Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

After St. Thomas has determined concerning the ordering of the angels, he wishes to determine concerning the ordering of men ¹. And he posits a threefold order in men: one, of men in relation to other things; another, of those things that are found in man; the third, of men among themselves.

I. The first order is that human souls hold the lowest rank among intellectual substances: because in their establishment, as was said above, namely in the preceding chapter, they receive cognition of the order of divine providence in only a certain universal cognition, but are led to a perfect cognition of singulars from the things themselves, in which such an order has already been particularly established, on account of which bodily organs have been given to them. But nevertheless they are not able to attain a perfect cognition from the things themselves concerning those things that pertain to men, unless they are aided by the light of a higher spirit, the divine disposition requiring this, so that lower spirits may acquire perfection through higher ones. All brute animals, however, according to the order of divine providence, are subject to man, because they participate somewhat in intellectual light: as is clear from Gen. 1.

Brute animals, because they have some cognition, are preferred to plants and other things lacking cognition: as is also held in Gen. 1.

Of those things, however, that lack cognition, one is subject to another inasmuch as one is more powerful than the other in acting: for they participate only in the execution, but not in the disposition of providence.

2. The second order is that, according to the likeness of the order in the universe, the bodily power in man is subject to the sensitive and intellective power, as executing their command; the sensitive power, however, is subject to the intellective power, and is contained under its command.

3. The third order is that among men, those who pre-excel in intellect naturally rule: while those who are deficient in intellect, but robust in body, seem established by nature for serving, as is shown in the Politics, and Prov. 11, and Exod. 18.

If, however, it is objected that it is found in human governance that someone presides over others not on account of eminence of intellect, but either usurps dominion for himself through bodily strength, or is set in charge to govern on account of the sensual affection of certain people (which Solomon does not pass over in silence, Eccles. 10), and thus it seems that that third order is not according to divine providence: — St. Thomas answers, and says two things. The first is, that this inordination does not exclude divine providence. For it arises from divine permission on account of the defect of lower agents, just as was said above concerning other evils.

He says secondly, that through an inordination of this sort the natural order is not totally perverted. Because the dominion of fools is weak unless it is strengthened by the counsel of the wise, as is held in Prov. 20 and 24: and the one who counsels rules the one who receives counsel, and therefore in a certain way rules over him, as is held in Prov. 17.

St. Thomas concludes finally, from the authority of the Apostle, Rom. 13, that divine providence imposes order upon all things.

II. Concerning the first order, it must be noted first that, just as many things to be executed by lower angels are not known by them with a perfect cognition unless through illumination made by higher angels, so also the secrets of divine providence that pertain to men are not known perfectly by men themselves except through revelation received from angels: so that in this way the order of divine providence is preserved, while lower things are governed and brought back to God through higher things. For this reason, just as one hierarchy of angels is placed under another, inasmuch as one is illuminated by the other concerning divine mysteries; so men are fittingly placed under the celestial spirits, that they may be instructed by them concerning divine matters. For, as is said here, on account of the weakness of the intellectual light in men, men cannot have perfect knowledge concerning those things that pertain to man himself, namely from the order alone and the disposition alone of divine providence, through the things from which they take their cognition.

2. It must be considered secondly that, just as brute animals, although they do not have prudence, nevertheless have some likeness of prudence, inasmuch as they proceed in an orderly manner in their operations; so indeed they do not have providence, since they do not know the nature of the end, as was shown above ²; yet they participate in some likeness of providence, inasmuch as through cognition they perform diverse actions of which one is for the sake of the other, as if they themselves were ordering one to the other as to an end, although nevertheless they act for the sake of an end, not as ordering anything from themselves to an end, but as directed and moved by another, just as an arrow by the archer. When, therefore, from his manner of speaking, St. Thomas seems to imply that brute animals participate somewhat in providence, when he said of them that, because they have some cognition, they are preferred to those lacking cognition; while of those things that lack cognition, he said that they do not participate anything of the disposition of providence, but only of its execution: he says that on account of a certain likeness of providence existing in them, not because they have anything of true providence in their cognition.