absolutely. But if it is understood that all things happen of necessity in the manner in which they were provided, it is conceded. For the other part of that consequent is true, namely the second part.

3. To the fourth, the consequence is denied, as is clear from the premises. For since not only effects, but also causes and modes of being, are subject to providence, it does not follow, if all things are subject to providence, that nothing is in our power. For some things are so provided as to be done freely through us.

To the fifth, the consequence is denied. Because, since God operates in all things and according to the choice of His will, it belongs to His providence sometimes to permit defectible causes to fail, and sometimes to preserve them from defect.

The sense of this response is that sometimes God, producing some effect by means of a defectible cause, does not permit it to fail; and consequently that effect happens infallibly from divine providence, although by means of a cause that is contingent and able to fail. And therefore the infallibility and certitude of divine providence does not remove the contingency that belongs to the effect in itself, in relation to its proximate cause.

Here it must be observed, from the doctrine of St. Thomas, De Veritate, q. 6, a. 3, that we find the order with respect to some effect to be certain in two ways. In one way, from the fact that one particular cause, from the order of divine providence, infallibly produces its effect. In another way, from the fact that many causes, any one of which can fail, are ordered by God to the attainment of one effect in place of the one that fails, or lest it fail; just as we see the perpetuity of the species preserved in corruptible things, not through a single individual, but through the succession of one after another, divine providence so governing that not all things fail when one fails. If therefore we speak of necessary effects, they happen infallibly, not only in relation to divine providence, but also in relation to their proximate causes. If, however, we speak of contingent effects, they happen infallibly, not in relation to their proper causes, but in relation to divine providence, which supplies so many helps that their proper causes do not fail. For this reason St. Thomas says that it belongs to divine providence sometimes to preserve defectible causes from defect.

Lastly, St. Thomas adds: above, where the knowledge of God was treated, those things were resolved which could be assumed concerning the necessity of things provided from the certitude of foreknowledge.

IX. For the evidence of the things that are said here, it must be considered that it is indeed most difficult to reconcile the certitude of divine providence with the contingency of causes and the freedom of choice, as St. Thomas says concerning the certitude of predestination in De Veritate, q. 6, a. 3; on account of the weakness, I say, of the human intellect, which is not able by its own power to penetrate divine things. The best way, however, of escaping the difficulties that arise concerning this is the way touched upon here: namely that, since both effects and causes are subject to divine providence not only according to being and according to operation, but also according to the mode of being and according to the mode of operating, it is not necessary that all natural or human things happen of absolute necessity, but that they happen of the necessity of supposition and immutability, in the manner in which they were provided; namely, contingently and freely those things which God determined should happen freely and contingently, but necessarily those which He determined should happen necessarily. For by this foundation, as was clear, St. Thomas resolves all the instances brought forward; and through it other instances can also be resolved.

2. For Aureoli argues, in Capreolus, In I Sent., d. 40, a. 3 ¹¹, First: Everything that will happen infallibly will happen immutably, because the same thing is signified by both. But what is provided will happen infallibly. Therefore immutably. Therefore the effect of divine providence will so happen that it cannot be changed.

Secondly: While an immutable condition remains, it is foolish to strive to remove that which is immutable while that condition remains. But it is manifest that divine providence remains immutable; and, providence standing, that which is provided cannot not happen. Therefore it is foolish to strive or deliberate concerning that which is provided. Since therefore all things are provided, it follows that all striving and all deliberation is in vain.

3. To the first of these, through this foundation, it is said that everything provided will indeed happen infallibly and immutably in the manner in which it was provided. Yet not every such thing will happen infallibly and immutably absolutely. For some things are so provided as to proceed from a proximate cause that is fallible and mutable.

To the second, it is said that it is foolish to strive to remove that which is immutable while an immutable condition remains, in the manner in which it is immutable while that condition remains. Now, it is said that, divine providence remaining immutable, that which is provided is immutable in the manner in which it was provided, but not absolutely. Therefore it is foolish to strive to prevent that from happening contingently which was provided to happen contingently, or to prevent that from happening necessarily which was provided to happen necessarily. But it is not foolish to strive to remove it absolutely. Therefore not all striving is in vain, nor is all deliberation in vain.

4. However, I do not approve of that response which says that God, from His excellence higher than we can think, so provides for things and events that to be provided by God follows something higher than evitableness or inevitableness ¹². For this is to say nothing. For since evitable and non-evitable are contradictorily opposed, just as being able not to happen and not being able not to happen, one of them must be said of the thing provided, namely either that it is evitable, or that it is not evitable. And thus the same difficulty remains: because the uncertainty of divine providence seems to follow if it is posited that it is evitable; but the necessity of all things, if it is posited that it is inevitable. Therefore the response which is taken from St. Thomas in this place is more suitable and satisfies better.

X. But against this response of St. Thomas someone could object as follows: I take some effect provided to happen, yet from a contingent cause. It is certain that providence regards two things: namely, that the effect itself happen, and that it happen contingently; for example, Antichrist. I ask, with respect to the first: will Antichrist happen fallibly, namely in such a way that he can not happen? Or will he happen infallibly, namely in such a way that he cannot not happen? If you say fallibly, then providence is not certain. If you say infallibly, then he will happen necessarily in himself; and thus it follows that what you say was provided to happen contingently happens necessarily absolutely.

2. It is answered that to happen fallibly from some cause can be understood in two ways. In one way, that, the cause being posited and disposed to act, it can not happen; which is properly said to happen fallibly, for to happen fallibly is said in relation to a cause posited in act. And in this way, what is provided to happen does not happen fallibly from divine providence, but infallibly: because divine providence is most efficacious, and it is not compatible that something be provided and not happen in the manner in which it was provided. Yet it does not follow on this account that it happens necessarily absolutely, but only that it happens necessarily from supposition, that is, this supposition being made that it was provided to happen, and in the manner in which it was provided to happen, namely contingently. Just as it is necessary for Socrates to be moved, this supposition being made that he is running; and yet absolutely he is moved contingently, just as he also runs contingently. Hence, just as this holds: If Socrates is running, Socrates is moved. But he is running. Therefore he is moved; so this holds: If this is provided to happen, it will happen. But it is provided to happen. Therefore it will happen. But just as this does not hold: If Socrates is running, Socrates is moved. But Socrates is running. Therefore he is moved necessarily and infallibly; so this does not hold: If this is provided, it will happen. But it is provided. Therefore it will happen necessarily and infallibly absolutely.

In another way, that it in itself can not be and not be produced; which, however, is improperly said to happen fallibly. And in this way, all things provided happen fallibly: because just as God determined from eternity that these things were to come, so He was able not to determine, or to determine the opposite, absolutely speaking, since the things that God produces, He produces freely; and thus what is now provided would not be. Yet from this it does not follow that divine providence is uncertain, but that concerning that of which there is providence that it be, there was able not to be such providence absolutely, although, that providence being posited, it cannot be changed.

3. But if it is objected again: this supposition has already been made, that it was provided that Antichrist happen. And this supposition cannot be changed. Therefore Antichrist will happen inevitably: it is said that Antichrist will happen inevitably in the manner in which it was provided, namely contingently; because to happen contingently is inseparably conjoined with this, namely that Antichrist happen according to what was provided. For it was not provided that Antichrist happen except with this condition, that he happen contingently. And therefore through divine providence contingent causes were prepared for him, to the end that he happen contingently.

XI. Finally, I would say one thing: that, since it can be shown by evident reason that divine providence is certain; and by experience we see that we have free choice, since we do many things by our own choice; but it is obscure and difficult how the certitude of divine providence can stand with the freedom of our choice: it is foolish to deny that we have free choice, or that divine providence is not certain—of which things we have open and manifest knowledge—on account of the obscurity and non-evidence of that which exceeds our intellect and which we cannot grasp by our own powers.

How, moreover, the freedom of choice stands with the certitude of divine providence, we can declare by this example. If someone were to help one weak in strength and wishing to go somewhere by supporting him lest he fall on the way, and thus brought him to some destined place without defect, he nevertheless walking on his own feet: it would certainly be said that this helper brought to the end without defect him who, if he had been left to himself, would have fallen many times on the journey; and yet, notwithstanding this, this man reached the end on his own feet, and, so far as comes from himself, defectibly, since he was weak in strength. In like manner, when a man is brought to some end by divine providence, God moving and helping his will, and removing all hindrances: the man indeed acts freely and by his own will, and, so far as comes from himself, defectibly; yet, helped by divine providence, inasmuch as it is such, he arrives at that end infallibly.