Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

From what has been said before, St. Thomas infers three corollaries ¹.

I. The first is, that human affairs are not conducted by chance, as though ordered and intended by no one: but are reduced to higher causes in such a way that choices and acts of will are immediately disposed by God; intellectual knowledge is ordered by God through the mediation of angels; while bodily things, whether interior or exterior, that come to the use of man, are dispensed by God through the mediation of angels and heavenly bodies.

2. Now although these things are manifest from the preceding, he nevertheless proves all of them at once by a single reason. And he argues thus. Everything multiform, mutable, and capable of failing must be reduced, as to a principle, to something uniform, immutable, ² and incapable of failing. But all things that are in us are found to be multifold, variable, and defectible; whereas those other things are disposed in the opposite way. Therefore etc.

The minor premise is proved with respect to all its parts. With respect to our choices, indeed, it is proved, because in different persons and by different persons different things are chosen, and they are possessed in manifold ways; since they are both mutable—partly on account of the levity of the mind, which is not fixed upon the ultimate end; partly on account of the change in the things that surround us—and, as sins testify, defectible. But the divine will, because by willing one thing it wills all things, is uniform, and is immutable and indefectible, as was shown above.

With respect to our understanding, it is proved, because, since we, as it were, gather intelligible truth from many sensible things, it possesses multiplicity. And since we proceed by discursively moving from one thing to another, it is mutable. Also, on account of the admixture of phantasy and sense, it is defectible: as the errors of men show. On the contrary, however, the knowledge of the angels, since they receive knowledge from one source of truth, namely God, is uniform. Moreover, since they do not run discursively, but gaze upon pure truth by a simple intuition, it is motionless. Furthermore, since they gaze upon the very quiddities of things through themselves, concerning which the intellect cannot err, it is indefectible.

With respect to human bodily things, it is made manifest, because in them there is a multiplicity of mixture and contrariety; and they are not always moved in the same way, since their motions cannot be continuous; and they are capable of failing through alteration and corruption. On the contrary, however, the heavenly bodies are simple and devoid of all contrariety; and their motions are continuous and always disposed in the same way: nor can there be corruption or alteration, namely corruptive alteration, in them.

3. Note, when it is said that from many sensible things we, as it were, gather intelligible truth, that the word as it were can be taken similitudinously, by reason of the word we gather. For we do not properly gather truth from sensible things, since truth itself is not in sensible things formally, but in the intellect. We are said, however, to gather it similitudinously, as though truth pre-existed there, because, although truth does not exist formally in them, it nevertheless pre-exists in them originally and fundamentally. It can also be taken as expressive of the truth. For it is the case that the aggregation of many truths in our intellect originates and is caused from many sensible things.

II. Concerning the second part of the corollary, when it is said that our intellectual knowledge is ordered by God through the mediation of angels, it must be noted that this is not to be understood as if angelic knowledge were the productive cause of our intellection, as an agent acting immediately upon the intellect, in the manner in which God is the cause of human choice by acting upon the will; but it is understood in this sense, as can be gathered from the teaching of St. Thomas in the First Part, q. cxiii, a. 1, and II Sent., d. xi, ³ that, since men are ordered to supernatural beatitude through divine providence, and God executes His providence over lower things through higher things, He moves men, who are lower than the angels, toward the attainment of their good through the angels. For because man can vary and fail in manifold ways in the things to be done, therefore the guardianship of the angels was given by God to men, through whom they are regulated and directed and instructed toward the good.

Moreover, this instruction, as is found in II Sent., where cited above, at the end, and de Verit., q. xi, a. 3, occurs inasmuch as they dispose and illuminate the phantasms which man uses in understanding, so that from them he may receive right knowledge; and they also strengthen the light of the human intellect by their own intellectual light, so that it may be more vigorous for perceiving the truth. Hence for human knowledge to be ordered and regulated by angelic knowledge is for the angel himself, in the aforesaid ways, to instruct man and to teach him concerning the things that the angel himself knows.

2. But a doubt arises from these things. For just as men are regulated through angels with respect to knowledge, so they are regulated with respect to affection, as is clear in the places cited above. Therefore, just as human knowledge is reduced to angelic knowledge as to its rule, so also human volition is to be reduced to angelic volition as to a rule. Therefore St. Thomas poorly divides and separates these two, referring knowledge to the angels, but choice to God.

He answers that choice can be regulated in two ways: in one way, as by an end and a form; in another way, as by an agent and efficient cause. In the first way, the regulation of choice belongs also to the angels, inasmuch as they instruct man concerning the knowledge of things to be done; for it was said above ⁴ that the known good moves the will after the manner of an end and a form, and that separate substances move the will after the manner of one persuading. But in the second way it does not belong to them to regulate; rather, to regulate choice in this way belongs to God alone, who alone, together with the human will, is the cause of our choices. Therefore, because here St. Thomas intends to show how human affairs are reduced to higher efficient causes; and to regulate choice after the manner of an efficient cause belongs to God alone; whereas to regulate intellection efficiently belongs also to the angels, inasmuch as they efficiently illuminate the intellect and the phantasms, which efficiently move the intellect to knowledge: therefore he referred the one to the angels as to an invariable rule, but referred the other to God.

III. Concerning that which was said, that the knowledge of the angels is indefectible, it must be noted, from the teaching of St. Thomas in the First Part, q. LVIII, a. 5, and in Qu. de Malo, q. xvi, a. 6, that this is to be understood of their knowledge concerning those things which can be known by them naturally; but not of their knowledge as it extends to supernatural things. For concerning things of this kind they can err and fail, considering their nature; although the blessed angels are neither deceived nor do they err even concerning these, because, since their will is regulated, they do not apply the intellect to judging concerning things that exceed their capacity.

2. Concerning that which is said, that the knowledge of an angel is motionless, it must be noted that this is not to be understood as if there were no succession in the knowledge of an angel; for since it was shown in the preceding ⁵ that they do not know all things at once, there must be succession in them, according as they know diverse things. But it is understood of the immobility opposed to the discursiveness of our intellect: for, as is said here and was shown above, ⁶ they do not run discursively from known things to unknown things, but apprehend and gaze upon cause and effect, principle and conclusion, by a single act.