Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

Just as it was shown that celestial bodies do not act per se directly upon the human intellect, so now St. Thomas wishes to show that they do not act upon the will ¹. Concerning this, however, he does two things: first, he shows that the heaven is not the cause of human choice by its own power; second, that neither is it such by the power of a moving soul, ch. LXXXVII.

Concerning the first he does two things: first, he shows the thesis; second, in order that the thesis may be further confirmed, he shows that not even natural effects in these lower things follow with necessity from the heaven, in the following chapter.

I. As to the first, he posits four conclusions ². The first is: Celestial bodies are the cause neither of our acts of will nor of our choices, namely per se and directly.

It is proved first. They cannot impress directly upon the intellect. Therefore neither upon the will. — The consequence is proved. Because the will is in the intellective part of the soul: as is clear in III De Anima, text 42.

II. Secondly. They are not the cause of our understanding. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. Because every choice and actual volition in us is immediately caused by intellectual apprehension. Which is evident both because the understood good is the object of the will, III De Anima, text 51, and because perversity in choosing arises only if the judgment of the intellect fails regarding the particular eligible good, as is said in VII Ethics, ch. V ³.

2. Concerning the process of this argument a doubt arises. For the argument seems to proceed from this foundation: that understanding is the immediate cause of choice. For from this it seems to follow that nothing can mediate between understanding and choice from which choice may be caused; and therefore, if something is to be the cause of choice, it must be the cause of understanding, by which choice is immediately caused. But this foundation seems to have no validity for the proposed thesis. For understanding, according to St. Thomas, does not move the will except by way of end and of form, namely by presenting an object to it. But it is not unfitting that the will be moved immediately by one thing as by an end and as by that which specifies its operation, but by another as by an efficient cause and as to exercise: as is the mind of St. Thomas, I-II, q. 9, a. 3, ad 3. Therefore these could both be true at the same time: that understanding is the immediate cause of choice; and that even celestial bodies are causes of it, namely in another genus of cause.

The objection is confirmed. Because, notwithstanding that immediacy, St. Thomas posits below ⁴ that God is the cause of the act of the will. Therefore that immediacy does not remove the causality of another cause over choice.

3. It is answered that the argument does not proceed from that immediacy of the causality of understanding over choice insofar as it excludes another intermediate cause; for, since that is an immediacy only in the genus of final and formal cause, it has only to exclude another intermediate cause in the same genus, not however in the genus of efficient cause, as the objection touches upon. But we can interpret this argument in two ways. First, by saying that it proceeds from that immediacy insofar as it includes a certain continuation of those operations, and a natural order of the one to the other. For things that are thus bound together have such an order among themselves that nothing can be the cause of the posterior by way of an extrinsic effective cause which is not the cause of the prior. For because risibility is immediately caused by the essence of man, that which is not the cause of human nature cannot be the cause of risibility. Similarly, therefore, because choice is immediately caused by understanding, and cannot exist unless understanding is presupposed, therefore something cannot be the cause of choice which is not the cause of understanding. Hence also God, who is the cause of choice, is also the cause of understanding, as will be shown below ⁵.

4. But because perhaps this proposition, What is not the cause of the prior is not the cause of the posterior, holds truth only if causality is taken in the same genus—for example, that nothing can be the final cause of anything immediately caused by some end unless it is the final cause of that end; and nothing can be the efficient cause of anything depending immediately on another efficiently unless it is the efficient cause of that prior thing on which it depends; but it is not apparent why in the genus of efficient cause something could not be the cause of something depending on another immediately in the genus of final cause, without its being the effective cause of that final cause:—therefore it is answered secondly that from that immediacy of causality St. Thomas intends to hold that understanding and choice belong to the same order of things. For the action of the appetite in us is of the same order as the cognition upon which it immediately follows. For the act of the sensitive appetite is of the same order as sensitive apprehension, by which it is immediately caused: for both belong to the genus of sensibles. Similarly, the act of the intellective appetite, namely of the will, is of the same order as the apprehension of the intellect, by which it is immediately caused: for both belong to the genus of intelligibles, and to such a genus of intelligibles as is the operation of the human intellective nature. And because acts belonging to the same order of things ought to be able or unable to be caused by some extrinsic efficient cause in the same way, therefore what is the cause of the one can also be the cause of the other, and what cannot be the cause of the one cannot be the cause of the other either. If, therefore, celestial bodies cannot be the cause of intellective apprehension, neither will they be able to be the cause of choice.

It must be noted, however, that this argument differs from the preceding one: because that one proceeds from the fact that the intellect and the will belong to the same part of the soul; but this one because the act of the intellect and the act of the will are of the same order, like proper cause and proper effect.

How perversity of choice follows upon a defect of judgment in the particular eligible good, St. Thomas shows at length in I-II, q. XIX, a. 3 ⁶.

III. Thirdly. If our choices arose from the impression of celestial bodies, they would happen naturally. But this is unfitting. Therefore etc.

The first part of the antecedent is proved. Because whatever things happen in these lower things from the impression of celestial bodies occur naturally: since these lower things are naturally ordered under them. — But the second part is proved. Because then purpose and nature would not be two agent principles, but one only, namely nature: contrary to Aristotle, II Physics.

Concerning the proof of the first part of the antecedent, it must be noted that St. Thomas presupposes that celestial bodies are naturally acting agents, just as other bodies are. For, this being presupposed, it follows very well that if our choices arose from the impression of celestial bodies, they would happen naturally. For things that are subject by a natural order to the action of a naturally acting agent must be moved naturally, and being moved must act naturally, not from choice and purpose: because such things act according as they are moved and directed by another, but do not move themselves to their operations; as is clear in brute animals, and in heavy and light things.

IV. Fourthly. Human choices tend toward the end in diverse ways, both in moral matters and in artificial matters. Therefore they do not occur naturally. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. Because, since nature is determined to one thing, things that occur naturally are led to the end by determined means. A sign of which is that they always happen in the same way.

Fifthly. If man chose naturally, for the most part his choices would be right. But this is clearly false. Therefore etc. — The assumed premise is proved. Because things that occur naturally are for the most part done rightly: since nature fails in the fewer cases.

To this argument someone could say that celestial bodies are not the cause of choices in the same way in all men: but in some they are the cause of bad choices, and these for the most part choose badly, and in the fewer cases well; but in some they are the cause of good choices, and these in the fewer cases choose badly; and thus it is saved in each case that what is natural fails in the fewer cases.

But this reply does not remove the argument. Because if celestial bodies impress directly upon the will, as being directly the cause of human choice, and not merely indirectly through action upon the body, they will move the will according to its own condition and inclination insofar as it is the will: just as other subjects of their impressions are moved by them according to the condition of their own nature, as heavy things downward and light things upward. But the will, as far as it is of itself, has an order to right choice, since its object is the good: but a non-right choice arises from some defect. Therefore it follows very well that if the will chooses according to the impression of celestial bodies, it will for the most part choose rightly: and no impression will be given that inclines and moves the will to bad choices for the most part; although the will could sometimes choose not rightly, just as in other natural causes we see that they sometimes fail from their course and order. — How man fails in the greater or the lesser part was shown above ⁷.

Sixthly. If man chose naturally, all men would choose in the same way. This is clearly false both in moral and in artificial matters. Therefore etc. — The conditional is proved. Because choice is an operation following upon the human species. But things that are of the same species are not diversified in the natural operations that follow upon the species: as is clear of swallows similarly nest-building, and of men similarly understanding first principles.

Seventhly. Political virtues and vices are not in us by nature, but from habituation, as is proved in II Ethics. Therefore neither are choices. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. Because virtues and vices are the proper principles of choices: for the vicious and the virtuous man differ by the fact that they choose contrary things.

Note that the four arguments brought forward immediately above are confirmations of the third argument.

V. Concerning that proposition, Virtues and vices are the proper principles of choices, it should be considered, from the doctrine of St. Thomas in III Sent., d. XXXIII, q. II, a. 3, that, since choice is of those things that are for the sake of the end, the inclination of the will toward the proximate end, insofar as it is ordered to the ultimate end, is called choice. And in this sense it is said in VI Ethics ⁸ that choice is the principal act of moral virtue. Therefore political, or moral, virtue is said to be the proper cause of choice, because the inclination of the will toward the proximate end, or the right choice of the proximate end, is from virtue as from its proper cause, which namely from its nature is determined to making a right choice regarding the end, as to its proper and principal act. And similarly vice is a cause determined from its nature to making a perverse choice regarding the proximate end, as to its proper and principal act.

Concerning that proposition, Political virtues and vices are not in us by nature, it must be noted, from the doctrine of St. Thomas in Qu. de Virt., a. 8; I-II, q. LXIII ⁹; III Sent., d. XXXIII, q. I, a. 2 ¹⁰, that this proposition is understood of virtue as to its very completion and its perfect notion. For originally, and according to aptitude both active and passive, virtues are from nature: partly indeed according to the nature of the species, insofar as aptitude for virtue is common to all men; but partly according to the nature of the individual, according as certain men above others are apt for virtue. But as to vice, it cannot be said that it is also originally and according to active aptitude from the nature of the human species insofar as it is such: because the vice of each thing seems to be that it is not disposed according to what befits its nature, as is said in I-II, q. LXXI, a. 1 and 2. Hence vice is said by Augustine, III De Lib. Arb. ¹¹, to be against nature.

VI. Eighthly. Celestial bodies do not act directly except upon bodies, as was shown above. Either therefore they are the cause of our choices insofar as they impress upon our bodies, or insofar as they impress upon exterior bodies. The second is not a sufficient cause of our choice: because it is clear that at the occurrence of a pleasurable object, such as food or a woman, the temperate man is not moved to choose, but the intemperate man is moved. Nor is the first either: because from the impression of celestial bodies upon our bodies there follow in us only certain passions, more or less vehement; but it is evident that by the same passions the incontinent man is induced to follow them through choice, but the continent man is not. Therefore etc.

Note that St. Thomas argues that the heaven is not the sufficient cause of our choice through impression upon bodies, but not that it is in no way a cause: in order to show that in some way indeed they are the cause of our choice through impression upon bodies, namely by way of disposing and in some way inclining, as will be shown below ¹²; yet it is not a cause by way of perfecting, or being sufficient to cause choice. For that is called a sufficient cause upon whose action the effect immediately follows: in which way it was shown ¹³ that the heaven is not the cause of choice.

Ninthly. If choice were not in our power, but were caused by celestial bodies, in vain would man have the power of judging and deliberating about all things operable by him, whether in the use of exterior things, or in admitting and repelling intrinsic passions. But no power is given to anyone in vain. Therefore etc.

Tenthly. The social life of man would be removed. But this is unfitting. Therefore etc. — The first part of the antecedent is proved. Because in vain would laws and precepts of life be given, and in vain would rewards and punishments be applied to the good and the bad, since it would not be in us to do these or those things. But if these were lacking, social life would immediately be destroyed. — But the second part of the antecedent is proved. Because man is naturally a political and social animal. A sign of which is that one man is not sufficient for himself if he lives alone: since nature has sufficiently provided for man in few things, but has given him reason, by which he can provide for himself. But the order of providence does not take away from anything what is natural to it.

2. Concerning that proposition, Nature has sufficiently provided for man in few things, a doubt arises. Because nature does not fail in necessaries, as is said in II De Caelo ¹⁴, text 50.

It is answered, from the doctrine of St. Thomas, First Part, q. LXXVI, a. 5, ad 4; and q. XCI, a. 3, ad 2; likewise De Veritate, q. XXII, a. 7; and De Anima, a. 8, ad 20, that, although nature has not sufficiently provided for man in particular, namely by giving him all the things he needs, because this could not be done:—both from the complexion of the body, which does not admit certain natural instruments that are found in other animals, such as hard hide, feathers, horns, and the like; and also from reason, which is of infinite conceptions—nevertheless it has sufficiently provided for him in common, by giving him principles, namely reason and hands, by which he can provide for himself regarding all necessaries.

VII. Eleventhly. Then the stars would be the per se cause of bad choices: since the choices of men relate to good and bad things. But this is impossible: because evil does not have a cause in nature, since it occurs from the defect of some cause. Therefore etc.

To this argument someone could say that every bad choice arises from the appetite for some good, as was said above: just as the choice of adultery ¹⁵ from the appetite for a pleasurable good, toward which universal good indeed some star moves, as necessary for generation. And thus it does not follow that evil has a cause per se, but per accidens.

But this response, says St. Thomas, is not sufficient if celestial bodies are posited as the per se cause of our choices, as directly impressing upon the intellect and the will: because then there will never be a bad choice in us. For since the impression of a universal cause is received in each thing according to its own mode, the effect of a star moving toward pleasure ordered to generation will be received in the intellect and the will according to its own mode: just as in brute animals it is received diversely according to the congruence of their nature. But when something is desired according to the mode of intellect and reason, sin does not happen in choice, which is always bad from this: that it is not according to right reason. Therefore etc.

It must be noted that the refutation of the given response tends to this: that it does not save that the heaven is the cause of all our choices; rather, it confirms the argument itself. Because if the heaven is the cause in us per se of a good appetite only, it follows that it is the cause only of a good choice: for that inclination toward the good, for instance the pleasurable, given by the heaven, will be received in us according to the mode of intellect and reason, and consequently will be a good choice. Since therefore there are also some bad choices in us, it follows that the heaven is not the cause of all our choices. Either therefore one must say that the heaven is not the cause of all our choices, which is the intention in this argument; or, if it is the cause of all, that it also causes the bad choices themselves per se. And thus evil will have a cause per se, as the argument deduced.

Twelfthly. Willing itself transcends every corporeal species, just as understanding does: since the will itself is also borne toward something universal, just as the intellect is, for we hate the whole class of thieves. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. Because no active power extends to those things that are above the species and nature of the agent: since every agent acts through its own form. Therefore etc. — This argument was explained in the preceding chapter ¹⁶.

VIII. — Thirteenthly. Human choices are ordered to happiness, which does not consist in corporeal goods, but in the fact that the soul is joined through the intellect to divine things. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. Because things that are for the sake of the end are proportioned to the end.

2. Concerning this argument a doubt arises. Because not only is choice ordered to intellective happiness, but also exterior works, by which we merit that happiness. If therefore, because choice is ordered to happiness, it follows that it is not subject to celestial bodies, it will follow, by the same argument, that neither do exterior works themselves fall under the influence of celestial bodies.

Furthermore, although it is necessary that what is ordered to the end be so proportioned to the end that it is such that through it the end can be had, it is not however necessary that it be so proportioned that it is of the same nature as the end: otherwise, every created thing would be of the divine nature, since all things are ordered to God as to an end. Therefore, although choice is ordered to spiritual happiness, it is not however necessary that it be of such great spirituality as is happiness itself, and on this account be withdrawn from the influence of the heavens.

3. It is answered that that proposition, What is ordered to the end must be proportioned to the end, is understood in this sense, as is found in the Fourth Book, d. XLIX, q. 1, a. 1, quᵃ 3, ad 3, that they must be such that through them the thing can sufficiently attain to the end. Hence, since conjunction with God through the intellect, or the intellective cognition of God, is the proper end of the intellectual creature, especially one existing in grace; it is necessary that the operations by which it tends to that end be such that they can lead to that vision and intellection. But they cannot do this if they are something corporeal, or depending on the influence of a body: because a corporeal thing, as such, is not a proportioned means for bringing about an incorporeal and entirely spiritual thing. Therefore it is necessary that such operations also be free from the influence of a body. If therefore choices are posited to depend directly and per se on celestial bodies, they will not be able to be a means by way of merit by which man may attain to happiness: and if they are a means, it is necessary that they not be caused by the influences of celestial bodies. And in this consists the argument of St. Thomas.

To the first objection, however, it is said that extrinsic works in themselves are not ordered to happiness, according namely as in them the sole nature of the extrinsic work is considered, such as the giving of money or something of this sort, but insofar as they fall under choice: for they do not have the character of merit except insofar as they are voluntary. And thus the character of meriting belongs to them from choice informed by charity. On this account choice itself is the foundation of all works that are ordered to happiness. And therefore it must be proportioned to an end of this kind.

To the second it is said that it is not the mind of St. Thomas that there must be an agreement in specific nature between the end and those things which are ordered to the end, since he himself says, in the passage cited above, that the agreement between these things is not an agreement according to genus, but that there must be between them the aforesaid proportion.

IX. The conclusion is confirmed by the authority of Jeremiah 10.

By this, moreover, is excluded the position of the Stoics; which is also said to have been that of the Pharisees among the Jews; and which the Priscillianists followed, as is said in the book De Haeresibus; and which was also that of the ancient philosophers who posited that the intellect does not differ from sense, as is shown by the authority of Empedocles.

X. The second conclusion is: ¹⁷ Indirectly, from the heavenly bodies, some occasion is afforded for our choices, in so far as they have an impression upon bodies. It is explained both from impressions upon exterior bodies: as when, the air being disposed to intense cold, we choose to be warmed at a fire; and from impressions upon our bodies: as when, upon their alteration, certain movements of the passions arise; or through their impression we are made prone to certain passions, as choleric persons are prone to anger; or there is caused in us some bodily disposition which is the occasion of some choice, as, when we are sick, we choose to take medicine.

For the understanding of this conclusion it must be considered, from the doctrine of St. Thomas, I Sent., d. xlvi, a. 2, ad 3; IV Sent., d. xxxviii, q. ii, a. 1, ad 4; and IIª IIae, q. xciii, a. 1, ad 3, that an occasion can be taken in two ways. Sometimes indeed for an insufficient and imperfect cause, but one that is per se. Sometimes, however, for a cause per accidens, whose operation does not reach it, but only reaches something to which the effect, of which it is called the cause per accidens, is in some way joined: just as one who produces a house is called the cause of the discord arising from it. The heaven, therefore, is said to be the occasion of our choices in the second way: because its action does not indeed reach choice itself, but nevertheless reaches some bodily disposition to which, from our own will, some choice is joined, whence our choice is said to be occasioned by the impression of the heavenly bodies.

XI. The third conclusion is: Sometimes human acts are caused by the heavenly bodies. It is proved. Because sometimes, from an indisposition of the body, some become insane, deprived of the use of reason. In whom there is not properly choice, but they are moved by some natural instinct, like brute animals.

It should be noted that the operations of the insane, or of those who are deprived of the use of reason, are not properly human operations: since they are not free and proceeding from the judgment of reason, from which an operation has that it is the operation of man in so far as he is man. But, because they have from the outside a likeness to human acts, St. Thomas calls them human acts: giving to understand, however, that they are not properly human acts, since he subjoins that in them there is not properly choice. There is indeed in them a certain likeness of choice, while they pursue one thing and reject another, just as brute animals do; yet it is not properly choice, since in them there is no counsel and inquiry of reason, the term of which is human choice. Whence it should rather be said of them that they live brutally than that they live humanly: because, namely, they are not governed by the judgment of reason, but by a natural estimation, like brute animals; so that the first regulative principle of their works is not reason, but the estimative or cogitative power. And because the heavenly bodies directly imprint upon the organs of the senses, and through this impression alter the senses themselves, therefore it is said here that they are in the insane the cause of human acts: in so far, namely, as they alter the cogitative power per accidens upon the alteration of the organ, according to which alteration the insane are moved to operation. Whence it happens that very often such persons foretell some future things concerning those which proceed from the influx of the heavenly bodies: in so far as they are moved to judge from some impression of the heavenly bodies upon the interior sensitive powers.

XII. The fourth conclusion is: The occasions of choosing that proceed from the heavenly bodies, whether interior or exterior, are not a necessary cause of choice. It is proved.

Because this is known by experience, in that man through reason can resist them or obey them: although there are many who pursue such natural impulses, while few, namely only the wise, do not follow them.

It is confirmed by the authority of Ptolemy in the Centiloquium, saying both that the wise soul assists the work of the stars; and that the astrologer, unless he knows well the power of the soul and the temperament, cannot give judgments through the stars; and that he ought not to speak of a thing specifically, but only universally. Of this saying St. Thomas assigns the reason, because the impression of the stars obtains its effect in the majority, who do not resist the given inclination; but not always in this or that person, who perhaps through reason resists the natural inclination.

XIII. Concerning those things which are here said about the occasion of our choices from the impression of the heavenly bodies, in so far as from their impression we are made disposed and inclined to certain passions, it must be noted that St. Thomas does not on this account posit that human morals are sufficiently from the impression of the heavenly bodies, such that, namely, from their impression some are made temperate, some however intemperate, some just, some however unjust, as some of the astrologers perhaps falsely assert: since human morals depend upon the will, upon which it has been shown that the heavenly bodies do not directly act. But he means only this, that from the impression of the heavenly bodies some have an inclination to certain passions, by which certain human morals are occasioned, when reason does not regulate the impulse of the passion. For from the fact that some are inclined to the pleasure of the appetites, they are made intemperate by their own will; and from the fact that some are inclined to anger, they are made wrathful and cruel. Nevertheless, although inclinations to passions of this kind come about from heavenly impressions, man is yet able both to moderate the impulse of the passions themselves, and to act against them and become habituated.

XIV. But the arguments of Pico ¹⁸, by which he argues against the astrologers that human morals are not produced by the heaven, do not hold against this meaning.

For he argues against this, first, because if an inclination to some wickedness were from the heaven, an inclination of this kind should be referred not so much to the nature of the heaven as to God Himself, the Author of nature. Which is indeed exceedingly contrary to piety.

Secondly, because this would be to make the best servants of God, namely the heavens, the authors and ministers of evils.

Thirdly, because it is not fitting to the order and institution of nature that the best and principal parts should bring about the occurrence of things which the order of nature would not will to happen.

Fourthly, because it is not fitting for higher causes, always efficient, never deficient, to invite to deficiency. But he who invites to sin invites to deficiency: since he who sins does not do something, but rather falls short.

Fifthly, because all of nature, especially the higher, could perhaps favor the observation of the natural and divine law, but not obstruct and oppose it.

XV. For to these arguments it is said together indeed that we do not say that the heaven invites to some wickedness by directly inclining the will toward it. On the contrary, according to the mind of St. Thomas, Iª IIae, q. xxiv, ¹⁹ the passions to which they directly incite the sensitive appetite are not wickednesses or morally evil if they are considered in themselves, in the manner in which they are caused by the impressions of the heavenly bodies, since, as such, they are common to men and brute animals; but moral good or evil is found in them according as they are subject to the command of the will and reason. Whence the Philosopher says, II Ethic.: ²⁰ that by passions we are neither praised nor blamed; for he who fears or is angry is not praised or blamed, but he who is so in a certain way, namely according to reason or against reason. But it is not repugnant to this that such passions, in so far as they are not regulated by reason, are certain occasions of wickednesses, in the way in which the cold of the exterior air is also an occasion of choosing fire: for just as it stands together that some natural passion of the sensitive appetite is neither morally good nor evil in itself, and yet is the occasion of some sin in him who follows it, such as adultery or homicide; so the heaven does not incline the will to sin by acting upon the will itself, but only occasionally and indirectly, by exciting passions in the sensitive appetite.

2. Responding, however, individually to the single arguments, to the first it is said that that from which the heaven is said occasionally and indirectly to incline to some wickedness, namely the passion which the will of its own accord follows, is not unfitting to be referred to God as to the first cause, if it is considered in itself, just as every other natural effect is referred to Him: because, as such, it is not an evil, nor does it incline to sin; but it is a certain evil, and inclines to sin, in so far as it is outside the order of reason. Whence God is not in this way said to incline to sin, but to be the cause of something which, if it is not regulated by reason, inclines to sin. But that it is not regulated by reason is not from God, but from us. Therefore He is not to us a cause or occasion of sin, but is the cause of a good which, because it is not regulated by reason, is an occasion of sin.

To the second it is said similarly. For we do not make the heavenly bodies to be the authors of evils, but to be the cause of something good in itself in the genus of nature, which, on account of the defect of regulating reason, is the occasion of an evil choice.

To the third it is clear through the same. For we do not say that the heavenly bodies bring about the commission of sins, as we have already shown.

Similarly it is clear that we do not say that the heavenly bodies invite man to fall short, as the fourth argument posits, but that they effect some bodily impression or some sensitive movement, whence the occasion of sin and defect is taken when it is not regulated by reason.

Through the same it is clear to the last argument. For we do not say that the heavenly bodies obstruct or oppose the observation of the divine law, except very remotely, by causing certain passions. But that which obstructs the observation of the law is reason itself, which does not impose the due measure upon the passions, whence it happens that the will follows the movement of the sensitive appetite in its choice.

XVI. It must be noted, lastly, from the doctrine of St. Thomas, Prima, q. cxv, a. 4, and De Veritate, q. v, a. 10, that, although both the intellect and the will are said to be indirectly moved by the heavenly bodies in this and in the preceding chapter, in so far as their impression made upon the body or the bodily sensitive powers overflows into them, this nevertheless is found differently in them. For the intellect of necessity receives from the sensitive powers: a sign of which is that, when the imaginative, or the cogitative, or the memorative power is disturbed, the action of the intellect is of necessity disturbed. The will, however, does not of necessity follow the inclination of the lower appetite, but it is in its power to follow the passions or to reject them. Therefore it follows that the impression of the heavenly bodies, according to which the lower powers can be altered, reaches the will less than the intellect. This I understand thus: that since cognition comes about according as the known is received in the knower through the action of the known itself causing its likeness in it; and the object of the intellect is the phantasm received in the interior sensitive powers: it is necessary, in order for the intellect to understand, that it be moved by the imaginative and other sensitive powers, by which, as by an object, it is naturally moved. The operation of sensitive powers of this kind is also necessarily required for the actual operation of the intellect, as was shown above in the second book. ²¹ Therefore, when some alteration has been made in the sensitive powers through the impression of the heavenly bodies, the intellect of necessity receives some variation in its operation: just as, when the cause is varied, it is necessary that the effect be varied. Volition, however, comes about not according as the willed is received in the will, but according as the will is inclined toward the willed, according to which order the will is compared to the sensitive appetite as mover to moved, as is said in III De Anima. ²² Therefore it is not necessary that, when an alteration of the sensitive appetite has been made through the impression of the heavenly bodies, a variation or change be made in the act of the will, but it always remains in its liberty to choose according to the inclination of the sensitive appetite, or in a contrary manner.