Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

After St. Thomas showed in general that divine providence extends to the being of all things and to the operations of all things, he wishes to demonstrate in particular that it also extends to contingent singulars ¹. Regarding this, however, he does two things: first, he shows that these singulars fall under divine providence; second, that they do so immediately, in the following chapter.

I. As to the first, he sets down this conclusion: Divine providence reaches even to the singulars of generable and corruptible things.

It is proved first. Neither contingency, nor chance and fortune, nor the voluntary is repugnant to providence, as has been shown. Therefore nothing prevents there being providence of these things, just as of incorruptible and universal things. — The consequence is proved. Because there does not seem to be a lack of providence over these things except on account of some one of those factors, in which alone corruptible things differ from incorruptible things and from the universals of corruptibles, concerning which they say there is providence: — namely, those who deny that there is providence over these singulars.

Secondly. God has knowledge of these things, as was shown above. — Nor is it the case that he cannot have care of them: since his power is infinite. — Nor is it the case that these singulars are not capable of governance: since we see that they are governed both by the industry of reason, as men are; and through natural industry, as bees and brute animals are. — Nor is it the case that God does not will to govern them: since his will is universally of every good; but the good of those things that are governed consists especially in the order of governance. — Therefore etc.

The consequence is proved. Because, if God did not have providence over these things, it would be on account of one of the aforesaid reasons.

Thirdly. Secondary causes, in that they are causes, attain a divine likeness. But they themselves have care of those things that they produce: as is evident in animals. Therefore God does as well. But God is the cause of all these particular things. Therefore etc.

Fourthly. God does not act in created things from necessity of nature, but through will and intellect. Therefore all things that are done by him are subject to his providence. Therefore also these singulars, and motions and operations. — The first consequence is proved. Because those things that are done through will and intellect are subject to the care of a provider, which seems to consist in this, that certain things are dispensed through the intellect. — But the second is proved. Because God works in all secondary causes, and all effects are reduced to him as to a cause.

II. Fifthly. If God cares for universals only, it follows that his providence is foolish and imperfect. Because the providence of someone who does not care for the things without which the things of which he has care cannot exist is foolish. But it is clear that, if all particulars were to fail, their universals could not remain.

If it should be said that God has care of these singulars up to the point that they are preserved in being, but not as to other things: — it is argued to the contrary. Because all other things that happen concerning singulars are ordered to their preservation or corruption. Therefore, if God cares for their preservation, he also has care of all things contingent concerning them.

If it should be said that the care of universals alone suffices for the preservation of particulars in being, because to each species are provided those things through which an individual of that species can be preserved in being, as is evident in animals; and the utilities of these things do not fail except in the lesser part; and thus not all individuals can fail, although some individual can fail: — according to this reasoning, all things that happen concerning individuals will be subject to providence: because nothing can happen to the singulars of any species that is not reduced in some way to the principles of that species; either, namely, as preservative of some one of them, or as corruptive. Therefore etc.

III. Sixthly. To providence belongs both the end and the things that are for the end. Therefore both universals and singulars.

The antecedent is proved. Because providence is the ordering of certain things to an end.

And the consequence is proved. Because particulars are on account of the universal nature. Which is indeed shown by reason: because in the comparison of things to an end, such an order appears that accidents are on account of substance, namely that it may be perfected through them; but matter is on account of form, since through this it participates in the divine goodness, on account of which all things were made. — Moreover, it is shown by a sign: because in those things in which the universal nature can be preserved through one individual, there are not many individuals of one species; as is evident in the moon and the sun.

Note that from the fact that accidents are on account of substance as perfective of the nature, and matter is on account of form, he deduces as manifest that singulars are on account of the universal nature. Because the principle of singularity is matter limited by individual accidents, which is called designated matter. For from this the proposition follows exceedingly well. For if the individual does not have its individuation, by which it is distinguished from the universal nature, except from matter and accidents; if the accidents themselves are ordered to the nature of substance, and matter to form, from which the notion of the species is taken, it follows manifestly that singulars themselves are ordered to the species.

IV. Seventhly. Providence belongs to practical cognition: since it is the ordering of things to an end. Therefore God's providence would be imperfect if it did not reach to particulars. — The consequence is proved. Because speculative cognition, and the things that belong to it, are perfected in the universal, since its end is truth, which consists primarily and per se in immaterial things and in universals: but the things that belong to practical cognition are perfected in the particular, since its end is operation, which is concerning singulars. It is explained by the example of the physician.

Note, when it is said that the things that belong to practical cognition are perfected in the particular, whereas the things that belong to speculative cognition are perfected in the universal, that by the things that belong to these sciences St. Thomas does not understand the objects about which they are engaged, but the things that hold themselves on the part of the very act of knowing. For the practical cognition itself of the principal object will be perfect if it is known in particular, and according to the particular conditions by which it is operable. Similarly, for a perfect practical argumentation it is required that it proceed from some particular principle, and that it terminate in a particular conclusion. And universally speaking, the perfection of practical cognition of the principal object demands that all things whose cognition is required for its cognition be considered particularly, and not only according to universal notions. And this is for all things required for practical cognition to be perfected in the particular. — Similarly, all things required for speculative cognition are said to be perfected in the universal, insofar as the intellective cognition of all things that are demanded for the cognition of the principal object ought to be engaged about universal notions. And similarly, every argumentation serving such cognition ought to proceed from universals.

V. Eighthly. Speculative cognition is perfected more in the universal than in the particular, since universals are known more than particulars: on account of which the cognition of the most universal principles is common ². But he is more perfect in speculative science who has not only universal, but proper cognition of things. Therefore much more in practical science is he more perfect who disposes things to act not only in the universal, but also in the particular. Therefore divine providence, which is most perfect, extends all the way to singulars. — The minor is proved. Because he who knows in the universal knows the thing, namely that which is contained under it, only in potency. It is explained through a sign by the example of the master.

It must be noted that the foundation of this reasoning is that, if speculative cognition, whose role is merely to speculate on universals, is more perfect concerning some thing when not only the notions common to it and to others are known of it, but also its own proper notion is known, by which it is distinguished from others; much more will practical cognition, whose role is to dispose something for this, that it be in act—which belongs primarily to singular things—be more perfect if it disposes things not only in the universal, but also in the particular for this, that they be in act.

2. Concerning that proposition, Speculative cognition is perfected more in the universal than in the particular, it must be considered that, since the perfection of cognition on the part of the knower consists in two things, namely in certitude and evidence, nothing else is given to be understood through the above-stated proposition than that the speculative cognition of a universal object is more certain and more evident to the intellect than that of a singular thing, because universals themselves are known more certainly and more evidently by such speculative cognition, by which namely the truth of the thing is apprehended, than material particulars, which are mutable and variable.

And to this sense proceeds the sign adduced, namely that the cognition of the most universal principles is common. For the cognition that is common to all is most certain and most evident, as that which arises from the natural light itself of the intellect alone, which is common to all. For this is a sign that the speculative cognition of universals is more perfect than that of singulars; and that universals are known more than particulars, that is, more certainly and more evidently.

So that it may be argued thus from a sign. The more certain principles recede from particularity, the more perfect is the cognition of them, as both more evident and more certain: if, namely, they are taken formally according to themselves, and as to their simple truth. Therefore singulars are known less than universals. — The consequence is clear. Because when something is such through recession and distance from something, it is a sign that that thing either is not such, or that it is less such than the things that are distant from it: just as, because something is so much the more intelligible the more it recedes from matter, therefore we say that matter is least intelligible, and less so than the things that are separated from matter. — But the antecedent is proved. The cognition of the most universal principles is most perfect. Therefore etc. The antecedent is proved. The cognition that is in all is most perfect and most certain and most evident, as arising from the common intellectual light itself, which is the fountain and origin of all cognition. But the cognition of the most universal principles is common to all. Therefore etc.

3. Concerning that proposition, He who knows a thing in the universal only, knows it only in potency, it must be noted that, just as it is not unfitting for something to be one thing in act and another in potency, as water is in act moist and in potency hot; so it is not unfitting for something to be known in act according to itself, and yet another thing to be known potentially in it, insofar as through it the intellect can come into knowledge of another unknown thing, or insofar as another thing is potentially contained in the thing known. Therefore, because in a more universal nature less universal things are potentially contained, as in a genus its species are potentially contained, and in principles conclusions are potentially contained; therefore, if the cognition of the more universal is considered insofar as it is the cognition of such a nature absolutely, thus it is the actual cognition of it; but if it is considered insofar as it is the cognition of the things that are potentially contained in it, thus it is potential cognition. For this reason St. Thomas did not say that he who knows the universal knows it in potency: but that he who knows a thing in the universal, that is, he who knows some thing by knowing only the universal in which it is potentially contained, knows the thing itself only in potency. On account of this he adduces the sign concerning the disciple, who, though he has cognition of universal principles, nevertheless needs a master reducing him into the act of the cognition of the conclusions, which he knew only potentially in the universal principles.

VI. Ninthly. Whatever is in any way falls under God's providence. Singulars are beings: and more so than universals, which do not subsist per se alone, but are in singulars. Therefore there is providence of them. — The major is proved. Because, since God is the cause of being inasmuch as it is being, he is also its provider: since he provides for things inasmuch as he is their cause.

2. Concerning the proof of the major, note that, just as a cognitive potency that bears upon some object inasmuch as it is such bears upon everything in which that object is found; for sight, because it bears upon color inasmuch as it is color, bears upon everything colored: so an active cause that has for its object something inasmuch as it is such is the cause of all things in which that is found inasmuch as it is of this kind. Therefore, since God is the cause of being inasmuch as it is being, he will be the cause of every being in whatever way it is a being, or in whatever way it has being. And the same must be said of the provider: because the provider of being inasmuch as it is being is the provider of all things that in any way have being. And from this foundation the reasoning proceeds.

3. Concerning that proposition, Singulars are more beings than universals, it must be observed that something can be said to be more a being than another in two ways. In one way, because it is of a more perfect nature and a more perfect essence. And in this way it is not understood here. For singulars do not have another essence and another nature than their species have, so that the essence of the singular could be said to be more perfect than the essence of the species: but the essence itself of the species is also the essence of the individual, limited in it by determinate accidents. Nay rather, if through the intellect the universal nature is separated from the individuating principles, it will be found more perfect: as more actual and more remote from the potentiality of matter. — In another way, because it exists more, and to it priorly belongs the act of actual existence as to that which is, rather than to the other. And in this way it is understood here. Which is clear from the reason that St. Thomas assigns: because, namely, universals do not subsist per se, that is, they do not have being separated from singulars, but are only in singulars. For from this it is given to be understood that singulars are said to be more beings because through themselves they have being, and not in another, to which being belongs priorly.

VII. Tenthly. Contingent singulars participate in the divine goodness. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. Because, since creatures are subject to divine providence insofar as they are ordered by him to the ultimate end, which is his goodness, the participation in the divine goodness by created things is through divine providence.

The conclusion is confirmed by the authority of Matt. 10 ³; Wis. 8; and also because in Ezek. 9 and Job 22 the opinion of those saying that God does not consider our affairs is rebuked.

VIII. Through this is excluded the opinion of certain ones saying that divine providence does not extend to these singulars. Which opinion certain ones impute to Aristotle, although it cannot be had from his words.

Note that the opinion that is touched upon here is that of Averroes, XII Metaph., comment 37, and comment 52 ⁴. For he places it in the common nature ⁵; and that, if some things are without care, they arise from the necessity of matter, not from a deficiency of the agent ⁶. And this he seems to want to be the opinion of Aristotle. But, as St. Thomas says, from the words of Aristotle upon which Averroes founds himself, this cannot be had: as is clear to those considering his very words. Nay rather, as St. Thomas shows in De Verit., q. 5, a. 3, from him the opposite is had: in that he posits a twofold order in the universe, namely the order of the parts of the universe among themselves, and the order of the whole universe to God, and that the first order is on account of the second. For from this it is clear, since the corruptible and incorruptible parts of the universe are ordered to one another, and their order is on account of the order of the universe to the first principle, that both corruptible and incorruptible things agree in one order of providence of an exterior principle.

It must be noted further, from the doctrine of St. Thomas in the place cited, that the opinion of Averroes could have truth if it were understood that corruptible individuals are not provided for on account of themselves, but only on account of something else. For those things in which the essential perfection of the universe consists are provided for on account of themselves, as are all incorruptible individuals, and the species of corruptible things: but corruptible individuals are provided for on account of the perpetual being of the species only, and not on account of themselves. For some parts are said to be provided for on account of themselves when they are not principally intended on account of some other part, although from them some utility arises for other parts: but they are said to be provided for on account of something else when they are principally on account of another part. For in this way corruptible individuals are said to be provided for on account of something else, because they are primarily willed on account of this, that the perpetual being of the species may be saved: but the species themselves, and other incorruptible things, are willed on account of themselves, because they are willed principally on account of the universe itself and on account of the divine goodness. For it is not repugnant that they be willed on account of themselves, and that they be willed on account of the perfection of the universe: because in this they constitute the perfection of the universe, insofar as from God they have being and subsist in their natures. In which way St. Thomas says in De Potentia, q. 5, a. 4, that these two are not repugnant: that God wills the universality of creatures on account of itself; and that God wills it on account of himself. Because he wills the universality of creatures on account of his goodness, namely that they may imitate and represent it in their own way: but this they do insofar as from it they have being and subsist in their natures.