Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

After St. Thomas determined concerning divine providence and governance with respect to the ordering of things itself, he determines concerning it with respect to the execution of the order ¹. Concerning this, moreover, he does three things: first, he treats of the execution of divine providence in general; second, in particular, in the following chapter; third, he makes an epilogue of what has been said, in chapter 83.

I. With respect to the first, he posits this conclusion: Secondary causes are the executors of divine providence.

For the evidence of which, it must be considered that, since the execution of divine providence signifies nothing other than the operation of the pre-conceived order, it is the same to say that secondary causes are the executors of divine providence; and that God does not cause the order devised in things through Himself immediately, by an intermediation of the supposit, but through secondary causes mediating, so that secondary causes are the instruments and ministers of God who causes the order of creatures.

The conclusion is proved, therefore, first thus. In God there is found the highest perfection with respect to ordering and with respect to execution, both of which pertain to providence. Therefore, through Himself and through His wisdom, He disposes the order of all things, even the least; but He executes the least through other, inferior powers, through which He works ². Therefore, etc. — The antecedent is proved. Because ordering takes place through the cognitive power, for it belongs to the wise to order; but execution takes place through the operative power. But in God there is the most perfect wisdom for ordering, and the most perfect power for working. — But the consequence is proved. Because an ordering is so much more perfect, the more it descends to the least things; but the execution of the least things is befitting an inferior power, proportioned to the effect.

2. Note, when it is said that through Himself and through His wisdom God disposes the order even of the least things, that the phrase through Himself and His wisdom excludes a medium through which He disposes the order of things. For someone is said to dispose the order of certain things through another with respect to the ordering itself existing in the mind, when he himself does not devise their order in particular, but another disposes it in his mind at his command. But when he himself devises such an order within himself through his own wisdom, he is said through himself to establish and dispose such an order, and not through that medium; for the form which the intellect conceives in itself comes to be in the intellect not by another supposit mediating, but immediately. Whence, since God in His own mind devises the order of all things whatsoever, even the least, He is said through Himself and through His wisdom, that is, immediately, to dispose the order of all things, not merely without an intermediation of power, as some judge, but also without an intermediation of the supposit.

Nor does it stand in the way that human reason seems to mediate between God and the human acts ordered by Him. For it is said that, although human reason also orders human acts in itself, yet human reason is not the medium by which God disposes those acts in His own mind; just as it is also not the medium through which the divine intellection is terminated to them. But it is indeed the medium by which God causes the ordering of those acts in the human mind itself, prior to whose causation is presupposed the order disposed in the divine mind, as the rule and exemplar of that human ordering; just as every inferior cause is the medium by which God causes the effect of that inferior cause, yet it is not the medium by which God practically understands that effect; rather, that practical cognition is presupposed to the production of the effect.

II. Second. Those things that arise from the actions of secondary causes are subject to divine providence. Therefore, etc. — The antecedent is proved. Because God orders all singulars through Himself, namely in His own mind.

Third. The stronger the power of an agent is, the more it extends its operation to remote things: as is evident in fire. But the power of divine providence is greatest. Therefore it extends its operation to the most remote things. Therefore it ought to produce its operation to the last things through intermediate things. — The ultimate consequence is proved. Because it does not happen in an agent that does not act through a medium that it extends its operation to the most remote things: since whatever it acts upon is proximate to it.

III. Concerning this reason there is a doubt. For it seems false that the divine power extends to the most remote things, in which the whole force of the reason consists. For St. Thomas proves above ³ that God is everywhere, because in every thing there is some proximate and immediate effect of God Himself. Therefore nothing is remote from Him.

Second, the doubt is increased. Because in the First Part, q. 8, a. 1 ⁴, where he asks whether God is in all things, he resolves this reason. For when he had argued thus: The more powerful an agent is, to the more distant does its action proceed; God is the most powerful agent; therefore His action can reach even to those things that are distant from Him, nor is it necessary that He be in all things: — he answers that it pertains to His greatest power that He acts immediately in all things, and therefore nothing is distant from Him.

IV. For the evidence of this, two things must be considered. The first is that in many ways one thing can be distant from another. In one way, according to local distance: as two bodies between which another body mediates. — In another way, according to distance of nature and perfection: as a man and a plant, between which mediate many natures of animals more imperfect than man and more perfect than a plant. — Third, according to the distance of agent and patient inasmuch as they are such: as between the heaven and the earth, on which the heaven acts, mediate other elements, on which the heaven acts prior to the earth, and which are acted upon by the heaven prior to the earth.

Therefore that proposition, The stronger the power of an agent is, the more it extends its operation to remote things, is formally understood of the distance of the patient to the agent inasmuch as they are such: because the more powerful an agent is, on the more things it can act, of which one acts on another and one is acted upon by another, and so much the more do many patients and agents mediate between it and the ultimate patient. But according to the diverse condition of agents and patients, another distance is joined to this distance; but that is accidental to the agent and patient inasmuch as they are such. For if the agent and patient are bodies, to the distance of the agent and patient inasmuch as they are agent and patient, local distance is joined: because diverse bodies have diverse locations. But if they are incorporeal things, distance of natures is joined.

In the matter at hand, when God is said to act on the most remote things, it cannot be understood according to local distance: since God is contained by no location, but is everywhere present. — Neither can it be understood according to distance of nature alone: because it would not be to the purpose. For it would stand together that God should act on those things which are most distant from Him according to the perfection of nature, and yet that He should not act on them by other causes mediating, but through Himself alone; and thus it would not follow that secondary causes were executors of divine providence. — It remains, therefore, that it is understood according to distance in the character of agent and patient. For God acts on the most remote patient, inasmuch as through many mediating agents and patients He extends His operation to a certain patient.

2. The second is that we can speak of the effect of God in two ways: in one way, with respect to all things that are in it; in another way, with respect to some things. If we speak with respect to all things that are in the effect, thus it is not true that God acts on the distant in the character of patient: because in every effect there is something that is produced by God alone; for those things that are produced through creation are produced by God alone immediately, as the substances of immaterial things, and prime matter in corporeal things, as was evident in the second book ⁵. And thus between God and His effect, with respect to these things, other agents and patients do not mediate, so that He could be said to act on the distant in the character of patient. — But if it is understood with respect to some thing, thus it is true that He acts on something as on the distant: because, namely, in something there is something that God works by secondary causes mediating, for instance an operation, or some supervening good. — Similarly, that proposition, The stronger the power of an agent is, to the more remote does it extend its operation, if it ought to be universally true, is understood with respect to something found in the effect, but not with respect to all things.

3. But it must be observed that St. Thomas does not conclude absolutely in this reason that God extends His operation through some media, but that He ought to extend it. Because it is not necessary that God work through intermediate agent causes; rather, He can produce every effect through Himself. But from the fact that in created things we see a more powerful cause extend its operation through more media to the ultimate, he wished to conclude that it is befitting and fitting that God, whose power is most perfect, should work through some media. For this is what the phrase ought to produce ⁶ signifies.

4. To the first in the contrary, therefore, ⁷ it is said that indeed nothing is remote from God in the character of patient with respect to all things that are in it: because in all created things there is something produced by God alone through creation. There are, however, some things remote and distant from Him with respect to some things that are produced in them.

Similarly it is said to the second. For St. Thomas intends nothing other than that in all beings there is something immediately caused by God, and thus nothing is distant from God with respect to all things, as if they did not have God in themselves as the immediate agent of something existing in it. But to this it is not repugnant that something be distant from God in the character of patient with respect to something caused in it by God.

V. Fourth. It belongs to the dignity of a ruler that he have many ministers and executors of his rule: because through this his dominion is more manifested. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is proved. Because no dignity of any ruler is comparable to the dignity of the divine rule.

Fifth. The perfection of divine providence requires that it reduce the excess of certain things over others to a suitable order. But this comes to be when from the superabundance ⁸ of some having more, some good arises for those having less. Therefore the perfection of divine providence demands that through those things that participate more fully in the divine goodness, which are required for the perfection of the universe, the execution of the divine rule be completed. — The antecedent is proved. Because the suitability of order demonstrates the perfection of providence. But it belongs to the suitability of order that nothing be left unordered.

Sixth. If there were not some intermediate causes executing divine providence, there would not be an order of causes in things, but of effects only. This is unfitting. Therefore, etc. — The second part of the antecedent is proved. Because, since the order of causes is more noble than that of effects, just as the cause is superior to the effect, in it the perfection of providence is more demonstrated.

It is confirmed by the authority of Psalm 102 and 147.