Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

Since it has been shown that divine providence extends even to corruptible singulars, it remains to be shown that it is of these singulars immediately¹. Concerning this, however, St. Thomas does two things: first, he recounts the opinion of Plato; second, he shows in what respect it departs from the truth of the Catholic faith².

I. As to the first point, Plato, as Gregory of Nyssa relates, posited a threefold providence. The first is that of the supreme God: which is primarily and principally of spiritual and intellectual beings; but secondarily of the whole world as to genera and species and the celestial bodies. — The second is that of the gods who circle the heavens: which extends to the singulars of generable and corruptible things, as to their generation and corruption and other changes; whose quality, however,³ Aristotle, in II De Generatione, text 58,⁴ ascribes to the oblique circle. — The third indeed is that of certain demons existing around the earth: which is of things pertaining to human life. — He said, however, that the second and third providence depend on the first.

II. As to the second point, St. Thomas says that this opinion agrees with the Catholic faith in this respect, that it reduces the providence of all things to God as to the first actor; but it seems to conflict with it in this respect, that it says not all particulars are immediately subject to divine providence. Therefore, it is argued against it as follows.

First. God immediately has knowledge of singulars in themselves, as was shown in the first book. Therefore, He immediately establishes their order. — The consequence is proved. Because, since the will of God is the principle of all goodness, it seems unfitting that, knowing singulars, He would not will their order, in which the chief good of things consists.

For the clarification of this reason, and also of the conclusion, it must first be considered that, since two things belong to providence, namely the devising of the order of the provided things to their ends, and the execution of the devised order; just as God is said to provide for things immediately as to execution, if through Himself alone, with no intermediate cause intervening, He brought things to their ends; so He is said to provide immediately as to the devising of the order, because He Himself in His own mind devises how each singular ought to attain its end, and what impediments are to be removed, and what aids are to be afforded, and wills each thing to be disposed to its proper end so that it can arrive at it in its own manner, namely contingently or necessarily; but He does not impose upon another to devise the order of those singulars, while He Himself does not devise such an order, as a king imposes upon the prefect of a city to devise the order suitable for the city; which would be to provide mediately. Hence, for God to have providence over all things immediately in this manner is nothing other than for the immanent act of the divine intellect devising the order in things not only to be terminated per se to the order of genera and species, but also to extend to the order of each singular: although He executes that devised order by means of secondary causes, as will be shown in what follows;⁵ just as if we were to say that the king by himself devises every order suitable for the city and wills it to be observed, and he himself imposes upon his ministers to observe that order.

It must be considered secondly that, although providence essentially belongs to the intellect, since it is the plan of things that are ordered to an end insofar as they are such; yet because it is practical knowledge, which is ordered to work through the will, it also includes the will of the end, and the will of ordering things to the end. Therefore, St. Thomas, wishing to show that God, who knows singulars, also has providence over them, names the will, from which providence has its completion, when he says that it is unfitting for God, knowing singulars, not to will their order.

III. Second. It is presupposed that the order which is established through providence in governed things proceeds from that order which the provider has disposed in his mind,⁶ as is evident from artificial things. Then as follows. Where there are many providers one under another, the superior must hand down the contained order⁷ to the inferior: just as an inferior art receives principles from a superior. Therefore, if second and third providers are placed under the first, who is the supreme God, as Plato indeed willed, they must receive the order to be established in things from the supreme God. Therefore, the order of singulars is under the disposition of divine providence.

The last consequence is proved. Because the order of things must be in the secondary providers not only in universal, but also as to singulars: otherwise they could not establish order in singulars by their providence. But it is not possible that this order be in them more perfectly than in the supreme God: since all perfections proceed from Him into other things by way of descent. Therefore, etc.

2. To this reason someone could say that the inferior provider receives from the superior the order to be established in things in universal, but not in particular: just as also an inferior science receives its principles from a superior, but not the conclusions which are deduced from those principles. Just as we would also say that the prefect of a city receives from the king the order to be imposed in the city, not in particular, but only in universal, inasmuch as it is committed to him by the king to impose order on the city.

But if the process of this reason is well considered, it is clear that this reply does not invalidate it. For since, as was presupposed, the order to be established in things is first in the mind of the provider, where there are many subordinated providers, there must be in the mind of each one the plan of the order to be established, and one receives the knowledge and the devising of that order from the superior. If to this it is added that this order cannot have been devised by the supreme provider, who is the supreme God, in a more imperfect manner than by the inferior providers, it follows very well, since the other providers consider that order in particular, that it is devised by God not only in universal, which is to be devised in a more imperfect manner, but also in particular: for the knowledge of a thing in universal only is knowledge of it solely in potency.

When, however, the example is first given concerning a superior science, from which an inferior science receives principles only, but not conclusions: — it is said that this is because the superior science is not a perfect knowledge of the conclusions of the inferior science, although in itself it is a more perfect science. If, however, someone were to know the conclusions perfectly, he would hand them down to the inferior in particular, and not only in universal principles: as happens with a teacher with respect to a disciple; for he hands down to him the knowledge of those conclusions in particular which he himself knew first, and afterwards hands down to the disciple.

Similarly, the example adduced concerning the king does not stand in the way. Because in that case the king does not perfectly have the order of things in his mind, but in a more imperfect manner than the prefect, who devises the order of the city in particular, and not only in universal, as the king does: as is clear in the following reason.

IV. Third. That a superior provider should devise by himself how certain great universals are to be ordered, but leave the order of lesser things⁸ to be devised by other inferiors, proceeds either because he is ignorant of the conditions of lesser singulars; or because he is not sufficient for devising the order of all things, on account of the labor and the length of time that would be required. But defects of this kind are far from God: since He knows all singulars; nor does He labor in understanding, or require time; for by understanding Himself, He knows other things. Therefore, etc. – This reason is a confirmation of the preceding one.

V. Fourth. All wisdom and intellect is caused by the supreme God in all intellects;⁹ nor can any intellect understand anything except by divine power, as is clear in other agents. Therefore, etc. – The consequence is proved from human affairs. In which we see that a superior does not devise the order of those things which are committed to the care of inferiors, because he does not give to the inferiors the industry by which they devise the order of those things. If, however, he gave that, the ordering would already be made through him, while the inferiors would be executors only.

Note that this reason is founded on this, that God operates toward the actions of all things, as was shown above, not only by giving to agents the powers through which they operate, but also by giving the use of those powers, that is, by applying them to operations: on account of which He is said to operate immediately toward every effect by the mediation of power. For from this it follows that He concurs toward every intellection and devising of order as an immediate agent, and thus such an ordering is made through Him.

2. But then a doubt occurs. For according to this sense, the reason does not seem to be to the point. For here St. Thomas intends to show that God devises the order of all things in Himself: but this reason concludes that He causes the devising in others.

To this, reply can be made in two ways. First, that although the principal intent is to show that God by Himself devises the order of all things in His mind, yet, because he argues against the position of Plato, who posited that He does not immediately order anything concerning singulars, he wished secondarily to show that He immediately orders the things that belong to singulars, inasmuch as He immediately causes in whichever ordering agent that devising of the order which he conceives in his mind.

Secondly, it can be replied that St. Thomas presupposes that God acts through intellect and will, as he showed in what precedes.¹⁰ From this, however, it follows, if He causes the order of singulars in the mind of inferior providers, that He Himself first conceives that order in His own mind.

VI. Fifth. A superior providence gives rules to an inferior providence: as is clear in the statesman, who gives rules to the general of an army, and he to the centurions and tribunes. Therefore, if under the providence of the supreme God there are other providences, He gives to the other providers the rules of their governance. Therefore, He gives either universal rules only, or particular ones. If universal only, it follows that the other providers would have judgment over the received rules, as to when it is fitting to act according to them, and when it would be fitting to bypass them: because universal rules cannot always be applied to particulars, especially in changeable things; and therefore it is necessary at times to order something concerning things outside of them. But this cannot be: because this judgment belongs to the superior, since it belongs to him to interpret laws and to dispense in them whose it is to establish them. – If, however, He gives particular rules, it is clear that the ordering of these particulars will be immediately through divine providence.

Note, concerning that proposition, It belongs to the superior to interpret his laws and to dispense in them, from the teaching of St. Thomas, I-II, q. 96, a. 6; and IV Sent., d. 15, q. 3,¹¹ that this is understood as a rule: and in this sense it serves the purpose. In a sudden case, however, not enduring so much delay that recourse could be had to the superior, even an inferior can interpret the superior's law: because then necessity has a dispensation annexed.

VII. Sixth. The superior provider always has judgment concerning the things that are ordered by inferior providers: whether they are well ordered or not. Therefore, God also has judgment concerning the things that are ordered by inferiors. Therefore, He considers the order of singulars. Therefore, etc.

Note that, since it is universally true that a superior provider has judgment concerning the things that are ordered by inferiors, this happens differently in human beings and in God. For in human beings this happens, that the superior considers the order of things later than the inferiors: because the inferiors first establish some order, and then the established order is brought to the judgment of the superior. In God, however, it is not so, because He does not receive knowledge from another, but rather is the cause of all knowledge: but He considers the order of all things per se, and from His own order established in His mind He judges concerning the orderings of inferiors.

VIII. Seventh. If God does not care for inferior things, this is either because He despises them, or lest His dignity be stained, as some say. Not on account of the first: because it is more dignified to devise the ordering of things providently than to operate in them; and yet God operates in singulars. Nor on account of the second: because through this nothing is detracted from His dignity; on the contrary, it belongs to His universal and supreme power.

Eighth. Divine power in operating reaches even to the lowest of things. Therefore, divine wisdom is ordaining of what, and how many, and how effects proceed from His power, even in the lowest things. Therefore, etc. – The first consequence is proved. Because every wise person who providently uses his power in acting moderates the use of his power, ordering to what and how much it should proceed: otherwise power in acting would not follow wisdom.

The conclusion is confirmed by the authority of Rom. 13 and Judith 9.