Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

After St. Thomas has shown that God executes the order of his providence through secondary causes, he wishes to show in particular the very order of the divine execution ¹. Now, concerning this he does three things: first, he shows that other things are governed by God through intellectual substances; second, how intellectual substances are governed by him, in the following chapter; third, that lower bodies are governed by higher ones, in chapter 82.

I. Regarding the first, he sets down this conclusion: ² The order of divine providence requires that other creatures be governed by rational, that is, intellectual, creatures. It is proved first. It belongs to divine providence that order be preserved in things. Therefore, that it reach all the way down to the lowest things according to a certain proportion. Therefore, that other creatures be governed through rational creatures. — The first consequence is proved. Because it is a fitting order that there be a proportional descent from the highest to the lowest things. — But the second is proved. Because this proportion is such that, just as the highest creatures are under God and governed by him, so the lower creatures are under the higher and governed by them. But among all creatures, intellectual ones are the highest.

Second. Whatever creature executes the order of divine providence has this inasmuch as it participates something of the power of the one providing for it ³. This is clarified by the example of an instrument. Therefore, those that participate more of the power of divine providence are executive of it toward those that participate less. Intellectual creatures participate more of it: since they participate both the cognitive power, namely, the intellectual power, and the operative power, which are required for providence; whereas the remaining creatures participate only the operative power. Therefore, etc.

Third. To whomever any power is given by God, it is given to him in ordination to the effect of that power. But the intellective power is of itself ordinative and regulative. Therefore, etc. — The major is proved. Because in this way all things are most well disposed. — But the minor is clarified. Because when they are joined in the same subject, the operative power follows the rule of the intellective power: just as in man the members are moved by the command of the will. If they also exist in different subjects, the same thing appears: for those who excel in operative power must be directed by those who excel in intellective power; namely, according to a due and fitting order. Sometimes, however, we see the opposite: but even then those who seem to rule others are in truth ruled by those who surpass in intellect, and from whom they take counsel, rather than they themselves ruling the wise.

II. Fourth. The intellective power is more universal than every other operative power. Therefore, etc. — The antecedent is proved. Because the intellective power contains universal forms: but every operative power is only from some proper form of the operator. — But the consequence is proved. Because particular powers are naturally suited to be moved by universal powers: as is clear both in art and in nature.

Note that this difference between the intellective power and the operative power is to be understood in such a way that the operative power is determinate and limited, inasmuch as it follows one determinate and singular form: and on this account St. Thomas says that it is only from some proper form of the operator. But the intellective power apprehends universal forms not limited by matter: and therefore it can extend to more things, inasmuch as a universal form can be determined and limited in many ways. Now this belongs to the intellective power because an intellectual substance is not limited by matter, as a bodily form is, but is absolute from matter.

Fifth. Only intellectual creatures can know the reasons for the order of created things. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is proved. Because in all ordered potencies that one is directive of the other which knows more the reason, namely, on account of which it must act in this way. This is clarified in the order of agents acting through art.

Sixth. Only intellectual creatures act through themselves, as being masters of their operations through free choice: but other creatures act from the necessity of nature, as being moved by another. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is proved. Because that which is per se is the cause of that which is through another.