Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

After St. Thomas has shown that lower intellectual substances are governed by God through higher ones, he intends consequently to determine the order of the intellectual substances themselves ¹. Now, concerning this he does two things: first, he treats of the order of separate intellectual substances, which we call angels; second, of the order of men among themselves, in the following chapter.

Concerning the first, he does two things: first, he treats of the ordering of the angels according to the opinion of Dionysius; second, he compares the opinion of Gregory to the opinion of Dionysius, near the end of the chapter ².

Concerning the first, he does two things: first, he premises certain things necessary for understanding Dionysius's ordering; second, he pursues the opinion itself ³.

I. As to the first, he premises first that, since corporeal things are governed through spiritual things, it is necessary that the order of spiritual and corporeal things correspond to each other: namely, so that higher bodies are governed by higher spirits, and lower ones by lower spirits.

It must be noted that what is said here is not to be understood as though, taking the entire multitude of intellectual substances absolutely, the supreme substances govern the supreme bodies, for this is false, as will be clear from what follows ⁴; but because, taking the multitude of spirits that govern bodies, those who govern higher bodies are higher, while those who govern lower ones are lower.

II. The second thing he premises is that, because the higher a substance is, the more universal is its power, and the power of an intellectual substance is more universal than the power of a body: higher intellectual substances have powers that cannot be unfolded through any corporeal power, and therefore are not united to bodies; whereas lower ones have particularized powers that can be unfolded through corporeal instruments, and therefore it is necessary that they be united to bodies.

Note that we can understand this difference of intellectual substances in two ways ⁵. In one way, such that it is a difference only of those intellectual substances that we call angels, but which the philosophers call separate substances. And then the sense is that the higher among them have powers that cannot be unfolded through bodies, because they are capable of certain effects to which bodies cannot extend: because their power is more universal than the power of bodies, both namely that power which naturally belongs to them and that which is suited to belong to them instrumentally. Therefore they are not united to bodies. But the lower ones have powers that can be unfolded through bodies, because they are capable of no effect that they cannot unfold through bodies: therefore they are united to bodies. And then it will have to be understood that their power is more universal than the power of bodies—that power, I say, which per se belongs to bodies, but not that which is suited to belong to them instrumentally.

Yet this exposition does not seem suitable. First, because it is false that lower angels are not capable of any effect that they cannot accomplish through bodies. For they can illuminate intelligibly by strengthening the human intellect through their action, as is said in the Prima Pars, q. 111, a. 1, which does not take place instrumentally through a body. Second, because, although they can use some body as an instrument for some effect of theirs by applying particular agents to their passives, it does not follow from this that they must be united to bodies (namely as though this belonged of necessity to their natures), as St. Thomas says here. On the contrary, as is said in the Prima Pars, q. 51, a. 1, and is gathered from what was said above in the second book ⁶ and in other places, angels do not have bodies naturally united to them. Third, because this difference would serve no purpose here. For it is introduced to manifest the order of the hierarchies. But for this the aforesaid sense serves in no way.

2. Therefore, this passage must be expounded in a second way, such that a distinction is drawn between separate substances and the intellective soul. For because a substance, the higher it is, has a more universal power, just as celestial bodies have in relation to lower bodies; since an intellectual substance is higher than a corporeal substance, it follows that the power of an intellectual substance is more universal than corporeal power, as being capable of some operation that cannot be exercised through a body. But there is a distinction among intellectual substances themselves. For there are some that have no power whose operation must be exercised through a body. And these are the higher substances, which we call angels. For in them there is only intellective and appetitive power, neither of which is exercised through a body; nor does their motive power need a corporeal instrument, since it is not distinguished from intellect and will. Therefore they are not united to bodies as forms: although, by divine disposition, some of them are united to celestial bodies as movers. But there are some which, although they have certain powers exceeding the body, nevertheless have some that cannot be accomplished without a body: such are human souls, which have intellect and will, which need no corporeal organ, but have sensitive and vegetative powers, which cannot be exercised without a corporeal instrument. And therefore, in order that they may be able to issue into the act of these powers, it is necessary that they be united to bodies as forms.

This distinction serves the purpose: because through this St. Thomas intends to hold that, since angels are intellectual substances separate from bodies, they receive divine illuminations in their intelligible purity; but intellective souls, because they are united to bodies and receive cognition by way of the senses, receive the divine illuminations themselves under sensible likenesses, as Dionysius says in chapter 1 of The Celestial Hierarchy. Therefore, the hierarchy of men must be one thing, and the hierarchy of angels another: because there is one mode for angels of receiving divine illuminations, and another mode for men. From which he further intends to hold that the hierarchy of angels must suitably be determined separately from the hierarchy of men.

III. The third thing he premises is that, just as higher intellectual substances are of more universal power, so also they receive the divine disposition more perfectly from God, in that they know the rationale of the order down to singulars: that is, they not only know the universal disposition of things that God disposed in His mind, for example that He disposed the universe to exist for the manifestation of the divine goodness, and ordered the motion of celestial bodies to the generation of these lower things, and the like; but they also receive from God the cognition of the order of each singular thing that God conceived in Himself. For just as they know to what the heavy is ordered, and to what the light; to what the hot is ordered, and to what the cold; to what such a herb is ordered, and to what such another; so concerning the mysteries of grace, and concerning the salvation of men, and concerning other things that are particularly ordered by the divine disposition, they have a particular cognition, and not only a universal one.

It must be noted that in this statement he understands angels by the higher intellectual substances, just as also in the second statement. Which is clear, because below ⁷, speaking of the angels of the lowest hierarchy, he calls them the lowest among the higher intellectual substances.

IV. The fourth thing he premises is that this manifestation of the divine ordering made divinely reaches even to the last of the intellectual substances, as is shown in Job 25. The lower ones, however, cannot through it know singular things that pertain to the order of divine providence to be executed by them, but only in a certain generality. And the lower they are, the less they receive cognition of the divine order in particular through the first illumination divinely received: so much so that the human intellect, according to natural cognition, has knowledge of certain most universal things only.

Now from this it is given to be understood that, when it was said in the third statement that higher substances know the rationale of the order down to singulars, this is understood of the genus of those substances that are above the human soul, but not of the individuals of that genus. For it belongs to that genus of substances to know the orders of things in particular, but not to all the substances of that genus.

2. For the evidence of what is said here, it must be considered that St. Thomas seems to posit a twofold illumination in separate substances through the reception of supernatural light from God: one, by which they have cognition of things in the vision of the divine essence; and another, according as they are illuminated by God concerning those things that they do not see in the divine essence. Speaking of the first illumination in this place, he says that this is common to all substances of this kind, that the manifestation of the divine ordering, namely concerning created things according as they are subject to divine providence, reaches them, for it reaches even to the last of such substances: for all of them, while they see the divine essence, see indeed all genera and species and their powers and properties, and they see the order of all creatures established and devised by divine wisdom, as is clear from what was said above ⁸. But among them there is a difference as to this: that the lower angels do not receive in the divine essence so perfect a cognition of the order of divine providence as to be able to know the singular things to be executed by them that pertain to the order of divine providence, but only in a certain generality, and they receive cognition of the divine order less in particular the lower they are; whereas the higher ones receive a perfect and particular cognition. For this is easy to know from those things that were shown above ⁹ when there was a discourse concerning beatitude. For there it was said that not all who see the divine essence see all the dispositions of things, or all their orders, as they are subject to divine providence, except the soul of Christ ¹⁰; but some see more, some fewer. From which it follows that many relations of things, and orderings belonging to things from divine providence, are known distinctly by the higher Blessed in the divine essence, which are not known distinctly by the lower, but confusedly, or in something general: just as concerning the mystery of the Incarnation St. Thomas says in the Prima Pars, q. 57, a. 5 ¹¹, that all the angels, by the cognition by which they see things in the Word, knew it in general from the beginning, because it is a certain general principle to which all their offices are ordered; but as to special conditions, not all were instructed from the beginning, but some knew more about them, and some fewer, and some are instructed later by higher angels, according as is fitting for their offices.

Now St. Thomas explains this proportionally from natural cognition. For we see that the human intellect, which is the lowest among all intellectual substances, by natural cognition has knowledge of certain most universal things only, namely the knowledge of first principles indwelling in it by nature:—while the higher intellects, of course, have a distinct knowledge of things; for it was shown above ¹² that there is indwelling in them the knowledge of all things that they can naturally know. For from this it appears that even according to supernatural cognition, the lower an angelic intellect is, the less distinct knowledge it has concerning things pertaining to the mysteries of grace, and concerning those things that depend on the divine will alone: for in them the mode of gratuitous cognition must be proportioned to natural cognition ¹³.

3. It must be observed, however, that by the first illumination divinely received one cannot understand in this place the cognition of the angels had through the natural light: because according to that cognition angels are not distinguished by the fact that higher ones have a more distinct cognition of things on the part of the things known themselves, and lower ones a less distinct cognition; since, as is clear from the second book ¹⁴, all have connatural species of the things that pertain to their natural cognition, and those species represent both universal natures and existing singulars distinctly. Therefore it must be understood of the first supernatural illumination, by which they are illuminated by supernatural light.

V. The fifth thing he premises, following from the preceding, is that higher intellectual substances obtain a more perfect cognition of the said order immediately from God, and the other, lower ones obtain it through them. This is made manifest by the example of a disciple, whose universal cognition is brought to perfection through the cognition of a master who knows in particular; and by the authority of Dionysius in chapter 7 of The Celestial Hierarchy.

For the evidence of this, it must be considered, from the doctrine of St. Thomas in the Prima Pars, in the Question cited ¹⁵, and q. 106 ¹⁶, that the higher angels, contemplating the divine essence more perfectly, know more and higher mysteries in the vision of God itself concerning those things that pertain to the disposition of the universe, and especially to the salvation of the elect, than the lower ones. Therefore they are said to receive immediately from God a more perfect cognition concerning the order of creatures than the lower ones, who do not know as many divine mysteries in the divine essence. But although the lower ones do not have so great a cognition of divine mysteries by seeing the divine essence as the higher ones do, they nevertheless obtain the knowledge of those things that the higher ones have, through revelation made by the higher ones: although in the higher ones there remains a more excellent and clearer knowledge of those things that they reveal to the lower ones, just as a master understands one and the same thing more fully than the disciple who learns from him.

2. But concerning the aforesaid a doubt arises. For, as was shown in the preceding ¹⁷, according to the mind of St. Thomas, the Blessed, by seeing the divine essence, see in Him all things that pertain to themselves: whence in the Fourth Book, d. 45, q. 3, a. 1, he holds that in the Word they see prayers, both vocal and mental, that are directed to them. From which it is necessary to say that from the beginning of his beatitude each one knows all prayers to be directed to him: otherwise there would be succession in the vision of things in the divine essence, contrary to what was determined before ¹⁸. Therefore it is ill said here that lower intellects through the first illumination do not know the singular things to be executed by them that pertain to the order of divine providence, but only in a certain generality.

3. It is answered, and said first, that it suffices for the blessed angels to know in universal what is to be done by them, namely by knowing the office to which they are assigned by divine disposition; but it is not required for their beatitude that they know singular things in particular that are to be committed to them in the future. Nor is their natural desire borne toward this. For among human administrators, who execute the king's commands, it is apparent that their desire rests if they know what their office is with the king; nor do those who are wise seek to know in particular all the things that are to be executed by them in the future by the king's imposition.

It is said secondly, that prayers directed by men to the saints have a created cause. Therefore it is not a matter of presumption if any of the saints desires to know them. But those things that are to be executed by the angels from the order of divine wisdom depend on the mere and simple will. Therefore to wish to scrutinize them would be of great rashness and presumption. For that reason no one with a right will can desire the acknowledgment of them. Hence what is said, that the saints see in the divine essence all things that pertain to them, is to be understood of those things that have a dependence on a created cause: but not of those things that are constituted in the disposition of the divine will alone as to be executed by them toward others.

VI. As to the second, from these presuppositions St. Thomas shows the order among the intellectual substances themselves ¹⁹. And since the angels are distinguished by Dionysius into three hierarchies, that is, sacred principalities, and each hierarchy has three orders ²⁰, St. Thomas distinguishes the hierarchies thus, according to the mind of Dionysius ²¹.

For he says that they are distinguished according to a diverse mode of receiving the perfect cognition of the order of divine providence. For the angels of the first hierarchy receive such cognition immediately in a higher principle, namely in God Himself:—understand this, by seeing those things that they reveal to lower ones in the divine essence itself, such as are the things that they know from the beginning of their beatitude; or also by receiving cognition of them immediately from God through revelation, and thus seeing in the light of divine revelation. For, as is said in the Prima Pars, in the places cited above ²², down to the day of judgment, certain new things are always revealed to the supreme angels concerning those things that pertain to the disposition of the universe, and especially to the salvation of the elect.—The angels of the second, or middle hierarchy, however, do not receive this perfect cognition in God through the vision of the divine essence, or through immediate illumination from God, but they obtain it from the angels of the first hierarchy through illumination; and they know the order of divine providence in universal created causes, which are middle between the supreme cause, which is God, and particular causes.—The angels of the lowest hierarchy, on the other hand, receive divinely the order of providence knowable in particular causes: that is, they obtain cognition of such order in particular causes through illumination made by the angels of the second hierarchy. For that cognition is said to come divinely to the lowest angels because it has its origin from God, either seen through His essence or immediately revealing certain mysteries and secrets to the supreme angels.

Now St. Thomas notes that the angels of the second hierarchy know through more universal causes than the angels of the lowest hierarchy, because they are more universal in knowing, just as they are also of more universal power. For a man would be of higher intellect who could consider the order of all natural things in the celestial bodies, than one who needs to look down to lower things for perfect cognition. And therefore they are suitably placed by Dionysius in the middle hierarchy, as being able to know the order of providence perfectly in universal causes, which are middle between God and particular causes.

2. It must be noted in this place that, since the conditions of particular things and their orderings according to the determination of divine providence proceed from God by means of created causes, so that for putting the order itself into execution there concur the most universal cause, which is God Himself, the created universal cause, and the particular cause; it is necessary that the angels whose nature is to know through the most universal concepts know those conditions and orderings of particulars in the most universal cause; while those whose nature is to know through less universal concepts know them through created universal causes, which namely are closer to the most universal cause; while those whose nature is to know through more particular concepts know those conditions in more particular causes. The reason for this is because, where something is known in a cause, the cause must proportionally correspond to the concept of the one understanding, so that namely a more universal cause corresponds to a more universal concept: for a concept is not called more universal except because a more universal object responds to it; and thus to a more universal concept by which something is known in a cause—namely by knowing the cause itself in which it is virtually contained—a more universal cause must respond. Now it was shown above, in the second book ²³, that the higher angels have a more universal cognition, as understanding through more universal species, and knowing many things distinctly by a single concept. Therefore most suitably is there attributed by Dionysius and St. Thomas to the supreme angels the cognition of the order of divine providence in the supreme cause of all itself; to the middle ones, the cognition of this kind of order in universal created causes; and to the lowest ones, the cognition in particular causes.

3. Moreover, we can clarify this by way of examples. First, in evils. For God from eternity determined to consume Sodom and Gomorrah with fire on account of their demerits. Now, there were three causes of this burning: namely, divine justice, as the most universal cause; sins in general, as a universal cause; and this particular sin which is against nature, as a particular cause. We shall say that the angels of the first hierarchy, considering divine justice, knew the future conflagration of these cities in the divine essence, which is the most universal cause of all things, or through a revelation made to them immediately by God; and they communicated this knowledge by revelation to the inferior angels of the middle hierarchy. We shall say that the angels of the middle hierarchy, considering the malice of those peoples in general, in which they knew all their sins, through the revelation and illumination made to them by the superiors, knew that such a conflagration was to come. But concerning the lowest angels, we shall say that, illuminated by the angels of the middle hierarchy, they knew this conflagration by considering in particular the sin against nature which they practiced against the young men. For thus it is clear that the superiors knew the said order of these cities toward conflagration, instituted and preordained by God, by a more universal concept—namely, one distinctly representing more things—and in the knowledge of a more universal cause; whereas the inferiors knew it by a less universal concept, as representing fewer things, and in a less universal cause.

Second, in goods. For God ordained that Peter and Paul were to be saved through martyrdom by the power of the passion of Christ, which is the universal cause of human salvation. For the most universal cause of this was God; the universal cause was the passion of Christ; and their martyrdom was the particular cause. We shall say that the angels of the first hierarchy knew this divine ordination in the divine essence itself, or in a light received immediately from God: for example, considering the divine goodness, by which He wills to lead certain human beings to beatitude. But the angels of the middle hierarchy, illuminated by the angels of the first hierarchy, knew this divine ordination by considering the power of the passion of Christ. But the angels of the lowest hierarchy, illuminated and directed by the middle, knew this ordination in the very consideration of martyrdom: that Peter and Paul were to be crowned in the heavenly homeland by the power of martyrdom.

VII. As regards, however, the distinction of the orders contained in each hierarchy ²⁴, St. Thomas says that, since the orders of the first hierarchy agree in this, that all receive the knowledge of the order of divine providence immediately from God, they are distinguished in this: that the first and supreme of that hierarchy receive the plan of the order of providence in the ultimate end itself, which is the divine goodness—some of them, however, more clearly than others. And these are called Seraphim, that is, ardent or kindling. — But the second know the aforesaid plan of the order perfectly in the divine form itself. And these are called Cherubim, which is interpreted fullness of knowledge. — But the third consider the disposition of the divine judgments in itself, and not in any higher principle. And these are called Thrones, because judicial power is signified by a throne.

Lest anyone take occasion to err, however, St. Thomas says that the foregoing are not to be understood as though the divine goodness were one thing, the divine essence another, and the knowledge containing the disposition of things another; but because according to this there is one consideration and another: that is, they are apprehended by distinct concepts in our reason and consideration.

VIII. But a doubt arises. For there seems to be a certain contradiction in the words of St. Thomas. For he posits that it is common to all the spirits of the first hierarchy to know the plan of the divine works immediately in God Himself. Yet later he says that the Thrones know the disposition of the divine judgments in itself, not in any higher principle.

2. For the evidence of this, it must be considered that, just as in things ordered by God there is found both an assimilation to God, as an intrinsic end; and a form, according to which they are assimilated to God; and the very ordering of the effects, according as one effect is ordered to another, either as cause to effect, or as matter to form, or in whatever other way: so in God one must consider three things distinct according to reason, corresponding to these three which are found in the effects. And thus divine goodness is posited, as the end for the sake of which God provides all things, corresponding to the end intrinsic to the effects; the divine essence is posited, as the form through which proper forms are produced in the effects; and the disposition or ordering is posited, by which God in His mind established the order to be placed in the effects. Therefore, this ordering of the divine intellect, existing in the divine mind itself, can be known by knowing the divine goodness per se, under the aspect by which it is distinguished from the essence and the ordering itself. And similarly it can be known in the essence, insofar as it has the character of a form to whose likeness things are produced: for from the consideration of the form it can be known how other things are to be ordered so that such a form may result. And thirdly, such an ordering can also be known in itself, insofar as it is considered according to its proper character, as it is distinguished from the essence and goodness, and is seen not in something else at which knowledge is primarily terminated.

From these things it is apparent that there is no contradiction in the words of St. Thomas. For he does not intend that the Thrones see the disposition inherent in things in itself as existing in the things themselves, not in God Himself, as the objection assumes; but that in God Himself they see the divine knowledge and the ordinative cognition of things according to itself, as it is distinguished by reason from the divine essence and goodness; but not in the goodness or essence, which are called higher principles, just as the end and the form are nobler than the motion by which things are directed to the end and the form. Now, this is clear from the fact that, removing the said error, he says that this is not to be understood as though the divine goodness were one thing, the essence another, and the knowledge containing the disposition of things another. For from these things it is clear that by the disposition of the divine judgments known in itself he understood the divine knowledge itself containing the disposition of things, and not that disposition which inheres in things.

3. It must be noted, however, that on the part of the thing no such distinction is posited, as though the Thrones saw the disposition of the divine judgments in itself, yet did not see the goodness and essence: for by the single act by which they see the divine essence, they also see both the goodness and the knowledge. But this is according to the consideration of our intellect, distinguishing the act of seeing God itself according as it is terminated at diverse objects distinct according to reason, and imposing diverse names from this. For we name the first from the knowledge of God itself as terminated at goodness, and we call them Seraphim; but the second from the knowledge itself as terminated at the divine essence, we call Cherubim; but the third from the knowledge itself as terminated at the knowledge ordinative of things, we name Thrones.

IX. The orders of the second hierarchy are distinguished in such a way that, while they all agree in this, that they know the order of divine providence through the consideration of universal causes, the first distribute the disposition of universal providence among many executors. And they are called Dominations: for it belongs to a lord to command what others execute. Whence Dionysius, in chapter viii of On the Celestial Hierarchy, says that the name Domination signifies a certain anagoge, etc. — But the second, who are executors, distribute and multiply the disposition of providence itself to various effects. And they are called Virtues: for they are, as it were, universal executors. Whence the principle of universal operation belongs to this order. And the motion of the celestial bodies, from which particular effects follow as from universal causes, seems to belong to them. The execution of divine works that are done outside the order of nature also seems to belong to them. — But the lowest preserve the unshaken order of divine providence established in the effects, by restraining those things which could disturb this order. And they are called Powers.

2. Concerning the authority of Dionysius brought forward for the explanation of the first order, where it is said that the name Domination designates a certain anagoge set above all servitude, it must be considered that, although by the name anagoges the Greeks signify a departure and the sending out of a fleet, as is found in the Suda ²⁵; nevertheless here it is taken for loftiness and excellence, as even the Latin translator seems to interpret ²⁶. For it is derived from the verb anago, which signifies not only I depart, but also I lead upward. Whence anagoge can also signify a super-action, or an eminent action, and from there be drawn to signify an exalted intelligence.

X. The orders of the third hierarchy agree in this, which is to know the order of divine providence in particular causes and human affairs: that is, they are set over inferior natures and particular causes which are ordered to man and come into his use. But they differ, because to the first, who are called Principalities, belongs the common good in human affairs, which is the good of a city or a nation. And thus to these belongs the disposition of kingdoms; the transfer of dominion from nation to nation; and the instruction of those who are princes of others, in those things which pertain to the administration of government. — But to the middle, who are called Archangels, belongs the good which does not consist in commonality, but belongs to each one according to himself, yet is not useful to one alone, but to many: such as those things which are to be believed and observed by all, like the things of faith, and divine worship, and the like. — But to the lowest, who retain the common name and are called Angels, belongs the human good which pertains to each one singularly.

2. One thing must be noted in this place, from the doctrine of St. Thomas in the First Part, q. CVIII ²⁷: that although some of the inferior orders are named particularly from a certain perfection, it is not thereby excluded that it is found in the superior orders; on the contrary, whatever perfection is found in the inferior spirits is also found in the superior spirits according to a certain more excellent mode. But the inferior order is named from it, and not the superior, because that perfection is, as it were, commensurate with the inferior order and the highest perfection found in it; but it is not the supreme perfection which the superior order has. Just as the Thrones are denominated from the knowledge of the order of divine providence in the divine mind itself; whereas the Cherubim, although they have this very perfection, are nevertheless not denominated from it, but from a superior perfection, that is, from this: to gaze upon the said order of providence in the divine essence as in the form of all intelligibles. And so it must be said of the others.

XI. As regards the second main point, St. Thomas compares the arrangement of Dionysius to the arrangement of Gregory ²⁸. And he says that they differ because, whereas Dionysius placed Principalities in the lowest hierarchy, but Virtues in the middle; Gregory on the contrary places Principalities in the middle hierarchy, and places them immediately after Dominations; but Virtues he places in the lowest hierarchy, before Archangels.

Now, concerning their difference, St. Thomas says two things. First, that each arrangement differs in little. For with Gregory, Principalities are called not those which preside over nations alone, as Dionysius indeed interprets; but also those which preside over the good spirits themselves, as presiding in the execution of the divine ministries. Therefore, where Dionysius placed Virtues, to which he attributed this, Gregory placed Principalities. — Likewise, with Gregory, Virtues are called those which are ordered to certain particular operations when something happens to be done miraculously. According to which interpretation, they are ordered appropriately enough with the angels of the lowest hierarchy. Therefore, where Dionysius placed Principalities, Gregory placed Virtues.

He says secondly, that each arrangement can have authority from the words of the Apostle: the arrangement of Dionysius, indeed, from the order which is observed in ascending, in Ephesians 1; but the arrangement of Gregory from the order set down in Colossians 1, in descending. — But concerning the other spirits of which mention was made above, whom the Apostle does not name in that enumeration, St. Thomas shows in which places of Sacred Scripture mention is made.

Lastly he notes that, since in all ordered powers this is common, that all inferiors act in the virtue of the superior power; that which we said belongs to the order of Seraphim, namely to kindle, all the inferiors execute by its virtue. And it is to be considered similarly in the other orders ²⁹.

2. Concerning the difference between Dionysius and Gregory, note that St. Thomas in II Sent., dist. IX ³⁰, holds that the arrangement of Dionysius is more reasonable, although Gregory’s arrangement is also reasonable. — Moreover, he adds that Gregory did not apply much intention to the ordering of these spirits, but only willed to enumerate the orders of angels.

XII. Concerning the last thing which St. Thomas notes ³¹, it must be considered first, that we can take a threefold intention in those words. One is, that all inferior species are capable of every effect of which the Seraphim are capable, but in the virtue of the Seraphim themselves, and not merely by their own virtue. — Another is, that the inferior orders act in the virtue of the superiors, and of the Seraphim themselves, whose order holds the first place, in every effect of which they are capable. — The third is that, if the inferiors act in any effect belonging to the Seraphim, they act in it in the virtue of the Seraphim.

All these senses can have truth. The first indeed because, since ordered powers are said to be those of which one moves the other to operate, and of which one operates through the other, it is necessary that all effects which proceed from the first insofar as it is ordered with the others can be accomplished through the inferior powers. For if it were capable of some effect which could not be accomplished through the inferiors, it would no longer have an order with the inferior orders as to that effect. And thus it follows that, since the Seraphim hold the first place with respect to divine mysteries, and the revelations of such secrets reach from them all the way to the lowest order: whatever the Seraphim are capable of in executing such mysteries, the inferiors also are capable of, yet by the virtue of the Seraphim themselves. — The second sense also contains manifest truth: because an inferior cause does not act except in the virtue of a superior cause. — The third sense likewise is manifestly true: for it is clear enough that the effect of a first cause cannot be produced through a second except by the power of the first cause itself. — But although all these senses are true, and can be applied to the text, the first sense nevertheless seems to be intended here. For, as is said in the First Part, q. CXII ³², the superior angels communicate their proper gifts, from which they are denominated, through the mediation of the inferior angels.

2. It must be considered secondly, that St. Thomas noted this to remove a certain doubt that could arise. For from the things that were said above ³³, it is held that the angels of the first hierarchy do not exercise anything concerning inferior things, but are named from their operation regarding God. But to this it seems to stand in the way that one of the Seraphim was sent to kindle the lips of the prophet, as is found in Isaiah VI ³⁴.

Now, through what is said here the answer is given, and it is in accord with the mind of Dionysius, chapter XIII of On the Celestial Hierarchy, that that angel was not of the order of Seraphim, but of the inferior orders: but he is called by the name Seraphim because he produced that effect which is to kindle by the virtue of the Seraphim. For, since the Seraphim are called ardent or kindling, it belongs to them to kindle men toward God: mediately indeed, but not immediately.

XIII. Concerning this distinction of hierarchies and orders, it must be considered that, although St. Thomas speaks in diverse ways in diverse places, nevertheless, if it is diligently considered, all these modes can easily be reduced to one. Which can very easily be manifested if we run through the modes of distinction themselves.

For between the hierarchies he posits a distinction in this place because the angels of the first hierarchy see the order of divine providence in the divine essence; the angels of the middle hierarchy see it in universal causes; but the angels of the lowest hierarchy gaze upon it in particular causes. — But in the First Part, q. CVIII, a. 1, he posits this difference, that the first hierarchy receives the reasons of things as they proceed from God; the second indeed as they depend on universal causes ³⁵; but the third according as such reasons depend on particular causes. — But in II Sent., dist. IX, a. 3, he says that the first hierarchy receives the knowledge of divine effects in the first universal cause itself; the second hierarchy knows things in the universal reasons of things; but the third hierarchy knows things in their proper reasons.

2. Moreover, to one who considers diligently, it appears that the two latter modes are reduced to the one which is posited here. For all these modes agree in this, that the hierarchies are distinguished according to a diverse mode of receiving divine illuminations. For those orders which have a more universal cognition from their nature receive divine illuminations in such a way that through them they know the things that are to be done in some more universal principle: just as one who is of more elevated intellect knows in one principle handed down to him by a master many conclusions which one who is of duller and slower intellect does not know. But those orders which have a more particular cognition from their nature know through those divine illuminations the things that are to be done in some more particular principle.

3. Therefore, the mode which is touched upon in the First Part ³⁶ is the same as this one which is touched upon here. Because there seems to be no difference between them except that in the one the difference is taken on the part of the knowledge of the reasons of things, but in the other on the part of the knowledge of the order of divine providence: and yet, as regards this, there is no difference except in name; for what St. Thomas here calls the order of divine providence, he calls in the First Part the reasons of things. For by these names nothing else is signified than that which God has ordained by His providence to effect in things. For we understand that the concept, idea, and exemplar of the order to be placed in things is in the divine mind prior to such order being placed in the things themselves: and such an idea, and such an exemplar, is called the order established through divine providence, insofar as it is of the same nature with the extrinsic order itself in some way; in that way in which we say that the exemplar of a house to be produced existing in the mind of the builder is the house in intelligible being. It is also called the reason of the thing, insofar as the concept of the thing existing in the divine mind is called its reason and likeness. Whence it is the same to say to know the order of divine providence, and to know the reasons of things, in God Himself, as to know what God has determined in His mind to effect in created things, or what order He has devised to place in any things.

4. But the mode touched upon in II Sent. ³⁷ seems to agree in some respect with the first two. For the divine effects, according to whose knowledge the hierarchies are said to be distinguished, are known together with the order of divine providence existing in the divine mind, and the reasons of things. For the effects of divine providence to be produced in things, which are nothing other than certain orders to be placed in them, concerning which the angels are illuminated as concerning things to be produced in the future, have being first in the divine mind through their reasons and exemplars. Therefore, when the order existing in the divine mind itself is known, the divine effects to be produced according to that order are known.

Now, that manner seems to differ from the others with respect to this: for those posit that the angels of the middle hierarchy know the reasons of the divine works in created causes; but this manner posits that they know them in the reasons of things that are in the intellect. But with respect to this we can find an agreement between these manners in two ways. First, by saying that by created causes in the first two manners nothing other is understood than the very concepts existing in the angelic mind, which in the third manner are called reasons of things, according to which they work those effects in which they minister to God; for, as is said in the same place, the forms through which angels know are operative, at least with respect to the effects in which they minister to God. And because in the higher orders concepts of this kind are more universal, but in the lower they are particular, inasmuch as the higher know more things by a single concept than do the lower, on that account the angels of the middle hierarchy are said to know in universal causes, but the lower in particular causes.

Secondly, we can find an agreement by saying that the one manner entails the other. For since a more universal cause is not known by higher angels except through a more universal concept, from the fact that it is posited that the higher angels know something to be done through divine providence when, by divine illumination, seeing the universal cause, they see it to be ordained through divine providence to the production of such an effect, it follows that they know that effect in a universal reason and concept. And the same must be said of one who knows in a particular cause. For one who knows, in the consideration of Christ's passion, that Peter is to be saved through that same passion of Christ, knows that Peter is to be saved from that concept by which he knows Christ's passion; ³⁸ which concept is a universal concept with respect to the concepts that are formed concerning the particular causes of someone's salvation, just as the passion of Christ itself is the common cause of all who are to be saved. But one who knows that Peter is to be saved through martyrdom considered in itself, which is a particular cause of his salvation, knows this through the particular concept that he forms of martyrdom. — This manner seems rather to be according to the mind of St. Thomas, if his procedure is carefully considered.

XIV. Concerning also the distinction of the orders of a single hierarchy, there seems to be a diversity. For here he distinguishes the angels of the first hierarchy by the fact that the Seraphim see the order of divine providence in the divine goodness; the Cherubim, in the divine essence; the Thrones, in itself, or in God's very knowledge that orders things. — He distinguishes the angels of the middle hierarchy because the Dominations distribute the disposition of divine providence to many executors, commanding what the others are to execute; the Virtues, as executing and working, distribute and multiply the said disposition unto various effects; the Powers restrain those things that could disrupt the said order. — He distinguishes the angels of the lowest hierarchy because to the Principalities belongs the governance of the common good; to the Archangels, the governance of goods that belong to each thing according to itself, but are useful to many; to the Angels belongs the governance of the good that belongs to one individually.

In the First Part, ³⁹ however, he distinguishes the angels of the first hierarchy because the Seraphim excel in that which is being united to God, who is the end of creatures; the Cherubim supereminently know the secrets of God; the Thrones receive God familiarly in themselves, knowing the reasons of things immediately in Him, which is proper to the whole first hierarchy. — He distinguishes the angels of the second because to the Dominations belongs the distinguishing of those things that are to be done; to the Virtues belongs providing the capacity for fulfilling them; to the Powers, ordering how those things that have been commanded or defined can be fulfilled. — He distinguishes the angels of the third thus: that the Principalities begin actions and lead others; the Angels simply execute; the Archangels hold a middle position.

But in II Sent., ⁴⁰ he distinguishes the angels of the first hierarchy because the Seraphim are named from the act of loving, by which the will is perfected; the Cherubim, from the act of seeing, by which the intelligence is perfected; the Thrones, from the act of comprehension, or retention, by which the memory is perfected. — He distinguishes the angels of the middle because to the Dominations belongs directing in all divine ministries; to the Virtues belongs helping and championing, so that it may not be impossible for divine ministries to be brought to effect; to the Powers belongs judging what is due to each. — He distinguishes the angels of the third thus: that the Principalities have an act limited to one province; the Archangels have an act limited to one man, but concerning those things that belong to the good of many, which are fulfilled through the act of one person; but the Angels have an act limited to one man, concerning those things that belong to him alone.

XV. All these manners, however, can be reduced to one in this way. For with respect to the first hierarchy, all the manners enumerated here agree that the angels of the first hierarchy receive the knowledge of the divine works immediately in God Himself. But because God is both God, and the first principle, and the ultimate end, here it is said that they all receive this knowledge in God Himself, without limiting it to any one aspect; in the First Part, however, it is said that they all receive this knowledge in the end, which is God; but in II Sent., it is said that they receive this knowledge in the first universal cause. Yet the same thing is signified by all these names: but in different places he considered different conditions of God, distinguished according to our mode of understanding.

What is said in the First Part, that the Seraphim excel in that which is being united to God; but in II Sent., that they are named from the act of loving: is the same as what is said here, namely, that they receive knowledge in the end, which is the divine goodness. For by all these statements it is signified that they are named from love; for through love the lover is fixed upon the thing loved, and is united to it; and likewise, because they intensely love the end itself, and out of intense love fix the whole gaze of the intellect upon it, they are said to receive knowledge in the divine goodness, according as it is an end vehemently loved. — When it is said of the Cherubim that they supereminently know the secrets of God, that they are named from the act of seeing, and that they know perfectly in the divine form itself, there is signified the fullness of knowledge of these angels, while they see the order of things in the divine essence, which is the form of every intelligible. Now this is said, not because the Seraphim, who are higher, do not know the divine secrets with so great an eminence, but because this is what is noblest in the Cherubim; whereas the Seraphim both see the divine secrets themselves more eminently and are more ardently united to God above all others through love; therefore they are named from this highest union, as from the most perfect act in the line of what is unitive. ⁴¹ — Concerning the Thrones, it is clear that all the statements are referred to one thing. For, as the lowest of that hierarchy, they are named from that which is common to the whole first hierarchy and by which the first hierarchy is distinguished from the lower ones, namely, from seeing the reasons of things in God Himself, because they have nothing more excellent than that. Therefore they are said to hold God in themselves, as namely embracing Him perseveringly and immutably by their knowledge, and to see the ordering and knowledge of the divine mind in itself.

2. With respect to the second hierarchy, it is clear that all the manners agree in this, that to it belongs the universal disposition concerning things to be done, just as they also know the order of divine providence in universal causes. Concerning the Dominations, too, it is clear that there is no difference. For all things tend to this: that it belongs to them to distinguish those things that are to be done, and to command that they be brought to effect; just as an architect distinguishes, regarding a building, that stones are to be fitted, timbers are to be planed, mortar is to be ground, and commands that these things be done, but executes none of them by himself. — What is said of the Virtues seems to be different, yet all statements nevertheless agree in this, that they are first among those who execute, as namely executing by themselves something first and universal in the divine ministries, such as the motion of the heavenly bodies, and handing on to other executors what each one ought to do, yet concerning universal governance. Now this fact, that the Virtues are first in the execution of the divine works and distributors of universal ministries, carries with it this: that it is to help so that all things may be done, and to champion and defend by their power lest anything hinder the execution of divine providence, which is to provide the capacity for acting. — What is said of the Powers tends to this: that it belongs to the Powers to keep unshaken the order of divine providence established in effects, by restraining through their judgment those things that could disrupt this order; and to determine that this belongs to this one, but not to that one. And on account of this they are also said to order how those things that have been commanded can be fulfilled.

3. With respect to the third hierarchy, all the manners agree in this, that this hierarchy has its acts concerning human affairs, namely, concerning the lower natures ordained to man. But what is said of the Principalities tends to this, that they are set over kingdoms and cities. And therefore they are said to be, as it were, beginning action concerning things of this kind, and leading others to the execution of their works concerning human affairs. — To the Archangels belongs, according to all the manners, the governance of those things that are conducive to the multitude and belong to each one. Therefore they are said to execute certain things by themselves concerning human affairs, namely great things, but they direct the lower angels in certain things, as their princes and leaders. Therefore they are placed in the middle between the Principalities and the Angels. — In those things that are said of the last order of the Angels, it is evident that there is no difference.

The remaining matters that belong to this subject are treated at length in the places cited above.