Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

After St. Thomas showed that divine providence extends to the esse and to the actions of all things, he now wishes to eliminate certain doubts concerning this common providence over all things ¹. There are, moreover, four doubts, which he eliminates in these four following chapters.

I. The first doubt is: because it seems, since God preserves the esse of all things and applies all things to their proper operations, that He ought to exclude all evil from created things.

To eliminate this, however, the following conclusion is posited: The divine providence that ² governs things does not prevent corruption, defect, and evil from being found in things.

It is proved first. It happens that a defect is found in an effect on account of a defect of the secondary cause, without there being a defect in the first agent: as happens in the effect of a craftsman who possesses the art perfectly, and in the limping of a man who possesses a strong motive power. Therefore, in those things that are done and governed by God, it happens that defect and evil are found on account of a defect of the secondary agents, although in God Himself there is no defect. — The consequence is proved. Because the governance by which God operates in things does not exclude the operation of secondary causes.

Note that, since good, according to the mind of Dionysius ³, consists in an integral cause, while evil arises from individual defects, when several causes concur toward one effect, in order that the effect itself be entirely complete, it is required that all causes be without defect; but in order that there be some defect in it, it suffices that there be a defect in one of those causes. Whence we also see in argumentations and syllogisms that to infer a universal affirmative proposition, both premises are required to be both universal and affirmative; but to conclude a particular or negative one, it suffices that one of them be either particular or negative. For that reason St. Thomas very well says that it happens that defect and evil are in the effect on account of the defect of the secondary cause, given that there is no defect in the first cause.

II. Second. It does not belong to divine providence to exclude entirely from things the potency of falling short of the good. Therefore, neither does it belong to it to exclude evil entirely.

The consequence is proved. Because evil follows upon the potency of falling short: since that which can fall short sometimes falls short; and the very defect of good is evil, as was shown above.

The antecedent is proved. If it excluded such a potency of falling short, the grades of goodness and inequality in things would be removed. Therefore, perfect goodness in created things would be removed. But this is not fitting for providence: since it belongs to the providence of a ruler to preserve perfection in the things governed, not to diminish it. Therefore etc. — The first consequence is proved. Because a higher grade of goodness is that something be a good not capable of falling short of goodness, and a lower grade that it be a good capable of falling short. — The second consequence is proved. Because, if inequality and diversity of grades were removed from things, multiplicity would be removed from things, and there would be only one created good: since, through the differences by which things differ from one another, one exists as better than another. Likewise, the highest beauty would be removed from things. Likewise, not all possible grades of goodness would be filled out. Likewise, no creature would be assimilated to God with respect to this, that it excelled another. All of which the perfection of the universe requires. Therefore etc.

Note, when it is said that not all possible grades of goodness would be filled out, as though St. Thomas meant to say that in the universe there ought to be all possible grades of goodness, that this can have truth in a threefold way, as can be clear from the preceding ⁴. In one way, so that it is understood of the universal grades by which being is primarily divided, such as are necessary and contingent: but not of the specific grades of goodness. — In another way, so that it is understood of the grades per se regarding the perfection of this universe: but not of all grades of beings absolutely possible to be produced by God. — In a third way, so that it is understood of the grades possible to be produced by God, on the supposition of the determination of divine wisdom: for all those that have been determined by divine wisdom to be, ought to be in the universe.

III. Third. The best thing in any governance is that the governed be provided for according to their own mode: because the justice of rule consists in this. Therefore, it would be against the nature of divine rule if He did not allow created things to act according to the mode of their own nature. Therefore etc. — The first consequence is clarified by the proportion to human rule, in which it would be contrary to justice if men were prevented by the governor of a city from acting according to their offices: unless perhaps for a time, on account of some necessity. — The second consequence is proved. Because from the fact that creatures thus act according to the mode of their own nature, corruption and evil in things follow, on account of the contrariety and repugnance existing in things.

Note that St. Thomas added, speaking of human rule, unless perhaps for a time etc., to give to understand that it is not against the nature of divine rule that He sometimes hinder some thing from its natural course: as when He hindered the action of fire upon those youths cast into the furnace of fire, of whom it is related in Dan. III ⁵; and when, in the time of Joshua, He made the sun stand still against the Gibeonites, as is related in Joshua X ⁶; and concerning many other things miraculously done for the manifestation of His power and divinity; or also to demonstrate the holiness of others; or according to some other reason of divine wisdom.

IV. Fourth. It is impossible for an agent to work any evil except because it intends some good, as is apparent from the preceding. — But to prohibit universally the intention of any good whatsoever from created things does not belong to the providence of Him who is the cause of all good. Therefore etc. — The minor is proved. Because then many goods would be withdrawn from the universality of things: just as, if the intention of generating its like, upon which follows the corruption of combustible things, were withdrawn from fire, the generation of fire and its preservation according to species would be removed.

To this reason someone might perhaps say that, although it does not belong to divine providence to prohibit the intention of the good, it nevertheless belongs to it to prohibit the evil that is conjoined to the intended good. — But this response is nothing. Because there is some evil inseparably conjoined to a determinate good: just as the corruption of something is necessarily conjoined to the generation of fire, since the form of fire cannot be introduced into matter except through the casting off of the preexisting form. Therefore, it cannot be permitted that the intention of fire concerning generating its like be fulfilled, unless the corruption of that substance from which fire is generated is also permitted.

V. Fifth. If evil were entirely excluded from things by divine providence, the multitude of goods would also have to be diminished: for example, the patience of the just, vindictive justice, generation. But this ought not to be: because the good is more efficacious in goodness than evil in malice, as is clear from the preceding. Therefore etc.

Concerning this last statement it must be noted, as we held above in chapter IX, that no evil is so outstanding that it excludes all good: because every evil must be grounded in the good, and of itself it is powerless and weak, as Dionysius says in chapter IV of On the Divine Names ⁷, and it does not fight against the good except by the power of the good ⁸. For that reason St. Thomas said that the good is more efficacious in goodness than evil in malice: namely, because the good cannot be totally excluded by evil, nor can evil act except by reason of the good; but the good acts by its own power. St. Thomas thus explains it in III Sent., d. XXVII ⁹, a. 3, ad 3.

VI. But two doubts arise. The first is: although evil is grounded in the good, there is nevertheless some evil that seems to be more outstanding in malice than the good that follows upon it is in goodness: just as mortal sin seems to exceed any created good and to outweigh it, since it is against the infinite good; for example, the persecution of the just outweighs the patience of the just. Therefore, it seems to belong more to divine providence to exclude certain particular goods, by not permitting the evils upon which those goods follow, than to permit those evils in order that some goods may come forth from them.

The second is concerning what is said, There would be no place for vindictive justice ¹⁰ if offenses did not exist: from which St. Thomas intends to hold that God permits offenses in order that this good, which is vindictive justice, may be. For from this it seems to follow that God takes delight in punishments, which is a mark of cruelty: for to permit someone to sin in order that an occasion for punishing may be had belongs only to one who takes delight in punishments.

2. To the first of these, it is said that we can speak in a twofold way concerning the good consequent upon evil: in one way, secundum se; in another way, as it belongs to the perfection of the universe, as a constitutive part of it. If the good that follows from evil is considered secundum se absolutely, thus it is not unfitting that it be less good than the removal of the evil, and consequently less to be desired: just as the generation of water from fire is absolutely a lesser good than the removal of the corruption of fire that accompanies the generation of water, because fire is a greater good than water. But if it is considered as it is constitutive of the integrity and perfection of the universe, thus whatever good secundum se is occasioned by some evil is better than the removal of that evil: because from such a good the universe is, extensively at least, more perfect, inasmuch as some grade of goodness is in the universe that would not be if that evil were entirely prohibited, and thus the universe has its integrity and its completion. Whence it must be said, even granting that the evil of fault has more malice than the good coming forth from it, considered secundum se, has goodness, if it is nevertheless considered as it is ordered to the perfection and integrity of the universe, the good of which is the highest among created goods and principally intended by divine providence, it thus has more goodness than fault has malice, if fault is taken formally, namely, as it imports an act deprived of due order. Therefore, it belongs to divine providence rather to permit the evil of fault, from which some grade of goodness results in the universe, than to prohibit evil, from whose prohibition the privation of some grade of perfection in the universe and the diminution of its integrity would follow.

But because St. Thomas seems to mean that the good is not only in relation to the perfection of the universe more outstanding in goodness than evil in malice, but also in some way considered secundum se, since he says absolutely that the good is more efficacious in goodness than evil in malice; therefore it is said secondly that, even granting this (which is perhaps not true), St. Thomas's statement is understood of a good eligible for its own sake. For such a good is said to be more efficacious in goodness than evil in malice because a good of this kind is more suited by nature to draw the appetite entirely to itself by its goodness than evil is suited by nature to repel the appetite entirely by its malice, or to bring about flight from itself. The reason for this is that the good eligible secundum se has nothing whence it is to be fled from: since it has no aspect of evil conjoined to it, taking evil properly. But evil itself has in itself something through which it can be chosen in some way: since, as was shown above ¹¹, every evil is grounded in some good. Whence, when it is said that sin has more malice than the good following from it has goodness, it is denied. For although extrinsically and objectively it has a certain infinity, yet intrinsically, as has been said, inasmuch as it denotes an act deprived of due order, it does not have as much malice as the good has goodness.

3. To the second it is said that God is not cruel while He permits offenses in order that this good which is punitive justice may be, nor does He delight in punishments: because He does not do this because He wills the punishment of the offense inasmuch as it is the evil of the sinner; but He permits this because He wills and loves the good of the universe more than the particular good of this individual. For to the good of the universe it is required that there be defectible natures and natures of free choice, from which it follows that they fall short; and God, allowing them to run their courses, also elicits some grade of goodness from which the universe is extensively more perfect.

I say extensively, because St. Thomas in I Sent., d. XLVI, a. 3, ad 6, says that there are certain evils which, if they were not, the universe would be more perfect, as are the evils of fault. But this is understood of the intensive perfection of the universe with respect to the human species. For human nature would be intensively more perfect, namely with respect to accidental perfection, though not with respect to essential perfection, if there were no sin, than if some sins are committed. For speaking also of extensive perfection in the same book, d. XLIV, a. 2, ad 5, he says that a universe in which there were nothing of evil would not be of as great goodness as this universe, because there would not be as many good natures in that one as in this one.

VII. Sixth. If evil were withdrawn from certain parts of the universe, much of the perfection of the universe would be lost. Therefore, it is not to be excluded through providence. — The antecedent is proved. Because the beauty of the universe arises from the ordered union of goods and evils, while evils come forth from deficient goods, and from them certain goods follow: just as the interposition of silence also makes a melody sweet. — The consequence is proved. Because, since the good of the whole excels the good of the part, it belongs to a provident ruler to neglect some defect in the part so that an increase of goodness may be made in the whole. It is clarified by the example of a builder, who hides the foundation under the earth so that the whole house may have stability.

Note that this reason differs from the preceding: because the first proceeded from substantial perfection, which consists in the parts; but this one proceeds from perfection accompanying substance, namely from the beauty and decor of the universe.

VIII. Seventh. Much of the good of man would be diminished, both as to knowledge and as to the desire and love of the good. Therefore etc. — The antecedent is proved. Because the good is more known from the comparison with evil; and while some evils are perpetrated ¹², we desire goods more ardently. It is clarified by the example of health. — The consequence is proved. Because other things, especially lower things, are ordered to the good of man as to an end.

Concerning the proof of the consequence, it must be noted that St. Thomas added especially lower things, because, as he says in II Sent., d. 1, q. 2, a. 3, all creatures indeed were made by God in some way on account of man, inasmuch as from all creatures some utility comes to man; but in a particular way lower creatures are ordered to man as to an end, inasmuch as they tend toward assimilation to him as a superior, according to which through this they are assimilated to the highest goodness. Whence also in II De Anima ¹³ the rational soul is said to be the ultimate end intended by lower nature. — But in this way separated substances are not on account of man: since they are of a nobler and higher nature.

The conclusion is confirmed by the authority of Isaiah XLV, and Amos III.

IX. But against the conclusion proved in this chapter a doubt arises from those things that St. Thomas says in Prima Pars, q. XXII, a. 2. For he says that, since every agent acts for the sake of an end, the ordering of effects to the end extends as far as the causality of the first agent extends. And he seems to mean that, conversely, the causality of the first agent extends as far as the ordering to the end extends, when he adds that from this it happens in the works of any agent that something comes forth not ordered to the end, because that effect follows from some other cause outside the intention of the agent. From this, therefore, it is argued thus. Nothing is ordered by God to an end to which His causality does not extend. But God's causality does not extend to the evil of fault. Therefore, the evil of fault is not ordered by God to any end. Therefore, it does not fall under providence, which is the rationale of the order of things to the end. Therefore, providence excludes at least the evil of fault.

2. For the evidence of this it must be considered, from the doctrine of St. Thomas, De Veritate, q. V, a. 4, that a thing falls under divine providence in a twofold way. In one way, as ordered to another, and as that to which another is ordered: as the act of generation by which a man generates a perfect man is ordered to the nature of man, and to it the power of the generator is ordered. In another way, as that which is ordered to another, but nothing is ordered to it: as the deficient act by which monsters are generated (inasmuch as they are such). With respect to the first, it is called the providence of approbation; with respect to the second, however, it is called the providence of concession and permission; according to Damascene, in the Second Book ¹⁴.

It is said therefore that this proposition, The causality of the first agent extends as far as the ordering of effects to the end extends, has truth concerning the ordering of those things that fall under the providence of approbation: but not concerning the ordering of those that fall under the providence of concession and permission. Now, it is said that evil falls under the providence of concession, not however of approbation, as St. Thomas explains there: for it is ordered by God to some utility, but nothing is ordered to it. Therefore, the argument does not follow.

It could be said secondly that St. Thomas is speaking of the ordering not of just anything, but of effects, as is clear from his words. Now, it is evident that sin, inasmuch as it is such, is not an effect: since it is a negation or privation. Therefore, it is not necessary that divine causality extend to it, although it is ordered.

X. Through this conclusion the error of those denying that God exists because they saw evils happen in the world is excluded, as is found in Boethius, I De Consolatione: whereas it ought rather to be concluded that God exists, because evil is. For evil would not be if the order of the good were withdrawn, which order would not be if God did not exist.

Note that, since the good of the universe consists in the order of its parts to the whole, and in the order of the whole to God, evil cannot be in the universe except through the removal of some order due to be in some part: for evil is the privation of a good due to be in it. But it would not be due to the parts to have such an order unless they had such an order from some ordering and appointing one, whom we call God. Therefore, evil presupposes the order placed in things by God. For this reason St. Thomas very well says that it is rather to be argued that God exists because evil is, than that God does not exist.

The occasion of error is also taken away from those who denied that divine providence extends to these corruptible things, on account of the fact that they saw many evils happen in them. And from the Manichees, who posited two active principles, namely good and evil, as though evil could not have a place under the providence of a good God.

2. Lastly, the doubt of certain persons is solved: namely, whether evil actions are from God? For it is clear from what has been said that according as they are deficient, they are not from God, but from deficient proximate causes. But as to that which they have of action and entity, they are from God. — It is clarified in limping, which as to that which it has of motion is from the motive power; but as to that which it has of defect, it is from the curvature of the leg.

Note that from this response it is had that the effect of a secondary cause is reduced to the first cause as to that which it acts, inasmuch as it is subject to the order of the first cause itself, and inasmuch as it is moved by it. But as to that which comes forth from it not inasmuch as it is subject to the order of the first cause and moved by it, but inasmuch as it falls short of due perfection and order, it does not have to be reduced to the first cause.

XI. But one doubt arises. For a mover moving a secondary cause to an action which defect and evil always and inseparably accompany seems to be the cause not only of the goodness of the action, but also of the accompanying malice: whence, as is held from II Phys. ¹⁵, that which happens for the most part is not said to be outside intention. But there are some human operations that have malice always annexed to them, for instance the hatred of God. Therefore, if God is the cause of the entity of the action, it must be said that He is also the cause of the conjoined malice and deformity. And thus that operation, inasmuch as it is deficient, is not referred only to the deficient proximate cause.

It is answered, from the doctrine of St. Thomas, Malo, q. III, a. 2, that wickedness inseparably accompanying some act can be understood in two ways: in one way, as it accompanies the act considered absolutely according to its entity; in another way, as it accompanies the act according as it proceeds from such an agent, namely from free choice. In the first way, no deformity of sin will accompany any act: because, if the essence of that act of hating God produced by the free choice of a creature were produced by God alone, it would not be an evil and deformed act, since it would not be done badly. Hence in this sense the minor is false. — But such deformity does indeed accompany some act as it proceeds from the free choice of a creature subject to divine rules and to the rules of reason. But then the major is denied. For although that act cannot proceed from a man without deformity, because it never proceeds from him except insofar as it departs from his rule; yet the first agent can move the cause to produce the entity of the action, and not act toward the deformity; similarly he can intend one thing, another not intended; just as in one who is lame, the motive power indeed produces the motion as to what is of goodness in it, yet it does not produce the defect of the motion which is in the lameness itself, although that defect always accompanies that motion, but arises only from a defect of the instrument. — But what is adduced from II Phys. does not hold: because Aristotle speaks of what accompanies a thing absolutely according to its entity. — On this matter you have Capreolus, in II Sent., d. XXXVII.

One thing alone is well to be noted: that, although God may produce the act of hatred, and can produce that whole entity per se; if He were to produce immediately the essence of that act, He would not for that reason be said to hate Himself, or to will Himself not to be, just as a man is said to hate God through that act. Because in order that someone be said to hate another through an act of hatred, it does not suffice that the essence of that act be immediately caused by him, but it is required that it be an operation elicited immediately from his own deficient will. But that act of hatred immediately produced by God would not be an operation elicited from the deficient divine will, but would be a certain effect of the divine action supplying the place even of a secondary agent.