Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber III

From the foregoing St. Thomas infers this corollary ¹: God is everywhere and in all things. Concerning this, however, he does two things: first, he shows the proposition; second, he excludes certain false opinions, around the end of the chapter ². I. As to the first, he argues first thus. God moves all things to their operations, as has been shown. Therefore he is in all things. — The consequence is proved. Because the mover and the thing moved must be together, as is said in VII Physics.

2. To this reason Scotus says, II Sent., d. II, q. v ³, that it either has no force, or it concludes the opposite of what he intends. For either, he says, he intends to conclude that God is present to all things, that is, is moving them. And then it is a begging of the question, and the conclusion is not to the purpose: because he intends to conclude the immensity of God, according to which he is present to all things; for the principle and the conclusion are the same. — Or he intends to conclude that presence which belongs to God inasmuch as he is immense. And thus from the operation in some place that presence follows, and it is concluded from the fact that he is in all things through operation, a posteriori. Therefore he will be naturally present inasmuch as he is immense prior to being present inasmuch as he is operating.

3. It is answered that St. Thomas intends to conclude that God is in all things, and is present to all things: that is, to have the relation of simultaneity and presence of an immediate mover to created things. And it is not a begging of the question: because a relation is concluded to belong to a subject from the foundation of the relation. For because God moves all things, it is therefore concluded that there belongs to him the relation of presence, which accompanies such motion: just as from the fact that someone has generated, it is concluded that he is or was a father. It is said secondly, that such presence according to immensity, that is, that God is present not only to one thing, but to all, is concluded from operation not a posteriori, but a priori according to reason, namely as from the reason for such presence and simultaneity. For God's operating in all things is the reason why he is in all things: but it is not from the fact that he is in all things that he operates in them.

II. Secondly. God is of infinite power. Therefore etc. — The consequence is proved. Because, since it happens in two ways that something is in a place, namely according to the contact of dimensive quantity, as a body, and according to the contact of power, as an incorporeal thing: so is an incorporeal thing related to being in something through its power, as a corporeal thing is related to being in a place through dimensive quantity. But a quantitatively infinite body would be everywhere. Therefore also an infinite incorporeal power. Therefore etc.

Thirdly ⁴. A particular cause must be simultaneously present to its proper effect. Therefore also the universal cause of all being, which is God: since each is compared to its effect in the same way. Therefore wherever being is found, the divine presence must be present. It must be observed that, since God is everywhere and in all things by way of an immediate agent, as will be explained ⁵; and the immediacy of an agent is twofold, namely according to the acting supposit, and according to the power of acting: the first reason and the second prove that God is in all things as an immediate cause by immediacy of power; but this third reason proves that he is in all things as an immediate cause by immediacy of supposit.

III. Fourthly ⁶. If God were present to only one of his effects, as for instance to the first mobile, which is moved by him immediately, it would follow that his action could not be derived to others except by means of that. But this is unfitting. Therefore etc. The consequence is proved. Because whatever agent is present to only one of its effects, its action cannot be derived to others except by means of that: just as the motive power is related to the heart. The reason is that the agent and the patient must be together. The falsity of the consequent is proved ⁷. Because it would follow that there is some creature through which whatever the divine power can do could be fulfilled. Which is clearly false: since the divine power infinitely exceeds any created thing. — The consequence is proved. Because if the action of an agent cannot be derived to others except by means of some first thing, that thing must proportionally correspond to the agent according to its whole power: otherwise the agent could not use its whole power. It is explained in the motive power of an animal. The same follows, says St. Thomas, if it is posited that God is in some things, not in all.

IV. Concerning that proposition, The first mobile is moved immediately by God, a doubt arises how, according to the doctrine of St. Thomas, it is to be understood. For some hold that he moves it so immediately that no other intelligence mediates between God and the heaven by which the heaven itself is immediately moved, but God alone is the cause moving the first mobile. But they are moved because in XII Metaphysics ⁸, he rebukes Avicenna who posits that the first mobile is moved not immediately by God, but by the first created intelligence. Others however hold that he does not move it immediately, but by means of an intelligence. I would say, always saving a better judgment, that by the name of first mobile we can understand two things: namely either the body alone of the first heaven, which is moved by another; or the aggregate of such a body and the intelligence appropriated to it, in which way the Philosopher takes the first mobile, when he posits that it is moved by itself and is divided into two parts, namely into a moving part and into a moved part ⁹. If the first mobile is taken for the aggregate of the body of the heaven and the moving intelligence appropriated to it, thus it is moved immediately by God, according to the mind of Aristotle. But if it is taken for the body of the heaven alone which is moved by another, thus it is not moved by God immediately, but by means of an intelligence.

2. I am moved to this first, because St. Thomas in XII Metaphysics, lect. 7, explaining those words of Aristotle ¹⁰, Now it moves as desirable, says that the first mover moves as desirable because the motion of the heaven is for the sake of it as for the sake of an end, caused by some proximate mover, which moves for the sake of the first unmoved mover, in order to assimilate itself to it in causing, and to explicate in act that which is in potency in the first mover. For from these words it is evident that he posits, according to the mind of Aristotle, that the first mover does not move the body of the heaven immediately, but also another proximate mover does. Secondly because, as was shown above in the Second Book ¹¹, St. Thomas holds that according to the mind of Aristotle there are two orders of intelligences, one namely of those moving effectively, the other of those moving by way of an end; and that each heaven has two really distinct movers, one moving effectively, the other as the end for the sake of which it is moved. From these things it is evident that God does not move the body of the heaven effectively without a mediating intelligence: because if he moved immediately, then there would have to be another intelligence for the sake of which he would move as for the sake of an end; which is repugnant to the things demonstrated above by him. Thirdly, because in Qu. de Verit. q. v, a. 8, he says that it is said both by the Saints and by the philosophers that all corporeal things are governed by divine providence through the mediation of angels, inasmuch, namely, as they move the higher bodies. Fourthly, because above in the First Book, chap. XIII ¹², he said that, after Aristotle showed that there is some first mover that is part of that which moves itself, he investigates further, in the Metaphysics, another entirely separate mover, who is God.

3. But that he rejects the opinion of Avicenna does not stand in the way. Because he does not principally reject it except with respect to the reason he posits. For St. Thomas does not consider it true that only one thing can proceed immediately from God, as Avicenna held. As to the conclusion, however, he agrees with him, taking the heaven precisely for the body itself. But taking the heaven and the first mobile for the aggregate, he disagrees with him. Because Avicenna in this matter did not distinguish between moving by way of an end, and moving by way of an efficient cause: therefore he absolutely denied that God immediately moves the first mobile. But St. Thomas, positing a distinction according to the mind of Aristotle among motions of this kind, said that, notwithstanding that God immediately caused the intelligence appropriated to the sphere, it is nevertheless not unfitting that he is also the immediate cause of that mobile moving itself as to motion in the genus of final cause, in that way in which it was said that the first mover moves as desirable and longed for. For other intelligences, the movers of the lower spheres, move for the sake of another created intelligence immediately: but the first created intelligence, moving the first sphere effectively, does not move for the sake of another created intelligence, but immediately for the sake of God himself. And thus the fitting order of mover to mobile is preserved: while the first mobile, moving itself immediately, is moved by the first substance who is God, namely as by a proximate end causing in the moving intelligence the appetite by which it moves the sphere; but the lower mobiles are moved properly by the lower intelligences by way of an end.

4. In this sense are to be understood all the authorities of Aristotle and the Commentator by which it is said that the first cause moves the first mobile immediately. For the first mobile is taken for that aggregate moving itself; and they are understood of that motion by which the desirable is said to cause immediately the desire of itself in the moving part of that which moves itself.

In this sense also is understood what is said here, the first mobile is moved immediately by God. And the sense is: The first mobile is moved immediately by God as by one causing in it the desire of himself, etc.

V. Concerning the proof of the falsity of the consequent ¹³, it is also doubted. Because it does not seem to follow, if God's action could not reach other things except by means of one first thing, that there would be some creature that corresponded to him according to his whole power. For there is not the same judgment concerning the power of God and concerning the power of a creature. Because a creature can use its whole power: therefore it is necessary that the first thing through which its action reaches other things be such that through it all the effects of that power can be fulfilled. But God cannot use his whole power, in such a way that it could at some time be exhausted through the production of all things producible through it. Therefore, if there is something first through which the divine action must reach other things, it is not necessary that it absolutely equal the divine power, but it suffices that it be such that through it all the effects which God has determined that he will produce can be fulfilled.

2. For the evidence of this, it must be considered that we must speak in one way of a medium of action chosen from the will and disposition of the agent: and in another way of a medium absolutely necessary for the action of the agent. For although someone can establish for himself something by which he may fulfill every effect of his that he has determined to produce, just as a craftsman can make for himself some instrument which he may use for all those works that he arranges to perform, and on that account it need not simply equal the power of the craftsman, but it suffices that it equal his disposition and purpose concerning the things to be produced through the instrument; yet when a medium is absolutely necessary for the action of the agent, according as it is absolutely of such a nature, so that the agent cannot in any way operate except through it, it is necessary that it equal the power. Because just as the action of an agent, according to its notion as it is absolutely its action considered according to its species, equals the power of the agent; so it is necessary that the medium necessary for the fulfillment of the power equal the power itself: otherwise the power of the agent could terminate without it at some effect, and consequently its action; and thus it would not be a universally necessary medium for the action of the agent. And this holds true both in God and in a creature: since this truth arises from the notions of the terms. For if it is a necessary medium for every action of the agent, it must be that without it the power cannot operate. But this is for it to equal the power in the notion of an instrument. Therefore also in God it is repugnant that something be an entirely necessary medium through which he produces his effects, and that medium not equal the divine power.

When, however, it is said that the divine power cannot be exhausted, it is conceded. Nevertheless, that necessary medium would have to be such that through it the whole divine power could be fulfilled if that power were totally exhaustible. Since this can belong to no creature, because every creature is infinitely surpassed by the divine power, it must be said that there is no absolutely necessary medium through which divine action must reach other things.

VI. Fifthly ¹⁴. In every thing there is some proximate and immediate effect of God: since in every thing there is something that is caused through creation, in corporeal things primary matter, in incorporeal things their simple essences; but it belongs to God alone to create, as was shown in the Second Book. Therefore he is present to all things: especially since those things which he produced from non-being to being, he continuously and always conserves in being. — The consequence is proved. Because it is necessary that a cause be together with its proximate and immediate effect.

Observe, from what St. Thomas says in this place, that it is necessary that a cause be together with its proximate and immediate effect, that what he says in Potentia, q. III, a. 11, ad 5, namely that it suffices that the mover and the moved be together in the beginning of motion, is not understood of a proximate and immediate mover, but of a principal and first mover.

The conclusion is confirmed by the authority of Jeremiah XXIII, and of the Psalm.

VII. Through this, moreover, is excluded the error of certain people saying that God is in some determinate part of the world, for instance in the first heaven, and in the eastern part.

Which nevertheless can be sustained if it is understood that the principle of all corporeal motions, according to the order of nature, begins from some determinate part, with God moving it: according also as Scripture, in the last chapter of Isaiah, and in the Psalm, posits that God is in heaven. The aforesaid opinion, thus explained, is Aristotle's, at the end of VIII Physics ¹⁵.

St. Thomas adds, however, that because God operates something even in the lowest things outside the order of nature, this shows that God is immediately present even to the lowest things.

VIII. As to the second ¹⁶, St. Thomas excludes certain false opinions. For someone could think that God is everywhere in such a way as to be divided into parts through the spaces of places. — But this, he says, is not true, but he is whole everywhere: since he is entirely simple.

Someone could also think that he was simple like a point. — But neither is this true, he says: but he is indivisible as existing entirely outside the genus of the continuous. Therefore he is not determined to a place, large or small, from the necessity of his essence, as if it were necessary for him to be in some place: but, since he is the universal cause of being, he reaches all things that are in a place by the immensity of his power.

Someone could further believe that he is in things in such a way as to be mixed in them. — But neither is this true, he says, since he is neither the form nor the matter of any thing: but he is in things by way of an agent cause.

IX. Concerning the existence of God in place and in other things, it must be considered first, that since for an immaterial substance to be in something means nothing other than a certain conjunction and presentiality to it, just as something is said in many ways to be conjoined and present to another, so in many ways an immaterial substance is said to be in some thing. In the matter at hand, therefore, it happens in two ways that one thing is conjoined and present to another. In one way, as a cause is conjoined and present to its effect: for a cause and its proximate effect must be together, as was said above ¹⁷. In another way, as that which is located is conjoined and present to a place, inasmuch as it fills the place. Because, therefore, God is the cause of all things, and even of place itself inasmuch as it is a certain thing, therefore it is said here that God is in his works by way of an agent cause. But because he is the cause of all things that fill places, he is said in a particular way to be everywhere and in all places, inasmuch as they are places: namely as effectively filling all places. And this he signified when he said that by the immensity of his power he reaches all things that are in a place.

X. It must be considered secondly that, just as in the simultaneity and contact of bodies, or of the located thing and place, there are two things, namely the substance, which is that which is said to be together with the other, and that by which such substance is said to be together with the other, namely dimensive quantity; so in the simultaneity and contact by which God is said to be in things, there are two things, namely the divine substance, which is that which is in things; and his continued operation, which is that by which this belongs to him. On account of this it is frequently said by St. Thomas that God, and any spiritual substance, is in a place through operation: because namely the substance itself is that which is in the place, but operation is the reason for its existing in the place; just as the substance of a body is contained by a place, but dimension is the reason for its being contained by the place. And just as a corporeal substance need not be in a place prior to reaching the place by its proper dimensions, but both are together, one as the by which, the other as the which; so God, and a spiritual substance, need not be in a place prior to operating in the place, but both are together in the place, the substance as the which, but operation as the by which. For although to operate presupposes to be, yet to operate in a place does not presuppose to be in a place, in spiritual things: just as, although quantity presupposes the substance in which it is, yet that quantity is in a place, or touches a place, does not presuppose that the substance is in a place, but conversely.

XI. It must be considered thirdly ¹⁸, that in the doctrine of St. Thomas it is quite doubtful what he understands by the name of operation, when he says that an intellectual substance is in a place through operation. For Capreolus, in II, dist. ii, quest. i ¹⁹, holds that by the name of operation is understood not only a true transient operation, but any union to a heaven, or presidency, or whatever else is designated by way of a transient operation into a corporeal thing located in place. And he takes the foundation from the words of St. Thomas, Quodlibet 1, qu. iii, art. 4 ²⁰, where he says that by operation is to be understood not only motion, but any union by which by its power a substance unites itself to a body, by presiding, or containing, or in whatever other way. Others, however, say ²¹ that by the name of operation is understood one of these three: namely either a continued exterior operation; or continued attention with the interruption of exterior operation, as the angels guarding human beings continually attend so that things succeed well, although they do not by a continuous exterior operation do something there; or the habitual application of the angel to operation, because namely his power is in the ultimate disposition for work, and all impediments have been removed. Whichever of these is present, an angel is said to be in a place through operation. This opinion, moreover, takes its foundation both from what was said in that Quodlibet; and from what is said in the First Part, q. lii, a. 1, namely that an angel is in a place through the application of the angelic power to some place in whatever manner.

2. But to me, saving a better judgment, it seems that none of these expositions is according to the mind of St. Thomas. For the first seems to posit that operation signifies nothing other than the relation of the substance itself to a place. But I do not see how there can be such a new relation of union to a place in a separated substance, unless there be some other new foundation to which it follows: otherwise it will have to be said that the substance of the angel is in a place through itself, because it is itself the proximate foundation of such a relation. — Nor is it valid to say that it has the power of such a substance for its foundation. For power, as an active power, has no union with another except by reason of the operation by which it touches the other either effectively or formally: for nothing applies its power to another except by acting upon it. The second interpretation, however, seems directly contrary to the mind of St. Thomas in the First Part, q. 113, a. 6, ad 3, where he says that, even though the angel at times leaves behind the man he guards locally, he nevertheless does not leave him behind as to the effect of guardianship: because even when he is in heaven, he knows what is being done concerning the man, nor does he need a delay of time for local motion, but can be immediately present. From which it is evident that for an angel to be said to be in some place, it does not suffice that he have continued attention to the place; or be proximately disposed to operate; and that all impediments be removed; but it is required that he act there by an exterior action. Whence also in II Sent., d. 11 ²², art. 4, ad 5, it is said that the angel, although not always present, can nevertheless always guard, inasmuch as his effect remains after his action.

3. On account of which it seems to me it should be said that by the name of operation ought to be understood a transient operation by which some effect is produced in the place or in the thing located, in such a way that the angel is there where he operates by such an operation. But if he acts upon no place by any such operation, he is in no way said to be there. Whence if he operates nowhere in this manner, he is nowhere. — Nor is it necessary to be anxious as to what operation he acts upon the empyrean heaven, or upon any other place in which he is said to be. For just as the angelic nature is not fully known to us, nor the nature of the empyrean heaven, so neither are all the operations known to us by which something can be operated in the empyrean heaven and in bodies. Moreover, this interpretation seems to be according to the mind of St. Thomas in I Sent., d. 37, q. 3, a. 1. For, accepting that opinion which says that an angel is in a place through operation, he says: I say that an angel, and any incorporeal substance, cannot be in a body or in a place except through an operation by which he causes some effect in it, by presiding or by ministering. And explaining this effect, he adds that this is by conferring on the located body, not indeed to be, but something superadded to being, namely either motion, or light, or something of this sort. Behold that by the name of operation he understands a transient operation by which some effect is caused in the thing.

4. To that, however, which St. Thomas says in the Quodlibet ²³, it is answered that he does not say this as if he meant that by the name of operation and virtual contact something other than true transient action is to be understood: but in order to give to understand that by the name of operation not only local motion is to be understood, but every operation transient into a body, whatever it may be. For both a substance presiding over a body, and containing it by its power, can effect something in it. Similarly, every union by which an angel unites himself by his power to a body is according to some transient operation, although it need not be local motion. — In the same way must be understood what is said in the First Part, that the angel is in a place through the application of his power in whatever way ²⁴.

XII. But concerning the aforesaid a twofold doubt occurs. The first is: For according to the doctrine of St. Thomas, an angel cannot transmute bodies to form, but only to local motion ²⁵. Therefore he cannot have an operation concerning a body other than to move locally. If therefore he does not move locally, he cannot be said to be in a body or in a place through a transient operation. The opposite of which has been said. The second is ²⁶, because demons and damned souls are in hell; and blessed souls are in heaven. But it does not appear what operation they have there.

2. To the first it is answered first, that the saying of St. Thomas is understood of transmutation to an entirely material form, not however of transmutation to a form in some way spiritual: for this the angel can produce. Whence St. Thomas in the place cited above ²⁷ says that an angel is in a place inasmuch as he operates concerning some located body either motion, or light, or another thing of this sort. It is answered secondly that, although an angel cannot by his own power formally transmute a body, he can nevertheless do this by divine power: as is according to the mind of St. Thomas in De Daemonibus, art. 9, ad 3 and 12 ²⁸.

3. But this answer does not seem to be according to the mind of St. Thomas. For he everywhere holds that angels cannot imprint any imagined species into the imagination, from the fact that they cannot transmute bodies according to form ²⁹. But it is clear that such forms have spiritual being: since they are intentions of sensible things. Therefore the answer is null. It is answered that, when it is said that an angel can cause some form having spiritual being, it is understood that that being is the natural being of such a form, not however that it is intentional being in the soul. For intentional being of a form in the soul has to be caused by the form itself having natural being, as its likeness.

4. To the second doubt it can be answered in two ways. First, that an angel by his own power has to be in a place through his transient action: but by the power of a superior he can also be in a place through passion from another. And thus he is said to be in the fire of hell: because that fire by divine power holds him bound lest he be able to be and operate elsewhere. And the same is to be said of souls.

But because St. Thomas in IV Sent., dist. 44 ³⁰, seems to mean that such detention and binding presupposes his existence in the fire as in a place, therefore it can be answered secondly that they act something upon the fire, either namely motion, or something else hidden from us, and they cannot operate upon another body.

Similarly of the souls which are posited to be in heaven, it must be said that they operate something there, whatever that may be.

XIII. It is to be considered fourthly ³¹ that, because an angel is in a place not situally and defensively, in the manner of a body, but only as a mover in the moved and an operator in the operated; we must understand the angel to be in a place according to the mode in which a moving substance, essentially distinct from the moved, is in it, and an operator in the operated. But a mover is not in the moved by reason of anything that is in the mover, but by reason of the transient action into the patient, uniting and in a certain way binding together mover and moved. Therefore also the angel's being in a place, in the mode fitting to him per se, does not require that that by reason of which he is said to be in a place be in the angel himself, but it is required that it be in the moved and the patient. The opposite of which belongs to a body. For because it is in a place situally and defensively as commensurate with the place, it must be in a place through its own quantity, but not through quantity existing in another body: for nothing is primarily made commensurate with anything by reason of an extrinsic quantity, but by reason of its own and intrinsically proper quantity. What is said, therefore, that God is in all things as an agent cause, is understood to mean that He is not in things situally and locally after the manner of a quantified thing, but as an operator is in that which he operates, so that to act and operate in things is the reason for His presentiality to things. Which also St. Thomas sometimes calls being in a place through contact of power ³².

XIV. But concerning the aforesaid a twofold doubt occurs, touched upon by the divine Thomas in the First Part, q. 52 ³³, and I Sent., d. 37 ³⁴. The first is, whether, just as God is simultaneously in many places, so an angel at least can be simultaneously in many places. For a doubt arises in this matter, setting aside those things which are said by others, because, since the angel's being in a place is nothing other than his being present to the place through extrinsic operation, as is clear from the above ³⁵; that one angel is simultaneously in many places will happen if he operates in many places simultaneously. But this does not seem impossible for an angel. Therefore it seems that he can be simultaneously in many places. Which is contrary to the determination of St. Thomas in the places cited above. — The minor is proved. An angel is not of less power than a celestial body. But a celestial body operates simultaneously in many lower places, and by diverse operations: which is clear, because in diverse places it produces diverse effects. Therefore much more can an angel do this.

The second is ³⁶, whether in one and the same place there can be many angels simultaneously. And it seems that yes. Because one man seems to be possessed by many demons ³⁷: for it is said of that possessed man who is recounted to have been cured by the Lord, that in him was a legion of demons ³⁸. But this is contrary to the determination of St. Thomas in the place cited above.

XV. For the evidence of the first doubt, it must be considered, from the doctrine of St. Thomas in the places adduced, that it is not unsuitable that places which considered particularly and divisively are many, taken together in comparison to one power are related as constituting one total place: just as many houses and many streets constitute one city. It is said therefore, according to the mind of St. Thomas, that one angel cannot be simultaneously in many places as they are many, that is, inasmuch as they are taken as two totally distinct places, because from one finite power there cannot proceed except one operation simultaneously, and consequently except one effect: but he can well be in many places by mode of one place, namely as they constitute one total place; just as an angel can destroy all the places of one city simultaneously, inasmuch as the whole city corresponds to the angel's operation as one and adequate and total place. For an angel can be in a large place, and in a small place, and simultaneously in many places, provided that they can in some way be taken as integrating one place.

2. To the argument to the contrary, it is denied that heaven through a single power can immediately operate in many places. It can indeed through many powers existing in many parts of heaven, say in many stars, produce many operations, and operate in many places as they are many: but through a single power it cannot do this.

When however it is proved because in diverse places it produces diverse effects: — it is said that it does not produce those effects immediately, but by means of one effect which it produces immediately in many places as they constitute one place; say, by means of light or heat, or something of this sort. For the first and immediate effect of one celestial power in diverse subjects receives diverse limitation, so that thence diverse effects can proceed: just as the power of a universal cause receives limitation in a particular cause. But an angel is not said to be in the mode in which he is in a place, except where he immediately operates. Therefore, although in many places he can operate mediately, just as heaven also can, he is not nevertheless on account of this said to be simultaneously in many places.

XVI. For the evidence of the second doubt ³⁹, it must be considered first, that for many angels to be simultaneously in one place can be understood in two ways: in one way, formally; in another way, materially. For since an angel is not in a place except through the operation by which he produces something in the place, the material place of the angel is that thing which is a place, or in a place, considered absolutely and according to itself: but the formal place is the very thing which is a place, as it has the effect of the angelic operation in itself. Therefore for many angels to be simultaneously in one place materially taken, is for them to operate simultaneously in one located thing, or in one thing which is a place, taken absolutely. But for them to be simultaneously in one place formally taken, is to produce one and the same effect in number in one material place.

It is to be considered secondly, that for many angels to produce one and the same effect simultaneously can be understood in two ways: in one way, that each of them is a per se sufficient, total, and immediate cause; in another way, that each of them is related as an insufficient and partial cause, just as many pulling a ship are related to one pull of the ship.

2. It is said therefore first, that for many angels to be simultaneously in one material place is not impossible. For there is no reason why many angels cannot operate upon one and the same thing, by producing diverse effects through diverse operations: because neither is this repugnant to other causes. For it was shown above ⁴⁰ that an angel is in a place not only through local motion, but also through other effects.

It is said secondly, that for many to be simultaneously in one place formally as partial immediate causes of the same effect in number, is not indeed impossible, since this also can belong to other causes: it seems nevertheless unfitting, especially concerning angels who operate in a place by divine ordination. For, since one suffices to produce the effect to which he is sent through himself alone, either by his own power or by divine power, it seems superfluous that two concur to one effect as partial and insufficient causes.

It is said thirdly, that for many angels to be simultaneously, totally, and adequately in many places; that is, that they simultaneously produce one and the same effect in number in the same place as immediate and total causes of it, is simpliciter impossible, according to the divine Thomas and according to Aristotle. For that this is the mind of St. Thomas is clear in the First Part, in the place cited ⁴¹, and in I Sent. ⁴², where he expressly posits that it is impossible for two complete causes to be immediately of one and the same thing. The same he also expressly holds in V Metaphysics, the chapter on Cause ⁴³. — And that it is also according to the mind of Aristotle is clear in II Physics, text 30 ⁴⁴, and V Metaphysics, the chapter on Cause ⁴⁵, where, after he said that of the same thing it happens that there are many causes, as of a statue the statuary art and the bronze, he adds: but not in the same way, but this indeed as matter, while that as whence the motion. — The same holds the Commentator on II Physics, and V Metaphysics, expounding those words, but not in the same way. — This is also according to the mind of Themistius and Albert in the same places.

Moreover, the reason for this is, both because, if one effect in number were to proceed from many total causes of the same genus and of the same order, a per se and determinate effect would not have a determinate cause. For if it proceeds from one cause, and can also proceed from another simultaneously, it follows that the first is not its per se and determinate cause: for a cause without which some effect can be, is not the per se and determinate cause of that effect. — Nor is it valid to say that it depends on both as they are one. Because for those causes to be one in causing, if each is a per se sufficient and total cause, does not remove that the effect can be without whichever of them taken per se. And consequently it remains that none of them is its per se and determinate cause.

XVII. But against this determination a twofold doubt occurs. The first is absolutely against that proof, One effect cannot be from many immediate total causes of the same genus. For let us imagine two luminous bodies of the same nature and power, equally proximate to some first medium illuminable perfectly according to its whole self, that is in the highest degree, by either of them, — or even, that all cavil may be removed, by the power of God the luminous bodies themselves are placed in the same place: it is asked whether such a medium will be illuminated by one of those bodies only, or by both? Not by one only: because there appears no reason why it ought to be illuminated by one rather than by the other. Therefore by both. But each of them is a sufficient and total cause of that effect. Therefore etc.

The second doubt is against the principal proposition. Let us posit that one angel wills in one instant to produce some effect; and another angel wills to produce the same effect in the same instant; and let each of them be sufficient for the production of such an effect taken per se; and let one of them be ignorant of the thought of the other concerning the production: — then it is argued thus. Each of them in that and the same instant will apply his power and his volition to that effect. Therefore each of them will produce it. And each is a sufficient and total cause of such an effect. Therefore many angels will simultaneously be in the same formal place totally. The opposite of which has been said.

2. To the first of these it is said that either by none of those bodies will such a medium be illuminated: or both will concur to that effect as a partial cause, in such a way namely that neither will act according to its whole power, but according to a part of its power. For since each of them is inclined to the production of that effect per se, one will be repugnant to the other, as impediment to its causality. And therefore it will be necessary either that neither of them act, one entirely preventing the other: or that neither use its power totally, but both concur to that effect as partial causes.

3. To the second it is said first, if we speak of the blessed angels, that none of them operates concerning corporeal things except from divine ordination: as St. Thomas seems to mean in I Sent., d. 37 ⁴⁶. And therefore the case is not possible, unless we were to suppose God commanding what is impossible.

It is said secondly, if we speak of two bad angels, or even of two good ones with the power of nature alone considered in them, that either neither of them would operate, one hindering the other: or they would concur partially to that effect, as was said concerning luminous bodies. For although the thought of one angel is not manifest to another as long as it remains in himself alone, when first nevertheless it is applied to something extrinsic, it can be known. And therefore they would mutually hinder each other: just as two men sometimes hinder each other from the production of some effect, one resisting the other.

XVIII. But there still remains a doubt. For, since an angel can produce some effect in an instant, let each of these angels apply his power to the patient in one and the same instant: — if one hinders the other, it is asked when does he hinder? For he hinders either before the instant of the application of power; or in that instant; or in the time or instant following. Not before the instant of the application of power: because then the thought of the other is not known to the one angel. Not in the instant itself: because in it he produces by applying power, since he produces in an instant, but in such things to be produced and to have been produced are simultaneous; but it cannot be hindered that the effect be produced when it has already been produced. Nor also in the following instant or time: since it would have already been produced in the preceding instant. Therefore in no way will one hinder the other.

2. It is answered that one will hinder the other in the instant of the application of power: not indeed of an application existing in execution in that instant; but which would be unless it were hindered. For one hinders the other lest the power be applied to the patient through actual production of the effect, in that instant in which he commands the effect: for in the instant of such command the effect would proceed unless it were hindered.

When it is argued, because in that instant the effect is produced through the application of power: — it is denied. For there is no instant in which there is then an actual application of power by acting, but there is only an instant in which there would be such an application unless it were hindered.

XIX. But there still remains a doubt. For, since an angel acts through will, from his power there proceeds nothing except what he himself wills to happen. But in that instant neither of them wills to hinder the other: since one does not think about the other when he commands the effect, but only wills to produce the effect. Therefore in no way does one of them hinder the other in the instant in which the production of the effect is commanded.

2. It is said first that, although from the power of an angel there does not proceed per se except what he himself wills to happen, nevertheless through something else it can happen per accidens, while his will is resisted lest the intended effect happen.

It is said secondly that one angel in such a case is said to impede another, not on the part of the angel himself, namely by weakening and diminishing his power; but only on the part of the patient, namely by rendering him indisposed to receiving the effect from him. Which is to impede formally, but not actively: according to what St. Thomas says in IV Sent., d. xvii, q. 1, art. 5, quª 1, ad 2. For from the ultimate disposition and presence of one angel able to produce some effect totally in the patient, the patient is rendered indisposed and incapable of receiving that effect from another angel as from a total cause. And therefore, if each angel is ultimately disposed to produce that effect for one and the same instant, each of them will formally indispose the patient to receiving the same effect from the other. And thus it will be produced by neither.

XX. To the principal argument of this doubt ⁴⁷, it is said that, since an angel can through his operation be in a large and small place, and also in an indivisible place, according to the teaching of St. Thomas ⁴⁸; when many demons are in one body, they are not said to be many in one proper place, but in many proper places, in that one operates in one part of the body and another in another, tormenting the man or doing something else.

XXI. Against the principal foundation of the conclusion, namely that God is therefore in all things because He gives being to all things and conserves them ⁴⁹, it is argued from the sayings of Scotus in I Sent., dist. xxxvii ⁵⁰. First. It belongs to God alone to act where He is not: because He generates ore in the bowels of the earth, or some mixed body, and He is not there. And He does this by His substantial form: because a non-substance cannot generate a substance. Therefore from the operation of God in things it cannot be argued that He is in things.

Second. That a created agent cannot act upon something distant unless it first acts upon something near, this is not except either because there concur in the agent itself two subordinate active powers, one of which has the near thing as its proportioned patient, while the other has the remaining distant thing as proportioned patient; or because of a defect of the agent’s power, whence it comes about that it first produces a more imperfect form than a more perfect one. But none of these conditions is found in God, since He is omnipotent. Therefore He can act upon what is distant.

Third. The will can equally will what is distant as what is near. But God, being omnipotent, causes by His willing whatever He wills. Therefore He can also cause something distant.

Fourth. It is not necessary to understand God beforehand as being in some part of the universe in order that He cause something there, but rather the converse, that He is there first according to power where He first causes something. Therefore, although per impossibile He would not be there present according to essence, He could nevertheless cause there. — The antecedent is proved. Because before the creation of the world, the presence of immensity was not pre-required for the presence of power as power: rather, power first had its term before there was presence according to essence.

XXII. For the evidence of these things, it must be considered that it is universally indeed true that between agent and patient there must be some contact of power: for it is not intelligible that one acts upon another and that it does not touch it by its power. But the agent’s touching the patient by its power is the agent’s operating upon the patient itself. But because it happens that an agent operates upon one thing immediately, as the hand moves the staff; and operates upon something through another, as the hand through the staff moves the stone: therefore it happens that an agent touches something immediately by its power, and something else mediately, namely through something conveying its power to the patient. Just as in quantitative contact one cannot touch another immediately unless its substance is immediate to it, so it is impossible that one touches another immediately by its power, no medium conveying its power intervening, unless its substance is immediate to it. But just as quantitative contact is one thing and contact of power another, so the immediacy of substance according to quantitative contact is one thing, and another according to contact of power. For according to quantitative contact immediacy is considered according to situation, namely so that between two situated substances no other situated substance mediates. But according to contact of power immediacy is considered not of situation, since sometimes the agent is not subject to place; for instance a spiritual agent; but of the actuation of the patient by the agent, namely so that between agent and patient no other agent mediates by which the patient itself is actuated; and this is called immediacy of causality. Just as the immediacy or simultaneity of quantities is the reason of the situational immediacy of the substances which underlie those quantities, and from their immediacy the situational immediacy of substances is argued; so the immediacy of the agent’s action upon the patient and of the patient’s reception from the agent is the reason of the immediacy of agent and patient according to causality, and from their immediacy the immediacy of agent and patient is argued. But if the agent is spiritual, and consequently not determined to a place, it can be said not only that the agent is immediate to the patient, but also that it is in it, namely as immediately actuating it after the manner of an efficient cause, and existing there where the patient itself is, as is said in I Sent., d. xxxvii ⁵¹, art. 1.

It must nevertheless be noted that the spiritual substance’s being there where that is into which it acts, or being in the same place where that is, can be understood in two ways. In one way, that it be informed by the place and commensurated to it, like the body into which it acts. And this is not true: because only things having quantity are commensurated to a place and location. — In the other way, by indistinction; because namely it is not distinct and separate from the place and location of that body; and also by causality, and by the presence of causality; I mean actual causality, and not merely potential. And in this way it is understood to be where the body is into which it acts.

From these things it is clear that it is impossible that something acts immediately upon some patient unless it is immediate and simultaneous with it by the immediacy of causality, and by the indistance of place. For if it were distant from it by the distance of causality, it would already not be an immediate agent: because between it and the patient another agent would mediate.

2. Of this simultaneity, therefore, which is namely according to contact of power and according to immediacy of causality, St. Thomas speaks when he says that God is in all things: not however of situational simultaneity, since it does not belong to an immaterial substance to be situated, properly speaking, because it lacks quantity. But this simultaneity, or the existence of God in things, formally imports nothing else than the relation of the presence of God to created things, accompanying the operation which operates immediately in them: just as the presentiality and situational immediacy of two substances imports the relation of the presence of the one to the other, accompanying the immediacy of places and quantities. And it is similar concerning the existence of any separated substance in a place: for it is not in every place which it touches by its power, but in that one into which it operates immediately. Scotus, however, insists against St. Thomas as if he posited God to be contained in some place, and unable to act except upon that which is near to Him according to place. Which is far alien from His mind, as has appeared.

3. Whether, however, one body can act immediately upon something distant from it according to place: — it is said that it cannot, according to the mind of Aristotle, in VII Physicorum ⁵². And the reason of this is that, just as the power of a body, as such, is a material power received in quantity, and cannot be exercised without a body; so the contact of power between bodies cannot be without quantitative and material contact. For just as power relates itself to quantity, so the contact of that power seems to relate itself to contact according to quantity.

XXIII. These things being premised, it is easy to respond to the arguments of Scotus ⁵³.

To the first, indeed, the antecedent is denied. For it is false, as has appeared: whether it be understood of immediacy according to situation, or of immediacy according to causality. — To the proof it is said that those things which are generated in the bowels of the earth by the power of the sun are not generated immediately by the sun, but mediately: in that the sun first acts upon the bodies near to itself, and by those mediating the power of the sun is conveyed to the bowels of the earth. — But when it is said that a non-substance cannot generate a substance: this is indeed true as regards a principal agent, but that it does this as an instrument of a substance is not unfitting; for natural heat in animals generates flesh instrumentally, in that namely it is the instrument of the soul.

To the second, the major is denied. For that can come about from something else. For if we speak of the simultaneity and distance according to causality, of which we speak in the present matter, that comes about from the very notion of an immediate agent. For if an agent acted upon what is distant according to causality, it would already not be an immediate agent, as has appeared. — But if we speak of the simultaneity and distance according to situation, this comes about from the condition of a corporeal power. Because, as we have said, it is a material power received in quantity, it belongs to it to touch no body immediately unless they touch one another quantitatively.

To the third it is said first that the divine will cannot will something distant from God: because from Him nothing is distant either according to local place, since He is not situated; or according to the distance of causality, in the manner set forth above, since there is nothing in the nature of things which is not immediately reached by the divine action. Whence in the Prima Parte, q. viii, a. 1, ad 3, St. Thomas says that it pertains to the greatest power of God that He acts immediately in all things, and therefore nothing is distant from Him.

To the fourth, the consequence is denied. For although it is necessary to understand God beforehand as operating in something, as far as our manner of understanding, before He is present according to essence, in that to operate is the reason that God is in some thing; they are nevertheless not separable in reality, but the one necessarily accompanies the other. For not everything prior can be without the posterior: especially when it is a natural sequel to the other, and the one is the reason of the other. Just as, because the simultaneity and contact of quantity of a corporeal substance is the reason of the simultaneity of the substance, if the contact of quantity were removed, the situational simultaneity of the corporeal substance would be removed; and, although the simultaneity of quantity is prior according to intellect to the simultaneity of the corporeal substance, yet, given the contact and simultaneity of quantities, it is necessary to posit the simultaneity of the substances which underlie those quantities; so in the present matter, since the reason of the relation of the presence of God to the creature is His operation in the creature, the divine operation cannot be separated from such presentiality of essence.

Scotus makes other arguments in the Second Book, d. ii, q. vi, to prove that an angel is not in a place by operation: but those have been most fully solved by Capreolus ⁵⁴ and other Thomists. Therefore I judged those to be passed over: especially because from what has been said their solution can easily be had.