Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

The second corollary is:¹ Someone is said to be well-fortuned from higher causes, namely God, angels, and the heavens; and also from higher causes someone is said to be ill-fortuned.

Concerning this, St. Thomas does three things: first, he shows how a man is fortuned from higher causes; second, how he is aided from higher causes with respect to the outcome of his actions;² third, he removes certain doubts.³

Concerning the first, he does three things: first, he sets forth the proposition; second, he shows the difference among higher causes in making a man fortuned;⁴ third, he shows with respect to what things someone is said to be well- or ill-fortuned.⁵

I. First, therefore, it is shown that a man is fortuned from higher causes. And it is argued thus: It is said to happen well to someone according to fortune when some good befalls him outside his intention. But it happens that some good befalls a man outside his own intention, according to the disposition of a heavenly body, of an angel, and of God. Therefore etc.

St. Thomas does not prove the major premise, because it is evident from what is said in II Physics,⁶ and it is made clear by the example of finding a treasure. But he provides the proof and declaration of the minor premise. Which minor premise, indeed, he does not formally set down himself, but gives to be understood from his procedure. For he proves it thus: It happens that someone acts outside his own intention, yet not outside the intention of some superior to whom he is subject; this is made clear by the example of a master sending a servant to find another fellow servant, whom that servant nevertheless finds outside his own intention. But a man is ordered according to the body under heavenly bodies; according to the intellect, under angels; according to the will, under God. Therefore etc.

Second, he clarifies the conclusion, saying that since God acts directly on choice, while the action of an angel acts in the manner of one persuading, and the action of a heavenly body in the manner of one disposing; when someone, from the impression of heavenly bodies, is inclined to certain choices useful to himself, whose utility he nevertheless does not know by his own reason; and together with this, his intellect is illuminated from the light of an intellectual substance to understand the same things;⁷ and from divine action his will is inclined to choose something useful whose reason he does not know: he is said to be well-fortuned; and conversely ill-fortuned when his choice is inclined from higher causes to the contrary things; as is said of a certain man in Jeremiah 22: Write this man barren, a man ⁸ who shall not prosper in his days, etc.

The sense is that someone is said to be well-fortuned when he attains to greater goods from the disposition of these higher causes than he had thought out; but he is said to be ill-fortuned when he fails from those things which he prudently arranges, and comes upon unexpected evils.

2. Concerning that proposition, From the light of an intellectual substance the intellect of man is illuminated, it should be noted that the human intellect can be illuminated by an angelic intellect in two ways, as is had from the teaching of St. Thomas in the First Part, q. 111, a. 1, and De Veritate, q. 11, a. 3. First, indeed, by the infusion of a spiritual light having intentional being, and by an influx into the human intellect, in the manner in which the power of art is received in an instrument. For thus, through such a light, which is a certain intentional likeness of the angelic light, the human intellect is strengthened to understand something that it would not understand and would not consider without a light of this kind. In another way, not by the infusion of some light into the intellect, but only by the formation of certain species in the imagination, which can be formed from the commotion of the spirits in which the sensed species are preserved. For from forms of this kind, thus formed in the imagination by angelic power, the intellect receives some cognition, and considers something as good which it would not consider. And because everything by which something is made manifest is light, such a species can be called light.

However, I do not understand this as if these two modes were completely separated and could not concur—indeed, the second also concurs with the first—but because the second can occur without the first. For the very formation of species in the imagination alone, from which the intellect receives some notion, can be called illumination.

II. Second, it is shown how a man is said to be well- or ill-fortuned in different ways in relation to causes of this kind.⁹ And many differences are set down.

The first is that from the disposition left in our body by a heavenly body, from which a man is inclined to certain choices, someone is said to be not only well- or ill-fortuned, but also well- or ill-born, as is clear from the Philosopher in the Magna Moralia. But from the illumination of the intellect to do something, or the instigation of the will by God, a man is not said to be well- or ill-born, but rather guarded or governed. The reason for this is that the impressions of heavenly bodies upon our bodies cause in us natural dispositions of the bodies. For that one man, beyond his own reason, chooses useful things, while another chooses harmful things, cannot arise from a diverse nature of the intellect, since that nature is one in all: for formal diversity would induce a diversity according to species, whereas material diversity induces a diversity according to number.

2. Notice that the sense of this difference is that one is not said to be well-born and another ill-born except from the diversity that comes to men at birth; so that, namely, he is said to be well-born who from his birth has a disposition in nature toward those things that are useful to him, while he is ill-born who from his birth has it to be disposed toward things harmful to himself. But such diversity coming to men from birth cannot be considered from a diverse disposition of intellect and will in themselves; since intellect and will immediately follow the essence of the soul and are rooted in it alone; while the very essence of the soul, if considered in itself, has no diversity, but is of one ratio and one disposition; and if it has any distinction and diversity, this arises from the diversity of matter, from which it is individuated. But diversity in men from birth is properly considered according to the diverse disposition of the body.

Therefore, when something is said to happen well or ill to men from God and separate substances, insofar as they act on the intellect and on the will, someone is not said to be well- or ill-born from these causes, because a diversity of disposition of intellect and will does not arise from them from birth. But he is said to be governed and guarded insofar as different people are differently directed, according to intellect and will, toward their choices and acts of understanding. From heavenly bodies, however, someone is fittingly said to be well- or ill-born, because from them there arise from birth and conception various bodily dispositions according to which one is disposed to choose useful things, and another harmful things.

III. The second difference is that a man does not always choose that which the guardian angel intends, nor that to which the heavenly body inclines; but he always chooses that which God works in his will. Hence the guardianship of the angels is sometimes frustrated, according to that of Jeremiah 51: We would have cured Babylon, but she is not healed; and much more is the inclination of the heavenly bodies frustrated; but divine providence is always steadfast. The reason for this diversity is that the operation of an angel and of a heavenly body is only as disposing; but a disposition that is from a bodily quality, or from the persuasion of the intellect, does not induce necessity for choosing. But the operation of God is as perfecting.

This difference is sufficiently clear from what was said above. This alone must be recalled to memory: that although it is necessary on a supposition that the will wills that to which God moves it, nevertheless absolutely speaking it wills contingently and freely.¹⁰

IV. The third difference is between a heavenly body and an angel. Namely, because every disposition toward choice from heavenly bodies is by way of some passion, namely love, or hatred, or anger, or the like; because heavenly bodies do not dispose toward choice except insofar as they impress upon our bodies, from which a man is incited to choose in the manner in which passions induce toward choice. But the disposition toward choosing from an angel is by way of intelligible consideration, without passion: either, namely, when the intellect is illuminated by him to know only that something is good to be done, but is not instructed for what end, in which case, when the man attains a useful end not previously considered, it will be fortuitous to him; or when he is instructed both that this is good to be done and for what end, in which case it is not fortuitous when he attains the end.

2. Notice, from what was said above,¹¹ that heavenly bodies, by acting upon our bodies, are the cause of our choice in two ways: either, namely, by causing certain dispositions from which we are apt for certain passions, as choleric people are prone to anger; or by causing some disposition from which some movement of passion arises, as from excessive coldness befalling the body the appetite for fire arises, and from excessive heat the appetite shuns hot things. Because, therefore, a man is not instigated to choose something from heavenly bodies except in one of these two ways, it is therefore rightly said here that the disposition toward choice from heavenly bodies is by way of passion; insofar, namely, as it does not incline toward choosing except by exciting some passion, from which the intellective appetite is naturally suited to be drawn and inclined to something. But the intellective appetite is inclined by passion, as is had in I-II, q. 9, a. 2, and q. 10, a. 3, from that part whereby it is moved by the object, insofar as a man, disposed in some way through passion, judges something to be fitting and good which, existing outside passion, he would not judge. And therefore in this way also the bodily disposition arising from heavenly bodies inclines toward choice: insofar as it is the origin and foundation from which that judgment arises by which something is judged good and fitting. And therefore it is said to incline by way of passion.

V. The fourth difference is that some good can happen to a man not only outside his own intention, but also outside the inclination of heavenly bodies, and outside the illumination of angels; but not outside divine providence. And consequently some fortuitous good or evil can happen to a man in comparison to himself and to those other causes, but not in comparison to God.

The reason for this diversity is that a spiritual active power, just as it is higher than a bodily one, is likewise more universal. And on that account the disposition of a heavenly body does not extend to all things to which human choice extends. Likewise, the power of the human soul, or even of an angel, is particular in comparison to the divine power, which is universal with respect to all beings. And consequently, in comparison to it, in no thing can there be anything casual and unforeseen.

2. For the evidence of this difference, it must be considered that one must speak of a particular cause in one way, and of a universal cause in another. For because a universal cause can do more things than a particular cause, it is not unfitting for something to occur according to the order of a universal cause that does not occur according to the order of a particular cause. And consequently it is not unfitting for something to be per se intended by a universal cause which is outside the intention of a particular cause; and therefore to be casual in comparison to the particular cause, although it is not casual in relation to the universal cause. But a particular cause cannot do anything that the universal cause cannot do, since it acts only by its power. Therefore something cannot be per se in relation to a particular cause which is nonetheless per accidens and fortuitous in relation to the universal cause. Indeed, if there is a cause so universal that it contains all particular causes, nothing at all in relation to it will be able to happen per accidens or fortuitously. Because, therefore, the rational soul is more universal—namely, with respect to intellection and volition—than is the power of the heavens, it is therefore not unfitting for something to happen per se in comparison to it which is per accidens and fortuitous in relation to the power of the heavens; as when the power of the heavens inclines to one thing, say to anger and revenge, and yet a man, from his will and free choice, chooses to be meek and to spare his enemy. For that this man is meek and spares his enemy is per se with respect to the man, but it is per accidens in relation to the power and inclination of the stars. Similarly, since the most high God contains under Himself every particular cause, both naturally acting and acting freely, and applies each one to operation, as was shown above;¹² it is clear that nothing can be per accidens and fortuitous in comparison to Him, but everything that happens in things, except the evil of fault insofar as it is such, is foreseen and intended by Him.

VI. Third, it is shown with respect to what things someone is said to be well- or ill-fortuned.¹³ And a twofold conclusion is set down.

The first is: With respect to moral matters, one cannot be said to be well- or ill-fortuned, but well- or ill-born. — The first part is proved: because moral goods cannot be outside intention. — But the second part is proved, because from the natural disposition of the body someone is apt for the choice of virtues or vices.

The second conclusion is: With respect to exterior goods, a man can be said to be well-born, and well-fortuned, and governed by God, and guarded by angels.

2. Notice that moral goods are said to be voluntary acts and acts falling under choice; for it is proper to moral acts that they are voluntary. Therefore it is well said that moral matters cannot be outside intention; for it is contradictory for something to be done voluntarily and to happen outside intention with respect to the same thing.

Notice also that to God is attributed the governance of man, but to the angels his custody. For it belongs to governance to direct a man toward his end. But the first and principal thing among those that belong to man, through which a man attains the end through meritorious works, is choice; because nothing can have the nature of merit except insofar as it falls under choice. Therefore, because God alone is the cause of human choice by acting interiorly, St. Thomas attributes the governance of man to Him. But to the custody of man belongs instruction concerning things to be done. And because through the illuminations of angels men are instructed concerning things of this kind, on that account custody of man is attributed to angels.

VII. As for the second main point, it is shown how a man is aided by higher causes with respect to the outcome of his operations.¹⁴ And a twofold help is set down. One is according as a man is aided, or hindered, by higher causes with respect to the choice itself, in the ways stated. The other is according as he attains strength and efficacy to execute what he has chosen. Which efficacy, indeed, can come not only from God and angels, but also from heavenly bodies, insofar as it is situated in the body; such is the efficacy of a physician in healing, of a farmer in planting, of a soldier in conquering.¹⁵ It is made clear in inanimate things, which obtain an efficacy beyond those powers that follow upon the active and passive qualities of the elements, as that a lodestone attracts iron. But much more perfectly does God lavish this efficacy upon men to achieve their works efficaciously.

With respect to the first help, namely in choosing, God is said to direct a man. But with respect to the second, He is said to strengthen him. These helps are touched upon together in the Psalms, when it is said, The Lord is my light, etc.

Notice, when it is said that a physician attains efficacy in healing from higher causes, that this is understood of the operation of the physician by which he executes certain medicinal works. For if we were speaking of the inclination to choose a medicine that is fitting for the sick person, this would belong to the first help, by which, namely, someone is aided to choose useful things.

2. Between these helps, St. Thomas says, there is a twofold difference.¹⁶ The first is that from the first help a man is aided both in those things that are subject to human power and also in others; as a man can be aided in being instigated to search where a treasure is, but not in having given to him the power to find the treasure, since it proceeds from no power of man that one digging a grave finds a treasure. But the second help extends only to those things for which the power of man is effective; as that a physician heals, or a soldier conquers in battle, he can be aided not only in choosing things fitting for the end, but also in executing them efficaciously through a power received from a higher cause. Hence the first help is more universal.

3. Concerning that proposition, A man cannot be aided by having given to him the power to find a treasure, a doubt occurs. Because someone knowing where a treasure has been placed has the power of finding that treasure; hence by seeking it from intention he finds it. Therefore it is not unfitting that the power to find a treasure be given to a man from higher causes.

It is answered that by power of finding a treasure we can understand two things: namely, either a power by way of a power directing the operation or the finding of the treasure; or a power by way of a bodily executing power. In the first way, it is not unfitting that the power of finding a treasure be given to someone, because it is not unfitting for the knowledge of the treasure to be revealed and given to someone, through which he is directed to its finding. But in the second way, such a power cannot be given, because the executive power that is in the limbs is not terminated to the finding of the treasure itself except by means of some operation terminated to some effect with which the finding of the treasure is conjoined, whether it be walking, or digging a grave, or whatever other such thing; but the conjunction of the finding of the treasure with the terminus of such an operation is per accidens. A sign of this is that it is not always, or for the most part, conjoined with it; for such a finding of a treasure is not always, or for the most part, conjoined with the digging of a grave or walking to such a place. Therefore it has no natural cause per se, as was shown above.¹⁷ And on that account the power that is in the limbs for digging a grave, or for some similar action, cannot be called an inventive power of treasure, as if by its very ratio it were ordered to such an effect; although sometimes such an effect happens from it per accidens, and outside its intention or inclination. It is concerning such a power, therefore, that St. Thomas intends that it cannot be given to a man, but not concerning the first.

To the reason to the contrary, it is said that one who knows where a treasure is stored away and hidden has a directive power toward the finding of the treasure, namely the knowledge by which he is directed to that operation through which one arrives at the finding of the treasure. But he does not have a power by way of executing it which would be called an inventive power of treasure.

4. The second difference is that from the second help, since it is given to a man to pursue efficaciously those things that the man intends, a man cannot, properly speaking, be called well-fortuned. But properly from the first: either, namely, when he alone is acting, as when he is aided to this alone, that he choose that to which some advantage is conjoined which arises outside intention, as in the finding of a treasure; or when the action of another cause concurs, according, namely, as two agents are directed to some action or motion, as when someone going to the market for the sake of buying something finds his debtor outside intention.

VIII. As for the third point,¹⁸ St. Thomas removes two doubts that could arise from what has been said.¹⁹ For because it was said that a man is inclined from the heavens and from God to the choice of something to which some advantage or disadvantage is conjoined, someone could, first, ask: Whether that advantage or disadvantage is fortuitous in relation to these causes, just as in relation to the man's intention?

He answers, however, that the advantage or disadvantage which, referred to human choice, is fortuitous, loses the character of the fortuitous when referred to God; but not when referred to a celestial body. The reason for this is that a fortuitous effect is not one; and therefore it cannot have any natural power as its per se cause, since it is proper to nature to tend toward one thing. But a celestial power is an acting cause not after the manner of intellect, but after the manner of nature. Whence a celestial power, although it can instigate toward digging a grave after the manner of a passion, as has been said, ²⁰ yet it cannot per se incline toward this whole, namely that this man should dig a grave and the place where the treasure is. An agent acting through intellect, however, because it belongs to an intelligent being to order many things into one, can be the cause of the inclination toward this whole.

It is explained. For even a man who knew that a treasure was there could send an ignorant person to dig a grave in the place of the treasure, so that he might find it outside his own intention.

IX. Concerning this a twofold doubt arises. The first is because St. Thomas, in VI Metaphys., ²¹ seems to say the opposite of what is said here. For there he says that many effects found per accidens in these lower things, if they are referred to a celestial cause, are found not to be per accidens. Here, however, it is said that, when some effects are joined per accidens, no natural cause can be the per se cause of such a conjunction: and consequently neither can the power of a celestial body. But it is evident that these are opposites.

It seems also to be opposed to what was said at the beginning of the chapter, namely that something can happen outside the intention of a man, which is nevertheless according to the order of celestial bodies. For that which is according to the order of celestial bodies is not fortuitous in comparison to celestial bodies.

2. The second doubt is ²² because what is said here about an agent acting through intellect, namely that it can be the cause of an inclination toward this whole, namely that this man should dig a grave and the place of the treasure, seems to contradict what he said above, ²³ that a man cannot be helped in this, that a power be given to him to find a treasure.

X. For the evidence of the first doubt, it must first be considered that, since no being per accidens, in so far as it is per accidens, has a per se cause; no effect that is per accidens in comparison to one cause can be per se in relation to another cause, unless in relation to that cause it loses the character of a being per accidens. But if it loses that character and assumes the character of a being per se, it can depend per se on that cause.

2. It must secondly be considered that one must speak in one way of effects occurring in human events, and in another way of natural effects. For the effects that happen fortuitously to human beings not only stand per accidens with respect to the effect intended by the human being, and make with it one thing per accidens; but they also stand per accidens with respect to the effect toward which the celestial bodies incline. For example, when a man digging a grave finds a treasure outside his intention, that finding of a treasure stands per accidens with respect to the digging of the grave intended by the man in so far as he is such, and in itself has no order to that digging, as though it accompanied it per se, since we see those two joined for the lesser part. It also stands per accidens with respect to that digging of a grave in so far as the man digs the grave from a celestial inclination: since it rarely happens that one who digs a grave from a celestial inclination finds a treasure. — In natural effects, however, it is found that some effect stands per accidens with respect to the proper effect of some cause in so far as it is the effect of that cause, which nevertheless has an order per se to that effect as it proceeds from a celestial cause. Just as the flowering of one herb while another herb is flowering ²⁴ has no order in itself to the flowering of the other herb, in so far as it proceeds from the power of that herb, but stands per accidens with respect to it, since the power of one herb has no causality over the flowering of the other; yet because it can happen that from one celestial power the flowering of both herbs proceeds at the same time, therefore the flowering of one, which was per accidens in comparison to the flowering of the other as it is the proper effect of that herb itself, has an order per se in comparison to that very flowering as it depends on a celestial power, because they accompany each other either always or for the most part, as proceeding from one and the same cause.

3. From these things it follows that, since in human events that which is one per accidens, compared to a celestial body, does not lose the character of being united and conjoined per accidens with the effect intended by the man—since the celestial power does not act directly upon the human will, which holds the place of principal agent among created causes with respect to that effect to which the fortuitous event follows; and the fortuitous event is rarely conjoined to the intended effect—it cannot have one celestial cause per se intending the conjunction of both effects. But indeed some natural effect which, in relation to some particular cause, is one with another per accidens, can, in relation to a celestial cause, be one per se with it. Therefore it can have one natural per se cause, which is one celestial power.

XI. To the doubt, therefore, it is said first, that the things that St. Thomas says in VI Metaphys. do not contradict the things said here. Because there he is speaking of natural effects, among which some effects can be found which, although they do not have an order per se in comparison to particular causes, can nevertheless have an order per se in comparison to a celestial cause. Here, however, he is speaking of human events, in which effects not having an order among themselves cannot have an order per se even when ordered to a celestial cause.

And if at times St. Thomas seems to say that it is impossible for any celestial power to be the cause of those things that are done here per accidens, whether by chance or by fortune, in which he seems also to include natural effects, as seems especially to be held in the First Part, q. cxvi, a. 1: — it is said that he does not intend that absolutely none of the things that come to be here per accidens can proceed per se from a celestial power; but that, in so far as it is per accidens and by chance according to the being that it has outside the intellect, and having no per se order, it cannot be reduced to a celestial cause, but it can indeed be reduced to an intelligent cause, which can place an order in those things that have no per se order in nature, according to as they are apprehended by the intellect. He himself gives this sense to be understood when in the First Part, q. cxv, a. 6, speaking of the concurrence per accidens of some cause impeding the action of another cause, he says that such a concurrence does not have a cause in so far as it is per accidens.

2. It is said secondly, that the things said at the beginning of the chapter do not contradict the things said here. ²⁵ For something can be understood to be according to the order of a celestial body in two ways. In one way, directly and per se: in which way, namely, the celestial power either is the cause of it per se immediately, or is the cause of something that is its per se cause; as the flowering of an herb is said to be according to the order of a celestial body. In another way, occasionally only and indirectly: when, namely, it is not the cause of it per se, neither mediately nor immediately, but is only the cause of something that is the occasion of that other thing, whether proximate or remote.

When therefore it is said at the beginning of the chapter that something can happen outside the intention of a man that is according to the order of celestial bodies, it is understood of the order of the heaven occasionally. For the heaven is said to order to some advantage or disadvantage, in so far as, by imprinting on the body, it in some way inclines the will to choosing something from which an advantage results for him. Which sense he also gives to be understood in this place, when he says that it happens to a man well or ill according to fortune from a celestial body, in so far as he is disposed by it to choose something to which some advantage or disadvantage is conjoined. But this is not repugnant to what has been said, that such an advantage or disadvantage is fortuitous when referred to the heaven. — When, however, it is proved because that which is according to the order of celestial bodies is not fortuitous in comparison to them: — it is said that that is true of that which is according to their order directly and per se, but not of that which is according to their order occasionally.

XII. To the second doubt ²⁶ it is answered that a man can be understood to be inclined toward that whole in two ways. In one way, by taking a power through which he has an order to the production of that whole effect. And in this sense is understood what was said above, that a power cannot be given to a man for the finding of a treasure: namely, a power that is an executive power existing in the members. — In another way, from the fact that he is moved toward the whole effect from the intention of some moving cause, although not the whole effect is according to his own proper intention, but only some part of it. And thus it is understood in this place. But it is clear that these have no opposition.

XIII. The second thing that could be doubted ²⁷ is this. For because it has been said that a man is fortunate from the heaven and from God, someone might ask whether a man is said to be from the heaven universally fortunate: so, namely, that in his nature he has a celestial impression to choose always or in the greater number of cases things to which advantages are conjoined per accidens?

St. Thomas answers that from one celestial power one cannot be universally fortunate, but only with respect to this or to that. Because nature is ordered only to one thing. But the things according to which it happens to a man well or ill according to fortune are not reducible to any one thing, but are infinite and indeterminate, as is said in II Physicorum, and is plain to sense. But he can well be universally fortunate in such a way that from one celestial inclination he is inclined to choosing something to which some advantage is conjoined per accidens; and from another inclination another; and from a third a third; and so of the rest. — From one divine disposition, however, a man can be directed to all things: and consequently, be universally fortunate.

2. For the evidence of this response, it must be considered that the natural power of the celestial bodies differs from the divine power by which God orders and disposes some things in lower realities. For the celestial power, since it is natural, cannot, being one, incline toward many things that are not united per se into some one thing: because the power of nature tends toward one thing. But the divine power by which He orders things is His conception, by which He universally disposes all things. And because God by a single concept apprehends and intuits all things, and orders distinct and many things into one, therefore by a single disposition He provides for and governs all things. On account of this it is well said that through a single celestial power a man cannot be universally fortunate, as though from a single celestial impression he were inclined always to choosing useful things; but indeed from one divine disposition and ordering a man can be ordered to choosing always, or for the greater part, those things that are useful to him; and thus be universally fortunate, while to all his choices, or to the greater part, some advantages follow outside his intention.

XIV. From these things that have been said, it is clear that it must not be entirely denied that a man can be called fortunate or unfortunate from the heaven, as Giovanni Pico ²⁸ maintained, a man otherwise most learned in every way. Nor does the argument that he takes from this chapter prove this: namely, because a fortuitous effect is not one per se with the intended effect, but only per accidens; but an effect that is one per accidens cannot be reduced to one natural cause. For, as we have explained, ²⁹ from this argument nothing is inferred except that the aggregate of the intended effect and the fortuitous effect is not from some celestial power, and consequently that one cannot be said to be fortunate from the heaven in such a way as though he were inclined to that whole from the impression of the stars: which indeed we concede, and is according to the mind of St. Thomas. But through this argument it is not proved that a man cannot be fortunate occasionally from the heaven and the position of the stars, in so far as from some influence of the stars he is occasionally inclined to some choices, to which some advantages follow. Rather, St. Thomas maintains that a man can in this way be said to be fortunate from the impression of the celestial bodies. And in this sense must be understood the words of Augustine, V De Civ. Dei, ³⁰ saying that it can be said not altogether absurdly that certain sidereal influences are effective toward the differences of bodies alone, from which differences of bodies, namely, human actions can be occasioned.