Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

Having excluded the opinion of those who took away proper actions from created things, St. Thomas wishes to resolve certain doubts that cause difficulty for some concerning the premises¹. For it does not seem possible to some that natural effects should be attributed both to God and to a natural agent.

1. And they argue first in this way². One action does not seem capable of proceeding from two agents. Therefore, etc.

Secondly³. The divine power suffices for producing natural effects. Therefore it is superfluous to employ natural powers. Or, if a natural power suffices, it is superfluous that the divine power should act. Therefore, etc.

Thirdly⁴. If God produces the whole natural effect, nothing of the natural effect is left for the natural agent to produce. Therefore, etc.

II. To the first, St. Thomas answers that, since in any agent one must consider the thing that acts and the power through which it acts, the power of an inferior agent depends on the power of a superior agent, insofar as the superior agent gives the inferior agent the power through which it acts; or preserves it; or applies it to acting, giving to it motion alone. Hence the action of an inferior agent is produced by it not only through its own power, but also through the power of all superior agents. And just as the lowest agent is found to be the immediate active principle, so the power of the first agent is found to be immediate for producing the effect. From which it follows that, just as it is not unfitting for one action to proceed from an agent and its power, so it is not unfitting for the same effect to be produced immediately by God and by an inferior agent, though in different ways: namely, by God by an immediacy of power; but by the inferior agent by an immediacy of the acting supposit.

2. Concerning that proposition, A superior agent gives to an inferior agent the power through which it acts, or preserves it, or applies it to acting, it should be noted, from the doctrine of St. Thomas in De Pot., q. 3, a. 7, ad 7, that a twofold force for acting is in created things while they act. One is a form having a firm and settled being in nature, through which they act as through a proper and natural power. The other is a force that is an intention alone of the divine power, having incomplete being, in the manner in which colors are in the air, and the power of an art is in an instrument: and this force belongs to things only when they are actually operating and acting as instruments of the divine power; just as also the power of an art does not remain in the instrument except when it uses it for the operation of the art. God therefore gives both powers to natural things: but the second He communicates to them only while He applies them to operation. Hence St. Thomas said that the superior agent gives to the inferior agent the power through which it acts; or preserves it, which pertains to the first power; or applies it to acting, which is effected through the second power.

III. Immediacy of power and of supposit has been spoken of in the preceding remarks⁵: therefore it is sufficient now to exclude one doubt that arises. For it seems that the power of the supreme agent is not productive of the effect as an immediate cause, as is said here. For just as the first agent operates through second agents as through instruments, so the power of the first agent uses the powers of second agents as instruments. But because the first agent operates through second agents as through instruments, it is not called an immediate agent, but a mediate one: and the lowest agent, as is said here, is the immediate active principle. Therefore, because the power of the first agent acts through the powers of the second agents as through instruments, it will not be an immediate cause of the effect, but a mediate one.

2. It is answered that a deception occurs in this objection because order is taken in the same way in powers and in acting supposits when we say that one operates through another; and immediacy is taken in the same way. But this is not so: rather, the order that is considered in supposits when we say that one supposit operates through another is an order of descent; but the order that is considered in powers is an order of ascent. For when we say that one supposit acts through another, we understand that it acts through it as through an instrument moved by it to produce something: as when we say that a carpenter makes a bench through a saw. And therefore, if many agents concur in one operation, when we say that one operates through another, there is considered there a certain descent from the supreme unmoved agent down to the lowest moved agent. But when we say that the power of one acts through the power of another, we understand that its power depends on the other's power as on an agent, or as on a superior form, insofar as it is moved by it to its operation. And thus, where many powers are subordinated so that one is said to operate through another, there is considered there a certain ascent from the moved powers to the moving powers. — From which it follows that when we say that an agent is immediate, we understand that after it there is no other acting supposit moved by it. When, however, we say that a power is immediately productive of an effect, we understand that it does not have before it another power by which it is moved, but that it is of itself productive of the effect, as is said here. Hence St. Thomas likens this immediacy of power to the immediacy of a first principle: for a first principle is also called immediate because it has power from its own terms, and its truth depends on the truth of no other proposition.

3. When, therefore, it is said that just as the first agent operates through second agents as through instruments, so the power of the first agent uses the powers of second agents as instruments: once this is admitted, the consequence can be denied. Because, as has been shown, the immediacy of an acting supposit is one thing, and the immediacy of power is another, according to the way the philosophers use them.

That assumption can also be denied. Because the notion of an instrument properly belongs to the agent itself, but not to the power of the instrument. And if a power is called an instrumental power, this is not said as if the power itself were an instrument, but because it is the power of an instrument.

If, however, we should wish to use words in another way than the philosophers use them, and call an immediately acting power that than which no inferior power moved to the production of the effect exists; then it would be no absurdity to say that just as the first agent is not immediate to the effect according to supposit, so neither is it immediate according to power. But this would be to misuse terms in philosophy.

IV. But concerning the aforesaid there is still a doubt. For St. Thomas seems to say elsewhere the opposite of what is said here. For here he says that the same effects proceed from God immediately by mediation of power, but from inferior agents immediately by mediation of supposit. Yet in I Sent., d. 37, q. 1, a. 1, ad 4, he seems to intend that God is the immediate cause of all things even by mediation of supposit. For after saying that the power of God is most immediate to all things, he adds: But because He Himself is His power, therefore He is not only an immediate principle of operation in all things, but immediately operating in all things: which does not happen in other causes. — Also in Qq. de Potentia Dei, q. 3, a. 7, at the end, after concluding that God is the cause of the operation of anything insofar as every other power acts by His power, he adds: And when we have joined to these that God is His power, and that He is within any thing as holding the thing in being, it will follow that He immediately operates in whatever operates. From these he seems to intend that God operates immediately in all things, not only by mediation of power, but also by mediation of supposit.

V. For the evidence of this doubt, it must be noted first that there is a difference between a corporeal agent and God with respect to existence in things and simultaneity with them. Because the substance of a corporeal thing is not said to be in another thing distinct from itself, properly speaking, except because it is locally contained by it: hence for one body to be in another is for it to be locally contained by the other. Similarly, one body is not said to be together with another body except either because both are in the same place, as can happen miraculously; or because they are immediately situated, such that, namely, between the site of the one and the site of the other the site of another body does not mediate. But God, according to His proper mode and that of other separated substances, is said to be in things as to His substance and essence, not by local and situal containment, but by causality. Hence for His substance to be in things is for Him to be an immediate cause, that is, to have the relation of a proximate agent to those very things. And similarly, for Him to be together with things is for Him to be the immediate cause of things.

It must be considered secondly that a corporeal agent is said to be an immediate agent absolutely in one way, and God in another. For a corporeal agent is said to be an immediate agent when between the site of its substance and the site of its effect another corporeal agent moved by it does not situally mediate. For a corporeal substance is not said to be immediate to another except because the extremity of its quantity is together with the extremity of the quantity of its effect, or of the patient upon which it acts: as is clear from what is said in IV Physics⁶. But God is absolutely said to be the immediate agent of some thing when between Him and the effect there is no other agent according to the order of causality, and not according to the order of site.

It must be known thirdly that, because a corporeal substance is not the same as the power by which it acts, it is not necessary, if its power is in some extrinsic thing, that its substance be in it: since its substance is not said to be except where it is situally located; whereas power is said to be even where something is causally reached through it. But because the divine substance is the same as its power, therefore where its power is, there also is its substance. From which it follows that, if we wish to speak properly, it does not suffice for a body to be said to act immediately upon another that its power be immediate to the patient according to causality: but it is also required that the agent itself be proximate to the patient situally and according to the acting supposit; because immediacy in bodies, properly speaking, is attended to according to the order of site. Hence, although the power of the sun, in the order of corporeal powers, is said to be immediate to those things that are generated in the bowels of the earth, insofar as proximate agents operate by its power, it is not nevertheless fittingly said that the sun is their immediate agent: since between it and those things there are many middle corporeal agents according to site. And when we say that the sun immediately generates them, that is said improperly: namely, because it is said to generate them, not because it acts, but because proximate agents generate by its power. — But for God to be called an immediate agent absolutely, it suffices that His power be immediate causally. Because immediacy in God is only according to the order of causality. And therefore, since His substance is the same as His power, where His power is, there also is His substance, and it causes immediately that which is immediately caused by His power.

It must be known fourthly that it is one thing to say absolutely that God is an agent acting immediately in all things: and another thing to say that God is an agent in all things immediately by mediation of supposit. Because for the first it suffices that He immediately reach things by His power, that is, that He is the agent, and between the power of God itself and the effect there is no superior power through which He acts: for since the agent and the power are the same in Him, it is not only said that other agents act in His power, but also that He Himself acts immediately by His power. But for the second it is required that between God and things there be no cause co-acting with Him as moved by Him, but that He operates proximately by Himself alone.

VI. To the doubt, therefore, it is said first that it is not the mind of St. Thomas, where he is cited, that God differs from other agents because they act immediately by mediation of supposit alone, while God acts immediately both by mediation of power and by mediation of supposit: for that would involve a contradiction. For if God were immediately an agent by mediation of supposit in all effects of other causes, the other causes would not act immediately by mediation of supposit: unless we were to say that between God and other causes there is no per se order in causing, according to acting supposits: the opposite of which the whole school of both philosophers and theologians holds, and it appears especially in this place from St. Thomas, and in the other cited places.

It is said secondly that his mind is that God does not merely relate to the effects of other causes in such a way that His power is immediate to the effects, and those causes are said to act immediately through His power, while He Himself is not said absolutely to act immediately by His power as happens in a first corporeal agent, as we have explained: but just as His power is immediate to all things, and is the principle by which of acting in all things, so He Himself is said to act by His power immediately as the principle which absolutely, since He is really the same as it, and where His power is according to causality, there also is God Himself in the same way. For in this God differs from other first agents that are bodies, with respect to the effect produced by the proximate cause, because a first corporeal agent is not properly called an immediate agent as which, but only its power is as by which inferior agents act, because it is not in inferior agents according to its substance in which its power is, nor is it the same as the power itself, so that the agent by which and the agent which are the same: but God, because He is the same as His power, and is where it is, not only has it that His power is that by which second agents act, but also has it that He is the agent which, in the same order in which His power is the agent by which; namely, so that He acts immediately by mediation of power, and not through the power of another agent; and so that it can be said absolutely: God operates immediately in all things.

Yet with this stands the fact that He acts mediately by mediation of supposit: while He uses natural causes as instruments not only of His power, as inferior corporeal causes are the instrument of the powers of superior bodies, but also of God Himself the agent.

VII. But concerning this response certain doubts remain. The first is: for, according to the things said, it is true, absolutely speaking, that God immediately produces each thing, because by His power He immediately reaches all things. And this seems to be granted by all. Therefore it is pointless to ask whether God is the immediate cause of all things, or the mediate cause of some and the immediate cause of others. And yet this is called into doubt by the most illustrious philosophers, and some say that God produced some things immediately, but others mediately.

The second doubt is: we are speaking either of the divine power according to itself, as it is in God, or as to its intention and likeness received in inferior agents. If in the first way, it is not true that it is in inferior agents, but it is only in God: just as God's wisdom also is in God alone according to itself. If, however, we speak in the second way, then it is false that God is that power: since power in that way is an accident in a creature.

VIII. To the first it can be answered in two ways. First, that when philosophers ask whether God is the immediate effective cause of all things, they do not ask about the immediacy of power: because they hold this as manifest and acknowledged. But they ask about the immediacy of supposit: namely, whether He produced all things into being through Himself alone, with no other agent cooperating; or rather produced some through Himself alone, but produced others with other causes cooperating. And thus the question is not pointless, but undergoes many difficulties.

Secondly, it can be answered that it is not granted by all philosophers that God acts immediately in all things according to power, in the way in which we say that the divine power is immediate to all things, because, namely, He reaches every thing through Himself, and no cause acts except insofar as the power of the first agent applies it to operation and uses it as an instrument: but some have said that God produced certain things immediately, namely, by reaching them through His power; but certain things mediately, namely, by giving to their causes the natural powers by which they operate, and preserving them in being, but not reaching them immediately by His power. And therefore it is also fittingly asked by the philosophers whether God produces all things immediately according to His power.

2. To the second doubt it is answered that a deception occurs because we imagine the divine power to be in things in the way in which a substantial or accidental form is said to be in its recipient: when nevertheless for it to be in things is not for it to inhere in things by way of a form, but to touch things by producing them into being. It is said, therefore, that we are speaking of the divine power according as it is in itself. — But when it is argued to the contrary, because thus it is not in inferior causes: this is denied. For it is said that it is in inferior causes by way of an agent acting upon them, although not by way of an inhering form. For it immediately acts a certain participation of itself in all inferior causes, and together with that participated likeness it immediately reaches their effects. For the power existing in God and its intention produced in inferior causes are taken as one power: just as the art that is in the mind of the artisan, and its intention received in the instrument, are taken for one power.

IX. To the second⁷, St. Thomas denies the consequence. For it is not superfluous, if a natural thing produces its proper effect, that God should produce it: because the natural thing does not produce it except by the divine power.

Nor is it even superfluous, if God can produce all natural effects through Himself, that they should be produced through certain other causes. Because out of the immensity of His goodness He willed to communicate His likeness to things not only as to this, that they should be, but also as to this, that they should be causes of others. — And also because through this the beauty of order appears in created things.

Note that, since something is called superfluous to an operation either because it is not necessary to the operation; or because it is not only not necessary, but also is brought in for no good, or for no usefulness: when it is said that a natural thing does not produce an effect except by the divine power, it is given to be understood that it is not superfluous for God to act toward the effect of nature, as if without Him such an effect could be produced. Rather, it is necessary for God to act toward such an effect: because, if the divine power through which the natural thing acts were removed, it could not act; just as, if the power of the art were removed, the saw could not make the bench. — But when it is said that God willed to communicate His likeness to things both as to being and as to operating: it is given to be understood that the action of created things in the production of God's effects is not superfluous in the second way. Because, although it is not necessary as if without it God could not produce the effect, nevertheless from this the divine goodness is more manifested, and greater beauty appears in created things, and thus it does not concur uselessly.

X. To the third⁸, he denies the assumption. For the whole effect is made by both agents, but according to a different mode: just as the whole effect is attributed both to the principal agent and to the instrument, namely, to the one as operating from itself, but to the other as operating in the power of the other.