Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

After St. Thomas has shown that human choices are subject neither to celestial bodies nor to created intellectual substances, but to God alone, he wishes further to show that they are subject to divine providence¹. Concerning this, however, he does two things: first, he shows what is proposed; second, he removes certain objections².

I. As to the first, he argues first thus. God is the cause of our choice and will. Therefore, our choices and wills are subject to His providence. — The consequence is proved. Because all things that God does, He does from the order of His providence.

Second. If it were not so, it would follow that bodily things would be withdrawn from divine providence; and thus there would be entirely no providence. — The consequence is proved. Because all bodily things are administered through spiritual things; and spiritual things act upon bodily things through the will.

Note that St. Thomas in this argument extends his proposition, proving that not only human choices, but also the volitions of other intellectual substances are subject to divine providence. Moreover, he does this because both separate substances and human souls, in that they are created intellectual substances, as such, are of one order and of one condition.

Now, the foundation of this argument is that whatever does not have providence over the administrator of certain things regarding the act by which it administers them, neither does it have providence over the administered things themselves. For the order of an effect follows the intention and action of its cause. Therefore it follows, if God does not have providence over the acts of the will, by which the spiritual creature administers bodily things by ordering them to their ends, that He will not have providence over bodily things either.

II. Third. Intellectual substances are nobler than bodily substances. Therefore, if the latter, as to their substances and actions, fall under the order of divine providence, much more do the former. — The consequence is proved.

Because the nobler certain things are in the universe, the more must they participate in the order³, in which the good of the universe consists. It is declared by the authority of the Philosopher, censuring the ancient philosophers, II Phys., text 44, for placing chance and fortune in higher things, but not in lower things.

Fourth. The actions of intellectual substances are more closely ordered to God as to an end than the actions of other things, as was shown above. Therefore, they fall more under the order of providence, by which God orders all things to Himself, than the actions of other things. — The consequence is proved. Because things that are closer to the end fall more under the order which is toward the end: since other things are also ordered to the end through their mediation.

For the evidence of this last proposition, it must be considered that, just as there is an order in efficient causes, so also is an order found in final causes. For just as in efficient causes that which is immediate to the first cause, in comparison to it, has the character of something moved, but in comparison to lower things has the character of a mover, and by its mediation the lower thing is moved by the first cause; so in final causes that which is proximate to the ultimate end, in comparison to the ultimate end, has the character of something ordered to the end, but in comparison to things more remote from the end has the character of an end, and by its mediation other things are ordered to the ultimate end. Just as, because the purging of bile is closer to the bringing about of health than the taking of medicine, therefore the purging of bile, which is ordered to health as to an end, is the end of the taking of medicine, and the taking of medicine itself is ordered through that purging to health: for someone takes medicine for the sake of obtaining health, insofar as he thinks bile is to be purged by it. And thus it is clear that, through the mediation of those things which are closer to the end, other things are ordered to the end.

In the matter at hand, however, other creatures are ordered to God as to an end through the mediation of intellectual substances, because they do not manifest the divine goodness except insofar as they first in some way manifest the perfections of intelligible substances, in which the divine goodness is especially manifested: for higher things among beings are in a certain way the exemplars of lower things, yet exceeding them.

III. Fifth. The more God loves some things, the more they fall under His providence. But God loves intellectual substances most of all. Therefore, etc. — The major premise is proved. Because the governance of providence proceeds from divine love, by which God loves the things created by Him: since love consists principally in this, that the lover wills good to the beloved. It is confirmed by the authority of the Psalm: The Lord preserves, etc. — The minor and the major together are proved by the authority of Aristotle, X Ethic.

Sixth. If only external outcomes fall under providence, and not human choices, it follows that it will be more truly said that human affairs are outside providence than that they are subject to providence. But this is brought forward in the person of blasphemers in Job 22, and Ezek. 9, and Lam. 3. Therefore, etc. — The assumed premise is proved. Because the interior goods of man, which depend on the will and choice, are more proper to man than those things which are outside him. A sign of this is that through the former a man is said to be good, but not through the latter.

IV. As to the second, St. Thomas removes certain objections⁴. The first is that in Sir. 15 and Deut. 30 it seems to be said that God leaves man to himself.

But St. Thomas says that those words are introduced, not so that human choices may be withdrawn from divine providence, but that they may be shown to be of free choice.

2. The second is that both Gregory of Nyssa, in the book On Man, and Damascene, in the second book, seem to say that those things which are in us are not subject to divine providence.

But he answers that they intend nothing other than that the things that are in us do not receive necessity from divine determination⁵.

For the evidence of this, it must be considered, from what is found in De Verit., q. 5, a. 5, that, although all created things are subject to divine providence, this nevertheless belongs differently to intellectual substances and to others. For other creatures fall under divine providence in such a way that they are provided for and ordered only. But intellectual substances fall under it in such a way that they are not only provided for and ordered, but are also providing and ordering both themselves and other things. But because they themselves are not the end of providence, but are also ordered to God as to an end, they are ordered to the extent that they obtain the rectitude of their own providence from the divine rule. And because that which is not its own rule, but is to be directed in its work by an extrinsic rule, can sometimes fail from rectitude in working, intellectual substances therefore fall under divine providence in such a way that they can fail in the work of their own providence and sin: and consequently they have freedom in their works. And therefore, from the fact that their choices and volitions fall under divine providence, it does not follow that they have from it the necessity of choosing thus or thus.